🚀 Unit 6: Efficient and Inefficient Outcomes; Externalities (Part 1)
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AP Microeconomics · Unit 6: Market Failure and the Role of Government · 6.1 Socially Efficient and Inefficient Market Outcomes; 6.2 Externalities (part 1 of 2)
Mini-Lesson
AP® Microeconomics Unit 6: Socially Efficient and Inefficient Market Outcomes; Externalities (Part 1)
5 missions. Guess, learn, then check. Your place is saved.
Aligned to AP Microeconomics, Unit 6: Market Failure and the Role of Government · 6.1 Socially Efficient and Inefficient Market Outcomes; 6.2 Externalities; also 6.3 Public and Private Goods
Short, curiosity-driven missions (about 20 minutes each) that teachers can assign. Use them alongside AP Classroom practice.
Mission 1Why can a used car that runs perfectly be hard to sell for what it is worth?
Mission 2Why does a factory that pays all its own bills still produce too much?
Mission 3When a product harms people nearby who never bought it, why does the market sell too much?
Mission 4If a vaccine also protects the people around you, why might too few people get one?
Mission 5How can a government put a price on cleaner air before deciding whether to build a road?
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Mission 1
Mission 1: Why can a used car that runs perfectly be hard to sell for what it is worth?
Make a guess: Why can a used car that runs perfectly be hard to sell for what it is worth?
Mission 1
What markets need to know
Markets allocate resources well when buyers and sellers know the prices, the quality and the consequences of what they trade.
Imperfect information: people lack some of this knowledge, so they make choices they would not make if fully informed.
Information failure: missing or uneven information leads to a misallocation of resources: a market failure.
Mission 1
Asymmetric information
Asymmetric information: one party to a deal knows more than the other.
The seller knows more:
a used car's history
whether a repair was needed
the risks of a financial product
The buyer knows more:
an insurance customer knows their own health or driving
a borrower knows how likely they are to repay
The better-informed side can gain at the other's expense, so the other side trades less, or not at all.
Asymmetric information is a source of inefficiency: the quantity traded differs from the efficient quantity, creating deadweight loss.
Say: "asymmetric information" — not: "imperfect information", when one side knows more than the other.
Quick check
?Which situation is an example of asymmetric information?
Mission 1
Hidden quality: the used-car problem
Step 1 of 3
Used cars are either good or poor ("lemons"). The seller knows which. The buyer cannot tell.
So buyers will pay only what an average car is worth to them.
Owners of good cars get less than their car is worth, so many keep them.
Fewer good cars on sale → the average falls → buyers offer even less.
The market can shrink until mostly poor cars are traded. Good cars that both sides would gladly trade are not sold.
Idea from George Akerlof, "The Market for Lemons" (1970).
Mission 1
Worked example: what will a buyer pay?
Illustrative data.
Worth to a buyer
Lowest price its owner accepts
Good car
10,000
8,000
Poor car
4,000
3,000
Half the cars are good, half are poor. A buyer cannot tell which is which.
Expected value to a buyer = 0.5 × 10,000 + 0.5 × 4,000 = 7,000.
So buyers offer at most 7,000.
Good-car owners want at least 8,000. 7,000 < 8,000 → they withdraw.
Now only poor cars are left, so buyers will pay at most 4,000.
Every good car is worth more to a buyer (10,000) than to its owner (8,000), yet none is sold.
Mission 1Graph lab
When do good cars disappear?
Same illustrative cars as the previous screen.
Takeaway: good cars sell only when at least two-thirds of cars on offer are good; below that, the market shrinks to poor cars.
Mission 1
Government responses
Provide information: make it public, free and easy to use.
Food hygiene ratings: in England, Wales and Northern Ireland, restaurants are inspected and rated from 0 to 5.
Nutrition labels; health campaigns on smoking.
Legislation and regulation: minimum standards, compulsory disclosure, consumer rights (e.g. a refund for faulty goods), bans on misleading adverts.
In the US, packaged food must carry a Nutrition Facts label.
Private fixes also exist: warranties, independent inspections, online reviews.
Limits: information costs money to collect; people may ignore it; government may not know better than the market (government failure).
Quick check
?Under a Federal Trade Commission rule, US car dealers must post a Buyers Guide on each used car they sell. It states whether the car comes with a warranty or is sold "as is". Which problem is this rule designed to reduce?
Mission check
?Online, buyers of second-hand laptops cannot check whether a laptop's battery is healthy. Sellers know. Nothing else changes. Which outcome is most likely?
When only sellers know quality, the best products are the first to leave the market.
Mission 2
Mission 2: Why does a factory that pays all its own bills still produce too much?
Make a guess: Why does a factory that pays all its own bills still produce too much?
Mission 2
The cost nobody pays for
A firm pays for labor, materials, energy: its private costs.
Its production may also harm third parties, who are outside the trade: polluted air and rivers, noise, carbon emissions.
That harm is an external cost. Nobody pays the firm's victims through the market.
Social cost = private cost + external cost.
At the margin: MSC = MPC + MEC (marginal external cost).
A negative production externality = an external cost created by producing a good.
Examples: a chemical plant's waste in a river harms fishing downstream; an airport's noise lowers the value of nearby homes; a coal power station's emissions harm health.
Mission 2
Worked example: adding up social cost
Illustrative data: a paper mill dumps waste in a river. Per metric ton of paper:
Marginal external cost (lost fishing, water cleaning downstream) = 80.
MSC = MPC + MEC = 300 + 80 = 380.
Buyers value the last metric ton at 360 (MPB). No external benefit, so MSB = 360.
The mill makes the metric ton: to it, 360 > 300. To society: 360 − 380 = −20. Society loses 20 on that metric ton.
If all 1,000 metric tons cost the same: private cost 300,000; external cost 80,000; social cost 380,000.
Quick check
?Illustrative data: a cement works has a marginal private cost of 45 per metric ton. Its dust causes a marginal external cost of 15 per metric ton to nearby residents. What is the marginal social cost of a metric ton of cement?
Mission 2
The diagram
Step 1 of 3
Step 1: the market. Supply = MPC; demand = MPB = MSB (no external benefit). Market equilibrium at Qm, Pm.
Step 2: add the external cost. MSC lies above MPC; the vertical gap = MEC.
Step 3: the social optimum is where MSB = MSC: Q* (less), P* (higher).
Firms respond to private costs only, so the market produces Qm > Q*: overproduction.
The price Pm is too low: it does not include the external cost.
Agents respond to private, not external, costs: the external cost is not internalized.
Mission 2
The welfare loss
For each unit from Q* to Qm: MSC > MSB. It costs society more than it is worth.
Adding up these losses gives a triangle:
corners: the social optimum (MSB = MSC); MSC at Qm; MSB at Qm.
The triangle points toward the social optimum.
Called the deadweight loss.
Say: "welfare loss = the triangle between MSC and MSB, from Q* to Qm" — not: "the whole area between MSC and MPC". That bigger area is the external cost of all output, most of which is still worth bearing.
Mission 2Graph lab
Turn up the pollution
Illustrative data: MPB = MSB = 100 − Q; MPC = 20 + Q. The marginal external cost (MEC) is the same for every unit.
Takeaway: a bigger MEC does not change what the market produces; it lowers the social optimum and widens the welfare loss.
Mission 2
Worked example: calculating the welfare loss
Illustrative data: MPB = MSB = 100 − Q; MPC = 20 + Q; MEC = 20 per unit, so MSC = 40 + Q.
Market: 100 − Q = 20 + Q, so Qm = 40, Pm = 60.
Social optimum: 100 − Q = 40 + Q, so Q* = 30, P* = 70.
Compare: total external cost at Qm = 20 × 40 = 800. The welfare loss is only 100: most of the external cost (20 × 30 = 600) falls on units that are still worth producing.
Quick check
?A negative production externality diagram has MPB = MSB, MPC and MSC. The points are:
Point
Where it is
W
where MSC meets MSB (above Q*)
X
on MSC directly above Qm
Y
where MPC meets MPB (at Qm)
Z
on MPC directly below W (at Q*)
Which area shows the welfare loss?
Quick check
?Illustrative data: MPB = MSB = 90 − Q; MPC = 10 + Q; MEC = 16 per unit at every output. What is the welfare loss at the market equilibrium?
Mission 2
Putting a number on the external cost
Carbon dioxide is a global external cost: emissions anywhere add to climate damage everywhere.
The social cost of carbon estimates the damage from one more metric ton of CO₂, in today's money.
Two US government estimates for emissions in 2020: $51 per metric ton (2021) and $190 per metric ton (2023).
The gap comes mostly from assumptions, above all how much weight to give damage to people in the future.
So the MEC used for policy depends on value judgments, not only on science.
Mission check
?Illustrative data: a fertilizer plant's runoff harms a lake. The table shows marginal values at each output (thousand metric tons).
Output
MPB = MSB
MPC
MEC
10
90
30
10
20
80
40
15
30
70
50
20
40
60
60
25
50
50
70
30
What is the socially optimal output?
The social optimum still has some pollution. It is where the value of the last unit equals its full cost, including the harm to others.
Mission 3
Mission 3: When a product harms people nearby who never bought it, why does the market sell too much?
Make a guess: When a product harms people nearby who never bought it, why does the market sell too much?
Mission 3
Benefit to you, cost to others
Marginal private benefit (MPB): the benefit to the buyer of one more unit. It is the buyer's demand curve.
Some consumption harms third parties: people outside the deal.
Marginal external cost (MEC) of consumption: the harm to third parties from one more unit consumed.
Marginal social benefit (MSB) = MPB − MEC. The external cost cuts the benefit to society.
Buyers respond to private, not external, costs and benefits.
Example: second-hand smoke. Tobacco kills over 7 million people a year, including over 1.6 million non-smokers exposed to second-hand smoke (WHO).
In the US, second-hand smoke causes more than 41,000 deaths a year among nonsmoking adults (CDC).
Other cases: loud music at night, litter, driving after drinking alcohol.
Mission 3
Overconsumption on the diagram
Step 1 of 3
Step 1: no production externality, so MPC = MSC. The market settles where MPB = MPC: quantity Q1, price P1.
Step 2: MSB lies below MPB by the external cost. The social optimum is where MSB = MSC: quantity Q*.
Q1 > Q*: the market overconsumes.
Step 3: each unit from Q* to Q1 has MSC above MSB. Society loses on every one.
The shaded triangle between Q* and Q1 is the welfare loss. It points to the social optimum.
AP calls it deadweight loss (DWL). AP graphs label the socially optimal quantity Qso: it is the Q* in this text.
Say: "the welfare loss is the triangle between Q* and Q1" — not: "the whole area under MSB".
Mission 3Graph lab
Turn up the harm
Takeaway: the market ignores external costs, so a bigger external cost means a bigger gap between Q1 and Q*.
Quick check
?A product causes no external cost in production, so MPC = MSC = 10 for the 50th unit. For that unit, the buyer's MPB is 12 and the external cost of consuming it is 4 (illustrative data). From society's point of view, should the 50th unit be consumed?
Mission check
?In a city's main streets, late-night fast food leaves litter behind. Cleaning it up costs the city, and residents dislike it. The food sellers and buyers pay nothing toward this. What happens in the market for late-night fast food?
The market counts only what buyers and sellers feel. A cost that lands on third parties is left out, so too much is consumed.
Mission 4
Mission 4: If a vaccine also protects the people around you, why might too few people get one?
Make a guess: If a vaccine also protects the people around you, why might too few people get one?
Mission 4
Benefits that spill over
Marginal private benefit (MPB): the benefit to the buyer of one more unit. It is the demand curve.
Marginal external benefit (MEB): the benefit to third parties of one more unit.
Marginal social benefit (MSB) = MPB + MEB.
Buyers respond to private benefits only. The external benefit is ignored.
Example: vaccination. Each vaccinated person also lowers the chance that others catch the disease.
Measles vaccination averted an estimated 60 million deaths worldwide in 2000–2023.
Goal: 95% coverage with 2 doses. Actual global coverage in 2023: 83% for dose 1, 74% for dose 2.
Many things cause that shortfall, such as access, cost and conflict. The spillover is one reason why free choice alone may not close it.
Other cases: education, training, restoring old buildings.
Mission 4
Underconsumption on the diagram
Step 1 of 3
Step 1: MPC = MSC (no production externality). The market settles where MPB = MPC: Q1, P1.
Step 2: MSB lies above MPB by the external benefit. Social optimum Q* where MSB = MSC.
Q1 < Q*: the market underconsumes.
Step 3: units from Q1 to Q* have MSB above MSC, but are not consumed. The lost surplus is the welfare loss triangle, pointing to the social optimum.
AP calls it deadweight loss (DWL). AP graphs label the socially optimal quantity Qso: it is the Q* in this text.
Say: "underconsumption" or "underprovision" — not: "demand is too low", which makes it sound like a demand shift.
Mission 4Graph lab
Turn up the spillover
Takeaway: the market ignores external benefits, so the bigger they are, the further Q1 falls short of Q*.
Quick check
?A diagram shows a positive consumption externality with MPC = MSC.
Point
Where it is
X
MPB meets MPC = MSC, at Q1
Y
MSB meets MPC = MSC, at Q*
Z
On MSB, directly above X at Q1
Which area shows the welfare loss?
Mission 4
Positive production externalities
Some production benefits third parties. That lowers society's cost.
MSC = MPC − MEB. MSC lies below MPC.
Example: a firm trains workers who later move to other firms, which gain skills they did not pay for.
Example: research that other firms copy and build on.
Firms produce where MPC = MPB (Q1). Social optimum where MSC = MSB (Q*).
Q1 < Q*: underproduction. Welfare loss triangle between Q1 and Q*.
Quick check
?A firm trains apprentices at its own expense. Many later join rival firms, which gain skilled workers without paying for the training. With no government action, what happens?
Mission 4
How governments respond
Subsidy per unit equal to the MEB at Q*: MPC shifts down to MPC − subsidy. Quantity rises to Q*.
Direct provision, free at the point of use: state schools, public health services.
Governments sometimes produce private goods, such as education, and allow free access.
At a price of zero, people consume where MPB meets the quantity axis. That may be above or below Q*.
Regulation: compulsory schooling to a set age; vaccination requirements in some countries.
Information: campaigns that raise perceived MPB.
Strengths and limits of each.
Mission check
?A beekeeper sells honey. Her bees also pollinate the fruit trees in neighboring orchards, raising the orchards' fruit output. The orchard owners pay her nothing. Compared with the social optimum, how much honey does the market produce?
Whether the spillover comes from buying or from producing, the market leaves it out, so too little is made or used.
Mission 5
Mission 5: How can a government put a price on cleaner air before deciding whether to build a road?
Make a guess: How can a government put a price on cleaner air before deciding whether to build a road?
Mission 5
Private and social costs and benefits
Step 1 of 2
A firm counts its private costs and benefits: what it pays and what it earns.
Society also counts external costs and benefits: effects on third parties.
Social cost = private cost + external cost (SC = PC + EC).
A new road: building costs (private); noise for nearby homes (external cost); faster journeys and fewer crashes (benefits).
A project can lose money for its builder yet still be worth it to society, or the other way round.
Mission 5
The method of cost-benefit analysis
Cost-benefit analysis (CBA): comparing all the social costs and social benefits of a project or policy, valued in money, to decide whether to go ahead.
Steps:
Identify every cost and benefit: private and external, now and in future.
Value each in money. Where there is no market price, estimate one (a shadow price).
Compare: net social benefit = social benefits − social costs.
Decide: go ahead if social benefits exceed social costs. Between options, pick the highest net social benefit.
Test the result: does the decision change if an estimate is wrong?
Say: "net social benefit" — not: "profit". A CBA can approve a project that makes a loss.
Mission 5
Worked example: a town bypass
Illustrative data, in millions, all years added together.
Item
Type
Value
Building and maintenance
Private cost
120
Noise for homes near the new road
External cost
20
Lost woodland habitat
External cost
15
Time saved by travellers
Benefit
110
Fewer accidents
Benefit
40
Lower fuel and vehicle costs
Benefit
20
Social costs = 120 + 20 + 15 = 155.
Social benefits = 110 + 40 + 20 = 170.
Net social benefit = 170 − 155 = +15, so on these figures the bypass goes ahead.
Nobody pays to use the road, so its builder earns nothing: a firm would never build it.
But 15 is small next to the estimates. If time saved were valued 20 lower, net social benefit would be −5 and the answer would flip.
Quick check
?A city appraises a new tram line (illustrative data, in millions). Building and running it costs 300. Passengers will pay 180 in fares. Cleaner air and less traffic for other road users are valued at 160. Disruption during building is valued at 20. What is the net social benefit, and the decision?
Mission 5
Valuing things that have no price
Clean air, quiet and travel time are not sold in shops. Economists estimate their value in money:
Market prices: use a related price, e.g. the cost of cleaning up a river, or of treating an illness.
Revealed preference: watch what people actually pay.
Similar houses sell for less under a flight path: the gap values the noise.
Workers in riskier jobs are paid more: the extra pay values the risk.
Stated preference: ask people in a survey what they would be willing to pay.
Value of a statistical life (illustrative data): 100,000 people each pay 100 to cut their risk of dying this year by 1 in 100,000.
Expected deaths fall by 1.
Total paid = 100,000 × 100 = 10 million: the value of one statistical life.
It is not the value of any one named person's life.
Quick check
?To value the loss of quiet near a new airport runway, researchers compare the prices of similar houses inside and outside the flight path. Which method are they using?
Mission 5
Why externalities are hard to measure
Who is affected? Harm can spread far, across borders and to future generations.
How much harm? Scientists may not know the effect of a pollutant for years.
What money value? Different methods give different numbers for the same harm.
Survey problems: people may overstate what they would pay, or refuse to put a price on nature.
So a tax or subsidy set equal to the "external cost" rests on an estimate.
Mission 5Graph lab
Getting the tax wrong
Illustrative data: the true external cost is 20 per unit. The government sets a tax per unit equal to its estimate. When the tax equals the true MEC, MSB = MSC at the chosen output, and the deadweight loss disappears.
Takeaway: the tax corrects the market only if it matches the true external cost, so measurement matters.
Mission 5
How much clean-up is efficient?
Policymakers rarely choose "all or nothing". They choose how much.
For each extra unit of clean-up compare:
marginal social benefit (MSB): the extra harm avoided
marginal social cost (MSC): the extra cost of cleaning up
Keep going while MSB ≥ MSC. Stop when the next unit costs more than it is worth.
At MSB = MSC, net social benefit is as large as it can be: there is no deadweight loss.
Zero pollution is usually not efficient: the last units are very costly to remove.
Say: "choose the quantity where MSB = MSC" — not: "where total benefit is largest".
Quick check
?A council can clean up a polluted lake in stages. Illustrative data:
Unit of clean-up
1st
2nd
3rd
4th
5th
6th
Marginal social benefit
60
45
35
30
15
8
Marginal social cost
10
15
20
25
32
40
How many units maximize net social benefit?
Mission 5
CBA in use
Transport: governments value time saved, accidents avoided, noise and emissions before building roads and railways.
Health: some health services compare a treatment's cost with the quality-adjusted life years (QALYs) it adds.
Flood defense: a 1936 US law allowed federal flood projects if benefits "to whomsoever they may accrue" exceed the estimated costs.
Regulation: the US Environmental Protection Agency recommends a value of a statistical life of US$7.4 million (in 2006 dollars), updated to the year of each analysis, when it weighs rules that cut deaths from pollution.
Mission 5Evaluate
How far can we trust a CBA?
It depends on:
The estimates: the money values put on life, time and nature can differ widely. Small changes can flip the decision.
Who wins and who loses: CBA adds up gains and losses. A project can pass while one group (e.g. nearby residents) loses heavily and is not compensated.
Time and uncertainty: long-lived projects and climate harms reach far into the future, and forecasts can be optimistic.
Who does the analysis: interest groups and politicians may push for favorable numbers.
Still, a CBA makes assumptions visible, so they can be challenged.
Mission check
?A firm proposes a waste incinerator (illustrative data, in millions). It expects revenue of 50 and costs of 40. Air pollution would impose an external cost of 15 on local residents. Less landfill would give an external benefit of 3. Using cost-benefit analysis, what should the government decide?
CBA counts everyone's costs and benefits, so a profitable project can fail and a loss-making one can pass.
Recap
The big ideas
Mission 1
Information failure: missing or uneven information leads to a misallocation of resources.
Asymmetric information: one side knows more. Hidden quality can drive good products out of a market.
Governments respond with information provision and regulation.
Mission 2
A negative production externality makes MSC = MPC + MEC lie above MPC.
The market produces where MPB = MPC: more than the social optimum where MSB = MSC.
The welfare loss is the triangle between MSC and MSB from Q* to Qm, pointing to the social optimum.
Mission 3
A negative consumption externality puts MSB below MPB, so the market consumes Q1 > Q* and creates a welfare loss.
The socially optimal quantity is where MSB = MSC; buyers respond only to private benefits.
Mission 4
A positive consumption externality puts MSB above MPB, so the market stops at Q1 < Q*, with a welfare loss.
A positive production externality puts MSC below MPC, with the same result: Q1 < Q*.
Governments may subsidize or provide such goods, often free at the point of use.
Mission 5
Social cost = private cost + external cost; social benefit = private benefit + external benefit.
CBA: identify, value, compare, decide. Go ahead if social benefits exceed social costs; choose the quantity where MSB = MSC.
Values for things with no price come from related markets, revealed preference and surveys, so they are estimates.
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Mini-lesson complete!
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You've worked through Unit 6: Efficient and Inefficient Outcomes; Externalities (Part 1) for AP Microeconomics. 🎉
Mission 1Why can a used car that runs perfectly be hard to sell for what it is worth?
Mission 2Why does a factory that pays all its own bills still produce too much?
Mission 3When a product harms people nearby who never bought it, why does the market sell too much?
Mission 4If a vaccine also protects the people around you, why might too few people get one?
Mission 5How can a government put a price on cleaner air before deciding whether to build a road?
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