Mission 1: If everything you see is changing, how could anyone know what is truly real?
Make a guess: If everything you see is changing, how could anyone know what is truly real?
Mission 1
Reason over the senses
Step 1 of 3
Plato (c. 427–347 BCE), pupil of Socrates; his ideas come in dialogues such as the Republic (c. 375 BCE).
The world we see and touch is always changing: things grow, decay, look different from different angles.
What changes cannot give knowledge, only opinion.
So Plato relies on reason, not the senses, to find what is truly real: he is a rationalist.
Mission 1
The Forms
Step 1 of 3
Behind the changing world are the Forms: perfect, unchanging, eternal, non-physical ideals.
Each beautiful thing is beautiful because it participates in (shares in, imitates) the Form of Beauty.
Example: no drawn circle is perfect, yet we know what a perfect circle is. That knowledge points to the Form of the circle.
The Forms are known by reason, not seen with the eyes.
Plato's picture: two worlds. The world of appearances (senses, copies, opinion) and the world of Forms (reason, originals, knowledge).
Mission 1Read the source
The cave
Step 1 of 4
Plato, Republic VII, 514a–515a (Jowett translation, 1871). Prisoners chained since childhood face a wall; behind them a fire; people carry objects along a low wall, casting shadows. Socrates says the prisoners are:
> "Like ourselves, I replied; and they see only their own shadows, or the shadows of one another, which the fire throws on the opposite wall of the cave"
Q1 Why would the prisoners take the shadows to be real?
Show answer
They have never seen anything else, so they name the shadows as the things themselves.
Q2 Who does Socrates say the prisoners are like?
Show answer
Us: ordinary people relying on the senses.
Mission 1
Decoding the cave
Step 1 of 4
Prisoners: people who trust only the senses.
Shadows: images and opinions, mistaken for reality.
Objects and fire: physical things and the light of this world.
The climb out: education in reason, painful and slow; the freed prisoner is dazzled at first.
Outside, in sunlight: the world of the Forms; the sun is the Form of the Good.
The return: the philosopher must go back down to help the others, who mock him and might even kill him (a hint at the death of Socrates).
Quick check
?In the analogy of the cave, what does the freed prisoner's painful climb out of the cave represent?
Mission 1
Two worlds, two parts of a person
Step 1 of 3
Plato's two worlds match two parts of a human being.
The body belongs to the changing world of the senses: it is mortal.
The soul is akin to the Forms: immaterial, rational and immortal.
Learning is recollection (anamnesis): the soul knew the Forms before birth and is reminded of them.
So the body can hold the soul back, like the chains in the cave; at death the soul is freed.
This is dualism: soul and body are two different kinds of thing (more in Mission 2).
Mission 1
The legacy in Christianity
Augustine (354–430) read "the books of the Platonists" before his conversion and was, in his words, "taught to search for incorporeal truth" (Confessions VII.20, Pusey translation, 1838).
Platonic themes in Christian thought: a higher, unseen reality; the immortal soul; God as the source of all goodness and truth; the journey from darkness to light.
Christians often read verses such as "Set your mind on the things that are above, not on the things that are on the earth" (Colossians 3:2) in this light.
But Christianity also differs: creation, including the body, is "very good" (Genesis 1:31); belief in the resurrection of the body (1 Corinthians 15); God became flesh (John 1:14).
Critics: Platonism encouraged a low view of the body and the world; Nietzsche called Christianity "Platonism for the people" (paraphrase of Beyond Good and Evil, 1886, preface).
Many theologians defend the legacy: Plato helped Christians speak of a God beyond the physical world.
Mission 1Evaluate
Is Plato's two-world picture convincing?
Step 1 of 4
Claim: True reality is the unchanging world of the Forms, known by reason.
For: We know perfect ideals (a circle, equality, justice) we never meet in experience.
For: Universal concepts need explaining: why do we call so many different things "beautiful"?
For: Gives fixed standards for knowledge and morality, not shifting opinion.
Against: No evidence that a separate world of Forms exists; the ideals may be concepts the mind forms from experience (Aristotle's objection).
Against: The Third Man problem (raised by Plato himself, Parmenides 132a–b): if large things share in "the Large", what do they and the Large share in? An endless regress.
Against: Are there Forms of hair, mud and dirt (Parmenides 130c–d)? Of disease?
Against: Low view of the body and of this world, at odds with the goodness of creation.
Judgement criteria: Does it explain knowledge? Is it simpler than rival views? Does it fit what we observe? Does it value the physical world?
Quick check
?Which criticism argues that Plato's theory of Forms leads to an endless regress?
Mission check
?A chef has tasted thousands of dishes and says: "I know what a truly good meal is, because I have tasted so many." Which reply would Plato give?
For Plato, what is truly real is known by reason, not seen. A later mission: his pupil Aristotle brings reality back down to earth.
Mission 2
Mission 2: Are you a body that thinks, or a mind that happens to have a body?
Make a guess: Are you a body that thinks, or a mind that happens to have a body?
Mission 2
Three words, one problem
Body: the physical, living organism.
Mind: thinking, feeling, choosing, being conscious.
Soul: in religion and in Greek thought (psyche), the principle of life and of the self; in many traditions, what may survive death.
The mind–body problem: how does what thinks and feels relate to what is physical?
Dualism: mind (or soul) and body are two different kinds of thing.
Monism: there is only one kind of thing (more in Mission 3).
Mission 2
Plato: the soul is the real you
Step 1 of 3
For Plato the soul is the essential self: immaterial, rational and immortal.
It is only temporarily united with the body, which distracts it with desires and senses: in the Phaedo the body is like a prison for the soul.
The soul existed before birth (it knew the Forms: recollection) and lives after death.
In the Republic (Book IV) the soul has three parts: reason, spirit (courage, honour) and appetite (bodily desires). In the Phaedrus, reason is a charioteer steering two horses.
A just person is one in whom reason rules the other two parts.
> "the soul is in the very likeness of the divine, and immortal, and intellectual, and uniform, and indissoluble, and unchangeable; and that the body is in the very likeness of the human, and mortal, and unintellectual, and multiform, and dissoluble, and changeable."
Q1 What kind of reality does the soul resemble?
Show answer
The world of the Forms: unchanging, divine, known by intellect.
Q2 Why does "indissoluble" matter for life after death?
Show answer
What has no parts cannot break up, so it cannot be destroyed when the body dies.
Mission 2
Aristotle: the soul is the form of the body
Step 1 of 3
De Anima (On the Soul) II.1: the soul is the form of a living body: what makes it alive and the kind of thing it is.
His image (paraphrase): if an eye were a living creature, sight would be its soul.
The soul is what the body does: its capacities to live, sense and think.
So the soul cannot be separated from the body, as the shape of a wax seal cannot be separated from the wax (II.1).
One possible exception: the active intellect (De Anima III.5), which he calls separable and immortal. Scholars debate what he meant.
Quick check
?Why does Aristotle compare the soul to sight in an eye?
Mission 2
Descartes: two substances
Step 1 of 3
René Descartes (1596–1650), Meditations on First Philosophy (1641), Principles of Philosophy (1644).
Substance dualism: mind and body are distinct substances, each able to exist without the other.
Principles I.53: each substance has one principal attribute. Mind: thought (res cogitans, thinking thing). Body: extension in space (res extensa, extended thing).
The mind has no size, shape or location; the body cannot think.
For Descartes "mind" and "soul" are the same thing; it is the real I.
Mission 2
Descartes' arguments for the soul
1. From doubt (Meditation II; Discourse on Method IV, 1637): I can doubt that my body exists (I might be dreaming or deceived). I cannot doubt that I exist while I think. So I am a thinking thing, distinct from the body.
2. Clear and distinct conception (Meditation VI): I can clearly conceive my mind without my body; God can make real whatever I clearly conceive; so mind and body can exist apart.
3. Divisibility (Meditation VI): the body has parts; the mind does not.
Doubt and divisibility use one principle: if two things differ in even one property, they are not identical. Conceivability relies instead on what God can make real.
Mission 2Read the source
The divisibility argument
Descartes, Meditation VI (Molyneux translation, 1680, spelling as printed):
> "my Body is of its Nature divisible, but my Mind indivisible; for while I consider my Mind or my self, as I am only a thinking Thing, I can distinguish no parts in Me"
He adds that losing a foot or an arm takes no part of the mind away.
Q1 What property does the body have that the mind lacks?
Show answer
Divisibility: it has parts.
Q2 Why does that show they are distinct?
Show answer
If they were one thing, they would share every property.
Quick check
?Which is Descartes' argument from doubt?
Mission 2
How do soul and body relate?
Step 1 of 3
Plato: the soul uses and rules the body for a time, then leaves it.
Aristotle: soul and body are one living thing, as shape and wax are one seal.
Descartes: two substances that interact: the body sends sensations to the mind; the mind moves the body.
He placed the meeting point in the pineal gland in the brain (Passions of the Soul, 1649).
Princess Elisabeth of Bohemia (1618–1680), letter of 1643: how can an unextended soul, with no size or location, push a physical body?
This interaction problem is the main challenge to substance dualism (materialist answers in Mission 3).
Mission 2Diversity
Christian views of body and soul
Hebrew Bible: many scholars read it as seeing a person as a unity: "The LORD God formed man from the dust of the ground, and breathed into his nostrils the breath of life; and man became a living soul." (Genesis 2:7)
Platonic strand: Augustine and many later Christians: an immortal soul that survives death (Matthew 10:28).
Aristotelian strand: Aquinas (1225–1274): the soul is the form of the body (Summa Theologiae I.76.1), yet can survive death until the resurrection. The Catholic Church holds this today (Catechism 365).
Cartesian strand: many popular and some Protestant views of the soul as a separate mind.
Christian physicalists: some modern Christian thinkers hold that a person is a physical being and rely on resurrection, not a separate soul (see Mission 4).
Mission 2Evaluate
Does Descartes prove the soul exists?
Step 1 of 4
Claim: Descartes' arguments show that the mind is a non-physical substance.
For: Thought seems private and unified in a way no physical thing is.
For: We can coherently imagine existing without a body (out-of-body stories, life after death).
Against: The masked man fallacy: I can doubt that the masked man is my father, yet he may still be my father. Doubting X but not Y does not show X ≠ Y.
Against: Antoine Arnauld (Fourth Objections, 1641): I can clearly conceive a right-angled triangle without knowing Pythagoras' theorem holds of it, but it still holds.
Against: Minds may be divisible after all: brain damage removes abilities; split-brain cases.
Against: The interaction problem.
Judgement criteria: Does "I can conceive it" show "it can exist"? Does the argument fit what neuroscience shows? Is dualism needed to explain consciousness?
Quick check
?Lois Lane believes Superman can fly but does not believe Clark Kent can fly. Why does this example matter for Descartes?
Mission check
?Someone compares a person to a smartphone: "The apps are just what the phone does; take away the hardware and there is nothing left to run." Whose view of the soul is this closest to?
Plato and Descartes make the soul a separate thing; Aristotle makes it the life of the body. Next: what if there is only the body? (see Mission 3)
Mission 3
Mission 3: If scientists could map every cell in your brain, would anything about you be left out?
Make a guess: If scientists could map every cell in your brain, would anything about you be left out?
Mission 3
Materialism
Materialism (physicalism): only physical things exist. Mind and consciousness can be fully explained by physical processes in the brain and body.
So there is no soul as a spiritual substance.
It is a form of monism: one kind of stuff.
Several materialist accounts: behaviourism, identity theory, and (on the borderline) epiphenomenalism.
Mission 3
Ryle: the ghost in the machine
Step 1 of 3
Gilbert Ryle (1900–1976), The Concept of Mind (1949), chapter 1.
He calls Descartes' picture "the dogma of the Ghost in the Machine": a hidden mind steering a body.
Ryle says this rests on a category error (category mistake): treating the mind as a thing of the same type as the body, only invisible.
"Mind" is not an extra object: it is a way of talking about how a person thinks, acts and responds.
Mission 3Read the source
Where is the university?
Step 1 of 3
Ryle, The Concept of Mind, chapter 1 (paraphrase):
A visitor is shown the colleges, libraries, sports fields, museums and offices of a university.
He then asks: "But where is the University?"
His mistake: the university is not another building beside those he has seen; it is the way they are organised.
Q1 What category does the visitor wrongly put "the university" in?
Show answer
The same category as the buildings: one more thing to visit.
Q2 What, for Ryle, is the parallel mistake about the mind?
Show answer
Looking for the mind as an extra thing alongside the body and its behaviour.
Mission 3
Philosophical behaviourism
Philosophical (logical) behaviourism: talk about the mind is really talk about behaviour and dispositions to behave.
"Anna is in pain" means she winces, cries out, rubs the injury, would take a painkiller if offered.
Ryle's image: "glass is brittle" means it would shatter if struck; it names no hidden inner quality.
Critique: a person can be in pain and hide it completely; an actor can show pain and feel none.
Critique: it ignores what pain feels like from the inside.
Mission 3
The identity thesis
Identity thesis (mind–brain identity theory): mental states are brain states. Pain just is a certain pattern of neurons firing.
U. T. Place, "Is Consciousness a Brain Process?" (1956); J. J. C. Smart, "Sensations and Brain Processes" (1959).
Like lightning = electrical discharge, or water = H₂O: one thing, discovered under two descriptions.
Critique (multiple realisability): Hilary Putnam (1926–2016) asked whether an octopus, or an alien, with a very different brain could not also feel pain. If so, pain is not one type of brain state.
Critique: a brain state has a location and size; does a thought?
Mission 3
Epiphenomenalism
Epiphenomenalism: mental events are real, and are caused by brain events, but they cause nothing themselves.
T. H. Huxley (1825–1895), "On the Hypothesis that Animals are Automata" (1874): consciousness is like the steam whistle on a locomotive: it accompanies the engine's work but does not drive it.
Often classed as property dualism: one physical substance, but mental properties that are not physical.
Critique: if consciousness does nothing, why would evolution have produced it? (William James, 1890).
Critique: on this view, when I say "I am in pain", my pain is not the cause of my saying it. Critics find that absurd.
Mission 3
Materialist critiques of dualism
Interaction: how does a non-physical soul move physical neurons? (Elisabeth's question.)
Dependence: brain injury, drugs, anaesthesia and dementia change memory, mood and personality. Mind seems to depend on brain.
Simplicity (Ockham's razor): if the brain explains everything, a soul is an unnecessary extra.
Evolution: humans developed gradually from other animals; when would a soul have been added?
Physics: the physical world seems causally closed; a soul acting on it would add energy from nowhere.
Mission 3
Dualist responses
Qualia: the felt quality of experience (the redness of red, the hurt of pain). Thomas Nagel, "What Is It Like to Be a Bat?" (1974): science describes from outside; experience is from inside.
Mary's room (Frank Jackson, 1982): a scientist who knows every physical fact about colour, but has seen only black and white, still learns something new when she first sees red.
The hard problem (David Chalmers, The Conscious Mind, 1996): explaining brain functions does not explain why they are felt.
Correlation is not identity: a damaged radio distorts music without making the music; a damaged brain may distort a mind it does not produce.
Richard Swinburne (b. 1934), The Evolution of the Soul (1986): defends substance dualism today.
Quick check
?"Feeling anxious just is a certain pattern of activity in the amygdala, as lightning just is electrical discharge." Which view is this?
Quick check
?According to Ryle, what mistake does a substance dualist make about the mind?
Mission 3
Soul: metaphor or reality?
Reality: the soul is a real, non-physical substance (Plato, Descartes, Swinburne; many Christians, Muslims and Hindus).
Metaphor: "soul" names the deepest part of a person's character and life: "she put her heart and soul into it"; "soul music".
Ludwig Wittgenstein (1889–1951): "The human body is the best picture of the human soul" (Philosophical Investigations, 1953, Part II, iv). Soul-talk is about how we see and treat persons.
Aristotle's soul (the form of the body) sits between: real, but not a separate thing.
For religious believers the question matters: what survives death, and what is raised? (see Mission 4)
Mission 3Evaluate
Can consciousness be fully explained physically?
Step 1 of 4
Claim: Materialism can explain everything about the mind.
For: Neuroscience keeps mapping mental functions to brain activity.
For: Simpler; no interaction problem; fits evolution.
For: Ryle: dualism rests on a category error.
Against: Qualia and the hard problem: function is explained, feeling is not.
Against: Correlation shows dependence, not identity.
Against: Each materialist account has its own problems (hidden pain; multiple realisability; the idle mind of epiphenomenalism).
Judgement criteria: What counts as "explaining" consciousness? Is a simpler theory more likely true? Does the theory leave room for meaning, free choice or life after death, and should that matter?
Quick check
?Which objection is aimed specifically at epiphenomenalism?
Mission check
?A computer scientist builds a robot that says "ouch" and pulls away when its arm is damaged. She says: "It has pain, since that's all pain is: reacting this way." A critic replies: "It's all behaviour; nothing is felt." Which debate is this?
Materialists explain the mind through body and brain; dualists ask whether that leaves out what it is like to be you. Next: can a person survive death? (see Mission 4)
Mission 4
Mission 4: If God made a perfect copy of you after you died, would that copy really be you?
Make a guess: If God made a perfect copy of you after you died, would that copy really be you?
Mission 4
What makes you, you?
Personal identity: what makes a person at one time the same person as someone at another time?
Body (or brain): the same living organism, continuous in space and time.
Mind / memory: John Locke (1632–1704), Essay concerning Human Understanding (2nd edn, 1694), II.27: the same person is the same consciousness, stretching back by memory.
Locke's case (paraphrase): if a prince's consciousness entered a cobbler's body, the person would be the prince.
Soul: the same non-physical self, whatever happens to the body.
Mission 4
Why identity matters for life after death
Life after death is only my survival if the one who lives on is me, not just someone like me.
Each view of the afterlife needs something that carries identity across death.
Immortality of the soul: the soul carries it.
Resurrection: God raises the same person, body and all.
Replica: God re-creates the whole person (Hick).
Rebirth and reincarnation.
Mission 4
Immortality of the soul
The belief that the soul is non-physical and spiritual, and continues to exist after the death of the body.
Plato (Phaedo): the soul is simple, indissoluble and akin to the Forms, so it cannot die.
Descartes: the mind is a separate substance, so the body's death need not end it.
Many Christians hold that the soul goes to God at death: "today you will be with me in Paradise" (Luke 23:43).
Identity carrier: the soul itself.
Problem: can a soul without body, brain or senses think, remember or recognise anyone? Is a bodiless soul a whole person?
Mission 4
Resurrection
Resurrection: the belief that God will restore the dead in bodily form to eternal life.
Christianity: "I believe in … the resurrection of the body" (Apostles' Creed); Jesus' resurrection is the model.
Judaism: resurrection of the dead is one of Maimonides' Thirteen Principles; "many of them that sleep in the dust of the earth shall awake" (Daniel 12:2, JPS 1917).
Islam: God will raise the dead on the Day of Judgement: "Thinketh man that We shall not assemble his bones?" (Qur'an 75:3, Pickthall).
Identity carrier: God, who raises this person.
Problem: the body decays and its atoms become part of other things. What makes the raised body mine?
Mission 4Read the source
Paul on the resurrection body
Paul, 1 Corinthians 15:42–44 (WEBBE):
> "So also is the resurrection of the dead. The body is sown perishable; it is raised imperishable. It is sown in dishonour; it is raised in glory. It is sown in weakness; it is raised in power. It is sown a natural body; it is raised a spiritual body."
Paul uses the image of a seed (15:37): what is sown is not the same as the plant, yet the plant comes from it.
Q1 Is the raised body the same physical body?
Show answer
Not simply: it is transformed, "imperishable", yet continuous with the one that died, like seed and plant.
Q2 Does a "spiritual body" mean no body at all?
Show answer
No: Paul still calls it a body; many Christians read "spiritual" as fully given life by God's Spirit.
Quick check
?Which statement describes resurrection rather than immortality of the soul?
Mission 4Diversity
Christians on soul and resurrection
Catholic and Orthodox: at death the soul is judged and lives on (heaven, purgatory or hell in Catholic teaching); at the end, the resurrection of the body reunites soul and body.
Aquinas: the separated soul is not the full person; we need the body to be whole.
Some Protestants ("soul sleep" or conditional immortality, e.g. Seventh-day Adventists): the dead are unconscious until the resurrection; no separate immortal soul.
Some liberal Christians: resurrection language expresses hope and God's faithfulness, not a literal bodily event.
Mission 4
Hick's replica theory
Step 1 of 3
John Hick (1922–2012), Philosophy of Religion (1963) and Death and Eternal Life (1976).
Hick sees a person as a psycho-physical unity: no separable soul.
Stage 1: John Smith vanishes in the USA; at the same moment an exact replica, with his memories and character, appears in India. Hick: we would say it is John Smith.
Stage 2: John Smith dies in the USA, and the replica appears in India. Still John Smith, Hick argues.
Stage 3: John Smith dies, and God creates the replica in a resurrection world, a different space. It is John Smith.
So resurrection is possible without a soul: God re-creates the whole person. Hick links this to Paul's "spiritual body".
Quick check
?In Hick's replica theory, what makes the replica the same person as John Smith?
Mission 4Read the source
Hick's three cases
Step 1 of 3
Hick, Philosophy of Religion (1963), chapter on life after death (paraphrase):
If John Smith's friends in India met the replica, they would treat him as John Smith; he would think of himself as John Smith.
Hick admits the cases are odd, but says the oddness does not stop us calling the replica John Smith.
Q1 Which stage places the replica outside our space altogether, after death?
Show answer
Stage 3: death in this world, re-creation in another space.
Q2 What does Hick need God for?
Show answer
Only God could create an exact replica in a resurrection world.
Mission 4Evaluate
Is the replica really you?
Step 1 of 4
Claim: A replica created by God after death would be the same person.
For: We already judge identity by likeness and memory: Smith's friends would accept him.
For: Needs no soul, so fits materialist views of the person (see Mission 3), and fits belief in bodily resurrection.
Against:Duplication: God could make two replicas. Both cannot be Smith, so neither may be.
Against: A perfect copy is still a copy: if Smith is alive when the replica appears, there are two people.
Against: Without continuity of matter, place or soul, nothing links Smith to the replica except likeness.
Judgement criteria: Is likeness enough for identity? Does it matter if God guarantees there is only one? What would you need to survive to say "I survived"?
Quick check
?Which is the duplication objection to Hick's replica theory?
Mission check
?A teleporter on a spaceship scans Asha, destroys her body, and builds an exact copy on a planet, with all her memories. Which view of the afterlife faces the same question as this teleporter?
Every view of survival must say what carries "you" across death: a soul, God raising the body, or an exact re-creation. Next: rebirth, reincarnation and the evidence debate.
Recap
The big ideas
Mission 1
Plato is a rationalist: the changing world of the senses gives opinion; reason gives knowledge of the unchanging Forms.
The cave shows the journey from shadows to the Forms; Plato's two worlds match a mortal body and an immortal soul.
Plato's dualism shaped Christian ideas of the soul and an unseen reality, though belief in the goodness of creation and bodily resurrection pulls the other way.
Mission 2
Plato: the soul is the immortal, immaterial true self, temporarily joined to the body.
Aristotle: the soul is the form of the body, its capacities to live, sense and think; not separable from it.
Descartes: mind and body are distinct substances (thought and extension); arguments from doubt, conceivability and divisibility; the interaction problem and the masked man fallacy are key criticisms.
Christians differ: a soul that survives death, a soul as the form of the body, or a physical person raised by God.
Mission 3
Materialism: the mind is fully explained physically; there is no soul as a spiritual substance. Ryle calls dualism a category error.
Behaviourism: mind = dispositions to behave. Identity thesis: mental states = brain states.
Epiphenomenalism: mental events are caused by the brain but cause nothing.
Critiques of dualism (interaction, dependence, simplicity) meet dualist replies (qualia, the hard problem, correlation is not identity).
"Soul" may be read as a real substance or as a picture of the whole person.
Mission 4
Personal identity: the same body, the same consciousness and memory (Locke), or the same soul.
Immortality of the soul: a non-physical self lives on; resurrection: God restores the person in bodily form (1 Cor 15:42–44: a transformed "spiritual body").
Hick's replica theory: a person is a psycho-physical unity; God re-creates an exact replica in a resurrection world. Key objection: duplication.
🏆
Mini-lesson complete!
⭐⭐⭐
You've worked through The afterlife: body, soul and personal identity (part 1) for CCEA A-level Religious Studies. 🎉
Mission 1If everything you see is changing, how could anyone know what is truly real?
Mission 2Are you a body that thinks, or a mind that happens to have a body?
Mission 3If scientists could map every cell in your brain, would anything about you be left out?
Mission 4If God made a perfect copy of you after you died, would that copy really be you?
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