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AP Microeconomics · Unit 4: Imperfect Competition · 4.2 Monopoly; 4.3 Price Discrimination; 4.4 Monopolistic Competition; 4.5 Oligopoly and Game Theory
Mini-Lesson

AP® Microeconomics Unit 4: Imperfect Competition (4.2–4.5)

6 missions. Guess, learn, then check. Your place is saved.

Aligned to AP Microeconomics, Unit 4: Imperfect Competition · 4.2 Monopoly; 4.3 Price Discrimination; 4.4 Monopolistic Competition; 4.5 Oligopoly and Game Theory; also 6.1 Socially Efficient and Inefficient Market Outcomes; 6.4 The Effects of Government Intervention in Different Market Structures

Short, curiosity-driven missions (about 20 minutes each) that teachers can assign. Use them alongside AP Classroom practice.

  1. Mission 1If one company controls a whole market, why doesn't it just charge the highest price it can?
  2. Mission 2Why might it make sense for only one company to lay the water pipes in a city?
  3. Mission 3Why can two people sitting side by side on the same train have paid very different fares?
  4. Mission 4Why can a popular new kind of café make big profits at first, then only just cover its costs later?
  5. Mission 5When only a few big firms share a market, why do their prices so often move together?
  6. Mission 6How can two rival firms each make their best choice and still both end up worse off?

Also part of this unit: 1 mission in Long-Run Production Costs; Types of Profit; Profit Maximization (part 1); 1 mission in Profit Maximization; Short-Run and Long-Run Decisions; Perfect Competition (part 2).

AP® is a trademark registered by the College Board, which is not affiliated with, and does not endorse, this website.

Mission 1

Mission 1: If one company controls a whole market, why doesn't it just charge the highest price it can?

Make a guess: If one company controls a whole market, why doesn't it just charge the highest price it can?

Mission 1

A price maker

Price taker and price makerPerfect competition: price takerP0QP = MR = AR = DMonopoly: price makerP0QD = AR
  • Pure monopoly: one firm supplies the whole market. No close substitutes. High barriers to entry.
  • Monopoly power: the power to set price above marginal cost. A firm with a large market share can have it without being the only seller.
  • The monopolist's demand curve is the market demand curve: it slopes down.
  • So it is a price maker: it chooses price, or output, but not both. Demand decides the other.
  • Demand = average revenue (AR): the price received per unit.
  • A monopolist must lower its price to sell more, unlike a firm in perfect competition (P = MR = AR = D).
Mission 1

Where monopoly power comes from

  • Legal barriers: patents, licenses, state franchises. A patent normally lasts up to 20 years.
  • Economies of scale: a large incumbent has lower average cost than any small entrant.
  • Control of a key resource or of the network buyers must use.
  • Sunk costs and brand loyalty: entry is costly and hard to recover.
  • Few close substitutes: the fewer the substitutes, the less price elastic the firm's demand.
  • More barriers and fewer substitutes mean more monopoly power, and power that lasts.
Mission 1

Why MR is below AR

Marginal revenue is below average revenueIllustrative dataPrice (AR) and marginal revenue (MR) byquantity10101982863744625Qprice (AR)marginal revenue (MR)The same as straight linesP0115.511QARMRMR meets the quantity axis half way to AR.
  • Illustrative data. To sell one more unit, the firm must cut the price on every unit.
QuantityPrice (AR)Total revenueMarginal revenue
1101010
29188
38246
47284
56302
  • The 5th unit sells for 6, but the price cut on the first 4 units loses 4. MR = 6 − 4 = 2.
  • So MR < AR at every output after the first.
  • With a straight-line demand curve, MR is twice as steep as AR.
  • Say: "MR lies below AR for a monopolist" — not: "price equals marginal revenue".
Quick check
?Illustrative data. A monopolist can sell 4 units a day at a price of 20, or 5 units a day at a price of 18. What is the marginal revenue of the 5th unit?
Mission 1

Profit is greatest where MR = MC

Profit is greatest where MR = MCP0PmQmQD = ARMRMCMR slopes down faster than AR. MC isU-shaped.Output Qm is where MR = MC.Read price off the AR curve at Qm: Pm.
  • If MR > MC, one more unit adds more to revenue than to cost: raise output.
  • If MR < MC, the last unit adds more to cost than to revenue: cut output.
  • So profit is maximized at the output where MR = MC.
  • Price: go up from that output to the demand (AR) curve.
  • The monopolist charges P > MC at the profit-maximizing quantity.
  • A monopolist always produces where demand is price elastic: MR is positive there.
  • Say: "read price off the AR curve at the MR = MC output" — not: "price is set where MR = MC".
Mission 1Graph lab

Choose the output

Illustrative data: AR = 50 − Q; MC = ATC = 10. AP: ATC here is average total cost (ATC).

Choose the outputPQ0102030405001020304050545D = ARMRMC = ATC
  • Takeaway: profit peaks where MR = MC (Q = 20), not where revenue or price is highest.
Mission 1

Worked example: price, profit and lost surplus

Worked example: monopoly price, profit and lost surplusIllustrative dataP0Pm = 30Pc = 10Qm = 20Qc = 40QD = ARMRMC = ATCeconomic profit: (30 − 10) × 20 = 400deadweight loss: ½ × (40 − 20) × (30 − 10)= 200
  • Illustrative data. AR = 50 − Q, so MR = 50 − 2Q. MC = ATC = 10.
  • MR = MC: 50 − 2Q = 10, so Q = 20.
  • Price from AR: 50 − 20 = 30.
  • Economic profit = (P − ATC) × Q = (30 − 10) × 20 = 400.
  • A competitive industry with the same costs: P = MC = 10, Q = 40.
  • Deadweight loss (a later screen explains it) = ½ × (40 − 20) × (30 − 10) = 200.
Mission 1

Extra profit, normal profit (zero economic profit) or a loss

Profit, normal profit and loss for a monopolistEconomic profit: P > ATCP0PmQmQD = ARMRMCATCZero economic profit: P = ATCP0PmQmQD = ARMRMCATCLoss: P < ATCP0PmQmQD = ARMRMCATCeconomic profitloss
  • Profit per unit = AR − ATC at the MR = MC output.
  • P > ATC: economic profit. P = ATC: zero economic profit (normal profit). P < ATC: a loss.
  • Short run: a loss-making monopolist keeps producing if price covers AVC. Below AVC it shuts down.
  • Long run: barriers stop entry, so profit above normal can last. A firm that cannot cover ATC in the long run leaves.
  • Say: "barriers to entry let economic profit persist in the long run" — not: "a monopoly always makes a profit".
Quick check
?Illustrative data. A monopolist maximizes profit at an output of 300 units. At that output, AR = 12, ATC = 9 and MC = MR = 6. What is its profit?
Mission 1

Monopoly versus perfect competition

Monopoly compared with perfect competitionP0PmPcQmQcQD = ARMRMC = ATCconsumer surplus kepttransferred to the monopolistdeadweight lossPerfect competition: P = MC, output Qc, price Pc.Monopoly: MR = MC gives Qm; price Pm is readoff D. Qm < Qc and Pm > Pc.
  • Same costs, constant MC = ATC. Compare the two outcomes.
  • Perfect competition: P = MC, output Qc, price Pc.
  • Monopoly: MR = MC, so output is lower (Qm < Qc) and price is higher (Pm > Pc).
  • Rectangle (Pm − Pc) × Qm: consumer surplus transferred to the monopolist.
  • Triangle from Qm to Qc, below D and above MC: units worth more than they cost, never made. This is the deadweight loss.
  • Monopoly is allocatively inefficient: P > MC.
  • Say: "the rectangle is a transfer; the triangle is the deadweight loss" — not: "the whole fall in consumer surplus is lost".
Quick check
Monopoly compared with perfect competitionP0PmPcQmQcQwxyzD = ARMRMC = ATC
?A monopoly is compared with a competitive industry with the same constant MC. Which area is the deadweight loss caused by the monopoly?
AreaWhere it is
wTriangle below D and above Pm, from 0 to Qm
xRectangle between Pm and Pc, from 0 to Qm
yTriangle below D and above MC, from Qm to Qc
zRectangle below Pc and above 0, from 0 to Qm
Mission 1

Monopoly power as a market failure

  • Market failure: the market misallocates resources.
  • Monopoly power: price above MC, too little output, a deadweight loss.
  • The firm acts rationally for itself: it equates MR and MC, not marginal benefit to society and MC. The result is inefficient.
Mission 1

Taxing, subsidizing or capping a monopolist

Price ceiling on a monopolistIllustrative dataP010Q = 40QDMRP ceilingMCCeiling set at MC (10): the two lines coincide.The firm sells up to D, Q = 40.
  • Price ceiling at P = MC (illustrative: 10): MR becomes the ceiling up to the demand curve. The firm sells up to the demand curve: Q = 40, the allocatively efficient output. Here it earns only normal profit.
  • A ceiling between Pc and Pm also raises output; a ceiling above Pm has no effect; a ceiling below MC would cut output.
  • A binding ceiling set at or above MC raises quantity in a monopoly, unlike in a competitive market, where a binding ceiling cuts quantity. Price regulation targets the cause of the inefficiency.
Quick check
?A profit-maximizing monopolist pays a new lump-sum tax: a fixed amount, whatever it produces. What happens to its price and output?
Mission check

?Illustrative case: a town's only ferry operator sets one fare for all passengers. At its current fare, its marginal revenue is 4 and its marginal cost is 7 per passenger. What should it do to raise its profit?
Mission 2

Mission 2: Why might it make sense for only one company to lay the water pipes in a city?

Make a guess: Why might it make sense for only one company to lay the water pipes in a city?

Mission 2

What makes a monopoly natural

Average cost keeps fallingP0economies of scaleQLRATCDEconomies of scale over the entire effectivemarket demand.
  • Some industries have huge fixed costs and low marginal costs: water pipes, rail track, power grids.
  • So average cost keeps falling as output rises, across the whole market.
  • Natural monopoly: economies of scale over the entire effective market demand.
  • A second network would duplicate the fixed cost: wasteful.
  • Say: "natural monopoly" for a cost reason — not: "a monopoly protected by law or a patent".
Mission 2

Worked example: one network or two?

  • Illustrative data. A town needs 300 connections. The network costs 1,200 (fixed). Each connection adds 2 (marginal cost).
  • One firm: ATC = 1,200 ÷ 300 + 2 = 4 + 2 = 6.
  • Two firms, 150 connections each: ATC = 1,200 ÷ 150 + 2 = 8 + 2 = 10.
  • Splitting the market raises average cost from 6 to 10.
  • Same marginal cost; the difference is the fixed cost spread over fewer users.
Quick check
?Illustrative data. A rail line has a fixed cost of 900 and a marginal cost of 3 per journey. The market is 150 journeys. If two firms each build their own line and each carries 75 journeys, what is each firm's average cost?
Mission 2

The natural monopoly diagram

The natural monopoly diagramP0P1P2P3Q1Q2Q3QP = ATCP = MCDMRATCMCMR = MCloss at P = MCMC lies below ATC while ATC is falling.Fair-return price: P = ATC. Socially optimal price:P = MC.At P = MC, price is below ATC: a loss.
  • ATC (LRAC) falls across the whole demand curve. MC lies below ATC.
  • Three possible prices:
    • Unregulated: MR = MC. High price, low output, profit above normal.
    • P = ATC: normal profit. Output higher, price lower.
    • P = MC: the allocatively efficient output. But P < ATC: a loss.
  • AP: P = MC is the socially optimal price; P = ATC is the fair-return price.
  • So a natural monopoly cannot be allocatively efficient and cover its costs without help.
  • Say: "MC is below ATC whenever ATC is falling" — not: "MC is above ATC".
Mission 2

Worked example: three prices

Worked example: three pricesP022104180300360QDMRATCMCAC 14AC 9Illustrative data: AR = 40 − 0.1Q, MC = 4, AC =1,800/Q + 4.
  • Illustrative data. AR = 40 − 0.1Q. MC = 4. Fixed cost = 1,800.
  • Unregulated (MR = MC): 40 − 0.2Q = 4 → Q = 180, P = 22. ATC = 1,800 ÷ 180 + 4 = 14.
    • Profit = (22 − 14) × 180 = 1,440.
  • P = ATC: Q = 300, P = 10. ATC = 1,800 ÷ 300 + 4 = 10. Normal profit.
  • P = MC: Q = 360, P = 4. ATC = 1,800 ÷ 360 + 4 = 9.
    • Loss = (9 − 4) × 360 = 1,800: the whole fixed cost.
Mission 2Graph lab

Set the price cap

Same natural monopoly. A regulator sets a maximum price (price cap).

Set the price capPQ18022DMRMCATC
  • Takeaway: lowering the cap raises output; profit is normal at P = ATC (10); below that the firm makes a loss.
Mission 2

Lump-sum or per-unit?

Lump-sum subsidy versus per-unit taxLump-sum subsidy: ATC shifts down, MC andoutput do not changeP0PQQDMRMCATC1ATC2Per-unit tax: MC shifts up, output fallsP0P2P1Q2Q1QDMRMC1MC2Illustrative data.
  • Lump-sum tax or subsidy: a fixed amount, whatever the output. It changes fixed cost only.
    • ATC shifts; MC does not. Price and quantity do not change. Only profit changes.
  • Per-unit tax or subsidy: changes MC. Price and quantity change.
  • At P = MC, the natural monopoly makes a loss. A lump-sum subsidy equal to the loss lets it stay open at the allocatively efficient output, without changing its MC.
  • Effective intervention targets the incentive that causes the failure: the monopolist's MR = MC choice. Price regulation changes that choice; a lump-sum subsidy covers the loss.
Quick check
?Illustrative data. A regulator makes a natural monopoly charge P = MC = 6. It then sells 500 units, and its average total cost at that output is 8.5. What lump-sum subsidy lets it just cover its costs?
Mission check

?Illustrative case: a small town is served by one broadband network that costs a lot to build but very little to connect each extra home. A second firm plans to build its own full network and win half the town's homes. Assuming total demand does not change, what happens to the average cost of supplying a home?
Mission 3

Mission 3: Why can two people sitting side by side on the same train have paid very different fares?

Make a guess: Why can two people sitting side by side on the same train have paid very different fares?

Mission 3

Same product, different prices

  • Price discrimination: charging different buyers different prices for the same good or service, for reasons not linked to cost.
  • Examples: peak and off-peak train fares; child and adult cinema tickets; student discounts.
  • US examples: senior and student movie tickets; airline fares that vary by buyer.
  • Not price discrimination: a higher price because supplying costs more (e.g. delivery to a remote island).
  • Say: "price discrimination" only when cost is the same — not: for any price difference.
Mission 3

Three conditions

Three conditions for price discrimination1 Market powera price maker, not a price taker2 Groups with different elasticityLess elastichigher priceMore elasticlower price3 No resalelow pricehigh price

1. Market power: the firm must be a price maker. A price taker cannot set prices.

2. Separate groups with different price elasticities of demand, and a way to tell them apart (age, time, place, ID). The group with the more elastic demand gets the lower price.

3. No resale: buyers at the low price must not be able to sell on to those charged more.

  • If resale is easy, the low-price group buys for everyone (market seepage or arbitrage).
  • AP: the firm must have market power, identify buyers' willingness to pay, and prevent resale.
Quick check
?A firm with market power plans to charge students a lower price than other adults for an identical product. Its costs are the same for both groups. Which situation would stop this plan from raising its profit?
Mission 3

Three degrees

Three degrees of price discriminationFirst degree: each buyer pays their ownmaximum (the AP focus)Price0QuantityDSecond degree: price per unit falls after a blockof unitsPrice per unit0Units boughtThird degree: different prices for differentgroupsAdultshigher priceStudentslower price
  • First degree (perfect): each buyer pays their own maximum willingness to pay.
  • Second degree: price depends on how much you buy: bulk discounts, lower price per unit after a set amount.
  • Third degree: different prices for different groups: age, time of day, location.
  • AP focuses on perfect price discrimination.
  • Real firms rarely know every buyer's maximum price. Personalized online pricing is an attempt to get closer.
Mission 3

Perfect price discrimination

Perfect price discriminationP030102040QP = MCDD = MRMCMRconsumer surplusprofitdeadweight lossproducer surplusSingle price: output 20, price 30.Each unit sells at its own price up to output 40.CS = 0, DWL = 0.
  • Each unit sells at the buyer's maximum price, so the demand curve becomes the MR curve.
  • The firm produces where D = MC, the P = MC output: the same output as perfect competition.
  • All consumer surplus becomes producer surplus. Consumer surplus = 0.
  • No deadweight loss: allocatively efficient output.
  • Illustrative data (as): AR = 50 − Q, MC = 10.
    • Single price: Q = 20, profit 400, consumer surplus 200, deadweight loss 200.
    • Perfect price discrimination: Q = 40, producer surplus 800, consumer surplus 0, deadweight loss 0.
  • Say: "efficient but not equitable" — not: "consumers gain because output rises".
Quick check
?A single-price monopolist becomes able to practice perfect (first-degree) price discrimination. Its costs do not change. Compared with before, which statement is correct?
Mission 3

Who gains and who loses?

  • Producers: more profit. It may fund investment, or keep a service running (e.g. a rail route).
  • Consumers in the high-price group: pay more; lose consumer surplus.
  • Consumers in the low-price group: may be served for the first time.
  • Total output: may rise. Then some deadweight loss is removed.
  • Price discrimination raises profit by capturing consumer surplus.
Mission check

?Illustrative case: a theme park charges local residents less than tourists for an identical day ticket. Its costs are the same for both groups. Which pair of conditions is needed for this to earn more profit than one price for all?
Mission 4

Mission 4: Why can a popular new kind of café make big profits at first, then only just cover its costs later?

Make a guess: Why can a popular new kind of café make big profits at first, then only just cover its costs later?

Mission 4

Many firms, different products

  • Monopolistic competition: many firms, each selling a differentiated product.
  • Low barriers to entry and exit.
  • Each firm has a little price-setting power: its product is not identical to rivals'.
  • Examples: cafés, hairdressers, restaurants, takeaways, a new style of café such as bubble tea.
  • US examples: restaurants, nail salons, food trucks.
  • Firms are small, so each one acts independently: it does not plan around one rival's reaction.
Mission 4

Standing out: non-price competition

  • Product differentiation: real or perceived differences (quality, design, location, service, brand).
  • Non-price competition: competing on anything but price: branding, advertising, loyalty cards, opening hours, new menu items.
  • Aim 1: shift the firm's demand curve right (more customers at each price).
  • Aim 2: make demand less price elastic (customers less willing to switch).
  • Say: "the firm's demand curve slopes downward because its product is differentiated" — not: "because it has few rivals".
Quick check
?A hairdresser in a busy town center raises its price slightly. It loses some customers but not all of them. Which best explains why?
Mission 4

The short run

Monopolistic competition in the short runP0P1Q1QDMRATCMCeconomic profitDemand slopes down. MR lies below it.MR = MC gives output Q1. Price is read up to D.P > ATC at Q1: economic profit.Illustrative data.
  • Profit is maximized where MR = MC. Price is read up to the AR curve.
  • AP: economic profit where P > ATC, a loss where P < ATC, zero economic profit (normal profit) where P = ATC.
  • AP labels: D (the AR curve), MR, MC, ATC (the ATC curve).
  • In the short run, this looks just like the monopoly diagram (see Mission 1). The difference is what happens next.
Mission 4

Worked example: short-run profit

Monopolistic competition in the short runP0P1Q1QDMRATCMCeconomic profitDemand slopes down. MR lies below it.MR = MC gives output Q1. Price is read up to D.P > ATC at Q1: economic profit.Illustrative data.
  • Illustrative data. A new bubble tea shop.
  • Demand: AR = 30 − 0.2Q, so MR = 30 − 0.4Q.
  • Costs: MC = 0.2Q. ATC = 360/Q + 0.1Q.
  • MR = MC: 30 − 0.4Q = 0.2Q, so Q = 50.
  • Price from AR: 30 − 0.2 × 50 = 20.
  • ATC at Q = 50: 360/50 + 0.1 × 50 = 7.2 + 5 = 12.2.
  • Economic profit = (P − ATC) × Q = (20 − 12.2) × 50 = 390.
Mission 4

From short run to long run

From short run to long runP0P1P2P3Q3Q2Q1QATCMCD1MR1D2MR2D3MR3P2 = ATCeconomic profitlossEconomic profit: new firms enter.Entry: each firm's demand shifts left andbecomes more elastic.Zero economic profit: D2 is tangent to ATC.Entry stops.Economic loss: firms leave and demand shiftsright.
  • Profit above normal is a signal. Barriers are low, so new firms enter.
  • Each firm loses some customers to the newcomers: its demand curve shifts left.
  • More close substitutes: demand becomes more price elastic.
  • Entry stops when AR just touches (is tangent to) ATC: normal profit.
  • Losses work the other way: firms leave, and each remaining firm's demand shifts right until AR touches ATC again.
  • AP: in the long run, firms earn zero economic profit: D is tangent to ATC.
  • Say: "each firm's demand curve shifts left as firms enter" — not: "the market demand curve falls".
Mission 4Graph lab

Let new firms in

Illustrative data. Start: 4 shops; each earns a profit of 390.

Let new firms inPQ (one shop)020406080100010305020DMRMCATClowest ATC
  • Takeaway: entry continues until profit is normal, at the point where AR touches ATC to the left of the lowest point of ATC.
Mission 4

Worked example: the long run

From short run to long runP0P1P2P3Q3Q2Q1QATCMCD1MR1D2MR2D3MR3P2 = ATCeconomic profitlossEconomic profit: new firms enter.Entry: each firm's demand shifts left andbecomes more elastic.Zero economic profit: D2 is tangent to ATC.Entry stops.Economic loss: firms leave and demand shiftsright.
  • Illustrative data. After entry, each shop's demand: AR = 18 − 0.125Q, so MR = 18 − 0.25Q.
  • Costs are unchanged: MC = 0.2Q; ATC = 360/Q + 0.1Q.
  • MR = MC: 18 − 0.25Q = 0.2Q, so Q = 40.
  • Price: 18 − 0.125 × 40 = 13.
  • ATC at Q = 40: 360/40 + 0.1 × 40 = 9 + 4 = 13.
  • P = ATC: profit per unit 0. Normal profit.
  • PED at the chosen price: SR −2; LR −2.6. Demand is more elastic after entry.
Mission 4

Excess capacity

Excess capacityP01384060excess capacityQminimum ATCP > MCD2MR2ATCMCOutput 40 is below the efficient scale: output60, at minimum ATC. P > MC.Illustrative data.
  • The long-run tangency is on the falling part of ATC.
  • So output is below the output at the lowest ATC: excess capacity.
  • In the previous screen: output 40; lowest ATC (12) at 60. Excess capacity = 60 − 40 = 20 units.
  • Not productively efficient: P = ATC = 13 > lowest ATC = 12.
  • Not allocatively efficient: P = 13 > MC = 8. Buyers value one more unit more than it costs to make.
  • AP: long-run output is below the efficient scale, and P > MC.
  • Say: "excess capacity: output is below the level that minimizes ATC" — not: "the firm has too many workers".
Quick check
?Illustrative data. In long-run equilibrium, a monopolistically competitive firm produces 18 units at a price of 34. At that output, ATC = 34 and MC = 18. Its ATC is lowest at 30 units, where ATC = 30. Which describes this firm?
Mission 4

Compared with the other models

Long run: three market structuresPerfect competitionP0QATCMCDMonopolistic competitionP0QATCMCDMRMonopolyP0QATCMCDMReconomic profit can lastIllustrative diagrams. Same cost curves in each.
Long runPerfect competitionMonopolistic competitionMonopoly
ProductsIdenticalDifferentiatedUnique
BarriersNoneLowHigh
Demand facing firmHorizontalDownward, quite elasticDownward, less elastic
ProfitNormalNormalAbove normal can last
P and MCP = MCP > MCP > MC
Output at lowest ATC?YesNo: excess capacityNot usually
  • AP: "normal profit" is zero economic profit.
  • The key gain over perfect competition: variety. Buyers can choose the café, style or location they like best.
Mission 4

Advertising

AdvertisingP0QATCATC1D1D2ATC2Advertising shifts demand right and makes itless price elastic.It also raises costs: ATC shifts up.
  • Advertising aims to shift the firm's demand right and make it less price elastic (brand loyalty).
  • It also raises costs: ATC shifts up.
  • Short run: if extra sales outweigh the extra cost, profit rises.
  • Long run: rivals copy the idea, and new firms enter. Profit returns to normal.
  • Informative advertising (prices, opening hours, what is new) helps buyers choose.
  • Persuasive advertising (image, brand) may add to costs and prices without making the product better.
Quick check
?A nail salon launches a successful advertising campaign that makes its customers more loyal. In the short run, what happens to the salon's demand curve?
Mission check

?Illustrative case: a town has a few gyms making large profits. Opening a gym is easy, and each gym differs a little in equipment and classes. New gyms open until the market settles. Which describes a typical gym in the new long-run equilibrium?
Mission 5

Mission 5: When only a few big firms share a market, why do their prices so often move together?

Make a guess: When only a few big firms share a market, why do their prices so often move together?

Mission 5

A few firms dominate

  • Oligopoly: a market dominated by a few large firms.
  • High barriers to entry (economies of scale, brands, patents, high start-up costs).
  • Products may be identical (cement, crude oil) or differentiated (cars, smartphones, supermarkets).
  • Much non-price competition: advertising, branding, loyalty schemes.
Mission 5

Interdependence

  • Interdependence: each firm's best choice depends on what its rivals do.
  • So every decision (price, output, advertising) brings uncertainty: how will rivals react?
  • If one firm cuts its price, rivals may match the cut to protect their sales. All end up with lower prices and little extra market share.
  • If one firm raises its price, rivals may not follow, and it loses customers to them.
  • Matching cuts can spiral into a price war: each firm undercuts the others, and profits fall for all.
  • Say: "oligopolists are interdependent" — not: "oligopolists ignore their rivals" or "oligopolists always collude".
Mission 5

Compete or collude?

  • Non-collusive oligopoly: firms compete; each decides alone.
  • Collusive oligopoly: firms cooperate to limit competition, e.g. fixing prices or sharing out markets.
  • Overt (explicit) collusion: a formal agreement. A cartel is a group of firms that agree on prices or output.
  • Tacit collusion: no agreement, but firms behave as if there were one, e.g. following a price leader.
  • Why collude? Less uncertainty, higher joint profit, keeping new firms out.
  • Why not? Cartels are illegal in most countries, there may be fines, and members may cheat.
  • AP: oligopolists have an incentive to collude and form cartels.
Mission 5

When does a cartel work?

  • A cartel is more likely to hold when there are:
    • few firms (easier to agree and to watch each other)
    • similar costs and similar products (easier to agree one price)
    • high barriers to entry (no newcomers to undercut the cartel)
    • easy monitoring of rivals' prices and output (cheating gets spotted)
    • stable demand (less pressure to break ranks)
    • weak enforcement of competition law
  • Consequences: higher prices, lower output, high profit for members, less choice; buyers lose surplus.
Quick check
?Four firms in a market are thinking of forming a cartel. Which set of conditions makes the cartel most likely to last?
Mission 5

A cartel tries to act like a monopoly

  • Cartel members try to set the monopoly price and quantity, then share the market out.
  • Illustrative data: monopoly outcome P = 60, Q = 40. Perfect competition: P = 20, Q = 80.
  • Oligopolists often struggle to reach the monopoly outcome (cheating, price wars).
  • But price is still higher, and quantity lower, than in perfect competition: inefficient.
Mission 5

Worked example: the pull to cheat

CheatingProfit of each firm (illustrative data)800800Both keep toquota875700A cheats750750Both cheatFirm AFirm B
  • Illustrative data: two firms, A and B. AR = 100 − Q. MC = ATC = 20.
  • Cartel quotas: 20 each. Q = 40, P = 60. Profit each: (60 − 20) × 20 = 800.
  • A secretly produces 25. Q = 45, so P = 100 − 45 = 55.
    • A: (55 − 20) × 25 = 875. A gains.
    • B: (55 − 20) × 20 = 700. B loses.
  • If both produce 25: Q = 50, P = 50. Each earns (50 − 20) × 25 = 750.
  • Each firm gains by cheating, whatever the other does. Together they lose. (Payoff matrix in Mission 6.)
  • AP: "AR = 100 − Q" is the market demand curve, P = 100 − Q. ATC is ATC.
Mission 5Graph lab

Break the quota?

Illustrative data as the previous screen. B keeps to its quota of 20.

Break the quota?800A's profit800B's profit1,600Joint profit
  • Takeaway: cheating pays the cheater (up to a point) but lowers joint profit and the other member's profit.
Quick check
?Illustrative data as an earlier screen: AR = 100 − Q, MC = ATC = 20, quotas of 20 each. Firm A produces 30; firm B keeps to 20. What is B's profit?
Mission 5

Real cartels

  • OPEC: set up in 1960 by Iran, Iraq, Kuwait, Saudi Arabia and Venezuela. Members agree production targets to influence the world oil price.
  • In the US, price fixing is illegal under the Sherman Act (1890).
  • OPEC is made up of governments, not private firms. Competition laws on cartels do not apply to it in the same way.
Mission check

?Illustrative case: three airlines fly the same route at similar fares. One airline thinks about cutting its fare by 10%. Which is the strongest reason it may decide not to?
Mission 6

Mission 6: How can two rival firms each make their best choice and still both end up worse off?

Make a guess: How can two rival firms each make their best choice and still both end up worse off?

Mission 6

A game between firms

  • Game theory studies decisions where your result depends on others' choices too.
  • Every game has:
    • players (here, two firms)
    • strategies (the choices open to each player, e.g. high price or low price)
    • payoffs (what each player gets, e.g. profit, for each pair of choices)
  • Oligopoly fits: firms are interdependent (see Mission 5).
  • Say: "a strategy is a choice of action" — not: "a strategy is a payoff".
Mission 6

The payoff matrix

Cartel matrixnormal-form game: both firms choose at thesame timeFirm BB keeps toquotaB cheatsFirm AA keeps toquotaA cheats800, 800700, 875875, 700750, 750Nash equilibriumCells: (A's profit, B's profit)Illustrative data
  • Illustrative data: the cartel from Mission 5. Each firm either keeps to its quota (20 units) or cheats (25 units).
B keeps to quotaB cheats
A keeps to quota800, 800700, 875
A cheats875, 700750, 750
  • Each cell: (A's profit, B's profit). A chooses the row; B chooses the column.
  • Example: A keeps to quota, B cheats → A earns 700, B earns 875.
  • AP calls this a normal-form game: both choose at the same time.
Mission 6

Dominant strategy

Cartel matrixnormal-form game: both firms choose at thesame timeFirm BB keeps toquotaB cheatsFirm AA keeps toquotaA cheats800, 800700, 875875, 700750, 750Nash equilibriumCells: (A's profit, B's profit)Illustrative data
  • A dominant strategy is best for a player whatever the other player does.
  • Method: fix the rival's choice, then compare your payoffs.
  • A's view:
    • If B keeps to quota: cheat 875 > keep 800.
    • If B cheats: cheat 750 > keep 700.
  • So cheating is A's dominant strategy. B's payoffs mirror A's, so B's dominant strategy is also to cheat.
  • Say: "dominant strategy: best whatever the rival does" — not: "the strategy with the biggest number in the matrix".
Quick check
?Illustrative data. Two firms, P and Q, each choose a high or a low price. Each cell shows (P's profit, Q's profit).
Q: high priceQ: low price
P: high price100, 9040, 110
P: low price120, 5060, 60

What is firm P's dominant strategy?

Mission 6

Nash equilibrium

Cartel matrixnormal-form game: both firms choose at thesame timeFirm BB keeps toquotaB cheatsFirm AA keeps toquotaA cheats800, 800700, 875875, 700750, 750Nash equilibriumCells: (A's profit, B's profit)Illustrative data
  • Nash equilibrium: an outcome where no player can do better by changing only its own strategy, given the other's choice.
  • Check each cell: would either player want to switch?
  • In the cartel game: (cheat, cheat) → (750, 750).
    • A switching to "keep" gets 700 < 750. B switching gets 700 < 750. No one gains: Nash equilibrium.
  • (keep, keep) → (800, 800) is not a Nash equilibrium: each firm could earn 875 by cheating.
  • When both players have a dominant strategy, the Nash equilibrium is where they both play it.
  • Say: "no player has an incentive to change strategy alone" — not: "both players get their best possible payoff".
Mission 6

The prisoner's dilemma

The prisoner's dilemmaFirm BB keeps toquotaB cheatsFirm AA keeps toquotaA cheats800, 800700, 875875, 700750, 750best togetherNash equilibriumarrow: each firm's incentive to cheatIllustrative data
  • The story: two suspects are questioned in separate rooms. Each can confess or stay silent.
  • Confessing is each one's dominant strategy. Both confess, yet both would get shorter sentences if both stayed silent.
  • A prisoner's dilemma: each player follows its own dominant strategy, and both end up worse off than if they had cooperated.
  • The cartel game is a prisoner's dilemma:
    • Nash equilibrium: (cheat, cheat): 750 each.
    • Cooperation: (keep, keep): 800 each.
  • Why cooperation fails: neither firm can trust the other, and a cartel agreement cannot be enforced in court.
Mission 6Graph lab

Can a penalty hold the cartel together?

Illustrative data as an earlier screen. The cartel agrees a penalty that any member caught cheating must pay. It is taken off the cheater's payoff.

Can a penalty hold the cartel together?Firm BFirm AKeepCheatKeep toquotaCheat800,800700,875875,700750,750
  • Takeaway: keeping to the quota is dominant only when cheating pays less whatever the rival does: here a penalty above 75.
Mission 6

No dominant strategy

Best responsesFirm Ylow pricehigh priceFirm Xlow pricehigh price30, 4060, 2020, 5070, 30Y's dominant strategy: low priceX's best response (underlined)Y's best response (underlined)low, low: Nash equilibriumIllustrative data
  • Not every player has a dominant strategy. Find the Nash equilibrium by checking best responses.
  • Illustrative data. Each cell: (X's profit, Y's profit).
Y: low priceY: high price
X: low price30, 4060, 20
X: high price20, 5070, 30
  • Y: low is better whether X is low (40 > 20) or high (50 > 30). Y's dominant strategy: low.
  • X: if Y is low, X picks low (30 > 20); if Y is high, X picks high (70 > 60). X has no dominant strategy.
  • X expects Y to play low, so X plays low. Nash equilibrium: (low, low) → (30, 40).
  • Some games have more than one Nash equilibrium. A game can have a Nash equilibrium even when neither player has a dominant strategy.
  • AP tip: mark each player's best response in every row and column. A cell where both are marked is a Nash equilibrium.
Quick check
?Illustrative data. Two firms each choose technology standard 1 or standard 2. Each cell: (X's profit, Y's profit).
Y: standard 1Y: standard 2
X: standard 150, 4010, 10
X: standard 25, 1540, 50

Which outcome or outcomes are Nash equilibria?

Mission 6

Why the monopoly outcome is hard to reach

  • Illustrative data as (AR = 100 − Q, MC = ATC = 20):
OutcomePriceTotal output
Monopoly (cartel keeps to quotas)6040
Both cheat (Nash equilibrium)5050
Perfect competition (P = MC)2080
  • AP: "AR = 100 − Q" is the market demand curve, P = 100 − Q. ATC is ATC.
  • Each firm's incentive to cheat pulls price below the monopoly price.
  • But price stays above, and output below, the perfectly competitive outcome.
  • Firms that meet again and again (a repeated game) may keep cooperating: cheating today could start a price war tomorrow.
Quick check
?Illustrative data as the earlier screens: AR = 100 − Q, MC = ATC = 20; quota 20 each; "cheat" means producing 25. What is the market price at the Nash equilibrium of this game?
Mission check

?Illustrative data. Two rival phone makers each choose whether to run a large advertising campaign. Each cell: (A's profit, B's profit).
B advertisesB does not
A advertises30, 3070, 10
A does not10, 7050, 50

Which statement is correct?

Recap

The big ideas

Mission 1

  • A monopolist faces the downward-sloping market demand, so MR < AR.
  • It produces where MR = MC and reads price off AR: higher price, lower output than perfect competition.
  • P > MC at the profit-maximizing quantity, so there is a deadweight loss; a price ceiling at P = MC removes it.

Mission 2

  • A natural monopoly has falling average cost across the whole market, so one firm supplies most cheaply.
  • Unregulated, it sets MR = MC; P = ATC gives normal profit; P = MC is efficient but loss-making.
  • A lump-sum subsidy covers the loss at P = MC without changing MC.

Mission 3

  • Price discrimination: different prices for the same product, not explained by cost.
  • Conditions: market power; groups with different PED that can be told apart; no resale.
  • Perfect price discrimination: output where P = MC, consumer surplus zero, no deadweight loss.

Mission 4

  • Many firms, differentiated products, low barriers: each firm has a downward-sloping, fairly elastic demand curve.
  • Short run: MR = MC; profit above normal or a loss is possible. Long run: entry or exit leaves normal profit (AR tangent to ATC).
  • Long run: excess capacity and P > MC, but buyers get variety.
  • AP: zero economic profit in the long run, output below efficient scale, P > MC.

Mission 5

  • Oligopoly: a few large firms, high barriers, interdependence and uncertainty.
  • Firms can compete or collude: overtly (cartels) or tacitly (price leadership). Cartels act like a monopoly but each member is tempted to cheat.
  • AP: oligopolists struggle to reach the monopoly outcome, but price is higher and quantity lower than in perfect competition.

Mission 6

  • Payoff matrix: players, strategies, payoffs; each cell is (row player, column player).
  • Dominant strategy: best whatever the rival does. Nash equilibrium: no player gains by changing only its own strategy.
  • Prisoner's dilemma: each plays its dominant strategy, and both end up worse off than if they had cooperated. That is why cartels are unstable.
  • Oligopolists struggle to reach the monopoly outcome, but price is higher and quantity lower than in perfect competition.
🏆

Mini-lesson complete!

⭐⭐⭐

You've worked through Unit 4: Imperfect Competition for AP Microeconomics. 🎉

  1. Mission 1If one company controls a whole market, why doesn't it just charge the highest price it can?
  2. Mission 2Why might it make sense for only one company to lay the water pipes in a city?
  3. Mission 3Why can two people sitting side by side on the same train have paid very different fares?
  4. Mission 4Why can a popular new kind of café make big profits at first, then only just cover its costs later?
  5. Mission 5When only a few big firms share a market, why do their prices so often move together?
  6. Mission 6How can two rival firms each make their best choice and still both end up worse off?

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