← A-Level Economics · CCEA A-Level Economics revision
⭐ 0
CCEA GCE Economics (AS and A2) · Business objectives; Business growth; Measuring markets
Mini-Lesson

Business objectives; Business growth; Measuring markets

5 missions. Guess, learn, then check. Your place is saved.

  1. Mission 1Why might a business choose to earn less profit than it could?
  2. Mission 2When the people who own a company are not the people who run it, whose goals win?
  3. Mission 3Why would someone risk their savings to start a business, and who else gets a say once it exists?
  4. Mission 4Why do some firms grow by buying up other firms, while most firms stay small?
  5. Mission 5Why do some markets have thousands of sellers while others have only one or two?

Also part of this unit: 1 mission in Costs and revenues.

Mission 1

Mission 1: Why might a business choose to earn less profit than it could?

Make a guess: Why might a business choose to earn less profit than it could?

Mission 1

Why aim for maximum profit?

  • Economic theory usually assumes firms maximise profit: output where MC = MR.
  • Reasons a firm might:
  • Owners take the risk and want the reward (dividends, a higher share price).
  • Retained profit pays for investment and research.
  • Profit builds a cushion for bad years and makes lenders and investors keen.
  • High profit signals success and pays for growth.
Mission 1

Stakeholders pull in different directions

  • Stakeholder: anyone with an interest in what the firm does.
StakeholderWhat they may want
Shareholders (owners)High profit, dividends, rising share price
ManagersHigh pay, status, a bigger firm, an easy life
WorkersGood pay, secure jobs, safe conditions
CustomersLow prices, quality, good service
SuppliersSteady orders, prompt payment
Local community, governmentJobs, low pollution, taxes paid
  • Conflicts: higher pay for workers can mean lower dividends; lower prices for customers can mean lower profit.
  • The firm's objectives depend on who has the most power over it.
  • When owners do not run the firm, managers may pursue managerial utility: their own pay, status and perks (more in Mission 2).
Mission 1

Three targets on one diagram

Three targets on one diagramCosts and revenue01612109.2581214OutputAR = DMRMCACprofit max (MC = MR): P = 16, profit = 54revenue max (MR = 0): P = 12, TR = 144sales max (AR = AC): P = 10, TR = TC, normalprofitTotal revenue014414012881214OutputTRIllustrative data
  • Profit maximisation: MC = MR.
  • Sales revenue maximisation: MR = 0. The last unit adds nothing to TR, so TR is at its peak.
  • Sales (volume) maximisation: sell as many units as possible while still making normal profit: AR = AC.
  • Moving from profit max to revenue max to sales max: more output, a lower price, less profit.
  • Say: "revenue is maximised where MR = 0" — not: "where MC = MR".
Mission 1

Worked example: three outputs

Three targets on one diagramCosts and revenue01612109.2581214OutputAR = DMRMCACprofit max (MC = MR): P = 16, profit = 54revenue max (MR = 0): P = 12, TR = 144sales max (AR = AC): P = 10, TR = TC, normalprofitTotal revenue014414012881214OutputTRIllustrative data
  • Illustrative data. AR = 24 − Q, so MR = 24 − 2Q. TC = 42 + 0.5Q², so MC = Q.
  • Profit max: 24 − 2Q = Q → Q = 8, P = 16. TR = 128, TC = 74, profit = 54.
  • Revenue max: 24 − 2Q = 0 → Q = 12, P = 12. TR = 144 (the highest), profit = 30.
  • Sales max: AR = AC at Q = 14, P = 10. TR = TC = 140: normal profit only.
  • Each target gives up some profit for size.
Mission 1Graph lab

Change the target

Change the targetCosts and revenueOutput012142001020816AR = DMRMCACMC = MRMR = 0AR = AC
  • Takeaway: revenue peaks where MR = 0 and sales volume peaks where AR = AC; both mean more output, a lower price and less profit.
Quick check
Four outputs on a cost and revenue diagramCosts and revenue030405060OutputAR = DMRMCACMarked outputs, left to right: 30 (MC = MR), 40(AC lowest), 50 (MR = 0), 60 (AR = AC)Schematic: spacing not to scale. Illustrativedata.
?Illustrative data. On a firm's cost and revenue diagram: MC = MR at an output of 30; MR = 0 at an output of 50; AR = AC at an output of 60; AC is lowest at an output of 40. The managers' bonuses depend on the firm's sales revenue. Which output will they choose?
Mission 1

Growth, market share, survival

  • Growth: a bigger firm can gain economies of scale and market power, and spreads its risks. Managers often gain pay and status from size.
  • Market share: a larger share of sales can bring power over price and a strong brand. Firms may cut prices now to win it.
  • Survival: the first aim for many new firms and in recessions. Cover costs, keep cash flowing.
  • Many of these can serve long-run profit while lowering profit today.
Mission 1

Satisficing

  • Satisficing: aiming for a satisfactory level of profit, not the maximum. The term comes from the economist Herbert Simon.
  • Why firms satisfice:
  • Owners and managers are different people. Managers need only enough profit to keep shareholders content.
  • Firms have several stakeholders to keep happy at once.
  • Information is limited. Finding the exact MC = MR point is costly.
  • Satisficing is a minimum target, not a lack of effort. Profit below it brings pressure for change.
Mission 1

CSR and social objectives

  • Corporate social responsibility (CSR): a firm takes account of its impact on society and the environment, beyond what the law requires.
  • Examples: cutting emissions, fair supplier contracts, community projects, staff welfare.
  • Environmental targets (e.g. net zero emissions by a set date) are one such objective.
  • Social enterprises and not-for-profit organisations put a social aim first.
  • Real case: in 2022 the founder of the outdoor clothing firm Patagonia transferred its ownership to a trust and a non-profit body. Profit not reinvested in the firm goes to fighting climate change.
  • For CSR: it can attract customers and staff, and protect the brand: long-run profit.
  • Against: Milton Friedman (1970) argued a firm's social responsibility is to increase its profits within the rules; owners, not managers, should choose how to spend on good causes.
Quick check
?A new food-delivery firm sets its prices below its costs to sign up as many customers as possible. It expects to make losses for several years. Which objective best explains this?
Mission 1Evaluate

Do firms really maximise profit?

It depends on …

  • Who controls the firm: an owner-manager may maximise profit; managers of a large company with many small shareholders have more room to pursue other goals.
  • Competition: in fiercely competitive markets, firms that do not aim at maximum profit may not survive.
  • Time horizon: growth, market share and CSR can be routes to long-run profit, so they may not be alternatives at all.
  • Information: firms rarely know MC and MR exactly; rules of thumb can approximate maximum profit.
  • Judge: profit maximisation is a useful assumption for predicting behaviour, but real firms often balance several objectives.
Mission check

?The managers of a large hotel chain aim each year for a level of profit that keeps its shareholders content. Once they reach it, they do not push for more. They avoid price rises and cost cuts that would upset staff and regular guests, even though these would raise profit. Which objective best describes their behaviour?
Mission 2

Mission 2: When the people who own a company are not the people who run it, whose goals win?

Make a guess: A large company is owned by thousands of shareholders but run by a team of hired managers. Whose goals usually win?

Mission 2

Owning versus controlling

Owning versus controllingOwners (shareholders)electBoard of directorsappointManagersrunthe firmdecisionsinformation(limited)Divorce of ownershipand control
  • In a small firm (a sole trader or a partnership) the owners usually run the business themselves.
  • A large public limited company (plc) may have thousands of shareholders. They own the company.
  • Shareholders elect a board of directors, who appoint managers to run the firm day to day. The managers control it.
  • This split is the divorce (separation) of ownership and control.
  • It lets a firm raise huge sums from many owners and hire expert managers.
  • But owners and managers may want different things.
  • Say: "a public limited company is privately owned by its shareholders" — not: "a plc is in the public sector".
Mission 2

The principal–agent problem

  • A principal hires an agent to act on the principal's behalf.
  • Here the shareholders are the principals; the managers are the agents.
  • The principal–agent problem: the agent may pursue their own goals rather than the principal's.
  • Two conditions make it a problem:
  • Different objectives: owners want profit (and a rising share price); managers may want pay, status, power or an easy life.
  • Asymmetric information: managers know far more about the business than scattered owners, so owners cannot easily check what managers do.
  • Other examples: voters (principals) and politicians (agents); a patient and a doctor; a homeowner and a builder.
Quick check
?Which situation is the clearest example of the principal–agent problem?
Mission 2

What might managers aim for instead?

  • If owners cannot fully control managers, the firm may not maximise profit (MC = MR).
  • Managerial utility maximisation (Williamson): managers pursue their own satisfaction: salary, perks, large staffs, status.
  • Sales revenue maximisation (Baumol): managers' pay and prestige often rise with the firm's size, so they push revenue (MR = 0) rather than profit.
  • Growth maximisation: a bigger firm brings more power and is harder to take over.
  • Satisficing: managers aim for just enough profit to keep shareholders content, then follow other goals.
  • These objectives are compared on diagrams in Mission 1.
Mission 2

Lining up the incentives

Owners try to make the agents' goals match their own:

  • Performance-related pay: bonuses linked to profit or the share price.
  • Share options: managers gain if the share price rises, so they think like owners.
  • Monitoring: independent (non-executive) directors, audited accounts, published reports.
  • Shareholder votes: owners can vote down pay deals or remove directors.
  • UK example: since 2013, shareholders in UK quoted companies have a binding vote on the directors' pay policy.
  • Threat of takeover: if managers waste profit, the share price falls, a rival may buy the firm cheaply, and the managers lose their jobs.
  • Each fix has limits: targets can be gamed, and bonuses tied to this year's results can encourage short-termism.
Quick check
?To align managers with shareholders, a company pays its chief executive a large bonus if the share price is higher at the end of this year. Which unintended effect is most likely?
Mission 2

Public and private sectors

Public and private sectorsPrivate sectorowned by individualsor shareholderssole traderspartnershipscompaniescharitiesco-operativesPublic sectorowned or controlledby the governmentstate schoolspublic hospitalspublic corporations
  • Private sector: organisations owned by individuals or shareholders (sole traders, partnerships, companies, charities, co-operatives).
  • Public sector: organisations owned or controlled by the government, e.g. state schools, public hospitals, and public corporations (state-owned businesses that sell goods or services).
  • Typical objectives differ:
  • Private firms: often profit, but also growth, market share or survival.
  • Public sector: providing a service to all who need it, social welfare, meeting targets, often breaking even or delivering value for money for taxpayers.
  • A public corporation may keep running a loss-making service (e.g. a rural bus or rail route) because of its wider social benefit.
  • Principal–agent problems exist here too: taxpayers and voters (principals) cannot easily monitor public managers (agents).
Quick check
?Which of these organisations is in the public sector?
Mission 2Evaluate

How much does the divorce matter?

  • The principal–agent problem is a strong reason firms may not maximise profit. How serious it is depends on:
  • How spread out ownership is: a few large shareholders (e.g. pension funds) can monitor managers far better than thousands of small ones.
  • Information: better accounts, audits and independent directors shrink the information gap.
  • Competition: in a highly competitive market, a firm that wastes money makes losses and may not survive, which limits managers' freedom.
  • Pay design: rewards tied to long-run value align goals better than one-year targets, but no scheme is perfect.
  • Takeover threat: works only if shares are traded and rivals can buy them.
Mission check

?Lena founded a chain of gyms and still owns all of it. She has moved abroad and hired a chief executive on a salary plus a bonus based on the number of members. Lena checks the accounts twice a year. Which outcome is most likely?
Mission 3

Mission 3: Why would someone risk their savings to start a business, and who else gets a say once it exists?

Make a guess: Why would someone risk their savings to start a business, and who else gets a say once it exists?

Mission 3

Stakeholders

Stakeholders around a firmExternalInternalThe firmShareholdersManagersEmployeesCustomersSuppliersLendersLocal community,government
  • Stakeholder: any person or group with an interest in, or affected by, what a firm does.
StakeholderUsually wants
Shareholders (owners)Profit, dividends, a rising share price
ManagersPay, status, a growing firm
EmployeesGood pay, secure jobs, safe conditions
CustomersLow prices, quality, good service
SuppliersRegular orders, prompt payment
LendersInterest paid, loans repaid
Local community, governmentJobs, low pollution, taxes paid
  • Internal stakeholders are part of the firm (owners, managers, employees); external ones are outside it.
  • Owners put their own money at risk when they start or buy into a firm; profit is the reward they hope for, and it is never guaranteed.
Mission 3

When stakeholders clash

  • Illustrative case: a factory plans to automate its packing line, cutting 40 jobs and raising profit.
  • Shareholders gain. Employees lose. Customers may gain from lower prices. The local community loses jobs and spending.
  • Common conflicts: pay vs dividends, prices vs profit, expansion vs the local environment.
  • Whose aims win depends on power:
  • owners vote at meetings and can replace directors
  • employees can strike or leave; unions bargain
  • customers can switch to rivals or boycott
  • lenders set loan terms; governments regulate and tax.
  • Not every aim conflicts: well-paid, secure staff may work better, which helps profit in the long run.
Quick check
?A supermarket chain tells its suppliers that it will now pay invoices after 90 days instead of 30 days, which leaves the chain with more cash in hand. Which stakeholder conflict does this show most directly?
Mission 3Evaluate

Can a firm keep every stakeholder happy?

It depends on …

  • Time horizon: in the long run, satisfied staff and customers can raise profit, so aims may line up.
  • Power: a firm with one dominant shareholder may follow that owner's aims; a firm with many small shareholders gives managers more room.
  • Competition: fierce competition leaves less room for anything but low costs.
  • Information: it is hard to measure CSR and stakeholder satisfaction, so trade-offs are often hidden.
  • The law: minimum standards on pay, safety and pollution remove some conflicts for every firm.
  • Judge: firms usually balance stakeholders rather than satisfy them all; who wins depends on who holds power.
Mission check

?A bus company owned by shareholders plans to cut its loss-making rural routes. The local council, which grants the company its contract for town routes, objects. So do passengers and the drivers' union. The company keeps the routes in return for a small council payment, even though cutting them would have raised profit. What best explains the decision?
Mission 4

Mission 4: Why do some firms grow by buying up other firms, while most firms stay small?

Make a guess: Most businesses never grow beyond a handful of people. What is the main reason?

Mission 4

Why grow?

  • Economies of scale: a bigger firm can cut its average cost (bulk buying, specialist machines, cheaper finance).
  • Market power: a larger market share gives more control over price and less threat from rivals.
  • Spreading risk: selling more products or in more countries means one bad market hurts less.
  • Survival: a large firm is harder to take over and better able to ride out a downturn.
  • Managers' goals: pay, status and power often rise with size (the principal–agent problem, Mission 2).
Mission 4

Two routes: organic or external

  • Organic (internal) growth: the firm expands by itself: new outlets, new products, more capacity, often paid for from retained profit.
  • Slower and lower risk; the firm keeps its culture and control.
  • External growth joins firms together:
  • Merger: two firms agree to combine into one.
  • Takeover (acquisition): one firm buys a controlling share of another, with or without its agreement.
  • Faster: it buys market share, brands and skills at once. But it is costly, risky, and the two cultures may clash.
Mission 4

Three directions of integration

Three directions of integrationRaw materials(steel)Manufacturing(car maker)Wholesale/distributionRetail(showrooms)anothercar makerHorizontalBackwardverticalForwardverticalHotelchainConglomerate
  • Think of a chain of production: raw materials → manufacturing → wholesale → retail.
  • Horizontal integration: firms at the same stage of the same industry join (two car makers).
  • Vertical integration: firms at different stages of the same chain join.
  • Backward: towards the supplier (a car maker buys a steel works).
  • Forward: towards the customer (a car maker buys a chain of car showrooms).
  • Conglomerate integration: firms in unrelated industries join (a car maker buys a hotel chain).
  • Say: "backward vertical integration" for buying a supplier — not: "forward", which means moving towards the final customer.
Quick check
?A coffee-shop chain buys a company that roasts coffee beans and already supplies the chain. What type of integration is this?
Mission 4

Motives for each type

TypeMain motivesMain risks
HorizontalEconomies of scale; bigger market share; removes a rivalCompetition authorities may block it; may raise prices for consumers
Vertical (backward)Secures supplies; controls quality and cost; captures the supplier's profit marginLocked into one supplier even if cheaper ones appear
Vertical (forward)Controls how the product reaches customers; captures the retailer's margin; may shut rivals out of outletsFirm may lack retail skills
ConglomerateSpreads risk across unrelated markets; uses spare cash or management skillFew economies of scale; managers may not understand the new industry
  • The motive should match the type: a firm worried about supplies looks backward; a firm worried about one market falling looks to conglomerate growth.
Mission 4

Real cases

  • Horizontal, blocked: in April 2019 the UK's competition authority (the CMA) blocked a merger of Sainsbury's and Asda, two of the country's largest supermarkets. It expected higher prices, less choice or lower quality for shoppers.
  • Vertical: in March 2018 Tesco, a supermarket chain, completed its takeover of Booker, a food wholesaler that supplies shops and restaurants.
  • Demerger (break-up): in July 2022 the drugs company GSK split off its consumer health products (toothpaste, painkillers) as a separate company, Haleon.
  • The same patterns appear in every economy.
Mission 4Evaluate

Does growth pay?

  • Whether growth benefits a firm and its customers depends on:
  • Type: horizontal and vertical growth can give real cost savings; conglomerate growth gives few economies of scale.
  • Route: organic growth is slower but less risky; a takeover is fast but the buyer may overpay.
  • Culture and management: savings promised before a merger may be lost to clashing ways of working.
  • Size reached: past a point, diseconomies of scale outweigh economies.
  • Who you ask: shareholders may gain from market power while consumers pay higher prices; competition authorities weigh both.
  • So growth is not right for every firm. Most firms stay small: their market is small, finance for expansion is hard to get, or the owner prefers to keep control.
Mission check

?A chocolate maker's profits swing wildly because the price and supply of cocoa beans are unreliable. Its managers want growth that most directly reduces this problem. Which route fits best?
Mission 5

Mission 5: Why do some markets have thousands of sellers while others have only one or two?

Make a guess: Why can a town have dozens of hair salons but only one company running the water pipes?

Mission 5

The spectrum of competition

Spectrum of competitionBarriersto entryControlover priceFirmsPerfectcompetitionMonopolisticcompetitionContestable marketOligopolyMonopolyEach dot is a firm. Bars show a rough rank, notdata.
Perfect competitionMonopolistic competitionOligopolyMonopoly
Number of firmsVery manyManyA few dominateOne
ProductIdentical (homogeneous)DifferentiatedIdentical or differentiatedNo close substitutes
Barriers to entryNoneLowHighVery high
Control over priceNoneSomeConsiderableHigh
  • Example of monopolistic competition: hairdressers, cafés, pizza restaurants in a town.
  • Oligopoly: firms are interdependent: each must think about how rivals will react.
  • Contestable market: entry and exit are free and costless (no sunk costs), so even a few firms must behave competitively or be undercut by new entrants.
Mission 5

Barriers to entry

  • A barrier to entry is anything that makes it hard for new firms to enter a market.
TypeExamples
LegalPatents, licences, the sole right to run a service (e.g. a local water or power network)
CostEconomies of scale, high start-up costs, sunk costs (costs that cannot be recovered on leaving)
MarketBrand loyalty, heavy advertising, product differentiation
PhysicalControl of a key resource, the best locations, owning the network
  • Why they matter: without barriers, supernormal profit attracts entrants, whose extra supply competes it away. With high barriers, firms can keep supernormal profit in the long run.
Mission 5

Sunk costs and barriers to exit

  • A sunk cost cannot be recovered if the firm leaves the market: advertising, research, specialist equipment with no resale value.
  • High sunk costs deter entry: an entrant that fails loses them for good.
  • Barriers to exit: costs of leaving, e.g. sunk costs written off, redundancy pay, long contracts.
  • If sunk costs are low, a market is contestable: a new firm could enter, take profit and leave (hit-and-run entry).
  • So even a market with few firms may have prices close to average cost, because incumbents fear entry. (Contestable markets are covered fully in a later lesson.)
Quick check
?Building a new steel works costs billions. The two existing producers each make so much steel that their average cost is far below what any new, smaller rival could achieve. Which barrier to entry does this describe?
Mission 5

Concentration ratios

Concentration ratioGreat Britain grocery market shares (% ofsales)4-firm CR = 66.1%28.215.711.610.68.325.6Tesco 28.2%Sainsbury's 15.7%Asda 11.6%Aldi 10.6%Morrisons 8.3%Others 25.6%Others: all remaining grocers, incl. Lidl, Co-opand independents (100 − 74.4).Source: Kantar, 12 weeks to 2 November 2025
  • Market share = firm's sales ÷ total market sales × 100.
  • n-firm concentration ratio = combined market share of the n largest firms.
  • Great Britain grocery shares (Kantar, 12 weeks to 2 November 2025): Tesco 28.2%, Sainsbury's 15.7%, Asda 11.6%, Aldi 10.6%, Morrisons 8.3%.
  • 4-firm CR = 28.2 + 15.7 + 11.6 + 10.6 = 66.1%.
  • 5-firm CR = 66.1 + 8.3 = 74.4%.
  • A high ratio suggests oligopoly. There is no single official cut-off, so always state n.
  • Limits: the result depends on how the market is defined (all groceries or one product? national or local?). It does not show whether the top firms are equal in size or one dominates.
Quick check
?The table shows market shares in a country's mobile phone network market (illustrative data).
FirmMarket share (%)
P12
Q30
R8
S22
T18
All others10

What is the 3-firm concentration ratio?

Mission 5

Worked example: value, volume and growth

Three firms sell all of a market's output this year (illustrative data).

FirmUnits sold (million)PriceSales value (million)
A61.006.0
B32.507.5
C16.506.5
Market1020.0
  • Market size: 10 million units by volume; 20 million by value.
  • Shares by volume: A 60%, B 30%, C 10%. A is the leader.
  • Shares by value: A 6 ÷ 20 = 30%; B 7.5 ÷ 20 = 37.5%; C 6.5 ÷ 20 = 32.5%. B is the leader.
  • 2-firm CR: 60 + 30 = 90% by volume; 37.5 + 32.5 = 70% by value.
  • Market growth: last year's sales value was 16 million. Growth = (20 − 16) ÷ 16 × 100 = 25%.
  • Difficulties measuring share: defining the market, private firms not publishing sales, online and cross-border sales, and value and volume giving different answers.
Mission 5Evaluate

How useful are the models?

  • Perfect competition assumes identical products, perfect information and free entry. Few markets fit; some farm commodities come closest.
  • It is still useful as a benchmark: it shows what efficient outcomes look like.
  • Pure monopoly is rare; many "monopolies" are dominant firms with some rivals.
  • Real firms try to escape competition by differentiation and branding, which add value and give a competitive advantage: customers pay more for a product they see as different.
  • It depends on the question: the models predict the direction of effects (entry erodes profit) better than exact prices.
  • The threat of entry (contestability) can matter as much as the number of firms.
Mission check

?In which market are existing firms most likely to keep earning more than normal profit in the long run?
Recap

The big ideas

Mission 1

  • Theory assumes profit maximisation (MC = MR), but firms may aim for growth, market share, survival, satisfactory profit or social goals.
  • Revenue maximisation is at MR = 0 and sales maximisation at AR = AC: more output, a lower price, less profit.
  • Objectives depend on which stakeholders hold power, and stakeholders' aims often conflict.

Mission 2

  • When owners (principals) hire managers (agents), different goals plus asymmetric information let managers pursue their own aims.
  • So firms may pursue sales, growth, managerial utility or satisficing instead of maximum profit.
  • Public sector organisations are government-owned and often aim at service, welfare and value for money rather than profit.

Mission 3

  • Stakeholders' aims often conflict; which aims win depends on power. CSR has a case for and against.

Mission 4

  • Firms grow for economies of scale, market power, lower risk and survival; organically (by themselves) or externally (merger or takeover).
  • Horizontal joins the same stage, vertical joins different stages (backward to suppliers, forward to customers), conglomerate joins unrelated industries.
  • Most firms stay small because of small markets, limited finance or the owner's own goals.

Mission 5

  • Market structures range from perfect competition to monopoly, by number of firms, product differentiation, barriers to entry and control over price.
  • Barriers to entry (legal, cost, market, physical) let firms keep supernormal profit in the long run.
  • n-firm concentration ratio = combined market share of the n largest firms.
🏆

Mini-lesson complete!

⭐⭐⭐

You've worked through Business Economics for CCEA A-level Economics. 🎉

  1. Mission 1Why might a business choose to earn less profit than it could?
  2. Mission 2When the people who own a company are not the people who run it, whose goals win?
  3. Mission 3Why would someone risk their savings to start a business, and who else gets a say once it exists?
  4. Mission 4Why do some firms grow by buying up other firms, while most firms stay small?
  5. Mission 5Why do some markets have thousands of sellers while others have only one or two?

Your stars: 0 / 0

📣 Smashed it? Share your score

Challenge a friend to beat your stars, or show a parent how you got on.

→ Back to A-Level Economics · CCEA