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Pearson Edexcel A-level Economics B (9EB0) · 4.2 Market power and market failure
Mini-Lesson

Market power and market failure

4 missions. Guess, learn, then check. Your place is saved.

  1. Mission 1When should a government stop big firms from merging, fixing prices or growing too powerful?
  2. Mission 2Why would a firm refuse to hire a worker who would add more to its sales than they are paid?
  3. Mission 3Why might it make sense for only one company to lay the water pipes in a city?
  4. Mission 4Should a country's trains, water pipes and power lines be run by the state or by private companies?

Also part of this unit: 1 mission in Competition and market power.

Mission 1

Mission 1: When should a government stop big firms from merging, fixing prices or growing too powerful?

Make a guess: When should a government stop big firms from merging, fixing prices or growing too powerful?

Mission 1

Why have competition policy?

  • Market power can mean higher prices, lower output, less choice and a deadweight loss.
  • Firms with little competition may also let costs drift up (X-inefficiency) and innovate less.
  • Competition policy: laws and authorities that promote competition and stop firms abusing market power.
Mission 1

Three targets

Three targets1Anti-competitive agreementscartels, price fixing, sharing out markets2Abuse of a dominant positione.g. predatory pricing, refusing to supplyrivals3Mergersthat would substantially lessencompetition

1. Anti-competitive agreements (restrictive practices): cartels, price fixing, sharing out markets, bid rigging.

2. Abuse of a dominant position: e.g. predatory pricing (pricing below cost to drive out a rival), refusing to supply rivals, forcing buyers to take one product to get another.

3. Mergers that would substantially lessen competition.

  • Being large is not illegal. Abusing that position is.
  • The key question: would buyers face higher prices, lower quality or less choice?
  • A firm facing cheap imports or easy entry by rivals has little power to raise prices, even with a large share.
Mission 1

UK and EU rules

  • Competition and Markets Authority (CMA), since 2014: investigates cartels, abuse of dominance and mergers.
  • Competition Act 1998: bans anti-competitive agreements and abuse of a dominant position. Fines up to 10% of worldwide turnover.
  • Enterprise Act 2002: merger control; taking part in a cartel can be a criminal offence.
  • Leniency: the first cartel member to report can avoid a fine. This makes cartels unstable.
  • Regulators (e.g. Ofgem, Ofwat, Ofcom) also have competition powers in their industries.
  • Real case: in 2019 the CMA blocked the merger of Sainsbury's and Asda, two of the largest UK supermarket chains.
  • EU (awareness only): the European Commission enforces bans on cartels and abuse of dominance. In 2016 it fined truck makers €2.93 billion for a price-fixing cartel, and in 2017 Google €2.42 billion for abusing its dominance in online search.
  • Since the end of 2020 the Commission no longer rules on UK markets. The CMA does.
Quick check
?Which of these is most likely to break competition law?
Mission 1

Worked example: a merger

  • Illustrative data. Market shares (%): A 30, B 20, C 15, D 10, others 25 (each under 5).
  • Three-firm concentration ratio (CR3) before: 30 + 20 + 15 = 65%.
  • B and C propose to merge: share 35%.
  • CR3 after: 35 + 30 + 10 = 75%.
  • Merger types: horizontal (same stage, rivals: B + C), vertical (supplier and buyer), conglomerate (unrelated markets).
  • Horizontal mergers get the closest scrutiny: they remove a rival directly.
  • The authority can clear the merger, clear it with conditions (e.g. sell some stores), or block it.
  • Against the loss of a rival, it weighs any cost savings passed on to buyers.
Mission 1Graph lab

What does a cartel cost buyers?

Illustrative data. Market demand: P = 50 − Q. MC = AC = 10. A cartel acts like a monopoly: P = 30, Q = 20. Competition would give P = 10, Q = 40.

What does a cartel cost buyers?PriceQuantity0400102040502030CSDMC = AC
  • Takeaway: ending a cartel returns its profit to buyers and removes the deadweight loss.
Cartel vs competitionPrice0PcartelPcomp2040QuantityCSprofitDWLD = ARMC = ACconsumer surplus (CS) under the cartelcartel profit: (30 - 10) × 20deadweight loss (DWL)Illustrative data. Cartel: P = 30, Q = 20.Competition: P = 10, Q = 40.
Quick check
?Illustrative data. Market demand is P = 80 − 2Q and MC = AC = 20. A cartel sets Q = 15 and P = 50, earning a profit of 450. Under competition, P = 20 and Q = 30. If the cartel is broken up, by how much does consumer surplus rise?
Mission 1

Other tools to promote competition

  • Break up a monopoly into competing firms.
  • Price controls and regulation: price caps (RPI − X), quality targets.
  • Ban unfair trading practices: e.g. misleading pricing, forcing suppliers into unfair terms.
  • Deregulation: remove legal barriers to entry (see Mission 4).
  • Competitive tendering: firms bid for the right to supply a public service.
  • Privatisation: sell state-owned firms, often opening the market to rivals (see Mission 4).
  • Help for small businesses: grants, simpler rules, access to finance.
  • Make markets more contestable: lower barriers to entry so the threat of entry disciplines incumbents.
Mission 1

Impact on the economy

  • Prices: fall as cartels end and rivals enter.
  • Output and employment: output rises towards the competitive level. Jobs may rise across the market, though a merger blocked or a firm broken up can also cost jobs at the firm itself.
  • Profit: supernormal profit is squeezed.
  • Efficiency: allocative (P nearer MC), productive and X-efficiency improve. Dynamic efficiency may rise or fall.
  • Quality and choice: rivals compete to attract buyers.
  • Economic welfare: deadweight loss falls.
Mission 1Evaluate

How well does competition policy work?

  • It depends on information: proving a cartel, or telling predation from fierce competition, is hard and slow.
  • It depends on the size of the market: blocking a merger may stop a firm reaching the scale it needs to compete with global rivals.
  • It depends on dynamic efficiency: large firms' supernormal profit may fund R&D.
  • It depends on fines: too small to deter, or passed on to buyers?
  • It depends on the authority: regulatory capture (it comes to side with the firms it oversees) and the cost of investigations.
  • It depends on contestability: where entry is easy, the threat of entry may protect buyers without intervention.
Mission check

?Illustrative case: four firms supply cement in a country, with market shares of 35%, 25%, 20% and 20%. The two smallest firms propose to merge, saying it will cut their costs. Which finding gives the strongest economic case for the competition authority to allow the merger?
Mission 2

Mission 2: Why would a firm refuse to hire a worker who would add more to its sales than they are paid?

Make a guess: A firm is the only big employer in town. One more worker would add more to its sales than the wage it pays. Why might it still not hire them?

Mission 2

One buyer

  • Monopsony: a market with a single buyer (or one dominant buyer).
  • In a labour market: one employer hires most of the workers with a particular skill or in a particular place.
  • Examples: a mine or factory in a remote town · a state health service that employs most of a country's nurses.
  • In a product market: a few large retailers buying from many small farmers.
  • A monopsonist is a wage setter, not a wage taker.
  • Say: "monopsony" (one buyer) — not: "monopoly" (one seller).
Mission 2

Why one more worker costs more than the wage

Supply and marginal cost of labourWage rate (W)0LQuantity of labour (L)ACL = SMCLGap: extra pay for workers already hired
  • A monopsonist faces the whole upward-sloping supply curve of labour.
  • To attract one more worker it must raise the wage.
  • It must pay that higher wage to all its workers, not just the new one.
  • So the marginal cost of labour is above the wage.
  • Labels: ACL = S (average cost of labour = the wage) and MCL (marginal cost of labour), drawn above ACL.
Mission 2

Worked example: the cost of one more worker

  • Illustrative data. A firm is the only employer in its town. Wage needed to attract L workers: W = 4 + 2L (per hour).
  • Total cost of labour = L × W. Marginal cost = change in total cost when one more worker is hired.
Workers (L)Wage neededTotal wage billMarginal cost of labourMRP
166631
28161027
310301423
412481819
514702215
616962611
  • 5th worker: the wage rises from 12 to 14 for all 5 workers. Wage bill: 48 → 70. Marginal cost = 22, not 14.
Quick check
?Use the table in the previous screen. The firm employs 3 workers at a wage of 10 an hour. What is the marginal cost of hiring a 4th worker?
Mission 2

The monopsony diagram

MonopsonyWage rate (W)0WcWmLmLcQuantity of labour (L)MRP = DACL = SMCLA wage taker would hire Lc at WcHire where MRP = MCL: employment LmWm is read from the supply curve: Wm < Wc, Lm< Lc
  • Step 1: the supply of labour and the MRP curve. If the employer acted as a wage taker, it would hire where they cross: Wc, Lc.
  • Step 2: draw MCL above ACL = S. Profit is greatest where MRP = MCL: employment Lm.
  • Step 3: the firm pays the lowest wage that attracts Lm workers. Read down to the supply curve: wage Wm.
  • Result: Wm < Wc and Lm < Lc. Fewer workers, lower pay.
  • The last worker hired at Lm adds more revenue (MRP) than they are paid (Wm).
  • Say: "read the wage from the supply curve" — not: from the MRP or the marginal cost curve.
Mission 2Graph lab

How many workers?

How many workers?Wage, MRP, costWorkers23456010203016ACL = SMCLMRP = D25Profit from labour
  • Takeaway: the monopsonist stops where MRP = marginal cost of labour, even though the next worker's MRP is above their wage. In the table from an earlier screen it hires 4 workers at a wage of 12. A wage taker facing the same curves would hire 5 at about 14, so the firm turns down a 5th worker who would add 15 to its sales and be paid 14.
Quick check
?On a monopsony diagram, the firm employs Lm. What does the vertical distance between the MRP curve and the supply curve at Lm show?
Mission 2

Monopsony without one employer

  • Firms can set wages even when there are several employers, if workers cannot easily switch.
  • Imperfect information: workers do not know what other firms pay or which jobs are open.
  • Immobility and switching costs: long commutes, housing costs, family ties, firm-specific skills.
  • Each firm then faces an upward-sloping supply of labour, so it has some monopsony power.
  • Employers acting together can do the same. Real case: in 2015 a US court approved a $415 million settlement of a lawsuit claiming that Apple, Google, Intel and Adobe agreed not to recruit each other's staff, holding pay down.
  • Union power can offset monopsony power (a later screen, another lesson).
Mission 2

Monopsony in product markets

  • Large retailers buy food from many small farmers and suppliers.
  • Conditions: few buyers, many sellers, suppliers with few other outlets.
  • Costs: lower prices for suppliers; late payments or sudden contract changes; suppliers cut investment or leave the industry; less choice and quality.
  • Benefits: lower costs can be passed on as lower prices for consumers if retailers compete; a big buyer can counter the power of a monopoly seller (a state health service buying medicines from a patent holder).
  • Real case (UK): the Groceries Code Adjudicator, set up on 25 June 2013, enforces a code on how retailers with UK grocery turnover above £1 billion treat their direct suppliers. It can investigate and fine.
Mission 2

Limiting monopsony power

  • Trade unions: bargain as one seller of labour.
  • Minimum wages: can raise both pay and employment in a monopsony.
  • Regulation and competition policy: codes of practice, fines, bans on no-poaching deals.
  • Better information and mobility: job adverts with pay ranges, help with moving.
Mission 2

Bilateral monopoly

Bilateral monopolyWage rate (W)0WmLmQuantity of labour (L)MRP = DACL = SMCLRange of possible wages: bargainingUnion: pushes the wage upEmployer: pushes the wage down
  • Bilateral monopoly: a monopsony buyer faces a monopoly seller. In labour: one employer and one trade union.
  • The employer wants Wm at Lm.
  • At Lm, each worker's MRP is above Wm, so the union can press for more. The most the firm would pay to keep Lm workers is the MRP at Lm.
  • The wage settles somewhere between Wm and MRP at Lm. Where exactly is indeterminate: it depends on bargaining power.
  • Union power: share of workers in the union, strike threat, the firm's profits, the law, public support.
  • A union wage between Wm and Wc can raise both pay and employment.
Quick check
?Illustrative data: rows from the monopsony worked example (W = 4 + 2L).
Workers (L)Wage neededMarginal cost of labourMRP
3101423
4121819
5142215

A union now represents all the firm's workers, and the firm still employs at least 4 workers. Within what range of hourly wages would we expect the agreed wage to fall?

Mission 2

Evaluate: is monopsony always harmful?

It depends on…

  • Elasticity of labour supply to the firm: the more easily workers can leave, the less the firm can cut pay.
  • Whether savings reach consumers: in a competitive retail market, lower costs can mean lower prices.
  • Countervailing power: a big buyer facing a big seller may bring the price closer to the competitive level.
  • The long run: low pay and low supplier prices can reduce training, investment and supply.
  • Who is protected: unions, minimum wages and regulators can limit the power.
Mission check

?A region has many apple farmers but only one buyer, a juice company. To buy more apples it must offer a higher price, and it pays that price on all the apples it buys. Compared with a market where many buyers compete (same supply, same value of apples to buyers), what would we expect?
Mission 3

Mission 3: Why might it make sense for only one company to lay the water pipes in a city?

Make a guess: Why might it make sense for only one company to lay the water pipes in a city?

Mission 3

What makes a monopoly natural

Average cost keeps fallingPrice / cost0economies of scaleQuantityLRACDAverage cost falls across the whole market.
  • Some industries have huge fixed costs and low marginal costs: water pipes, rail track, power grids.
  • So average cost keeps falling as output rises, across the whole market.
  • Natural monopoly: one firm can supply the whole market at a lower average cost than two or more firms could.
  • A second network would duplicate the fixed cost: wasteful.
  • Say: "natural monopoly" for a cost reason — not: "a monopoly protected by law or a patent".
Mission 3

Worked example: one network or two?

  • Illustrative data. A town needs 300 connections. The network costs 1,200 (fixed). Each connection adds 2 (marginal cost).
  • One firm: AC = 1,200 ÷ 300 + 2 = 4 + 2 = 6.
  • Two firms, 150 connections each: AC = 1,200 ÷ 150 + 2 = 8 + 2 = 10.
  • Splitting the market raises average cost from 6 to 10.
  • Same marginal cost; the difference is the fixed cost spread over fewer users.
Quick check
?Illustrative data. A rail line has a fixed cost of 900 and a marginal cost of 3 per journey. The market is 150 journeys. If two firms each build their own line and each carries 75 journeys, what is each firm's average cost?
Mission 3

The natural monopoly diagram

The natural monopoly diagramPrice / cost0P1P2P3Q1Q2Q3QuantityP = ACP = MCAR = DMRLRACMCMR = MCloss at P = MCMC lies below AC while AC is falling.Three possible prices: MR = MC (unregulated), P= AC and P = MC.At P = MC, price is below AC: a loss.
  • AC (LRAC) falls across the whole demand curve. MC lies below AC.
  • Three possible prices:
    • Unregulated: MR = MC. High price, low output, profit above normal.
    • P = AC: normal profit. Output higher, price lower.
    • P = MC: the allocatively efficient output. But P < AC: a loss.
  • So a natural monopoly cannot be allocatively efficient and cover its costs without help.
  • Say: "MC is below AC whenever AC is falling" — not: "MC is above AC".
Mission 3

Worked example: three prices

Worked example: three pricesPrice / cost022104180300360QuantityAR = DMRACMCAC 14AC 9Illustrative data: AR = 40 − 0.1Q, MC = 4, AC =1,800/Q + 4.
  • Illustrative data. AR = 40 − 0.1Q. MC = 4. Fixed cost = 1,800.
  • Unregulated (MR = MC): 40 − 0.2Q = 4 → Q = 180, P = 22. AC = 1,800 ÷ 180 + 4 = 14.
    • Profit = (22 − 14) × 180 = 1,440.
  • P = AC: Q = 300, P = 10. AC = 1,800 ÷ 300 + 4 = 10. Normal profit.
  • P = MC: Q = 360, P = 4. AC = 1,800 ÷ 360 + 4 = 9.
    • Loss = (9 − 4) × 360 = 1,800: the whole fixed cost.
Mission 3Graph lab

Set the price cap

Same natural monopoly. A regulator sets a maximum price (price cap).

Set the price capPrice, costsQuantity18022AR = DMRMCAC
  • Takeaway: lowering the cap raises output; profit is normal at P = AC (10); below that the firm makes a loss.
Mission 3

Price caps: RPI − X

  • UK regulators of privatised utilities (e.g. Ofwat for water, Ofgem for energy) cap prices.
  • The classic formula, first used in 1984, is RPI − X: prices may rise each year by inflation (RPI) minus X%.
  • Worked example: RPI = 4%, X = 2. Maximum price rise = 4 − 2 = 2%. A price of 50 can rise to 51.
  • If the firm cuts costs by more than X, it keeps the extra profit: an incentive to be efficient.
  • Water added K for investment: RPI − X + K. Newer UK caps use other inflation measures (CPI or CPIH); the idea is the same.
Quick check
?Illustrative data. A regulated firm's price cap is RPI − X. RPI inflation is 3% and X is set at 5. What can the firm do to its price this year?
Mission 3

Other ways to regulate

  • Profit (rate-of-return) regulation: profit capped at a % of capital.
    • Risk: little reason to cut costs; firms may over-invest to raise the allowed profit.
  • Quality standards: a price cap can tempt a firm to cut quality. Regulators set standards (e.g. leaks, delays).
  • Performance targets: fines or rewards linked to service, e.g. punctuality or customer complaints.
  • Impact: lower prices and higher output, but possibly less profit for investment.
Mission 3

Who should own it?

  • Nationalisation (public ownership): the state owns the firm.
    • For: can price nearer MC; long-term investment; no supernormal profit to shareholders.
    • Against: weak profit incentive, so costs may drift up (X-inefficiency); political interference; funding competes with other public spending.
  • Privatisation: sale of state firms to private owners.
    • For: profit motive cuts costs; access to private capital.
    • Against: a private natural monopoly still needs regulation; profit may come before investment.
  • Example: water in England and Wales was privatised in 1989. Scottish Water is publicly owned.
  • Either way, each area is still served by a single network of water pipes.
  • The evidence on which model performs better is mixed; it depends on regulation and management.
Mission 3Evaluate

Does regulation work?

  • It depends on information: the firm knows its costs better than the regulator. X may be set too low or too high.
  • It depends on regulatory capture: a regulator may come to serve the industry it regulates.
  • It depends on quality: price caps can lead to cost cuts that harm service, unless standards are enforced.
  • It depends on investment: tight caps may squeeze money for new pipes, track and cables.
Mission check

?Illustrative case: a small town is served by one broadband network that costs a lot to build but very little to connect each extra home. A second firm plans to build its own full network and win half the town's homes. Assuming total demand does not change, what happens to the average cost of supplying a home?
Mission 4

Mission 4: Should a country's trains, water pipes and power lines be run by the state or by private companies?

Make a guess: Should a country's trains, water pipes and power lines be run by the state or by private companies?

Mission 4

Four tools, four meanings

  • Nationalisation: the state takes a firm or industry into public ownership.
  • Privatisation: transfer of a firm or activity from the public sector to the private sector.
  • Regulation: rules set by government or an appointed regulator, e.g. on prices, quality, safety or entry.
  • Deregulation: removing rules that restrict entry, prices or how firms operate.
  • Ownership (who owns it) and market structure (how many rivals) are separate questions.
  • Say: "privatisation changes the owner" — not: "privatisation creates competition".
Mission 4

Forms of privatisation

Ownership and control mapWho owns?publicsectorprivatesectorprivatisationnationalisationWho provides?state staffprivatecontractorcontractingoutstate still paysWho may enter?private rivallicence gatestatemonopolyderegulation / liberalisation
  • Sale of a state-owned firm: shares sold to the public or a buyer (denationalisation). E.g. British Telecom (1984).
  • Contracting out (competitive tendering): the state still pays for a service but invites private firms to bid to provide it, e.g. bin collection.
  • Liberalisation: opening a state monopoly to private rivals (a form of deregulation).
  • Public–private partnership (PPP): a private firm finances, builds and often runs a public project (e.g. a hospital); the state pays over many years.
  • Sale of state assets, e.g. land or council houses.
Mission 4

The case for privatisation

  • Profit motive: private owners gain from cutting costs, so less X-inefficiency (waste when a firm faces little pressure to keep costs down).
  • Shareholder pressure: a poorly run firm's share price falls, and it risks a takeover.
  • Competition, where the industry allows rivals: lower prices, more choice.
  • Access to private capital for investment, without adding to government borrowing.
  • One-off revenue for the government from the sale.
  • Less political interference in pricing and investment decisions.
  • Example: the UK sold telecoms (1984), gas (1986), water in England and Wales (1989), electricity (1990–91) and rail (1994–97).
Mission 4

The case against, and renationalisation

  • A natural monopoly (one network serves the whole market most cheaply, e.g. a power grid) sold whole stays a monopoly: a private monopoly still needs regulation.
  • Short-termism: dividends may come before long-term investment.
  • Social objectives may be dropped, e.g. loss-making rural routes.
  • Sale price: if shares are sold too cheaply, taxpayers lose; the one-off revenue replaces a flow of future profits.
  • Fragmentation: splitting a network among many firms can raise coordination costs.
  • Renationalisation arguments: run for the public interest, cheaper public borrowing, no dividends to pay out, one integrated network.
  • Example: Railtrack (privatised rail infrastructure) was replaced in 2002 by Network Rail, now a public body. A 2024 law lets passenger train services in Great Britain return to public ownership as contracts end.
Quick check
?A city council stops using its own staff to clean public parks. It invites private firms to bid, and pays the winning firm to do the work for five years. The parks stay free to use. Which policy is this?
Mission 4

Nationalisation: evaluate

  • For:
    • Can price nearer MC and serve social aims (e.g. universal service), not just profit.
    • Long-term investment in networks; account for externalities.
    • Rescue of a failing firm that the economy relies on, e.g. the bank Northern Rock (UK, 2008).
  • Against:
    • Weak profit incentive: X-inefficiency; losses may be covered by taxpayers (a "soft budget").
    • Political interference, e.g. prices held down before elections.
    • Investment competes with schools and hospitals for public money.
    • Cost of compensating the previous owners.
Mission 4

Deregulation, licences and prohibitions

Licence capFare (Price)0PeQeRides per day (Quantity)DS = MCFree market: D meets S = MC at Pe, Qe.
  • A licence limits who may operate (e.g. taxis, mobile spectrum). A prohibition bans an activity outright.
  • Deregulation removes barriers, so new firms can enter: supply rises, prices fall, choice widens.
  • Example: the US Airline Deregulation Act (1978) ended government control of fares and routes.
  • Example: UK local buses outside London were deregulated in 1986: any licensed operator could run a route.
  • Risks: firms "cherry-pick" profitable routes; safety and quality may suffer; financial deregulation can raise risk-taking.
  • Say: "deregulation lowers barriers to entry" — not: "deregulation means no rules at all".
Mission 4Graph lab

Lift the licence cap

Illustrative data. A city caps taxi licences, limiting rides to 5,000 a day. Fare: 20. Cost of the last ride (MC): 11.

Lift the licence capFare, costRides per day5,0002011DS = MClicence capgap 9
  • Takeaway: removing an entry limit shifts the market to where price = MC. The gap was a reward for holding a licence.
Licence capFare (Price)020PePe = 14115,000QeQe = 8,000Rides per day (Quantity)DS = MCLicence capcap removedlicence reward: the gap between fare andcostFree market: D meets S = MC at Pe, Qe.Entry allowed: rides rise and the fare falls to thecost of the last ride.
Mission 4

Worked example: competitive tendering

  • Illustrative data. A council's in-house refuse service costs 1.20 million a year.
  • Bids: Firm X 0.96 million; Firm Y 1.02 million.
  • Saving with X = 1.20 − 0.96 = 0.24 million. As a %: 0.24 ÷ 1.20 × 100 = 20%.
  • Saving with Y = 0.18 million = 15%.
  • But the cheapest bid is not always best value: check quality standards, penalties for missed collections, and staff terms.
  • Example: UK councils had to tender services such as refuse collection after the Local Government Act 1988.
  • PPP example: the UK's Private Finance Initiative (from 1992) built hospitals and schools. In 2018 the UK government stopped signing new PFI deals, after the National Audit Office questioned their value for money. Supporters point to projects delivered on time and risk passed to private firms.
Quick check
?Illustrative data. A hospital spends 2.50 million a year on its own cleaning staff. After tendering, it accepts a bid of 2.00 million a year. What is the percentage saving?
Mission 4

What regulators do

  • Where competition is weak, a regulator acts for consumers in its place.
  • Role: set price caps, quality and service standards; grant licences; give rivals fair access to networks; fine firms that break the rules.
  • UK examples: Ofwat (water), Ofgem (energy), Ofcom (communications), the Office of Rail and Road.
  • Consumer protection law: e.g. goods must be as described and fit for purpose (Consumer Rights Act 2015).
  • Employee protection: e.g. minimum wage, maximum working hours, health and safety rules.
Mission 4

When regulators fail

  • Asymmetric information: the firm knows its costs better than the regulator. It may overstate costs to win a looser price cap.
  • Regulatory capture: a regulator comes to act in the interests of the firms it regulates, not consumers.
  • Why capture happens:
    • The regulator relies on the industry for information and expert staff.
    • A revolving door: staff move between regulator and industry.
    • A few firms gain a lot and lobby hard; millions of consumers each lose a little.
  • Example: after the 2010 Deepwater Horizon oil spill, the US Minerals Management Service, criticised as too close to the industry it oversaw, was broken up (2010–11).
  • Say: "regulatory capture" — not: "the regulator was bribed". Capture can happen without any law being broken.
Quick check
?Illustrative case: a country's rail regulator hires most of its senior staff from the train companies. Over ten years it approves every fare rise the companies ask for, using cost figures that only the companies collect. Which problem does this best show?
Mission 4Evaluate

Does it work?

  • It depends on competition: privatising a firm that faces rivals differs from selling a natural monopoly.
  • It depends on regulation: information, capture and the regulator's powers.
  • It depends on time: cost savings may come fast; under-investment may show only years later.
  • It depends on objectives: efficiency and low prices, or universal service and equity?
  • Regulation — for: corrects market failure; protects consumers and workers. Against: compliance costs ("red tape"), barriers to entry, risk of government failure.
  • Evidence on ownership is mixed: many studies find that competition and regulation matter at least as much as who owns the firm.
Mission check

?Illustrative case: a government sells its state-owned national electricity grid as a single company. There is still only one grid, and the government sets up no regulator. What is the most likely result for the price of using the grid?
Recap

The big ideas

Mission 1

  • Competition policy targets anti-competitive agreements, abuse of dominance and mergers that would substantially lessen competition.
  • UK: the CMA enforces the Competition Act 1998 and the Enterprise Act 2002; fines up to 10% of worldwide turnover. The EU has parallel rules.

Mission 2

  • A monopsonist must raise the wage for all workers to hire one more, so the marginal cost of labour is above the wage.
  • It hires where MRP = MCL and pays the wage on the supply (ACL) curve: lower wage, lower employment than a competitive market.
  • In bilateral monopoly the wage is indeterminate between Wm and the MRP at Lm.

Mission 3

  • A natural monopoly has falling average cost across the whole market, so one firm supplies most cheaply.
  • Unregulated, it sets MR = MC; P = AC gives normal profit; P = MC is efficient but loss-making.
  • Regulators use price caps (RPI − X), profit limits, quality and performance targets; owners may be public or private.

Mission 4

  • Nationalisation, privatisation, regulation and deregulation answer two different questions: who owns the firm, and what rules it faces.
  • Privatisation and deregulation can cut costs and prices where rivals can enter; natural monopolies still need regulation.
  • Regulators face asymmetric information and the risk of regulatory capture.
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Mini-lesson complete!

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You've worked through Market power and market failure for Edexcel A-level Economics B. 🎉

  1. Mission 1When should a government stop big firms from merging, fixing prices or growing too powerful?
  2. Mission 2Why would a firm refuse to hire a worker who would add more to its sales than they are paid?
  3. Mission 3Why might it make sense for only one company to lay the water pipes in a city?
  4. Mission 4Should a country's trains, water pipes and power lines be run by the state or by private companies?

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