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Pearson Edexcel A-level Economics B (9EB0) · 4.1 Competition and market power
Mini-Lesson

Competition and market power

6 missions. Guess, learn, then check. Your place is saved.

  1. Mission 1Can a market with only one firm still behave as if it were full of competitors?
  2. Mission 2When only a few big firms share a market, why do their prices so often move together?
  3. Mission 3Why can two people sitting side by side on the same train have paid very different fares?
  4. Mission 4Why would a business stop making more when each extra sale still brings in money?
  5. Mission 5Why can't one wheat farmer charge even slightly more than the market price?
  6. Mission 6Can a firm make goods at the lowest possible cost and still waste resources?

Also part of this unit: 1 mission in Introducing the market; The role of credit in the economy (part 2); 1 mission in Market failure and intervention; 2 missions in Revenue, costs, profits and cash; 1 mission in Business growth and competitive advantage; 1 mission in Firms, consumers and elasticities.

Mission 1

Mission 1: Can a market with only one firm still behave as if it were full of competitors?

Make a guess: Can a market with only one firm still behave as if it were full of competitors?

Mission 1

The threat of entry

Threat of entrythe marketone firmopen doorpotentialentrantsA perfectly contestable market has:free entry and free exit (no sunk costs)the same technology for entrantsperfect information about prices and profits
  • A contestable market: one where new firms can enter and leave easily, so the threat of entry disciplines the firms already there.
  • What counts is how easy it is to get in and out, not how many firms there are now.
  • Perfectly contestable market:
    • free entry and free exit: no sunk costs
    • entrants can use the same technology and reach the same costs as incumbents
    • perfect information about prices and profits
  • In theory, even a market with one firm can be perfectly contestable.
  • William Baumol and colleagues set out the theory in 1982.
Mission 1

Sunk costs

Sunk vs recoverablesunk costcannot be recoveredon exitlaunch advertisingspecialist researcha non-refundablelicencemachinery with noother userecoverable on exitcan be sold, leased orendeda delivery vanan aircraftrent on a short lease
  • Sunk cost: a cost that cannot be recovered when a firm leaves the market.
  • Examples: launch advertising, specialist research, a non-refundable licence, machinery with no other use.
  • Not sunk: a delivery van or an aircraft, which can be sold or leased to someone else.
  • Sunk costs are a barrier to exit, and so a barrier to entry: an entrant risks losing them if it has to leave.
  • Say: "a sunk cost cannot be recovered on exit" — not: "a sunk cost is any fixed cost". Rent on a short lease is fixed but can be ended.
Quick check
?A firm is thinking of starting a new bus service on a local route. Which of these costs is most likely to be a sunk cost?
Mission 1

Worked example: hit-and-run entry

Hit-and-runPrice0100Quantityincumbent price 15entrant14price falls to ACprice = AC:normal profit onlyAC = 10entrant leavesentrant's profit: (14 - 10) × 100 = 400Incumbent: price 15, above AC = 10.No sunk costs: the entrant leaves with nothinglost.
  • Illustrative data. One incumbent charges 15. Its AC = 10: supernormal profit of 5 a unit.
  • An entrant with the same AC of 10 undercuts at 14.
  • It sells 100 units before the incumbent can react.
  • Profit while there: (14 − 10) × 100 = 400.
  • The incumbent cuts its price. The entrant leaves. No sunk costs, so it loses nothing on exit.
  • This is hit-and-run competition: enter, take the profit, leave.
  • So the incumbent's best defence is to price at AC from the start: normal profit only.
Mission 1Graph lab

How high can the price go?

Illustrative data. Incumbent AC = MC = 10. Its profit-maximising price is 16. A hit-and-run entrant would sell 100 units before the incumbent reacts. It enters if its profit while there is greater than its sunk cost of entry.

How high can the price go?PriceQuantity01003000162020010DAC = MCprofit-maximising price 16
  • Takeaway: the higher the sunk costs, the higher the price the incumbent can safely charge. The market is less contestable.
Quick check
?Illustrative data. An incumbent has an average cost of 8. A hit-and-run entrant with the same costs would sell 50 units before the incumbent could react, and would have sunk costs of 150. It enters only if its profit while there is greater than its sunk costs. What is the highest price the incumbent can charge without attracting entry?
Mission 1

Contestability and efficiency

Contestable natural monopolyPrice0PmP = ACQmQcQuantityACMCD = ARMRMonopoly: MR = MC gives Pm and Qm.Contestable: price is pushed down to P = AC, atQc.
  • In a perfectly contestable market, in the long run:
    • Normal profit only (P = AC). Any supernormal profit invites hit-and-run entry.
    • Productive efficiency: a firm that does not produce at the lowest possible cost is undercut.
    • X-inefficiency is squeezed out: slack is punished.
    • With two or more firms, P = MC: allocative efficiency.
  • A single firm with falling AC (a natural monopoly) prices at P = AC, not P = MC: P = MC would mean a loss.
  • So behaviour depends on how easy entry is, not just on how many firms there are now.
Mission 1

Barriers to entry and exit

  • Every barrier makes a market less contestable.
  • Barriers to entry:
    • Sunk costs: start-up advertising, specialist equipment.
    • Economies of scale: an entrant starts small with higher AC.
    • Product differentiation and branding: loyal customers.
    • Intellectual property (patents, copyright) and R&D spending.
    • Legal barriers: licences, regulation.
    • Incumbents' strategy: limit pricing, predatory pricing.
  • Barriers to exit: sunk costs written off, long contracts, redundancy payments.
Quick check
?A market is served by one firm whose average cost falls over the whole range of market demand. The market is perfectly contestable. In the long run, where will the firm set its price?
Mission 1

Real markets: how contestable?

  • Airline routes were the classic example: aircraft can move from route to route, so entry to one route looks cheap.
  • The EU opened its internal air market fully in 1997: any EU airline could fly any route inside the EU. Low-cost airlines entered many routes.
  • But later studies of US routes found fares were lower where more airlines actually flew. The threat of entry alone did not hold fares down fully.
  • Reasons: airport slots, branding, loyalty schemes and incumbents' fast price cuts.
  • Usefulness of the model:
    • It explains why some firms with large market shares still keep prices low.
    • It shows that market structure is not everything: conduct depends on entry conditions.
    • Few real markets are perfectly contestable.
Mission 1Evaluate

Does contestability protect consumers?

  • Advantages: lower prices, normal profit, productive efficiency, pressure to innovate, without the need for many firms.
  • Disadvantages: supernormal profit is low, so there may be less to spend on R&D; firms may focus on short-run survival.
  • It depends on the size of sunk costs: high sunk costs, little threat.
  • It depends on how fast incumbents react: a quick price cut makes hit-and-run unprofitable.
  • It depends on information: entrants must know profits are there.
  • It depends on policy: removing barriers (deregulation, opening markets) may do more than breaking up firms.
Mission check

?Illustrative case: one coach company runs the only service between two towns. It earns large supernormal profits. Which change is most likely to make it lower its fares, even though no rival has yet entered?
Mission 2

Mission 2: When only a few big firms share a market, why do their prices so often move together?

Make a guess: When only a few big firms share a market, why do their prices so often move together?

Mission 2

A few firms dominate

  • Oligopoly: a market dominated by a few large firms.
  • High barriers to entry (economies of scale, brands, patents, high start-up costs).
  • Products may be identical (cement, crude oil) or differentiated (cars, smartphones, supermarkets).
  • Much non-price competition: advertising, branding, loyalty schemes.
  • Structure (few firms, high concentration) is one way to spot it. Conduct (firms reacting to each other) is another. A market can be concentrated without firms behaving like oligopolists.
Mission 2

Measuring concentration

ConcentrationCement market: market share (%)Firm P31%Firm R24%Firm S18%Firm T11%Firm Q9%All others7%3-firmconcentrationratio: 73%5-firm ratio:93%Illustrative data. Shares sum to 100%.
  • Illustrative data: a country's cement market.
FirmPQRSTAll others
Market share (%)3192418117
  • 3-firm concentration ratio = shares of the 3 largest: P, R, S = 31 + 24 + 18 = 73%.
  • 5-firm ratio = 73 + 11 + 9 = 93%.
  • A high n-firm ratio suggests oligopoly. Always state n.
Mission 2

Interdependence

  • Interdependence: each firm's best choice depends on what its rivals do.
  • So every decision (price, output, advertising) brings uncertainty: how will rivals react?
  • If one firm cuts its price, rivals may match the cut to protect their sales. All end up with lower prices and little extra market share.
  • If one firm raises its price, rivals may not follow, and it loses customers to them.
  • Matching cuts can spiral into a price war: each firm undercuts the others, and profits fall for all.
  • Say: "oligopolists are interdependent" — not: "oligopolists ignore their rivals" or "oligopolists always collude".
Mission 2

Compete or collude?

  • Non-collusive oligopoly: firms compete; each decides alone.
  • Collusive oligopoly: firms cooperate to limit competition, e.g. fixing prices or sharing out markets.
  • Overt (explicit) collusion: a formal agreement. A cartel is a group of firms that agree on prices or output.
  • Tacit collusion: no agreement, but firms behave as if there were one, e.g. following a price leader.
  • Why collude? Less uncertainty, higher joint profit, keeping new firms out.
  • Why not? Cartels are illegal in most countries, there may be fines, and members may cheat.
  • Restrictive practices: agreements that limit competition, e.g. price fixing, sharing out markets or limiting output. They are a market failure: price is held above the competitive level.
Mission 2

When does a cartel work?

  • A cartel is more likely to hold when there are:
    • few firms (easier to agree and to watch each other)
    • similar costs and similar products (easier to agree one price)
    • high barriers to entry (no newcomers to undercut the cartel)
    • easy monitoring of rivals' prices and output (cheating gets spotted)
    • stable demand (less pressure to break ranks)
    • weak enforcement of competition law
  • Consequences: higher prices, lower output, high profit for members, less choice; buyers lose surplus.
Quick check
?Four firms in a market are thinking of forming a cartel. Which set of conditions makes the cartel most likely to last?
Mission 2

A cartel acts like a monopoly

Cartel as monopolyPrice0Pcartel20Qcartel80QuantityAR = DMRMC = AC2020Cartel: MR = MC at Q = 40, price P = 60 read upto AR. Competitive benchmark: P = 20, Q = 80.joint profit, shared out as two quotas of 20
  • The members act as one firm: they face the industry demand curve.
  • Joint profit is greatest where industry MR = MC. Price is read up to AR.
  • Members then share the output out as quotas.
  • Illustrative data: AR = 100 − Q; MC = AC = 20 for every member.
    • Cartel: MR = 100 − 2Q = 20, so Q = 40, P = 60.
    • Competitive benchmark: P = MC = 20, Q = 80.
Mission 2

Worked example: the pull to cheat

CheatingProfit of each firm (illustrative data)800800Both keep toquota875700A cheats750750Both cheatFirm AFirm B
  • Illustrative data: two firms, A and B. AR = 100 − Q. MC = AC = 20.
  • Cartel quotas: 20 each. Q = 40, P = 60. Profit each: (60 − 20) × 20 = 800.
  • A secretly produces 25. Q = 45, so P = 100 − 45 = 55.
    • A: (55 − 20) × 25 = 875. A gains.
    • B: (55 − 20) × 20 = 700. B loses.
  • If both produce 25: Q = 50, P = 50. Each earns (50 − 20) × 25 = 750.
  • Each firm gains by cheating, whatever the other does. Together they lose. (Payoff matrix in another lesson.)
Mission 2Graph lab

Break the quota?

Illustrative data as the previous screen. B keeps to its quota of 20.

Break the quota?800A's profit800B's profit1,600Joint profit
  • Takeaway: cheating pays the cheater (up to a point) but lowers joint profit and the other member's profit.
Quick check
?Illustrative data as an earlier screen: AR = 100 − Q, MC = AC = 20, quotas of 20 each. Firm A produces 30; firm B keeps to 20. What is B's profit?
Mission 2

Price leadership and tacit collusion

  • Price leadership: one firm changes its price; the others follow.
    • Dominant-firm leadership: the largest firm leads.
    • Barometric leadership: a firm that reads market conditions well leads.
  • No meeting and no agreement: this is tacit collusion, which is hard to prove.
  • Result: prices that move together and stay stable for long periods.
  • Price stability can come from tacit agreement, not only from formal cartels.
Mission 2

The kinked demand curve

Kinked demandPrice0P = 10Q = 100QuantityrelativelyelasticrelativelyinelasticAR = DMRMC1MC2Rivals ignore a price rise but match a cut, so ARhas a kink at the current price.MR has a vertical gap at Q = 100: from 5 downto below zero (-15).MC1 and MC2 both pass through the gap in MR.
  • A model of price rigidity in non-collusive oligopoly.
  • Assumption: rivals do not follow a price rise, but do match a price cut.
  • Above the current price: demand is relatively price elastic (a rise loses many sales).
  • Below the current price: demand is relatively price inelastic (a cut wins few sales).
  • So the demand (AR) curve has a kink at the current price, and MR has a vertical gap below the kink.
  • MC can rise or fall within the gap with no change in profit-maximising price or output.
  • Limits: it does not explain how the starting price was set, and firms do change prices (e.g. when all face a cost rise).
Mission 2

Worked example: PED and revenue at the kink

Kinked demandPrice0P = 10Q = 100QuantityrelativelyelasticrelativelyinelasticAR = DMRMC1MC2Rivals ignore a price rise but match a cut, so ARhas a kink at the current price.MR has a vertical gap at Q = 100: from 5 downto below zero (-15).MC1 and MC2 both pass through the gap in MR.
  • Illustrative data. Current price 10; quantity 100. Total revenue = 10 × 100 = 1,000.
  • Rise to 11: rivals do not follow; Q falls to 80.
    • PED = −20% ÷ +10% = −2 (elastic). TR = 11 × 80 = 880. TR falls.
  • Cut to 9: rivals match; Q rises to only 104.
    • PED = +4% ÷ −10% = −0.4 (inelastic). TR = 9 × 104 = 936. TR falls.
  • Either change cuts revenue, so the firm keeps the price at 10.
  • MR just left of the kink = 5; just right of it, MR is below zero (−15). Any MC curve passing through this gap (here, MC of 5 or less at Q = 100) keeps output at 100.
Quick check
?A firm faces a kinked demand curve, with the kink at its current price. Its marginal cost rises, but the new MC curve still passes through the vertical gap in MR. What happens?
Mission 2

Real cartels

  • OPEC: set up in 1960 by Iran, Iraq, Kuwait, Saudi Arabia and Venezuela. Members agree production targets to influence the world oil price.
  • Truck makers (EU): in 2016 the European Commission fined truck makers a total of €2.93 billion for colluding on prices from 1997 to 2011.
  • One member, MAN, revealed the cartel and was not fined: the law rewards the first to confess.
  • In the UK, cartels are illegal under the Competition Act 1998. The CMA investigates them.
  • OPEC is made up of governments, not private firms. Competition laws on cartels do not apply to it in the same way.
Mission 2Evaluate

Is oligopoly good or bad?

  • Costs: prices above MC (allocative inefficiency); collusion transfers surplus to firms; heavy advertising may add to costs.
  • Benefits: economies of scale can mean low average costs; supernormal profit can fund research and new products (dynamic efficiency); non-price competition can raise quality and choice.
  • It depends on conduct: fierce rivalry (even price wars) helps buyers; collusion harms them.
  • It depends on barriers: if entry is possible, the threat of new firms limits high prices (see Mission 1).
  • It depends on regulation: the chance of being caught and fined.
Mission check

?Illustrative case: three airlines fly the same route at similar fares. One airline thinks about cutting its fare by 10%. Which is the strongest reason it may decide not to?
Mission 3

Mission 3: Why can two people sitting side by side on the same train have paid very different fares?

Make a guess: Why can two people sitting side by side on the same train have paid very different fares?

Mission 3

Same product, different prices

  • Price discrimination: charging different buyers different prices for the same good or service, for reasons not linked to cost.
  • Examples: peak and off-peak train fares; child and adult cinema tickets; student discounts.
  • Not price discrimination: a higher price because supplying costs more (e.g. delivery to a remote island).
  • Say: "price discrimination" only when cost is the same — not: for any price difference.
Mission 3

Three conditions

Three conditions for price discrimination1 Market powera price maker, not a price taker2 Groups with different elasticityLess elastichigher pricePED −1.4More elasticlower pricePED −33 No resalelow pricehigh priceIllustrative data.

1. Market power: the firm must be a price maker. A price taker cannot set prices.

2. Separate groups with different price elasticities of demand, and a way to tell them apart (age, time, place, ID). The group with the more elastic demand gets the lower price.

3. No resale: buyers at the low price must not be able to sell on to those charged more.

  • If resale is easy, the low-price group buys for everyone (market seepage or arbitrage).
Quick check
?A firm with market power plans to charge students a lower price than other adults for an identical product. Its costs are the same for both groups. Which situation would stop this plan from raising its profit?
Mission 3

Three degrees

Three degrees of price discriminationFirst degree: each buyer pays their ownmaximumPrice0QuantityDSecond degree: price per unit falls after a blockof unitsPrice per unit0Units boughtThird degree: different prices for differentgroupsAdultshigher priceStudentslower price
  • First degree (perfect): each buyer pays their own maximum willingness to pay.
  • Second degree: price depends on how much you buy: bulk discounts, lower price per unit after a set amount.
  • Third degree: different prices for different groups: age, time of day, location.
  • Real firms rarely know every buyer's maximum price. Personalised online pricing is an attempt to get closer.
Mission 3

Third degree: the diagram

Third-degree price discriminationMarket 1: less price elastic demandPrice0P1Q1QuantityAR1 = D1MR1MC = ACMarket 2: more price elastic demandPrice0P2Q2QuantityAR2 = D2MR2MC = AC
  • Two markets, the same MC (constant).
  • In each market, the firm produces where MR = MC.
  • Price in each market is read off its own AR (demand) curve.
  • The less price elastic market pays the higher price.
  • The more elastic market pays less: a high price there would lose too many sales.
  • Say: "the higher price is charged in the market where demand is less price elastic" — not: "the richer group always pays more".
Mission 3

Worked example: business travellers and students

Worked example: business travellers and studentsBusiness travellersAR = 120 − Q, MR = 120 − 2QPrice0702050QuantityARMRMC = ACStudentsAR = 40 − 0.5Q, MR = 40 − QPrice0302020QuantityARMRMC = ACIllustrative data. The two graphs use differentscales.
  • Illustrative data. MC = AC = 20.
  • Business travellers: AR = 120 − Q, so MR = 120 − 2Q.
    • MR = MC: Q = 50, P = 70.
  • Students: AR = 40 − 0.5Q, so MR = 40 − Q.
    • MR = MC: Q = 20, P = 30.
  • PED at those prices: business −1.4; students −3. Students pay less.
  • One price for all: the best single price is 70. Students (who pay at most 40) buy nothing.
    • Output 50; profit (70 − 20) × 50 = 2,500.
  • Price discrimination: output 70; profit 2,500 + (30 − 20) × 20 = 2,700.
Mission 3Graph lab

Who pays more?

Same two markets as the previous screen. Now the students' demand grows: at every price, students want to buy more.

Who pays more?StudentsPriceQuantity01002000801202030AR (students)MRMCBusiness travellersPriceQuantity01002000401205070AR (business)MRMC
  • Takeaway: each market has its own MR = MC price. The less elastic group pays more; when both groups have the same PED, they pay the same price.
Quick check
?Illustrative data. A firm sells in two separate markets with the same constant MC = 10. In market A, AR = 70 − 2Q, so MR = 70 − 4Q. In market B, AR = 30 − 0.5Q, so MR = 30 − Q. Which prices maximise its profit?
Mission 3

Perfect price discrimination

Perfect price discriminationPrice030102040QuantityP = MCAR = DAR = D = MRMCMRconsumer surplusprofitdeadweight lossproducer surplusSingle price: output 20, price 30.Each unit sells at its own price up to output 40.CS = 0, DWL = 0.
  • Each unit sells at the buyer's maximum price, so the demand curve becomes the MR curve.
  • The firm produces where D = MC, the P = MC output: the same output as perfect competition.
  • All consumer surplus becomes producer surplus. Consumer surplus = 0.
  • No deadweight loss: allocatively efficient output.
  • Illustrative data (as): AR = 50 − Q, MC = 10.
    • Single price: Q = 20, profit 400, consumer surplus 200, deadweight loss 200.
    • Perfect price discrimination: Q = 40, producer surplus 800, consumer surplus 0, deadweight loss 0.
  • Say: "efficient but not equitable" — not: "consumers gain because output rises".
Quick check
?A single-price monopolist becomes able to practise perfect (first-degree) price discrimination. Its costs do not change. Compared with before, which statement is correct?
Mission 3

Who gains and who loses?

  • Producers: more profit. It may fund investment, or keep a service running (e.g. a rail route).
  • Consumers in the high-price group: pay more; lose consumer surplus.
  • Consumers in the low-price group: may be served for the first time.
  • In an earlier screen, students were served only under price discrimination.
  • Total output: may rise. Then some deadweight loss is removed.
  • Real example: the 16–25 Railcard gives one third off most rail fares in Great Britain.
Mission 3Evaluate

Good or bad?

  • It depends on output: if total output rises, welfare can rise; if it does not, welfare usually falls.
  • It depends on who pays more: lower prices for students, children or pensioners can help equity; higher prices for those who must travel at peak times may not.
  • It depends on use of profit: research and investment, or higher payouts to owners?
  • It depends on costs of separating groups: checking ID, building booking systems.
  • It depends on fairness: buyers may see personalised prices as exploitation.
Mission check

?Illustrative case: a theme park charges local residents less than tourists for an identical day ticket. Its costs are the same for both groups. Which pair of conditions is needed for this to earn more profit than one price for all?
Mission 4

Mission 4: Why would a business stop making more when each extra sale still brings in money?

Make a guess: Why would a business stop making more when each extra sale still brings in money?

Mission 4

Thinking at the margin

  • Profit = TR − TC.
  • Marginal revenue (MR): the extra revenue from selling one more unit.
  • Marginal cost (MC): the extra cost of making one more unit.
  • MR > MC: one more unit adds to profit. Make more.
  • MR < MC: one more unit cuts profit. Make less.
  • Profit is maximised where MC = MR.
  • Say: "profit is maximised where MC = MR" — not: "where revenue is highest" or "where cost per unit is lowest".
Mission 4

Worked example: the profit table

The profit hillRevenue and costs0123456Output (Q)TRTCProfit−1021216146−8profit max0123456TR max (Q = 5)MR and MC of each extra unit18614410668210−212123456Output (Q)MRMCIllustrative data

Illustrative data. Fixed costs are 10. The firm must cut its price to sell more.

Output (Q)Price = ARTRMRTCMCProfit (TR − TC)
0200–10–−10
11818181662
216321420412
314421026616
41248634814
51050244106
6848−25612−8
  • Units 1 to 3: MR > MC. Each adds to profit.
  • Unit 4: MR = 6 but MC = 8. It still brings in money, yet profit falls by 2.
  • Best output: 3 units, profit = 42 − 26 = 16.
  • Not at Q = 5, where TR peaks at 50. Not at Q = 4, where AC is lowest (34 ÷ 4 = 8.5).
Quick check
?Illustrative data. A bakery sells batches of bread at a fixed price of 5 per batch, however many it sells. Its fixed costs are 4. The marginal cost of the 1st to 5th batches is 2, 3, 4, 6 and 8. How many batches maximise its profit?
Mission 4

MC = MR on the diagram

MC = MR on the diagramCosts and revenue0P*AC*Q*OutputAR = DMRMCACsupernormal profit = (P* − AC*) × Q*
  • Find Q where MC cuts MR from below. That is the profit-maximising output.
  • Go up from that Q to the AR (demand) curve to read the price.
  • Go up to AC at the same Q to read cost per unit.
  • Profit = (AR − AC) × Q: the rectangle between price and AC.
  • If AR < AC at that output, MC = MR gives the smallest loss the firm can make while producing.
  • Say: "read the price off the demand (AR) curve" — not: "off the point where MC = MR".
Mission 4Graph lab

Find the best output

Find the best outputRevenue, cost, profitOutput0123456−100204060TRTCprofit—MR of thelast unit—MC of thelast unit−10Profit
  • Takeaway: profit climbs while MR > MC and falls once MC > MR, even though revenue is still rising. The peak is the MC = MR output.
Quick check
MC cuts MR at an output of 40Costs and revenue01240OutputAR = DMRMCACIllustrative data
?Illustrative data. On a diagram, MC cuts MR from below at an output of 40, where MC = MR = 12. At an output of 40, average revenue is 25 and average cost is 18. What price does the profit-maximising firm charge, and what is its profit?
Mission 4

Making a loss: carry on or shut down?

Shutdown and break-evenCosts and revenue0OutputMCACAVCshutdown pointP1 = AR= MRP2P3P1: profitP2 above min AVC: a loss, but keep producing(loss is less than fixed costs)P3 below min AVC: shut down, no output (loss= fixed costs)
  • Short run: fixed costs must be paid even at zero output (rent, loan repayments).
  • Shut down: loss = fixed costs.
  • Carry on: loss = TC − TR.
  • So carry on if TR covers variable costs. Every unit sold then pays something towards fixed costs.
  • Rule: produce if TR ≥ TVC, i.e. P ≥ AVC. Shut down if P < AVC.
  • Shutdown point: the minimum of AVC.
  • Price − AVC is the contribution per unit: what each unit adds towards fixed costs.
  • Say: "shut down if price is below average variable cost" — not: "shut down as soon as the firm makes a loss".
Mission 4

Worked example: shut down or not?

Shutdown and break-evenCosts and revenue0OutputMCACAVCshutdown pointP1 = AR= MRP2P3P1: profitP2 above min AVC: a loss, but keep producing(loss is less than fixed costs)P3 below min AVC: shut down, no output (loss= fixed costs)
  • Illustrative data, one week. Fixed costs 600. Best output 100 units. AVC = 8.
  • Price 10: TR = 1,000. TVC = 800. TC = 1,400.
  • Carry on: loss = 1,400 − 1,000 = 400. Shut down: loss = 600.
  • Carry on. Contribution = (10 − 8) × 100 = 200 towards fixed costs.
  • Price falls to 7: TR = 700, less than TVC of 800.
  • Carry on: loss = 1,400 − 700 = 700. Shut down: loss = 600.
  • Shut down: P (7) < AVC (8).
Quick check
?Illustrative data. A firm's fixed costs are 2,000 a month. At its best output of 500 units, its AVC is 6 and its ATC is 10. The price is 7. What should it do in the short run?
Mission 4Evaluate

Do real firms set MC = MR?

It depends on …

  • Information: firms rarely know their exact MC and MR. Many use rules of thumb, such as adding a mark-up to cost.
  • Objectives: owners and managers may aim for growth, sales or a satisfactory profit instead.
  • Time: a firm may hold prices below the short-run profit-maximising level to keep rivals out or win loyal buyers, aiming at long-run profit.
  • Competition: in fierce competition, firms that stray far from maximum profit may not survive.
  • Judge: MC = MR is a model of how profit-seeking firms behave, more accurate in competitive markets than as a description of how managers decide.
Mission check

?Illustrative data. A water park makes a large profit each year. It is thinking of opening for one extra hour every evening. The extra hour would bring in 900 of ticket and food sales. It would add 1,100 to costs (staff, lighting, heating the pools). What should a profit-maximising water park do?
Mission 5

Mission 5: Why can't one wheat farmer charge even slightly more than the market price?

Make a guess: Why can't one wheat farmer charge even slightly more than the market price?

Mission 5

The assumptions

Assumptions of perfect competitionmany sellersidentical productsperfect informationfree entry and exit
  • Perfect competition assumes:
    • many buyers and sellers, each too small to affect the price
    • identical (homogeneous) products: one seller's output is a perfect substitute for another's
    • perfect information: everyone knows every price
    • free entry and exit: no barriers
  • Also assumed: firms aim to maximise profit; factors of production are mobile.
  • Real markets come close, but never fully: wheat and other crops, some currency markets.
  • It is a model: few real markets meet every assumption. It is used as a benchmark for comparing other structures.
Mission 5

A price taker

Industry and firmIndustryPrice (£)0PeQeQuantityDSFirm: the price is set by the industryPrice, revenue (£)0PeOutput (q)P = AR = MR = DThe firm's output axis is on a much smallerscale than the industry's.
  • Two diagrams:
    • Industry: market D and S set the price, Pe.
    • Firm: sells any amount it wants at Pe. Its demand curve is horizontal at Pe.
  • Charge above Pe? Buyers switch to identical products: the firm sells nothing.
  • Charge below Pe? Pointless: it can already sell all it wants at Pe.
  • So the firm is a price taker: every extra unit sells for Pe.
  • P = AR = MR = D, a horizontal line.
  • Say: "the firm's demand curve is perfectly elastic" — not: "market demand is perfectly elastic". Market demand slopes down as normal.
Quick check
?In a perfectly competitive market, why is each firm's demand curve horizontal at the market price?
Mission 5

Case: the world wheat price

  • Wheat (US hard red winter), world price, annual averages:
    • 2021: about 315 dollars per tonne
    • 2022: about 430 dollars per tonne
    • 2023: about 340 dollars per tonne
  • 2022 was the year Russia invaded Ukraine; both are major wheat exporters.
  • No single farmer caused these swings, and none could resist them.
  • Each farmer's only choice: how much to grow and sell at the world price.
Mission 5

How much to produce?

MC = MRPrice, revenue (£)0Output (q)P = AR = MR = DMCLeft of the crossing: MC < MR, so produce more.Right of it: MC > MR, so produce less.Profit is greatest where MC = MR, on the risingpart of MC.
  • Profit is maximised where MC = MR.
  • For a price taker, MR = P. So produce where MC = P, on the rising part of MC.
  • Why:
    • MC below P: the next unit adds more to revenue than to cost → produce it.
    • MC above P: the unit adds more to cost than to revenue → don't produce it.
Mission 5

Profit, normal profit or loss

Three outcomes for a price takerCosts, revenue (£)0Output (q)MCACtangentto ACP = AR = MR = Dsupernormal profit = (P − AC) × qP = AR = MR = Dnormal profit: P = AC at the output where MC =MRP = AR = MR = Dloss = (AC − P) × q
  • Find output where MC = MR. Then compare AR (= P) with AC at that output.
  • P > AC: supernormal profit = (P − AC) × Q, a rectangle.
  • P = AC: normal profit (break-even): just enough to keep the firm in this industry.
  • P < AC: loss = (AC − P) × Q.
  • Say: "supernormal (or abnormal) profit" — not: "a big profit". Normal profit is already counted in AC as a cost.
Mission 5

Worked example: two prices

Three outcomes for a price takerCosts, revenue (£)02926152030Output (q)MCACtangentto ACP = AR = MR = Dnormal profit: P = AC at the output where MC =MRP = AR = MR = Dloss = (AC − P) × q
  • Illustrative data. One firm's costs (fixed cost 360):
OutputMCAVCAC
20151129
30261426
40431928
  • Price 26: MC = 26 at 30 units. AC = 26 → normal profit.
  • Price 15: MC = 15 at 20 units. Loss = (29 − 15) × 20 = 280.
Quick check
?A diagram shows a perfectly competitive firm with MC, AC and a horizontal line at price P. MC = MR at output Q1. At Q1, AC is below P.
AreaPosition
ARectangle from AC to P in height, 0 to Q1 in width
BRectangle from 0 to P in height, 0 to Q1 in width
CArea between the MC curve and the price line, from 0 to Q1
DRectangle from 0 to AC in height, 0 to Q1 in width

Which area shows the firm's supernormal (abnormal, economic) profit?

Mission 5Graph lab

Price changes

The firm from an earlier screen. Price is now 26; the firm makes normal profit at 30 units.

Price changesPrice and costOutput0102040500204060q = 3026MCACP = MR
  • Takeaway: output follows the MC curve. At 43, MC = 43 at 40 units, so output is 40 and supernormal profit is (43 − 28) × 40 = 600 (TR 43 × 40 = 1,720; TC 28 × 40 = 1,120).
Mission check

?A firm sells standard cardboard boxes in a perfectly competitive market. The market price is 15 per box. At its current output, the marginal cost of its last box is 12. What should it do to maximise profit?
Mission 6

Mission 6: Can a firm make goods at the lowest possible cost and still waste resources?

Make a guess: Can a firm make goods at the lowest possible cost and still waste resources?

Mission 6

Two questions about waste

  • Efficiency: getting the most out of scarce resources.
  • Ask two separate questions:
    • How is it made? At the lowest possible cost per unit? → productive efficiency
    • What is made, and how much? The goods society values most? → allocative efficiency
  • One can hold without the other.
  • Both are static efficiency: efficiency at a point in time, with today's technology.
  • Dynamic efficiency asks a third question: are costs and products improving over time?
Mission 6

Productive efficiency

Minimum average costCosts (£)0OutputACMCminimum ACLeft of the minimum: MC < AC, so AC falls.Right of it: MC > AC, so AC rises.Productive efficiency: the output at minimum AC.
  • Productive efficiency: output where average cost (AC) is at its minimum.
  • At that output, MC = AC: the MC curve cuts the AC curve at its lowest point.
  • Why? If the next unit costs less than the average (MC < AC), it pulls AC down. If it costs more (MC > AC), it pushes AC up.
  • Productivity (output per worker per hour) matters here: higher productivity lowers the cost of each unit.
  • Say: "productively efficient at minimum AC" — not: "at the lowest total cost" (that is zero output).
Mission 6

Worked example: finding minimum AC

  • Illustrative data. Fixed cost = 60.
OutputTotal costAC = TC ÷ QMC of that unit
110010040
21306530
31505020
41684218
52004032
62464146
  • AC is lowest, 40, at 5 units: the productively efficient output.
  • 5th unit: MC 32 < AC 42 before it → AC falls.
  • 6th unit: MC 46 > AC 40 before it → AC rises.
Quick check
?Illustrative data. A firm's total costs are: 10 units, 300; 20 units, 440; 30 units, 570; 40 units, 720; 50 units, 950. At which output is the firm productively efficient?
Mission 6

Allocative efficiency

Allocative efficiencyPrice (£)0PeQ1QeQ2QuantityP > MCDS = MCP < MCP = MCQ1: P > MC, too little is made.Q2: P < MC, too much is made.
  • Allocative efficiency: resources make the goods and services society values most, in the right amounts.
  • Condition: P = MC.
    • Price shows what buyers will pay for the last unit: its marginal benefit (MB) to them.
    • MC shows the cost of the resources used for it: the value of what else they could have made.
  • P > MC: buyers value one more unit above its cost → too little is made.
  • P < MC: the last unit costs more than it is worth to buyers → too much is made.
  • This is thinking at the margin: judge the last unit, not the average.
  • Say: "allocatively efficient where P = MC" — not: "where P = AC" (that is normal profit).
Mission 6Graph lab

Can both happen at once?

A price-taking firm always produces where P = MC. You set the market price.

Can both happen at once?Price and costOutput01020305002060q = 4043MCACP = MR
  • Takeaway: P = MC holds at every price; minimum AC only when the price equals minimum AC (here 26).
Quick check
?A firm sells its product for 30. At its current output, the marginal cost of the last unit is 18. What does this show?
Mission 6

Dynamic efficiency

Dynamic efficiency: process innovationCosts (£)0OutputAC1AC1AC2Process innovation: lower cost at every output
  • Dynamic efficiency: efficiency over time, through innovation.
    • Process innovation: new methods lower costs → the whole AC curve shifts down.
    • Product innovation: new and better products.
  • It needs investment, R&D and new technology.
  • Funding: retained supernormal profit is a major source.
  • Incentive: firms innovate to win or protect profit.
Mission 6

Comparing market structures

Structures comparedPerfect competition (long run)Costs, revenue0OutputACMCP = AR = MR = DFirm with market powerCosts, revenue0P1Q1OutputP > MCACAR = DMRMC
  • Long-run outcomes, as usually taught:
ProductiveAllocativeDynamic
Perfect competitionYes (min AC)Yes (P = MC)Limited: only normal profit; no secrets to protect
Monopolistic competitionNo (excess capacity)No (P > MC)Some: product variety
OligopolyUnlikelyNo (P > MC)Possible: profits and rivalry fund R&D
MonopolyUnlikely; may be X-inefficientNo (P > MC)Possible: profits fund R&D; or none, with no rivals
  • Firms with market power face a downward-sloping demand curve, so they can set P above MC.
Mission 6

Case: patents

  • A patent gives an inventor the sole right to sell an invention for a set time.
  • WTO members must offer patent protection for at least 20 years from the filing date.
  • Static cost: a monopoly → P > MC → allocatively inefficient.
  • Dynamic gain: the expected profit pays for costly R&D (e.g. new medicines).
  • A deliberate trade: less static efficiency now for more dynamic efficiency later.
Mission 6Evaluate

Static or dynamic: which matters more?

  • It depends on whether profit is reinvested: supernormal profit may fund R&D, or be paid out to owners.
  • It depends on competitive pressure: a protected monopoly may stop innovating and let costs drift up.
  • It depends on economies of scale: one large firm's minimum AC may be far below that of many small firms.
  • It depends on time: static losses happen now; dynamic gains, if any, come later and are uncertain.
Mission check

?Illustrative data. A firm produces exactly at the lowest point of its AC curve. Its price is 12. At this output, its marginal cost is 7. Which statement is correct?
Recap

The big ideas

Mission 1

  • A contestable market has low barriers to entry and exit; the threat of entry disciplines incumbents.
  • With no sunk costs, hit-and-run entry removes supernormal profit: price is pushed towards average cost.
  • Real markets are rarely perfectly contestable: sunk costs, branding and quick responses protect incumbents.

Mission 2

  • Oligopoly: a few large firms, high barriers, interdependence and uncertainty.
  • Firms can compete or collude: overtly (cartels) or tacitly (price leadership). Cartels act like a monopoly but each member is tempted to cheat.
  • Kinked demand curve: rivals match cuts but not rises, so prices are rigid; MC can move within the MR gap.

Mission 3

  • Price discrimination: different prices for the same product, not explained by cost.
  • Conditions: market power; groups with different PED that can be told apart; no resale.
  • Third degree: MR = MC in each market; the less elastic market pays more.

Mission 4

  • Profit is maximised where MC = MR (MC cutting MR from below); the price is read off the AR (demand) curve.
  • In the short run, keep producing if P ≥ AVC (TR ≥ TVC); shut down if P < AVC.

Mission 5

  • A perfectly competitive firm is a price taker: P = AR = MR = D, a horizontal line.
  • It produces where MC = MR = P. Compare P with AC: supernormal profit, normal profit or loss.

Mission 6

  • Productive efficiency: minimum AC (MC = AC).
  • Allocative efficiency: P = MC.
  • Dynamic efficiency: costs and products improve over time through R&D and investment.
🏆

Mini-lesson complete!

⭐⭐⭐

You've worked through Competition and market power for Edexcel A-level Economics B. 🎉

  1. Mission 1Can a market with only one firm still behave as if it were full of competitors?
  2. Mission 2When only a few big firms share a market, why do their prices so often move together?
  3. Mission 3Why can two people sitting side by side on the same train have paid very different fares?
  4. Mission 4Why would a business stop making more when each extra sale still brings in money?
  5. Mission 5Why can't one wheat farmer charge even slightly more than the market price?
  6. Mission 6Can a firm make goods at the lowest possible cost and still waste resources?

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