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Edexcel A-level Religious Studies (9RS0) · Religion and Ethics: Ethical Language
Mini-Lesson

Ethical Language

Meta-ethics asks what we are doing when we call something "good" or "wrong." Are we stating facts, reporting intuitions, or just voicing feelings?

This lesson covers three meta-ethical theories: naturalism, intuitionism and emotivism, and the key distinction between cognitivism and non-cognitivism. Answer the questions and collect ⭐.

The question

Cognitive or non-cognitive?

  • Cognitivists think moral statements express beliefs that can be true or false.
  • Non-cognitivists think they do something else — express feelings or issue commands — so they are not true or false.
Naturalism

Ethical naturalism

Ethical naturalism is cognitivist: moral facts are natural facts that can, in principle, be observed or verified. For example, a utilitarian might say "good" simply means "productive of the greatest happiness." Moral disputes are then factual disputes.

Check

Naturalism

1Ethical naturalism claims that moral statements:
Intuitionism

Intuitionism: G. E. Moore

G. E. Moore (Principia Ethica, 1903) attacked naturalism with the naturalistic fallacy: you cannot define "good" in terms of any natural property. His open-question argument: for any definition (e.g. "good = pleasant") we can still sensibly ask "but is the pleasant good?" — so they are not identical.

For Moore, "good" is a simple, indefinable, non-natural property known by intuition. W. D. Ross added prima facie duties.

Check

The naturalistic fallacy

2Moore’s "naturalistic fallacy" is the mistake of:
Emotivism

Emotivism: Ayer and Stevenson

Emotivism is non-cognitivist. A. J. Ayer (Language, Truth and Logic, 1936) argued moral statements are not verifiable, so they merely express emotion — the "boo/hurrah" theory. C. L. Stevenson (Ethics and Language, 1944) added that moral talk expresses attitudes and aims to influence others.

Check

Emotivism

3On emotivism, saying "stealing is wrong" is essentially:
Evaluation

Prescriptivism and evaluation

R. M. Hare’s prescriptivism (The Language of Morals, 1952) says moral statements prescribe (universalisable recommendations). Critics of non-cognitivism warn it can make moral disagreement look like mere clashes of feeling, undermining moral reasoning; defenders reply it captures the action-guiding force of morality.

Sort it

Which meta-ethical theory?

Sort each idea into the theory it belongs to.

🔬 Naturalism

🧠 Intuitionism

📣 Emotivism

Match

Thinker to idea

Match each thinker to their key idea.

Statement
Answer
Recap

The big ideas to know

Cognitive vs not: Do moral statements state facts (true/false) or express something else?

Naturalism: Cognitivist: good = a natural, verifiable fact

Intuitionism: Moore: naturalistic fallacy; good is simple, non-natural, known by intuition

Emotivism: Ayer/Stevenson: moral talk expresses feelings and attitudes

Decide whether ethics is fact-stating or attitude-expressing — it changes everything. Press Finish.

🏆

Mini-lesson complete!

⭐⭐⭐

You've worked through Ethical Language. 🎉

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Next: test yourself in the Evaluate stage, then lock it in with Verify.

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