Mission 1: If everyone gains from a lighthouse, why might no one choose to pay for it?
Make a guess: If everyone gains from a lighthouse, why might no one choose to pay for it?
Mission 1
Two tests for any good
Rival: one person's use leaves less for others. A sandwich you eat cannot be eaten by me.
Excludable: the seller can stop people who have not paid from using it.
Excludable
Non-excludable
Rival
Private good: a sandwich, a bus seat
Common resource: fish in the open sea
Non-rival
A film on a streaming service
Public good: national defence, a flood barrier, street lighting
Ask the two questions separately. A good can pass one test and fail the other.
Mission 1
Private goods and public goods
Private good: rival and excludable. The price mechanism works: pay, or go without.
Public good: non-rival and non-excludable.
Non-rival: one more user adds nothing to cost, so the marginal cost of an extra user is zero.
Say: "non-excludable: non-payers cannot be stopped from benefiting" — not: "it is free". Someone pays, usually through taxes.
Quick check
?Which of these is closest to a pure public good?
Mission 1
The free rider problem
Step 1 of 3
Free rider: someone who benefits from a good without paying for it.
Non-excludable → a firm cannot charge, because people can benefit anyway.
Each person thinks: "If others pay, I benefit free. If they don't, my payment alone won't be enough."
So too few pay. A firm cannot cover its costs and does not supply the good.
Result: the good is under-provided or not provided at all: a missing market.
A missing market is a complete market failure: the market does not exist, although the good would raise welfare.
Mission 1Graph lab
Will anyone pay for the flood barrier?
Two neighbours, Ana and Ben, live by a river. A barrier would protect both houses: neither can be excluded. Illustrative data. Each values the protection at 100. The barrier costs 150. Together they value it at 200, more than it costs. If both pay, they split the cost (75 each). If one pays, that person pays all 150.
Takeaway: below a cost of 100 one neighbour may pay alone; between 100 and 200 a barrier worth building is not built.
Quick check
?A coastal town has 1,000 households. Each values a new sea wall at 50. The sea wall costs 20,000 to build. (Illustrative data.) Which statement is correct?
Mission 1
Real world: who pays for lighthouses?
A lighthouse beam is non-rival (one more ship sees it at no extra cost) and non-excludable at sea.
Textbook result: no firm could make ships pay, so the state must provide.
In the British Isles, lighthouses are paid for by light dues: a charge on commercial ships when they call at a port.
The money goes into the General Lighthouse Fund, overseen by the UK Department for Transport.
A ship cannot be excluded from the light. It can be excluded from the port. The charge is tied to something excludable.
The dues are compulsory and set by government: closer to a tax than a market price.
Mission 1
How governments respond
Direct provision: government supplies the good and pays through taxation. Taxes are compulsory, so free riding is overcome.
Examples: national defence, flood defences, street lighting.
Government may produce the good itself (state employees, state-owned assets).
Or government pays a private firm to produce the good. The state still finances it; users still pay nothing at the point of use.
This is contracting out to the private sector.
The hard part: with no market price, how much does society value the good? Government must estimate it (cost-benefit analysis).
Quick check
?A city council pays a private company to install and maintain all its street lights. Residents pay nothing directly. What has happened?
Mission 1Evaluate
Must the state provide public goods?
It depends on:
How non-excludable the good really is. Charging may be possible where users can be shut out (light dues at ports), or once technology allows it (electronic road tolls).
Information. Government must guess how much people value the good; it can provide too much or too little (government failure).
The cost of taxation and of state production. Contracting out may cut costs, but contracts are hard to write and monitor.
Group size. A few neighbours may agree to share a cost; with millions of people, free riding dominates.
Mission check
?A city plans to spray against disease-carrying mosquitoes. Spraying the whole city costs 2 million; residents together value the protection at 5 million. (Illustrative data.) A private firm offers to spray if enough residents sign up and pay. Why is the market likely to under-provide the spraying?
When non-payers cannot be shut out, payment collapses, even for a good worth more than it costs.
Mission 2
Mission 2: Why does a factory that pays all its own bills still produce too much?
Make a guess: Why does a factory that pays all its own bills still produce too much?
Mission 2
The cost nobody pays for
A firm pays for labour, materials, energy: its private costs.
Its production may also harm third parties, who are outside the trade: polluted air and rivers, noise, carbon emissions.
That harm is an external cost. Nobody pays the firm's victims through the market.
Social cost = private cost + external cost.
At the margin: MSC = MPC + MEC (marginal external cost).
A negative production externality = an external cost created by producing a good.
Examples: a chemical plant's waste in a river harms fishing downstream; an airport's noise lowers the value of nearby homes; a coal power station's emissions harm health.
Mission 2
Worked example: adding up social cost
Illustrative data: a paper mill dumps waste in a river. Per tonne of paper:
Marginal external cost (lost fishing, water cleaning downstream) = 80.
MSC = MPC + MEC = 300 + 80 = 380.
Buyers value the last tonne at 360 (MPB). No external benefit, so MSB = 360.
The mill makes the tonne: to it, 360 > 300. To society: 360 − 380 = −20. Society loses 20 on that tonne.
If all 1,000 tonnes cost the same: private cost 300,000; external cost 80,000; social cost 380,000.
Quick check
?Illustrative data: a cement works has a marginal private cost of 45 per tonne. Its dust causes a marginal external cost of 15 per tonne to nearby residents. What is the marginal social cost of a tonne of cement?
Mission 2
The diagram
Step 1 of 3
Step 1: the market. Supply = MPC; demand = MPB = MSB (no external benefit). Market equilibrium at Qm, Pm.
Step 2: add the external cost. MSC lies above MPC; the vertical gap = MEC.
Step 3: the social optimum is where MSB = MSC: Q* (less), P* (higher).
Firms respond to private costs only, so the market produces Qm > Q*: overproduction.
The price Pm is too low: it does not include the external cost.
Say: "the market overproduces compared with the social optimum" — not: "the market is in disequilibrium".
Mission 2
The welfare loss
For each unit from Q* to Qm: MSC > MSB. It costs society more than it is worth.
Adding up these losses gives a triangle:
corners: the social optimum (MSB = MSC); MSC at Qm; MSB at Qm.
The triangle points towards the social optimum.
Called the welfare loss.
Say: "welfare loss = the triangle between MSC and MSB, from Q* to Qm" — not: "the whole area between MSC and MPC". That bigger area is the external cost of all output, most of which is still worth bearing.
Mission 2Graph lab
Turn up the pollution
Illustrative data: MPB = MSB = 100 − Q; MPC = 20 + Q. The marginal external cost (MEC) is the same for every unit.
Takeaway: a bigger MEC does not change what the market produces; it lowers the social optimum and widens the welfare loss.
Mission 2
Worked example: calculating the welfare loss
Illustrative data: MPB = MSB = 100 − Q; MPC = 20 + Q; MEC = 20 per unit, so MSC = 40 + Q.
Market: 100 − Q = 20 + Q, so Qm = 40, Pm = 60.
Social optimum: 100 − Q = 40 + Q, so Q* = 30, P* = 70.
Compare: total external cost at Qm = 20 × 40 = 800. The welfare loss is only 100: most of the external cost (20 × 30 = 600) falls on units that are still worth producing.
Quick check
?A negative production externality diagram has MPB = MSB, MPC and MSC. The points are:
Point
Where it is
W
where MSC meets MSB (above Q*)
X
on MSC directly above Qm
Y
where MPC meets MPB (at Qm)
Z
on MPC directly below W (at Q*)
Which area shows the welfare loss?
Quick check
?Illustrative data: MPB = MSB = 90 − Q; MPC = 10 + Q; MEC = 16 per unit at every output. What is the welfare loss at the market equilibrium?
Mission 2
Putting a number on the external cost
Carbon dioxide is a global external cost: emissions anywhere add to climate damage everywhere.
The social cost of carbon estimates the damage from one more tonne of CO₂, in today's money.
Two US government estimates for emissions in 2020: $51 per tonne (2021) and $190 per tonne (2023).
The gap comes mostly from assumptions, above all how much weight to give damage to people in the future.
So the MEC used for policy depends on value judgements, not only on science.
Mission 2Evaluate
How big is the problem?
It depends on measuring MEC. Health, nature and future harm have no market price, so estimates vary widely.
It depends on elasticity. For a given MEC, the more price elastic demand and supply are, the bigger the overproduction (Qm − Q*) and the welfare loss.
It depends on who and where. Many small polluters, or harm across borders, make the external cost hard to trace and charge.
It depends on time. Some damage builds up over years (carbon, soil), so today's MEC may understate the harm.
Ways to correct it (taxes, regulation, permits, property rights) are in Mission 7.
Mission check
?Illustrative data: a fertiliser plant's runoff harms a lake. The table shows marginal values at each output (thousand tonnes).
Output
MPB = MSB
MPC
MEC
10
90
30
10
20
80
40
15
30
70
50
20
40
60
60
25
50
50
70
30
What is the socially optimal output?
The social optimum still has some pollution. It is where the value of the last unit equals its full cost, including the harm to others.
Mission 3
Mission 3: When a product harms people nearby who never bought it, why does the market sell too much?
Make a guess: When a product harms people nearby who never bought it, why does the market sell too much?
Mission 3
Benefit to you, cost to others
Marginal private benefit (MPB): the benefit to the buyer of one more unit. It is the buyer's demand curve.
Some consumption harms third parties: people outside the deal.
Marginal external cost (MEC) of consumption: the harm to third parties from one more unit consumed.
Marginal social benefit (MSB) = MPB − MEC. The external cost cuts the benefit to society.
Buyers respond to private, not external, costs and benefits.
Example: second-hand smoke. Tobacco kills over 7 million people a year, including over 1.6 million non-smokers exposed to second-hand smoke (WHO).
Other cases: loud music at night, litter, driving after drinking alcohol.
Mission 3
Overconsumption on the diagram
Step 1 of 3
Step 1: no production externality, so MPC = MSC. The market settles where MPB = MPC: quantity Q1, price P1.
Step 2: MSB lies below MPB by the external cost. The social optimum is where MSB = MSC: quantity Q*.
Q1 > Q*: the market overconsumes.
Step 3: each unit from Q* to Q1 has MSC above MSB. Society loses on every one.
The shaded triangle between Q* and Q1 is the welfare loss. It points to the social optimum.
Say: "the welfare loss is the triangle between Q* and Q1" — not: "the whole area under MSB".
Mission 3Graph lab
Turn up the harm
Takeaway: the market ignores external costs, so a bigger external cost means a bigger gap between Q1 and Q*.
Quick check
?A product causes no external cost in production, so MPC = MSC = 10 for the 50th unit. For that unit, the buyer's MPB is 12 and the external cost of consuming it is 4 (illustrative data). From society's point of view, should the 50th unit be consumed?
Mission 3
Demerit goods
A demerit good is more harmful to the consumer than they realise.
It is overconsumed if left to the market.
Examples often given: tobacco, alcohol, gambling, recreational drugs.
Why overconsumed:
Imperfect information: buyers underestimate the harm to themselves.
Short-termism and addiction: today's pleasure outweighs tomorrow's cost.
External costs: most demerit goods also harm third parties.
Calling a good "demerit" is a value judgement: someone decides it is bad for people.
Mission 3
The demerit-good diagram
Step 1 of 3
Step 1: buyers act on MPB (perceived). Market at Q1, where it meets MPC = MSC.
Step 2: with full information, buyers would value it less: MPB (full information) lies lower. Quantity falls to Q2.
Step 3: adding the external cost gives MSB, lower still. Social optimum Q* where MSB = MSC.
Overconsumption: Q1 > Q2 > Q*. Welfare loss: the triangle between Q* and Q1.
Say: "overconsumed" for a demerit good — not: "overproduced because firms make too much".
Mission 3
Who decides what is "bad"?
Positive statement: can be tested against evidence. "Smokers underestimate the risk of lung cancer."
Normative statement (value judgement): an opinion about what ought to be. "People should not smoke."
Case for treating a good as demerit:
Evidence of information failure, addiction, harm to others.
Case against:
Consumer sovereignty: adults are the best judges of their own welfare.
Fears of paternalism: the state imposing its tastes.
Which goods count changes over time and between societies.
Policy responses (taxes, bans, information) are in Mission 7.
Quick check
?Which of these statements about a product is a value judgement, not a positive statement?
Mission 3Evaluate
How serious is the overconsumption?
It depends on the size of the external cost: hard to measure, so Q* is an estimate.
It depends on information: if buyers learn the true harm, perceived MPB falls on its own.
It depends on who is harmed: harm to the buyer alone is a weaker case than harm to others.
It depends on the value judgement: views differ on how far the state should overrule personal choices.
Mission check
?In a city's main streets, late-night fast food leaves litter behind. Cleaning it up costs the city, and residents dislike it. The food sellers and buyers pay nothing towards this. What happens in the market for late-night fast food?
The market counts only what buyers and sellers feel. A cost that lands on third parties is left out, so too much is consumed.
Mission 4
Mission 4: If a vaccine also protects the people around you, why might too few people get one?
Make a guess: If a vaccine also protects the people around you, why might too few people get one?
Mission 4
Benefits that spill over
Marginal private benefit (MPB): the benefit to the buyer of one more unit. It is the demand curve.
Marginal external benefit (MEB): the benefit to third parties of one more unit.
Marginal social benefit (MSB) = MPB + MEB.
Buyers respond to private benefits only. The external benefit is ignored.
Example: vaccination. Each vaccinated person also lowers the chance that others catch the disease.
Measles vaccination averted an estimated 60 million deaths worldwide in 2000–2023.
Goal: 95% coverage with 2 doses. Actual global coverage in 2023: 83% for dose 1, 74% for dose 2.
Many things cause that shortfall, such as access, cost and conflict. The spillover is one reason why free choice alone may not close it.
Other cases: education, training, restoring old buildings.
Mission 4
Underconsumption on the diagram
Step 1 of 3
Step 1: MPC = MSC (no production externality). The market settles where MPB = MPC: Q1, P1.
Step 2: MSB lies above MPB by the external benefit. Social optimum Q* where MSB = MSC.
Q1 < Q*: the market underconsumes.
Step 3: units from Q1 to Q* have MSB above MSC, but are not consumed. The lost surplus is the welfare loss triangle, pointing to the social optimum.
Say: "underconsumption" or "underprovision" — not: "demand is too low", which makes it sound like a demand shift.
Mission 4Graph lab
Turn up the spillover
Takeaway: the market ignores external benefits, so the bigger they are, the further Q1 falls short of Q*.
Quick check
?A diagram shows a positive consumption externality with MPC = MSC.
Point
Where it is
X
MPB meets MPC = MSC, at Q1
Y
MSB meets MPC = MSC, at Q*
Z
On MSB, directly above X at Q1
Which area shows the welfare loss?
Mission 4
Merit goods
A merit good is more beneficial to the consumer than they realise.
It is underconsumed if left to the market.
Examples often given: education, healthcare, vaccination, pensions.
Why underconsumed:
Imperfect information: people underestimate the long-run benefit to themselves.
Short-termism: the cost is now, the benefit years later.
External benefits: most merit goods also benefit others.
Calling a good "merit" is a value judgement.
Merit goods are not public goods: they are rival and excludable (see Mission 1).
Mission 4
The merit-good diagram
Step 1 of 3
Step 1: buyers act on MPB (perceived). Market at Q1, where it meets MPC = MSC.
Step 2: with full information, they would value it more: MPB (full information) lies higher. Quantity Q2.
Step 3: adding the external benefit gives MSB, higher still. Social optimum Q* where MSB = MSC.
Underconsumption: Q1 < Q2 < Q*. Welfare loss: the triangle between Q1 and Q*.
Say: "underconsumed because of imperfect information" — not: "underconsumed because it is too expensive".
Quick check
?Many countries provide school education free of charge. Why do economists usually class education as a merit good rather than a public good?
Mission 4Evaluate
Should the government step in?
It depends on measuring the MEB: hard to value, so the right subsidy is uncertain.
It depends on information: if perceived MPB is the problem, information may be cheaper than a subsidy.
It depends on opportunity cost: money spent here cannot be spent elsewhere; risk of government failure.
It depends on the value judgement: some argue people should be free to choose; others that the state should ensure access.
Mission check
?A household in a row of joined houses pays to fit smoke alarms. A fire caught early is less likely to spread, so the neighbours are safer too. The neighbours pay nothing. Compared with the social optimum, how many smoke alarms does the market sell?
Buyers count only their own benefit. A benefit that lands on third parties is left out, so too little is bought.
Mission 5
Mission 5: Why can a used car that runs perfectly be hard to sell for what it is worth?
Make a guess: Why can a used car that runs perfectly be hard to sell for what it is worth?
Mission 5
What markets need to know
Markets allocate resources well when buyers and sellers know the prices, the quality and the consequences of what they trade.
Imperfect information: people lack some of this knowledge, so they make choices they would not make if fully informed.
Information failure: missing or uneven information leads to a misallocation of resources: a market failure.
Mission 5
Asymmetric information
Asymmetric information: one party to a deal knows more than the other.
The seller knows more:
a used car's history
whether a repair was needed
the risks of a financial product
The buyer knows more:
an insurance customer knows their own health or driving
a borrower knows how likely they are to repay
The better-informed side can gain at the other's expense, so the other side trades less, or not at all.
Say: "asymmetric information" — not: "imperfect information", when one side knows more than the other.
Quick check
?Which situation is an example of asymmetric information?
Mission 5
Hidden quality: the used-car problem
Step 1 of 3
Used cars are either good or poor ("lemons"). The seller knows which. The buyer cannot tell.
So buyers will pay only what an average car is worth to them.
Owners of good cars get less than their car is worth, so many keep them.
Fewer good cars on sale → the average falls → buyers offer even less.
The market can shrink until mostly poor cars are traded. Good cars that both sides would gladly trade are not sold.
Idea from George Akerlof, "The Market for Lemons" (1970).
Mission 5
Worked example: what will a buyer pay?
Illustrative data.
Worth to a buyer
Lowest price its owner accepts
Good car
10,000
8,000
Poor car
4,000
3,000
Half the cars are good, half are poor. A buyer cannot tell which is which.
Expected value to a buyer = 0.5 × 10,000 + 0.5 × 4,000 = 7,000.
So buyers offer at most 7,000.
Good-car owners want at least 8,000. 7,000 < 8,000 → they withdraw.
Now only poor cars are left, so buyers will pay at most 4,000.
Every good car is worth more to a buyer (10,000) than to its owner (8,000), yet none is sold.
Mission 5Graph lab
When do good cars disappear?
Same illustrative cars as the previous screen.
Takeaway: good cars sell only when at least two-thirds of cars on offer are good; below that, the market shrinks to poor cars.
Mission 5
Government responses
Provide information: make it public, free and easy to use.
Food hygiene ratings: in England, Wales and Northern Ireland, restaurants are inspected and rated from 0 to 5.
Nutrition labels; health campaigns on smoking.
Legislation and regulation: minimum standards, compulsory disclosure, consumer rights (e.g. a refund for faulty goods), bans on misleading adverts.
Private fixes also exist: warranties, independent inspections, online reviews.
Limits: information costs money to collect; people may ignore it; government may not know better than the market (government failure).
Quick check
?In England, Wales and Northern Ireland, food outlets are inspected and given a hygiene rating from 0 to 5. In England, displaying the rating at the door is voluntary. Which is the strongest reason this may not fully close the information gap in England?
Mission 5Evaluate
Should government close information gaps?
It depends on:
The cost of information: inspections and labels cost money; is the gain worth it?
Whether people use it: information is ignored if it is complex or people are biased (smokers already see warnings).
Whether government knows more: regulators may lack information too (government failure).
Private fixes: warranties, reviews and inspections may already close much of the gap.
Mission check
?Online, buyers of second-hand laptops cannot check whether a laptop's battery is healthy. Sellers know. Nothing else changes. Which outcome is most likely?
When only sellers know quality, the best products are the first to leave the market.
Mission 6
Mission 6: Why do fishers who all want fish next year still empty the sea this year?
Make a guess: Why do fishers who all want fish next year still empty the sea this year?
Mission 6
Rival, but no one can be kept out
Recall the two tests (see Mission 1): rival?excludable?
Some resources are rival but non-excludable:
fish in the open sea: a fish one boat catches, another cannot
groundwater that any landowner may pump
common grazing land; a forest anyone may log
the atmosphere's capacity to absorb pollution
Often called common access or common resources.
Say: "rival but non-excludable" — not: "a public good". A public good is non-rival.
Quick check
?Which of these is a common pool (open-access) resource?
Mission 6
The tragedy of the commons
Step 1 of 3
Tragedy of the commons: users of a common resource, each acting in their own interest, over-use it until it is depleted.
Each user gets all the benefit of using more.
The cost (a smaller stock, lower catches for everyone, now and later) is shared among all users.
So each user's private gain from using more is larger than the gain to society.
Everyone reasons the same way. Total use exceeds the sustainable level: the stock shrinks year after year.
Nobody owns the stock, so nobody gains from conserving it.
The root cause is missing property rights: if the stock had an owner, that owner would gain from keeping it.
Mission 6
Worked example: one more tonne
Illustrative data. 10 boats share a fishing ground.
One extra tonne caught today shrinks the breeding stock, so future catches fall by 2 tonnes in total.
That loss is shared equally among the 10 boats.
The boat that catches the extra tonne:
gains 1 tonne
loses its share of the future loss: 2 ÷ 10 = 0.2 tonnes
net: 1 − 0.2 = +0.8 tonnes → it fishes more
Society: 1 − 2 = −1 tonne → the extra catch makes everyone worse off overall.
With 100 boats, each boat's share is only 0.02 tonnes. The more users, the weaker each one's reason to hold back.
Quick check
?20 farmers graze cows on common land. One farmer adds an extra cow, which gives her milk worth 300. The extra grazing means every cow on the common gives less milk: a total loss of 600 spread equally across the 20 farmers. (Illustrative data.) What is the effect on society, and will she add the cow?
Mission 6
Unsustainable use is a negative externality
Step 1 of 3
Each boat's private cost (MPC): fuel, crew, nets.
It ignores the external cost it imposes on others: lower catches for other boats and for future fishers.
Market catch Q1 > socially optimal Q*: over-use.
Mission 6Graph lab
How much should the fleet catch?
Illustrative data. Fish demand and boats' private costs are fixed. The market catch is 80 tonnes.
Takeaway: the market catch stays at 80 however large the external cost; a fee equal to the external cost brings the catch to Q*.
Mission 6
Real world: the northern cod
Off Newfoundland, Canada, the northern cod stock supported fishing for centuries.
After the Second World War, factory freezer trawlers and sonar made catches far bigger.
Quotas existed, but stock estimates were too high, and a 1989 advice to cut quotas by half was not followed.
On 2 July 1992 Canada stopped the fishery: a moratorium.
About 40,000 fishers and related workers were affected: the largest layoff in Canadian history.
The stock did not quickly recover. A limited commercial fishery reopened only in 2024.
Lesson: over-use can destroy a resource. Government limits can also fail when information is poor.
Mission 6
Managing the commons
Legislation and regulation: catch quotas, closed seasons, minimum net mesh sizes, protected areas.
Tradable permits (tradable quotas): a cap on the total catch, split into shares that can be bought and sold.
Property rights: give a user, a group or the state ownership of the resource, so the owner gains from conserving it.
Mission 6Evaluate
Can over-use be stopped?
It depends on:
Information. How big is the stock and how fast does it regrow? The cod quotas were set on estimates that were too high.
Monitoring and enforcement costs. Oceans are vast; illegal catches are hard to spot.
Political pressure. Quotas mean lost jobs now for gains later.
The users. Small groups who know each other can often govern a common well; thousands of anonymous users rarely can.
Mission check
?In a dry valley, farmers pump water from one shared underground aquifer. Any landowner may drill a well, and the water table is falling each year. Which explanation is best?
When a resource is rival but open to all, private gains and shared costs push use beyond what it can sustain.
Mission 7
Mission 7: Should a government tax pollution, ban it, or let firms buy and sell the right to pollute?
Make a guess: A factory's smoke harms people nearby. What should a government aim for?
Mission 7
The aim: make the polluter face the full cost
Governments intervene to correct market failure, and also to raise revenue, redistribute income and protect consumers.
A negative externality: the market produces Qm, more than the social optimum Q* (see Mission 2).
The fix: make decision-makers face the external cost. This is internalising the externality.
The target is Q*, not zero. Some pollution is worth its cost.
Two families of tools:
market-based: taxes, subsidies, tradable permits, property rights. They change prices or incentives.
command and control: regulation, bans, limits. They set rules.
Others: information, government provision, agreements between countries.
Mission 7
A tax on each unit
Step 1 of 3
A Pigouvian tax: a tax per unit equal to the MEC at the social optimum.
Firms now pay MPC + tax. Supply shifts up, from MPC to MPC + tax.
If MEC is the same for every unit, MPC + tax = MSC.
Quantity falls from Qm to Q*. Price rises from Pm to P*.
Consumers and producers share the tax; the government gains tax revenue.
The welfare loss triangle disappears.
Say: "the tax internalises the external cost" — not: "the tax ends the pollution".
Mission 7
Worked example: setting the tax
Illustrative data (from Mission 2): MPB = MSB = 100 − Q; MPC = 20 + Q; MEC = 20 per unit.
No tax: 100 − Q = 20 + Q, so Qm = 40, Pm = 60. Welfare loss = 100.
Takeaway: the tax must match the MEC. Too low leaves overproduction; too high causes underproduction.
Quick check
?Illustrative data: MPB = MSB = 120 − Q; MPC = 30 + Q. The MEC is 30 at every output. The government sets a per-unit tax equal to the MEC. How much tax revenue does it raise?
Mission 7
Carbon taxes
A carbon tax: a tax per tonne of CO₂ emitted, charged on fuels by their carbon content.
On a polluting industry, e.g. coal-fired electricity: S1 → S2 (S + tax). Price rises, quantity falls.
Low-carbon producers become relatively cheaper. Firms and households switch.
Real world: British Columbia, Canada.
2008: tax of C$10 per tonne CO₂e, with the revenue meant to be returned through other tax cuts.
2024: C$80 per tonne.
A 2015 review of studies put emissions 5–15% lower than without the tax.
1 April 2025: the tax on consumers was ended, as Canada dropped its national requirement for one.
Lesson: a carbon tax can cut emissions, but it lasts only while it keeps political support.
Mission 7
Subsidies for positive externalities
Some goods give external benefits (see Mission 4): MSB > MPB, so the market underproduces.
A subsidy per unit equal to the MEB at Q*: supply shifts down to MPC − subsidy.
Output rises to Q*; price to buyers falls.
Cost to the government = subsidy × Q*.
Examples: vaccinations, public transport fares, home insulation.
Subsidising a clean substitute (e.g. electric buses) also cuts demand for the polluting good.
Mission 7
Rules: regulation and legislation
Command and control: the law sets limits, enforced by inspection and fines.
emissions standards; limits on output or a cap at Q*
bans where the harm is severe: leaded petrol, CFCs
Real world: leaded petrol, still sold in 117 countries in 2002, was used for the last time in 2021 (UNEP).
Strengths: simple, certain, quick; best when the harm is dangerous at any level.
Limits: the same rule for every firm ignores their different costs of cutting; no reward for cutting more than the rule asks; inspection is costly.
Quick check
?A pesticide sold to farmers is found to poison rivers and wildlife even in very small amounts. What is the strongest economic case for banning it rather than taxing it?
Mission 7
Tradable permits
Step 1 of 2
The government sets a cap: the total pollution allowed. It issues that many permits (1 permit = 1 tonne).
Permits are given out or auctioned. Firms may buy and sell them.
Firms that can cut cheaply cut more and sell spare permits. Firms that find cutting costly buy.
Illustrative data: firms A and B each emit 100 t. Cap = 150 permits, 75 each.
Cost of cutting 1 t: A 20, B 60.
No trade: each cuts 25 t. Cost = 25 × 20 + 25 × 60 = 2,000.
Trade at 40 a permit: A cuts 50 t (cost 1,000) and sells 25 permits to B (+1,000). B cuts nothing and pays 1,000.
Same total emissions (150 t). Total cost of cutting falls to 1,000.
The permit price rises as the cap tightens: a price on pollution, set by the market.
Mission 7
Real world: the EU Emissions Trading System
Started 2005: power stations and heavy industry in the EU.
The cap falls every year.
After the 2008 crisis, demand for permits fell. By 2013 there was a surplus of about 2 billion permits, and prices stayed low for years.
Fix: a Market Stability Reserve (from 2019) takes surplus permits off the market.
In February 2023 the price reached about €100 per tonne.
Lesson: permits fix the quantity; the price depends on how tight the cap is.
Quick check
?Illustrative data: firms X and Y each emit 60 t. Each is given 40 permits, so together they must cut 40 t. Cutting 1 t costs X 15 and Y 45. By how much does permit trading lower the total cost of cutting 40 t?
Mission 7
Property rights and bargaining
Externalities often arise because property rights are missing or unclear: no one owns the river or the air.
Assign the right, and the parties can bargain. This is the Coase idea.
Illustrative data: a factory gains 300 a year by dumping waste in a river. A fish farm downstream loses 500.
Fish farm owns the river: the factory would pay at most 300 to dump; the farm needs at least 500. No dumping.
Factory owns the river: the farm pays it between 300 and 500 to stop. No dumping.
Either way the efficient outcome is reached. The right decides who pays.
Limits: many victims (city air), high bargaining costs, harm hard to trace or measure.
Mission 7
Information, provision and agreements
Step 1 of 2
Information and education: campaigns, labels, warnings.
For a demerit good, people overvalue it. Education lowers MPB towards MSB.
Government provision: the state supplies a good with external benefits (vaccinations, public transport), to reach Q*.
Road pricing: drivers pay to use busy roads at busy times. London's congestion charge began in 2003 at £5 a day; traffic entering the zone fell by about 18% in the first year.
Mission 7Evaluate
Which tool works best?
It depends on:
Measuring the externality. A tax needs the MEC; a cap needs the right total. Both are hard to value (see Mission 2).
Elasticity of demand. If demand is price inelastic, a tax cuts output little but raises much revenue.
Enforcement and admin costs. Monitoring emissions, collecting taxes and policing bans all cost money.
Consequences for stakeholders. Carbon taxes take a bigger share of poorer households' income; returning the revenue can offset this. Firms may move production abroad.
Certainty. A permit cap fixes the quantity, not the price; a tax fixes the price, not the quantity.
Mission check
?Illustrative data: a city airport's night flights cause noise. Values per flight:
Flights per night
MPB = MSB
MPC
MEC
10
80
20
5
20
70
30
10
30
60
40
20
40
50
50
30
50
40
60
40
The government will charge a fixed tax per flight. Which tax brings the number of flights to the social optimum?
The right tax is the external cost of the last unit at the social optimum, not at the market output.
Recap
The big ideas
Mission 1
Public goods are non-rival and non-excludable; private goods are rival and excludable.
Non-excludability creates free riders, so the market under-provides or fails to provide: a missing market.
Government usually provides public goods through taxation.
It can also contract out production to private firms.
Mission 2
A negative production externality makes MSC = MPC + MEC lie above MPC.
The market produces where MPB = MPC: more than the social optimum where MSB = MSC.
The welfare loss is the triangle between MSC and MSB from Q* to Qm, pointing to the social optimum.
Mission 3
A negative consumption externality puts MSB below MPB, so the market consumes Q1 > Q* and creates a welfare loss.
Demerit goods are overconsumed because of imperfect information and external costs; calling a good "demerit" is a value judgement.
Mission 4
A positive consumption externality puts MSB above MPB, so the market stops at Q1 < Q*, with a welfare loss.
Merit goods are underconsumed because of imperfect information and external benefits; calling a good "merit" is a value judgement.
Mission 5
Information failure: missing or uneven information leads to a misallocation of resources.
Asymmetric information: one side knows more. Hidden quality can drive good products out of a market.
Governments respond with information provision and regulation.
Mission 6
Common pool (open-access) resources are rival but non-excludable.
Each user gains all the benefit but shares the cost, so the resource is over-used: the tragedy of the commons.