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CCEA GCE Economics (AS and A2) · Oligopoly; Competition policy
Mini-Lesson

Oligopoly; Competition policy

5 missions. Guess, learn, then check. Your place is saved.

  1. Mission 1Should a country's trains, water pipes and power lines be run by the state or by private companies?
  2. Mission 2When only a few big firms share a market, why do their prices so often move together?
  3. Mission 3Why do a few big rival firms so often compete on brand and quality instead of simply cutting prices?
  4. Mission 4How can two rival firms each make their best choice and still both end up worse off?
  5. Mission 5When should a government stop big firms from merging, fixing prices or growing too powerful?

Also part of this unit: 1 mission in Market failure (part 1); 1 mission in Costs and revenues; 1 mission in Market structures; Perfect competition; Monopoly; Monopolistic competition.

Mission 1

Mission 1: Should a country's trains, water pipes and power lines be run by the state or by private companies?

Make a guess: Should a country's trains, water pipes and power lines be run by the state or by private companies?

Mission 1

Four tools, four meanings

  • Nationalisation: the state takes a firm or industry into public ownership.
  • Privatisation: transfer of a firm or activity from the public sector to the private sector.
  • Regulation: rules set by government or an appointed regulator, e.g. on prices, quality, safety or entry.
  • Deregulation: removing rules that restrict entry, prices or how firms operate.
  • Ownership (who owns it) and market structure (how many rivals) are separate questions.
  • Say: "privatisation changes the owner" — not: "privatisation creates competition".
Mission 1

Forms of privatisation

Ownership and control mapWho owns?publicsectorprivatesectorprivatisationnationalisationWho provides?state staffprivatecontractorcontractingoutstate still paysWho may enter?private rivallicence gatestatemonopolyderegulation / liberalisation
  • Sale of a state-owned firm: shares sold to the public or a buyer (denationalisation). E.g. British Telecom (1984).
  • Contracting out (competitive tendering): the state still pays for a service but invites private firms to bid to provide it, e.g. bin collection.
  • Liberalisation: opening a state monopoly to private rivals (a form of deregulation).
  • Public–private partnership (PPP): a private firm finances, builds and often runs a public project (e.g. a hospital); the state pays over many years.
  • Sale of state assets, e.g. land or council houses.
Mission 1

The case for privatisation

  • Profit motive: private owners gain from cutting costs, so less X-inefficiency (waste when a firm faces little pressure to keep costs down).
  • Shareholder pressure: a poorly run firm's share price falls, and it risks a takeover.
  • Competition, where the industry allows rivals: lower prices, more choice.
  • Access to private capital for investment, without adding to government borrowing.
  • One-off revenue for the government from the sale.
  • Less political interference in pricing and investment decisions.
  • Example: the UK sold telecoms (1984), gas (1986), water in England and Wales (1989), electricity (1990–91) and rail (1994–97).
Mission 1

The case against, and renationalisation

  • A natural monopoly (one network serves the whole market most cheaply, e.g. a power grid) sold whole stays a monopoly: a private monopoly still needs regulation.
  • Short-termism: dividends may come before long-term investment.
  • Social objectives may be dropped, e.g. loss-making rural routes.
  • Sale price: if shares are sold too cheaply, taxpayers lose; the one-off revenue replaces a flow of future profits.
  • Fragmentation: splitting a network among many firms can raise coordination costs.
  • Renationalisation arguments: run for the public interest, cheaper public borrowing, no dividends to pay out, one integrated network.
  • Example: Railtrack (privatised rail infrastructure) was replaced in 2002 by Network Rail, now a public body. A 2024 law lets passenger train services in Great Britain return to public ownership as contracts end.
Quick check
?A city council stops using its own staff to clean public parks. It invites private firms to bid, and pays the winning firm to do the work for five years. The parks stay free to use. Which policy is this?
Mission 1

Nationalisation: evaluate

  • For:
    • Can price nearer MC and serve social aims (e.g. universal service), not just profit.
    • Long-term investment in networks; account for externalities.
    • Rescue of a failing firm that the economy relies on, e.g. the bank Northern Rock (UK, 2008).
  • Against:
    • Weak profit incentive: X-inefficiency; losses may be covered by taxpayers (a "soft budget").
    • Political interference, e.g. prices held down before elections.
    • Investment competes with schools and hospitals for public money.
    • Cost of compensating the previous owners.
  • As competition policy: public ownership removes the incentive to exploit monopoly power for profit, but it does not add rivals.
Mission 1

Deregulation, licences and prohibitions

Licence capFare (Price)0PeQeRides per day (Quantity)DS = MCFree market: D meets S = MC at Pe, Qe.
  • A licence limits who may operate (e.g. taxis, mobile spectrum). A prohibition bans an activity outright.
  • Deregulation removes barriers, so new firms can enter: supply rises, prices fall, choice widens.
  • Example: the US Airline Deregulation Act (1978) ended government control of fares and routes.
  • Example: UK local buses outside London were deregulated in 1986: any licensed operator could run a route.
  • Risks: firms "cherry-pick" profitable routes; safety and quality may suffer; financial deregulation can raise risk-taking.
  • Say: "deregulation lowers barriers to entry" — not: "deregulation means no rules at all".
Mission 1Graph lab

Lift the licence cap

Illustrative data. A city caps taxi licences, limiting rides to 5,000 a day. Fare: 20. Cost of the last ride (MC): 11.

Lift the licence capFare, costRides per day5,0002011DS = MClicence capgap 9
  • Takeaway: removing an entry limit shifts the market to where price = MC. The gap was a reward for holding a licence.
Licence capFare (Price)020PePe = 14115,000QeQe = 8,000Rides per day (Quantity)DS = MCLicence capcap removedlicence reward: the gap between fare andcostFree market: D meets S = MC at Pe, Qe.Entry allowed: rides rise and the fare falls to thecost of the last ride.
Mission 1

Worked example: competitive tendering

  • Illustrative data. A council's in-house refuse service costs 1.20 million a year.
  • Bids: Firm X 0.96 million; Firm Y 1.02 million.
  • Saving with X = 1.20 − 0.96 = 0.24 million. As a %: 0.24 ÷ 1.20 × 100 = 20%.
  • Saving with Y = 0.18 million = 15%.
  • But the cheapest bid is not always best value: check quality standards, penalties for missed collections, and staff terms.
  • Example: UK councils had to tender services such as refuse collection after the Local Government Act 1988.
  • PPP example: the UK's Private Finance Initiative (from 1992) built hospitals and schools. In 2018 the UK government stopped signing new PFI deals, after the National Audit Office questioned their value for money. Supporters point to projects delivered on time and risk passed to private firms.
Quick check
?Illustrative data. A hospital spends 2.50 million a year on its own cleaning staff. After tendering, it accepts a bid of 2.00 million a year. What is the percentage saving?
Mission 1

What regulators do

  • Where competition is weak, a regulator acts for consumers in its place.
  • Role: set price caps, quality and service standards; grant licences; give rivals fair access to networks; fine firms that break the rules.
  • UK examples: Ofwat (water), Ofgem (energy), Ofcom (communications), the Office of Rail and Road.
  • In Northern Ireland: the Utility Regulator (electricity, gas, water). Know the role and purpose only.
Mission 1

When regulators fail

  • Asymmetric information: the firm knows its costs better than the regulator. It may overstate costs to win a looser price cap.
  • Regulatory capture: a regulator comes to act in the interests of the firms it regulates, not consumers.
  • Why capture happens:
    • The regulator relies on the industry for information and expert staff.
    • A revolving door: staff move between regulator and industry.
    • A few firms gain a lot and lobby hard; millions of consumers each lose a little.
  • Example: after the 2010 Deepwater Horizon oil spill, the US Minerals Management Service, criticised as too close to the industry it oversaw, was broken up (2010–11).
  • Say: "regulatory capture" — not: "the regulator was bribed". Capture can happen without any law being broken.
Quick check
?Illustrative case: a country's rail regulator hires most of its senior staff from the train companies. Over ten years it approves every fare rise the companies ask for, using cost figures that only the companies collect. Which problem does this best show?
Mission 1Evaluate

Does it work?

  • It depends on competition: privatising a firm that faces rivals differs from selling a natural monopoly.
  • It depends on regulation: information, capture and the regulator's powers.
  • It depends on time: cost savings may come fast; under-investment may show only years later.
  • It depends on objectives: efficiency and low prices, or universal service and equity?
  • Evidence on ownership is mixed: many studies find that competition and regulation matter at least as much as who owns the firm.
Mission check

?Illustrative case: a government sells its state-owned national electricity grid as a single company. There is still only one grid, and the government sets up no regulator. What is the most likely result for the price of using the grid?
Mission 2

Mission 2: When only a few big firms share a market, why do their prices so often move together?

Make a guess: When only a few big firms share a market, why do their prices so often move together?

Mission 2

A few firms dominate

  • Oligopoly: a market dominated by a few large firms.
  • High barriers to entry (economies of scale, brands, patents, high start-up costs).
  • Products may be identical (cement, crude oil) or differentiated (cars, smartphones, supermarkets).
  • Much non-price competition: advertising, branding, loyalty schemes (more in Mission 3).
Mission 2

Interdependence

  • Interdependence: each firm's best choice depends on what its rivals do.
  • So every decision (price, output, advertising) brings uncertainty: how will rivals react?
  • If one firm cuts its price, rivals may match the cut to protect their sales. All end up with lower prices and little extra market share.
  • If one firm raises its price, rivals may not follow, and it loses customers to them.
  • Matching cuts can spiral into a price war: each firm undercuts the others, and profits fall for all.
  • Say: "oligopolists are interdependent" — not: "oligopolists ignore their rivals" or "oligopolists always collude".
Mission 2

Compete or collude?

  • Non-collusive oligopoly: firms compete; each decides alone.
  • Collusive oligopoly: firms cooperate to limit competition, e.g. fixing prices or sharing out markets.
  • Overt (explicit) collusion: a formal agreement. A cartel is a group of firms that agree on prices or output.
  • Tacit collusion: no agreement, but firms behave as if there were one, e.g. following a price leader.
  • Why collude? Less uncertainty, higher joint profit, keeping new firms out.
  • Why not? Cartels are illegal in most countries, there may be fines, and members may cheat.
Mission 2

When does a cartel work?

  • A cartel is more likely to hold when there are:
    • few firms (easier to agree and to watch each other)
    • similar costs and similar products (easier to agree one price)
    • high barriers to entry (no newcomers to undercut the cartel)
    • easy monitoring of rivals' prices and output (cheating gets spotted)
    • stable demand (less pressure to break ranks)
    • weak enforcement of competition law
  • Consequences: higher prices, lower output, high profit for members, less choice; buyers lose surplus.
Quick check
?Four firms in a market are thinking of forming a cartel. Which set of conditions makes the cartel most likely to last?
Mission 2

A cartel acts like a monopoly

Cartel as monopolyPrice0Pcartel20Qcartel80QuantityAR = DMRMC = AC2020Cartel: MR = MC at Q = 40, price P = 60 read upto AR. Competitive benchmark: P = 20, Q = 80.joint profit, shared out as two quotas of 20
  • The members act as one firm: they face the industry demand curve.
  • Joint profit is greatest where industry MR = MC. Price is read up to AR.
  • Members then share the output out as quotas.
  • Illustrative data: AR = 100 − Q; MC = AC = 20 for every member.
    • Cartel: MR = 100 − 2Q = 20, so Q = 40, P = 60.
    • Competitive benchmark: P = MC = 20, Q = 80.
Mission 2

Worked example: the pull to cheat

CheatingProfit of each firm (illustrative data)800800Both keep toquota875700A cheats750750Both cheatFirm AFirm B
  • Illustrative data: two firms, A and B. AR = 100 − Q. MC = AC = 20.
  • Cartel quotas: 20 each. Q = 40, P = 60. Profit each: (60 − 20) × 20 = 800.
  • A secretly produces 25. Q = 45, so P = 100 − 45 = 55.
    • A: (55 − 20) × 25 = 875. A gains.
    • B: (55 − 20) × 20 = 700. B loses.
  • If both produce 25: Q = 50, P = 50. Each earns (50 − 20) × 25 = 750.
  • Each firm gains by cheating, whatever the other does. Together they lose. (Payoff matrix in Mission 4.)
Mission 2Graph lab

Break the quota?

Illustrative data as the previous screen. B keeps to its quota of 20.

Break the quota?800A's profit800B's profit1,600Joint profit
  • Takeaway: cheating pays the cheater (up to a point) but lowers joint profit and the other member's profit.
Quick check
?Illustrative data as an earlier screen: AR = 100 − Q, MC = AC = 20, quotas of 20 each. Firm A produces 30; firm B keeps to 20. What is B's profit?
Mission 2

Price leadership and tacit collusion

  • Price leadership: one firm changes its price; the others follow.
    • Dominant-firm leadership: the largest firm leads.
    • Barometric leadership: a firm that reads market conditions well leads.
  • No meeting and no agreement: this is tacit collusion, which is hard to prove.
  • Result: prices that move together and stay stable for long periods.
Mission 2

The kinked demand curve

Kinked demandPrice0P = 10Q = 100QuantityrelativelyelasticrelativelyinelasticAR = DMRMC1MC2Rivals ignore a price rise but match a cut, so ARhas a kink at the current price.MR has a vertical gap at Q = 100: from 5 downto below zero (-15).MC1 and MC2 both pass through the gap in MR.
  • A model of price rigidity in non-collusive oligopoly.
  • Assumption: rivals do not follow a price rise, but do match a price cut.
  • Above the current price: demand is relatively price elastic (a rise loses many sales).
  • Below the current price: demand is relatively price inelastic (a cut wins few sales).
  • So the demand (AR) curve has a kink at the current price, and MR has a vertical gap below the kink.
  • MC can rise or fall within the gap with no change in profit-maximising price or output.
  • Limits: it does not explain how the starting price was set, and firms do change prices (e.g. when all face a cost rise).
Mission 2

Worked example: PED and revenue at the kink

Kinked demandPrice0P = 10Q = 100QuantityrelativelyelasticrelativelyinelasticAR = DMRMC1MC2Rivals ignore a price rise but match a cut, so ARhas a kink at the current price.MR has a vertical gap at Q = 100: from 5 downto below zero (-15).MC1 and MC2 both pass through the gap in MR.
  • Illustrative data. Current price 10; quantity 100. Total revenue = 10 × 100 = 1,000.
  • Rise to 11: rivals do not follow; Q falls to 80.
    • PED = −20% ÷ +10% = −2 (elastic). TR = 11 × 80 = 880. TR falls.
  • Cut to 9: rivals match; Q rises to only 104.
    • PED = +4% ÷ −10% = −0.4 (inelastic). TR = 9 × 104 = 936. TR falls.
  • Either change cuts revenue, so the firm keeps the price at 10.
  • MR just left of the kink = 5; just right of it, MR is below zero (−15). Any MC curve passing through this gap (here, MC of 5 or less at Q = 100) keeps output at 100.
Quick check
?A firm faces a kinked demand curve, with the kink at its current price. Its marginal cost rises, but the new MC curve still passes through the vertical gap in MR. What happens?
Mission 2

Real cartels

  • OPEC: set up in 1960 by Iran, Iraq, Kuwait, Saudi Arabia and Venezuela. Members agree production targets to influence the world oil price.
  • Truck makers (EU): in 2016 the European Commission fined truck makers a total of €2.93 billion for colluding on prices from 1997 to 2011.
  • One member, MAN, revealed the cartel and was not fined: the law rewards the first to confess.
  • In the UK, cartels are illegal under the Competition Act 1998. The CMA investigates them.
  • OPEC is made up of governments, not private firms. Competition laws on cartels do not apply to it in the same way.
Mission 2Evaluate

Is oligopoly good or bad?

  • Costs: prices above MC (allocative inefficiency); collusion transfers surplus to firms; heavy advertising may add to costs.
  • Benefits: economies of scale can mean low average costs; supernormal profit can fund research and new products (dynamic efficiency); non-price competition can raise quality and choice.
  • It depends on conduct: fierce rivalry (even price wars) helps buyers; collusion harms them.
  • It depends on barriers: if entry is possible, the threat of new firms limits high prices.
  • It depends on regulation: the chance of being caught and fined.
Mission check

?Illustrative case: three airlines fly the same route at similar fares. One airline thinks about cutting its fare by 10%. Which is the strongest reason it may decide not to?
Mission 3

Mission 3: Why do a few big rival firms so often compete on brand and quality instead of simply cutting prices?

Make a guess: Why do a few big rival firms so often compete on brand and quality instead of simply cutting prices?

Mission 3

Rivals watching rivals

  • Oligopoly: a few large firms dominate the market (see Mission 2).
  • Firms are interdependent: each firm's best move depends on how its rivals react.
  • Two ways to win customers:
    • Price competition: cutting prices below rivals'.
    • Non-price competition: anything else that wins customers: branding, advertising, quality, design, service.
Mission 3

Worked example: a price war

Price warDaily profit, two rival firms (illustrative data)Profit AProfit BPrice 10400Price 10400Price 9450Price 10240400 at the startPrice 9330Price 9330400 at the startBoth charge 10 and sell 100 units. AC = 6, soeach earns (10 - 6) × 100 = 400.A cuts to 9 and sells 150: profit 450. B keeps 10and sells 60: profit 240.B matches at 9: both sell 110 and earn 330. Bothare worse off than at the start. B might cut to 8,then A to 7: a price war.
  • Illustrative data. Two firms, A and B. Each sells 100 units a day at 10. AC = 6 for both.
    • Profit each: (10 − 6) × 100 = 400.
  • A cuts its price to 9. B keeps 10.
    • A sells 150: profit (9 − 6) × 150 = 450. B sells 60: profit 240.
  • B matches: both charge 9 and sell 110 each.
    • Profit each: (9 − 6) × 110 = 330. Both are worse off than at the start.
  • B might cut to 8, then A to 7: a price war. Prices fall towards cost; profit is squeezed.
  • Consumers gain in the short run. Weaker firms may leave, leaving fewer rivals in the long run.
Quick check
?Illustrative data. Two rival firms each sell 200 units a week at a price of 5, with an average cost of 3. One firm cuts its price to 4. The other matches at once, and each now sells 220 units. What is each firm's weekly profit after the price cut?
Mission 3

Stable prices, leaders and followers

  • Because a price cut is likely to be matched, prices in oligopoly are often stable ("sticky") for long periods (the kinked demand curve).
  • Price leadership: one firm, often the largest, changes its price and rivals follow.
  • Tacit agreement: firms keep prices in line with no formal deal and no contact.
  • Following a leader's price is hard to prove as collusion. An agreement to fix prices is a cartel and is illegal (see Mission 5).
  • Say: "tacit collusion" for following without agreement — not: "a cartel", which needs an agreement.
Mission 3

Predatory pricing

Predatory pricingPrice0TimeAVCpredator's pricerival exitsprice raisedPrice is cut below AVC (losses now), the rivalleaves, then price rises above its old level(market power later).
  • Predatory pricing: setting price below cost to drive a rival out of the market, then raising price once it has gone.
  • A common test: is price below average variable cost (AVC)?
  • The predator makes losses now for market power later. It needs deep pockets and some way to stop rivals returning.
  • It is illegal as an abuse of a dominant position (UK Competition Act 1998; EU competition law).
  • Real case: in 2003 the European Commission fined Wanadoo, a French internet provider, €10.35 million for predatory pricing of broadband.
  • Hard part: telling predation apart from fierce, fair competition, which also lowers prices.
Mission 3

Limit pricing

Limit pricingPrice0PmPlimitQmQlimitQuantityMC = AC(incumbent)entrant'smin ACD = ARMRsupernormal profit at the limit priceIllustrative data. Pm: profit-maximising price(MR = MC). Plimit: at the entrant's minimum AC.
  • Limit pricing: an established firm sets a price low enough to deter entry, at or just below a possible entrant's minimum average cost.
  • The established firm often has lower costs (economies of scale, experience). So at the limit price it still makes supernormal profit, just less than the short-run maximum.
  • Structural barriers come from the market itself: economies of scale, sunk costs, patents.
  • Behavioural barriers come from firms' strategy: limit pricing, predatory pricing, heavy advertising.
  • Say: "limit pricing keeps price above the firm's own average cost" — not: "selling below cost", which is predatory pricing.
Mission 3Graph lab

The price that keeps rivals out

Illustrative data. An established firm: AC = MC = 6. Market demand: P = 20 − 0.1Q. A rival with a minimum AC of 10 enters only if it expects the price to stay above 10.

The price that keeps rivals outPriceQuantity01001502000610206014DAC = MC (firm)rival's minimum AC
  • Takeaway: the limit price is set by the rival's costs; at 10 the firm still earns 400, against 490 at 13.
Quick check
?Illustrative data. An established firm has an average cost of 20. Its profit-maximising price is 34. A possible entrant has a minimum average cost of 26 and will enter only if it expects the price to stay above 26. Which price is limit pricing?
Mission 3

Non-price competition

Non-price competitionPrice0QuantityDD1D2Non-price competition aims to shift demand right(D1 to D2) and make it less price elastic: steeper.
  • Methods:
    • Product differentiation: design, quality, features, new models.
    • Branding and advertising.
    • Loyalty schemes: points, rewards, memberships.
    • Service: delivery, after-sales care, opening hours, location.
    • Packaging and research and development (R&D).
  • Aim 1: shift the firm's demand curve to the right (D1 → D2): more sold at every price.
  • Aim 2: make demand less price elastic: loyal customers stay even if price rises.
  • Say: "an increase in demand" (a shift) — not: "an extension of demand", which is a movement along the curve.
Mission 3

Why a few rivals prefer it

  • A price cut can be copied in hours. A new design, a strong brand or a loyal customer base takes rivals much longer to copy.
  • It avoids a price war that would hurt every firm.
  • Strong brands raise barriers to entry: a newcomer must spend heavily just to be noticed.
  • Costs:
    • Advertising raises costs, which may be passed on in higher prices.
    • Competitive advertising can cancel out: each firm spends more, market shares barely change.
  • Benefits: informative advertising helps buyers choose; competition on quality and R&D brings better products.
Quick check
?A firm in an oligopoly launches a successful advertising campaign for its product. What is the campaign trying to do to the demand curve for its product?
Mission 3Evaluate

Is rivalry between a few big firms good for consumers?

  • It depends on whether low prices last: a price war helps buyers, unless it is predatory and prices rise later.
  • It depends on the type of non-price competition: better products and useful information, or advertising that only raises costs.
  • It depends on barriers to entry: limit pricing and heavy branding can keep new rivals out.
  • It depends on time: rivalry in R&D can bring large long-run gains.
Mission check

?Illustrative case: two coffee chains have most of the coffee shops in a city. Chain A is choosing between cutting all its prices by 10% and launching a loyalty app that gives a free drink after every ten bought. Which is the strongest reason the app may raise A's profit more than the price cut?
Mission 4

Mission 4: How can two rival firms each make their best choice and still both end up worse off?

Make a guess: How can two rival firms each make their best choice and still both end up worse off?

Mission 4

A game between firms

  • Game theory studies decisions where your result depends on others' choices too.
  • Every game has:
    • players (here, two firms)
    • strategies (the choices open to each player, e.g. high price or low price)
    • payoffs (what each player gets, e.g. profit, for each pair of choices)
  • Oligopoly fits: firms are interdependent (see Mission 2).
  • Say: "a strategy is a choice of action" — not: "a strategy is a payoff".
Mission 4

The payoff matrix

Cartel matrixFirm BB keeps toquotaB cheatsFirm AA keeps toquotaA cheats800, 800700, 875875, 700750, 750Nash equilibriumCells: (A's profit, B's profit)Illustrative data
  • Illustrative data: the cartel from Mission 2. Each firm either keeps to its quota (20 units) or cheats (25 units).
B keeps to quotaB cheats
A keeps to quota800, 800700, 875
A cheats875, 700750, 750
  • Each cell: (A's profit, B's profit). A chooses the row; B chooses the column.
  • Example: A keeps to quota, B cheats → A earns 700, B earns 875.
Mission 4

Dominant strategy

Cartel matrixFirm BB keeps toquotaB cheatsFirm AA keeps toquotaA cheats800, 800700, 875875, 700750, 750Nash equilibriumCells: (A's profit, B's profit)Illustrative data
  • A dominant strategy is best for a player whatever the other player does.
  • Method: fix the rival's choice, then compare your payoffs.
  • A's view:
    • If B keeps to quota: cheat 875 > keep 800.
    • If B cheats: cheat 750 > keep 700.
  • So cheating is A's dominant strategy. B's payoffs mirror A's, so B's dominant strategy is also to cheat.
  • Say: "dominant strategy: best whatever the rival does" — not: "the strategy with the biggest number in the matrix".
Quick check
?Illustrative data. Two firms, P and Q, each choose a high or a low price. Each cell shows (P's profit, Q's profit).
Q: high priceQ: low price
P: high price100, 9040, 110
P: low price120, 5060, 60

What is firm P's dominant strategy?

Mission 4

Nash equilibrium

Cartel matrixFirm BB keeps toquotaB cheatsFirm AA keeps toquotaA cheats800, 800700, 875875, 700750, 750Nash equilibriumCells: (A's profit, B's profit)Illustrative data
  • Nash equilibrium: an outcome where no player can do better by changing only its own strategy, given the other's choice.
  • Check each cell: would either player want to switch?
  • In the cartel game: (cheat, cheat) → (750, 750).
    • A switching to "keep" gets 700 < 750. B switching gets 700 < 750. No one gains: Nash equilibrium.
  • (keep, keep) → (800, 800) is not a Nash equilibrium: each firm could earn 875 by cheating.
  • When both players have a dominant strategy, the Nash equilibrium is where they both play it.
  • Say: "no player has an incentive to change strategy alone" — not: "both players get their best possible payoff".
Mission 4

The prisoner's dilemma

The prisoner's dilemmaFirm BB keeps toquotaB cheatsFirm AA keeps toquotaA cheats800, 800700, 875875, 700750, 750best togetherNash equilibriumarrow: each firm's incentive to cheatIllustrative data
  • The story: two suspects are questioned in separate rooms. Each can confess or stay silent.
  • Confessing is each one's dominant strategy. Both confess, yet both would get shorter sentences if both stayed silent.
  • A prisoner's dilemma: each player follows its own dominant strategy, and both end up worse off than if they had cooperated.
  • The cartel game is a prisoner's dilemma:
    • Nash equilibrium: (cheat, cheat): 750 each.
    • Cooperation: (keep, keep): 800 each.
  • Why cooperation fails: neither firm can trust the other, and a cartel agreement cannot be enforced in court.
Mission 4Graph lab

Can a penalty hold the cartel together?

Illustrative data as an earlier screen. The cartel agrees a penalty that any member caught cheating must pay. It is taken off the cheater's payoff.

Can a penalty hold the cartel together?Firm BFirm AKeepCheatKeep toquotaCheat800,800700,875875,700750,750
  • Takeaway: keeping to the quota is dominant only when cheating pays less whatever the rival does: here a penalty above 75.
Mission 4

Why the monopoly outcome is hard to reach

  • Illustrative data as (AR = 100 − Q, MC = AC = 20):
OutcomePriceTotal output
Monopoly (cartel keeps to quotas)6040
Both cheat (Nash equilibrium)5050
Perfect competition (P = MC)2080
  • Each firm's incentive to cheat pulls price below the monopoly price.
  • But price stays above, and output below, the perfectly competitive outcome.
  • Firms that meet again and again (a repeated game) may keep cooperating: cheating today could start a price war tomorrow.
Quick check
?Illustrative data as the earlier screens: AR = 100 − Q, MC = AC = 20; quota 20 each; "cheat" means producing 25. What is the market price at the Nash equilibrium of this game?
Mission 4Evaluate

How useful is game theory?

  • It shows why oligopolists are interdependent, and why cartels are unstable.
  • It depends on whether the game is one-off or repeated: repeated play makes cooperation easier (match what the rival did last time).
  • It depends on information: real firms rarely know their rivals' payoffs.
  • It depends on the number of firms: real markets often have more than two.
  • It depends on rationality: firms may value trust, reputation or market share, not just this period's profit.
  • Policy use: leniency rules turn a cartel into a prisoner's dilemma. The first member to confess is not fined (as with MAN in Mission 2).
Mission check

?Illustrative data. Two rival phone makers each choose whether to run a large advertising campaign. Each cell: (A's profit, B's profit).
B advertisesB does not
A advertises30, 3070, 10
A does not10, 7050, 50

Which statement is correct?

Mission 5

Mission 5: When should a government stop big firms from merging, fixing prices or growing too powerful?

Make a guess: When should a government stop big firms from merging, fixing prices or growing too powerful?

Mission 5

Why have competition policy?

  • Market power can mean higher prices, lower output, less choice and a deadweight loss.
  • Firms with little competition may also let costs drift up (X-inefficiency) and innovate less.
  • Competition policy: laws and authorities that promote competition and stop firms abusing market power.
Mission 5

Three targets

Three targets1Anti-competitive agreementscartels, price fixing, sharing out markets2Abuse of a dominant positione.g. predatory pricing, refusing to supplyrivals3Mergersthat would substantially lessencompetition

1. Anti-competitive agreements (restrictive practices): cartels, price fixing, sharing out markets, bid rigging.

2. Abuse of a dominant position: e.g. predatory pricing (pricing below cost to drive out a rival), refusing to supply rivals, forcing buyers to take one product to get another.

3. Mergers that would substantially lessen competition.

  • Being large is not illegal. Abusing that position is.
  • The key question: would buyers face higher prices, lower quality or less choice?
  • A firm facing cheap imports or easy entry by rivals has little power to raise prices, even with a large share.
Mission 5

UK and EU rules

  • Competition and Markets Authority (CMA), since 2014: investigates cartels, abuse of dominance and mergers.
  • Competition Act 1998: bans anti-competitive agreements and abuse of a dominant position. Fines up to 10% of worldwide turnover.
  • Enterprise Act 2002: merger control; taking part in a cartel can be a criminal offence.
  • Leniency: the first cartel member to report can avoid a fine. This makes cartels unstable.
  • Regulators (e.g. Ofgem, Ofwat, Ofcom) also have competition powers in their industries.
  • Real case: in 2019 the CMA blocked the merger of Sainsbury's and Asda, two of the largest UK supermarket chains.
  • EU (awareness only): the European Commission enforces bans on cartels and abuse of dominance. In 2016 it fined truck makers €2.93 billion for a price-fixing cartel, and in 2017 Google €2.42 billion for abusing its dominance in online search.
  • Since the end of 2020 the Commission no longer rules on UK markets. The CMA does.
Quick check
?Which of these is most likely to break competition law?
Mission 5

Worked example: a merger

  • Illustrative data. Market shares (%): A 30, B 20, C 15, D 10, others 25 (each under 5).
  • Three-firm concentration ratio (CR3) before: 30 + 20 + 15 = 65%.
  • B and C propose to merge: share 35%.
  • CR3 after: 35 + 30 + 10 = 75%.
  • Merger types: horizontal (same stage, rivals: B + C), vertical (supplier and buyer), conglomerate (unrelated markets).
  • Horizontal mergers get the closest scrutiny: they remove a rival directly.
  • The authority can clear the merger, clear it with conditions (e.g. sell some stores), or block it.
  • Against the loss of a rival, it weighs any cost savings passed on to buyers.
Mission 5Graph lab

What does a cartel cost buyers?

Illustrative data. Market demand: P = 50 − Q. MC = AC = 10. A cartel acts like a monopoly: P = 30, Q = 20. Competition would give P = 10, Q = 40.

What does a cartel cost buyers?PriceQuantity0400102040502030CSDMC = AC
  • Takeaway: ending a cartel returns its profit to buyers and removes the deadweight loss.
Cartel vs competitionPrice0PcartelPcomp2040QuantityCSprofitDWLD = ARMC = ACconsumer surplus (CS) under the cartelcartel profit: (30 - 10) × 20deadweight loss (DWL)Illustrative data. Cartel: P = 30, Q = 20.Competition: P = 10, Q = 40.
Quick check
?Illustrative data. Market demand is P = 80 − 2Q and MC = AC = 20. A cartel sets Q = 15 and P = 50, earning a profit of 450. Under competition, P = 20 and Q = 30. If the cartel is broken up, by how much does consumer surplus rise?
Mission 5

Other tools to promote competition

  • Break up a monopoly into competing firms.
  • Price controls and regulation: price caps (RPI − X), quality targets.
  • Ban unfair trading practices: e.g. misleading pricing, forcing suppliers into unfair terms.
  • Deregulation: remove legal barriers to entry (see Mission 1).
  • Competitive tendering: firms bid for the right to supply a public service.
  • Privatisation: sell state-owned firms, often opening the market to rivals (see Mission 1).
  • Help for small businesses: grants, simpler rules, access to finance.
  • Make markets more contestable: lower barriers to entry so the threat of entry disciplines incumbents.
  • Also used: taxes and subsidies, and nationalisation.
Mission 5

Impact on the economy

  • Prices: fall as cartels end and rivals enter.
  • Output and employment: output rises towards the competitive level. Jobs may rise across the market, though a merger blocked or a firm broken up can also cost jobs at the firm itself.
  • Profit: supernormal profit is squeezed.
  • Efficiency: allocative (P nearer MC), productive and X-efficiency improve. Dynamic efficiency may rise or fall.
  • Quality and choice: rivals compete to attract buyers.
  • Economic welfare: deadweight loss falls.
Mission 5Evaluate

How well does competition policy work?

  • It depends on information: proving a cartel, or telling predation from fierce competition, is hard and slow.
  • It depends on the size of the market: blocking a merger may stop a firm reaching the scale it needs to compete with global rivals.
  • It depends on dynamic efficiency: large firms' supernormal profit may fund R&D.
  • It depends on fines: too small to deter, or passed on to buyers?
  • It depends on the authority: regulatory capture (it comes to side with the firms it oversees) and the cost of investigations.
  • It depends on contestability: where entry is easy, the threat of entry may protect buyers without intervention.
Mission check

?Illustrative case: four firms supply cement in a country, with market shares of 35%, 25%, 20% and 20%. The two smallest firms propose to merge, saying it will cut their costs. Which finding gives the strongest economic case for the competition authority to allow the merger?
Recap

The big ideas

Mission 1

  • Nationalisation, privatisation, regulation and deregulation answer two different questions: who owns the firm, and what rules it faces.
  • Privatisation and deregulation can cut costs and prices where rivals can enter; natural monopolies still need regulation.
  • Regulators face asymmetric information and the risk of regulatory capture.

Mission 2

  • Oligopoly: a few large firms, high barriers, interdependence and uncertainty.
  • Firms can compete or collude: overtly (cartels) or tacitly (price leadership). Cartels act like a monopoly but each member is tempted to cheat.
  • Kinked demand curve: rivals match cuts but not rises, so prices are rigid; MC can move within the MR gap.

Mission 3

  • Oligopolists are interdependent: a price cut is likely to be matched, so price wars squeeze everyone's profit.
  • Non-price competition (branding, quality, loyalty, service) aims to shift demand right and make it less price elastic.
  • Predatory pricing is below cost to remove a rival; limit pricing sets price just low enough to deter entry.

Mission 4

  • Payoff matrix: players, strategies, payoffs; each cell is (row player, column player).
  • Dominant strategy: best whatever the rival does. Nash equilibrium: no player gains by changing only its own strategy.
  • Prisoner's dilemma: each plays its dominant strategy, and both end up worse off than if they had cooperated. That is why cartels are unstable.

Mission 5

  • Competition policy targets anti-competitive agreements, abuse of dominance and mergers that would substantially lessen competition.
  • UK: the CMA enforces the Competition Act 1998 and the Enterprise Act 2002; fines up to 10% of worldwide turnover. The EU has parallel rules.
🏆

Mini-lesson complete!

⭐⭐⭐

You've worked through Oligopoly; Competition policy for CCEA A-level Economics. 🎉

  1. Mission 1Should a country's trains, water pipes and power lines be run by the state or by private companies?
  2. Mission 2When only a few big firms share a market, why do their prices so often move together?
  3. Mission 3Why do a few big rival firms so often compete on brand and quality instead of simply cutting prices?
  4. Mission 4How can two rival firms each make their best choice and still both end up worse off?
  5. Mission 5When should a government stop big firms from merging, fixing prices or growing too powerful?

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