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Cambridge International AS & A Level Economics (9708) · 8.1 Government policies to achieve efficient resource allocation and correct market failure; 8.2 Equity and redistribution of income and wealth
Mini-Lesson

Government policies to achieve efficient resource allocation and correct market failure; Equity and redistribution of income and wealth

4 missions. Guess, learn, then check. Your place is saved.

  1. Mission 1Should a country's trains, water pipes and power lines be run by the state or by private companies?
  2. Mission 2Can changing the pre-ticked box on a form change what millions of people choose?
  3. Mission 3When a government steps in to fix a market, how can it end up making things worse?
  4. Mission 4If almost everyone in a country gets richer, can more people end up counted as poor?

Also part of this unit: 2 missions in Classification of goods and services; 4 missions in Reasons for intervention; Government intervention in markets (part 1); 2 missions in Intervention in markets; Income and wealth inequality (part 2); 1 mission in Different market structures (part 2).

Mission 1

Mission 1: Should a country's trains, water pipes and power lines be run by the state or by private companies?

Make a guess: Should a country's trains, water pipes and power lines be run by the state or by private companies?

Mission 1

Four tools, four meanings

  • Nationalisation: the state takes a firm or industry into public ownership.
  • Privatisation: transfer of a firm or activity from the public sector to the private sector.
  • Regulation: rules set by government or an appointed regulator, e.g. on prices, quality, safety or entry.
  • Deregulation: removing rules that restrict entry, prices or how firms operate.
  • Ownership (who owns it) and market structure (how many rivals) are separate questions.
  • Say: "privatisation changes the owner" — not: "privatisation creates competition".
Mission 1

Forms of privatisation

Ownership and control mapWho owns?publicsectorprivatesectorprivatisationnationalisationWho provides?state staffprivatecontractorcontractingoutstate still paysWho may enter?private rivallicence gatestatemonopolyderegulation / liberalisation
  • Sale of a state-owned firm: shares sold to the public or a buyer (denationalisation). E.g. British Telecom (1984).
  • Contracting out (competitive tendering): the state still pays for a service but invites private firms to bid to provide it, e.g. bin collection.
  • Liberalisation: opening a state monopoly to private rivals (a form of deregulation).
  • Public–private partnership (PPP): a private firm finances, builds and often runs a public project (e.g. a hospital); the state pays over many years.
  • Sale of state assets, e.g. land or council houses.
Mission 1

The case for privatisation

  • Profit motive: private owners gain from cutting costs, so less X-inefficiency (waste when a firm faces little pressure to keep costs down).
  • Shareholder pressure: a poorly run firm's share price falls, and it risks a takeover.
  • Competition, where the industry allows rivals: lower prices, more choice.
  • Access to private capital for investment, without adding to government borrowing.
  • One-off revenue for the government from the sale.
  • Less political interference in pricing and investment decisions.
  • Example: the UK sold telecoms (1984), gas (1986), water in England and Wales (1989), electricity (1990–91) and rail (1994–97).
Mission 1

The case against, and renationalisation

  • A natural monopoly (one network serves the whole market most cheaply, e.g. a power grid) sold whole stays a monopoly: a private monopoly still needs regulation.
  • Short-termism: dividends may come before long-term investment.
  • Social objectives may be dropped, e.g. loss-making rural routes.
  • Sale price: if shares are sold too cheaply, taxpayers lose; the one-off revenue replaces a flow of future profits.
  • Fragmentation: splitting a network among many firms can raise coordination costs.
  • Renationalisation arguments: run for the public interest, cheaper public borrowing, no dividends to pay out, one integrated network.
  • Example: Railtrack (privatised rail infrastructure) was replaced in 2002 by Network Rail, now a public body. A 2024 law lets passenger train services in Great Britain return to public ownership as contracts end.
Quick check
?A city council stops using its own staff to clean public parks. It invites private firms to bid, and pays the winning firm to do the work for five years. The parks stay free to use. Which policy is this?
Mission 1

Nationalisation: evaluate

  • For:
    • Can price nearer MC and serve social aims (e.g. universal service), not just profit.
    • Long-term investment in networks; account for externalities.
    • Rescue of a failing firm that the economy relies on, e.g. the bank Northern Rock (UK, 2008).
  • Against:
    • Weak profit incentive: X-inefficiency; losses may be covered by taxpayers (a "soft budget").
    • Political interference, e.g. prices held down before elections.
    • Investment competes with schools and hospitals for public money.
    • Cost of compensating the previous owners.
Mission 1

Deregulation, licences and prohibitions

Licence capFare (Price)0PeQeRides per day (Quantity)DS = MCFree market: D meets S = MC at Pe, Qe.
  • A licence limits who may operate (e.g. taxis, mobile spectrum). A prohibition bans an activity outright.
  • Deregulation removes barriers, so new firms can enter: supply rises, prices fall, choice widens.
  • Example: the US Airline Deregulation Act (1978) ended government control of fares and routes.
  • Example: UK local buses outside London were deregulated in 1986: any licensed operator could run a route.
  • Risks: firms "cherry-pick" profitable routes; safety and quality may suffer; financial deregulation can raise risk-taking.
  • Say: "deregulation lowers barriers to entry" — not: "deregulation means no rules at all".
Mission 1Graph lab

Lift the licence cap

Illustrative data. A city caps taxi licences, limiting rides to 5,000 a day. Fare: 20. Cost of the last ride (MC): 11.

Lift the licence capFare, costRides per day5,0002011DS = MClicence capgap 9
  • Takeaway: removing an entry limit shifts the market to where price = MC. The gap was a reward for holding a licence.
Licence capFare (Price)020PePe = 14115,000QeQe = 8,000Rides per day (Quantity)DS = MCLicence capcap removedlicence reward: the gap between fare andcostFree market: D meets S = MC at Pe, Qe.Entry allowed: rides rise and the fare falls to thecost of the last ride.
Mission 1

Worked example: competitive tendering

  • Illustrative data. A council's in-house refuse service costs 1.20 million a year.
  • Bids: Firm X 0.96 million; Firm Y 1.02 million.
  • Saving with X = 1.20 − 0.96 = 0.24 million. As a %: 0.24 ÷ 1.20 × 100 = 20%.
  • Saving with Y = 0.18 million = 15%.
  • But the cheapest bid is not always best value: check quality standards, penalties for missed collections, and staff terms.
  • Example: UK councils had to tender services such as refuse collection after the Local Government Act 1988.
  • PPP example: the UK's Private Finance Initiative (from 1992) built hospitals and schools. In 2018 the UK government stopped signing new PFI deals, after the National Audit Office questioned their value for money. Supporters point to projects delivered on time and risk passed to private firms.
Quick check
?Illustrative data. A hospital spends 2.50 million a year on its own cleaning staff. After tendering, it accepts a bid of 2.00 million a year. What is the percentage saving?
Mission 1

What regulators do

  • Where competition is weak, a regulator acts for consumers in its place.
  • Role: set price caps, quality and service standards; grant licences; give rivals fair access to networks; fine firms that break the rules.
  • UK examples: Ofwat (water), Ofgem (energy), Ofcom (communications), the Office of Rail and Road.
  • Most countries have similar bodies, e.g. the US Federal Energy Regulatory Commission (energy networks).
Mission 1

When regulators fail

  • Asymmetric information: the firm knows its costs better than the regulator. It may overstate costs to win a looser price cap.
  • Regulatory capture: a regulator comes to act in the interests of the firms it regulates, not consumers.
  • Why capture happens:
    • The regulator relies on the industry for information and expert staff.
    • A revolving door: staff move between regulator and industry.
    • A few firms gain a lot and lobby hard; millions of consumers each lose a little.
  • Example: after the 2010 Deepwater Horizon oil spill, the US Minerals Management Service, criticised as too close to the industry it oversaw, was broken up (2010–11).
  • Say: "regulatory capture" — not: "the regulator was bribed". Capture can happen without any law being broken.
Quick check
?Illustrative case: a country's rail regulator hires most of its senior staff from the train companies. Over ten years it approves every fare rise the companies ask for, using cost figures that only the companies collect. Which problem does this best show?
Mission 1Evaluate

Does it work?

  • It depends on competition: privatising a firm that faces rivals differs from selling a natural monopoly.
  • It depends on regulation: information, capture and the regulator's powers.
  • It depends on time: cost savings may come fast; under-investment may show only years later.
  • It depends on objectives: efficiency and low prices, or universal service and equity?
  • Evidence on ownership is mixed: many studies find that competition and regulation matter at least as much as who owns the firm.
Mission check

?Illustrative case: a government sells its state-owned national electricity grid as a single company. There is still only one grid, and the government sets up no regulator. What is the most likely result for the price of using the grid?
Mission 2

Mission 2: Can changing the pre-ticked box on a form change what millions of people choose?

Make a guess: Can changing the pre-ticked box on a form change what millions of people choose?

Mission 2

Choice architecture

Choice architecture: the same canteen, two layoutsFruit at the backTillFruit by the tillTill
  • Choice architecture: the way choices are presented to people.
  • Order, layout, wording and the option already selected all affect what people pick.
  • There is no neutral design: a canteen must put something at eye level.
  • Firms use it to sell. Governments can use it to improve choices people say they want to make.
  • Builds on: bounded rationality, inertia, present bias.
Mission 2

Framing

  • Framing: presenting the same information in different ways to influence a choice.
  • "Surgery has a 90% survival rate" vs "a 10% death rate": same fact, but more people choose surgery under the first frame.
  • Loss frames often bite harder than gain frames: "You are losing 300 a year by not insulating" vs "You could save 300 a year".
  • Better information, clearly framed (e.g. unit pricing, energy labels), can correct poor choices caused by imperfect information.
Mission 2

Nudges

  • Nudge (Thaler and Sunstein, 2008): a change in choice architecture that alters behaviour predictably without banning any option or significantly changing financial incentives.
  • A nudge must be easy and cheap to avoid.
  • Examples: fruit at eye level in a canteen; a letter saying "most people in your area pay their tax on time"; a text reminder before a doctor's appointment.
  • Say: "a nudge keeps every option open" — not: "a nudge is a small tax or a ban".
Mission 2

Default choice

Defaults: organ donation and pensionsEffective consent rate (%)05010012%Germany (opt in)99.98%Austria (opt out)Source: Johnson and Goldstein (2003)Eligible private-sector employees in aworkplace pension (%)05010042%201285%2018Source: DWP (2019)
  • Default choice: the option that applies if a person does nothing.
  • People tend to stick with defaults: inertia, effort, and a sense that the default is recommended.
  • Organ donation (Johnson and Goldstein, 2003): effective consent rates.
    • Germany (opt in: you must sign up): 12%.
    • Austria (opt out: you are a donor unless you refuse): 99.98%.
  • UK pensions: since October 2012, employers must automatically enrol eligible workers; they can opt out.
    • Eligible private-sector employees in a workplace pension: 42% in 2012, 85% in 2018.
Mission 2

Worked example: percentage points or per cent?

Workplace pension participation, 2012 and 2018Eligible private-sector employees in aworkplace pension (%)05010042%201285%2018+43percentagepointsSource: DWP (2019)
  • Pension participation rose from 42% to 85%.
  • Change in percentage points: 85 − 42 = 43 percentage points.
  • Percentage change: (85 − 42) ÷ 42 × 100 = 102% (participation roughly doubled).
  • Say: "rose by 43 percentage points" — not: "rose by 43%".
Quick check
?A school canteen moves fruit from the back counter to beside the till. The share of pupils buying fruit rises from 20% to 30% (illustrative data). How large is the rise?
Mission 2

Restricted and mandated choice

  • Restricted choice: the number of options is limited, so people are not overwhelmed and poor options are removed.
    • Example: a pension scheme that offers a handful of well-run funds rather than hundreds.
  • Mandated choice: people must make an active decision; there is no default.
    • Example: an application for a driving licence that cannot be completed until you answer "Do you want to be an organ donor? Yes / No".
  • Mandated choice avoids presuming what people want, but still beats inertia.
Quick check
?Which policy is an example of mandated choice?
Mission 2

Nudges compared with other policies

Policy ladder: nudge, tax, banmost coerciveRegulation (ban)Ban on smoking in enclosed publicplacesoptions banned: yesprice changed: noIndirect taxUK Soft Drinks Industry Levy(2018)options banned: noprice changed: yesNudge (default)Pension auto-enrolmentoptions banned: noprice changed: noleast coercive
PolicyExampleOptions banned?Price changed?
Nudge (default)Pension auto-enrolmentNoNo
Indirect taxUK Soft Drinks Industry Levy (2018)NoYes
Regulation (ban)Ban on smoking in enclosed public placesYesNo
  • Nudges are usually cheap to run and keep freedom of choice.
  • Taxes and bans are stronger tools where harm to others is large or behaviour is hard to shift.
Mission 2Evaluate

How much should we rely on nudges?

  • It depends on the size of effects at scale: in trials by government nudge units, the average effect was about 1.4 percentage points, against about 8.7 in published academic studies (DellaVigna and Linos, 2022).
  • It depends on the default chosen: auto-enrolled workers often stay at the minimum contribution, which may be too low for a comfortable retirement.
  • It depends on who designs the choice: governments can misjudge what is good for people (government failure), and firms use the same tools for profit.
  • Ethics: supporters call it "libertarian paternalism" (guiding while keeping choice). Critics call some nudges manipulation, especially if hidden.
  • Nudges often work best alongside taxes, regulation and information.
Quick check
?A government wants to cut childhood obesity and is choosing between a nudge (healthy food placed at eye level in shops) and a tax on high-sugar foods. Which is the strongest argument for preferring the nudge?
Mission check

?An energy company makes its renewable-electricity tariff the pre-selected option on its sign-up page. Customers can switch to the standard tariff with one click, and neither price changes. Far more new customers now end up on the renewable tariff. Which explanation fits best?
Mission 3

Mission 3: When a government steps in to fix a market, how can it end up making things worse?

Make a guess: Why might a policy meant to fix a market leave it worse off?

Mission 3

When the cure is worse

  • Markets can fail (earlier missions). Governments step in with taxes, subsidies, rules and provision.
  • But intervention can also go wrong.
  • Government failure: intervention that causes a net welfare loss compared with leaving the market alone. Resources end up misallocated.
  • A policy that has costs, or does not fix the problem fully, is not automatically a failure.
  • The test: is society better or worse off overall than with no intervention?
  • Say: "government failure = intervention leads to a net welfare loss" — not: "any policy that costs money".
Mission 3

Inadequate information

Tax set too highCosts and benefits0Q taxQ*QmQuantityMPB = MSB = DMPC = SMSCMPC + taxtaxwelfare loss (overproduction)new welfare loss (underproduction)old welfare loss
  • To set a Pigouvian tax, the government needs the MEC. It rarely knows it.
  • Also called information gaps.
  • Illustrative data: MPB = MSB = 100 − Q; MPC = 20 + Q; true MEC = 20.
  • No tax: Qm = 40; welfare loss = 100.
  • The government overestimates the harm and sets a tax of 50.
  • New supply: 70 + Q. 100 − Q = 70 + Q, so Q = 15. Q* is 30.
  • Now underproduction. At Q = 15: MSB = 85, MSC = 55, a gap of 30.
  • New welfare loss = ½ × (30 − 15) × 30 = 225.
  • 225 > 100: society is worse off than with no tax. Government failure.
Mission 3Graph lab

How wrong can the tax be?

Illustrative data: as the previous screen. MEC = 20; the market alone gives a welfare loss of 100.

How wrong can the tax be?Price, costs and benefitsQuantityQ*QmMPB = MSBMPCMSCno-tax loss 100100Welfare losswith this tax
  • Takeaway: a tax a little wrong still helps. A tax far too high can do more harm than the externality.
Quick check
?Illustrative data: MPB = MSB = 60 − Q; MPC = Q. The MEC is 10 at every output, so the market output is 30, the social optimum is 25 and the welfare loss with no tax is 25. The government sets a tax of 30 per unit. What is the new welfare loss, and is this government failure?
Mission 3

Distortions of price signals

Guaranteed price creates a surplusPrice0PminPeQdQeQssurplus: bought into storeQuantityDScost to taxpayers = Pmin × (Qs − Qd)
  • Prices tell producers what to make and consumers what to buy.
  • Taxes, subsidies and price controls change prices. Set badly, they send the wrong signals.
  • Also called price distortion or market distortion.
  • Real world: the European Community's farm policy (CAP) guaranteed farmers high prices and bought up what did not sell.
    • Farmers produced more than consumers wanted.
    • Surpluses filled stores: "butter mountains" and "wine lakes", paid for by taxpayers.
    • From 1984, milk quotas were brought in to limit dairy output.
  • One intervention led to another to fix its side-effects.
Mission 3

Unintended consequences

  • People and firms respond to a policy, sometimes in ways nobody planned.
  • Real world: Mexico City, 1989, "Hoy No Circula" (No Driving Today).
    • Most cars banned from driving one weekday a week, by the last digit of the number plate.
    • Aim: cleaner air.
    • A 2008 study found no evidence that air quality improved.
    • Many households bought an extra car, often an older, more polluting one, to drive on their banned day.
  • Other examples: high taxes on cigarettes can encourage smuggling; rent controls can shrink the supply of rented homes.
Mission 3

Administrative costs

  • Every policy must be designed, run, monitored and enforced.
  • These administrative costs use scarce resources: staff, inspections, IT, legal cases.
  • Firms bear compliance costs too: paperwork, reporting, meeting standards.
  • Illustrative data: a tax on a pollutant removes a welfare loss of 100 a year.
    • Collecting the tax and checking emissions costs 120 a year.
    • Net effect: 100 − 120 = −20. Society is worse off: government failure.
  • Costs can exceed gains when the externality is small, or polluters are many and small.
Mission 3

Conflicting objectives

  • Governments pursue many goals at once: cleaner air, low prices, jobs, tax revenue, re-election.
  • A policy that serves one goal can harm another, so it may be set at the wrong level, or dropped.
  • Real world: the UK planned yearly inflation-linked rises in fuel duty. They were cancelled every year from 2011 to 2025, and duty was cut by 5p a litre in 2022, after fuel prices jumped.
  • Tobacco taxes aim to cut smoking, yet they also raise revenue that depends on people still smoking.
  • Say: "conflicting objectives" — not: "the government did not care". Both goals may be valid.
Mission 3

Capture and political incentives

  • Regulatory capture: a regulator comes to serve the industry it regulates, not the public.
    • Close contacts; staff moving between regulator and industry; lobbying.
  • Asymmetric information in regulation: the firm knows its true costs and harm; the regulator does not. Firms can overstate the cost of meeting rules.
  • Political incentives: politicians face elections. They may favour quick, visible gains over long-term benefits (short-termism), or respond to strong lobby groups.
  • These are why some economists argue that intervention should be limited to clear, large market failures; others argue for better-designed institutions instead.
Quick check
?Illustrative data: a city charges households for rubbish by weight. Households respond as planned and throw away less, a gain to society worth 2 million a year. Weighing every bin, sending bills and chasing unpaid ones costs 3 million a year. Which cause of government failure does this show?
Mission 3

Government failure in macro policy

  • Time lags: spotting a problem, deciding, and the policy taking effect can take a year or more. By then the economy may have changed.
  • Inaccurate data and forecasts: GDP figures are revised; forecasts can be wrong.
  • Conflicting macro objectives: e.g. cutting inflation may raise unemployment for a time.
  • Side-effects: a large budget deficit may push up interest rates and crowd out private investment.
  • Result: a policy can destabilise the economy instead of smoothing it.
Quick check
?In a recession, a government cuts income tax to raise spending. The cut takes 18 months to pass and take effect. By then the economy is already growing fast, and the extra spending adds to inflation. Which cause of government failure does this best show?
Mission 3Evaluate

Market failure or government failure?

It depends on:

  • The size of the market failure. A large externality can justify intervention even if the policy is imperfect.
  • Information. Where the MEC can be measured, policy can be set closer to the optimum.
  • Flexibility. A tax can be adjusted as evidence comes in; a large project or a ban is harder to undo.
  • Effectiveness. Does the policy change behaviour? Inelastic demand can make a tax raise revenue but cut little harm.
  • Consequences for stakeholders. Who gains and who loses: consumers, producers, workers, taxpayers, the government, third parties.
  • Government failure is a reason to design policy carefully, not proof that intervention never works.
Mission check

?Illustrative data: a market for private bus services gives too few journeys. The welfare loss is 300 a year. The government brings in a subsidy. Afterwards, the welfare loss is 80 a year and the subsidy scheme costs 150 a year to run. Has government failure occurred?
Mission 4

Mission 4: If almost everyone in a country gets richer, can more people end up counted as poor?

Make a guess: If almost everyone in a country gets richer, can more people end up counted as poor?

Mission 4

Two meanings of poverty

Two poverty linesWeekly income0500nine households, lowest to highest incomemedianabsolute poverty line (fixed in real terms)relative poverty line (60% of median)Illustrative data
  • Absolute poverty: income too low to pay for basic needs: food, clean water, shelter, clothing.
    • Measured against a line that is fixed in real terms (it rises only with prices).
  • Relative poverty: income far below the typical income of the same society.
    • Measured against a line that moves with the median income, e.g. 60% of median household income.
  • Median: the middle income when all households are lined up from lowest to highest.
  • Absolute poverty asks: can you survive? Relative poverty asks: can you take part in normal life where you live?
  • Say: "relative poverty is low income compared with the median" — not: "a milder form of absolute poverty".
Mission 4

Worked example: the line moves

The poverty line movesWeekly income (illustrative data)05001000nine households, lowest to highest incomemedian 400median 480relative line 240 = 60% of the median 400absolute line 200relative poverty 2/9 = 22%absolute poverty 1/9Bottom three households +2%, everyone else+20%. Dashed outlines: incomes before.relative line 288 = 60% of the new median480absolute line 200 (unchanged)relative poverty 3/9 = 33%absolute poverty 1/9
  • Illustrative data. Nine households, weekly income:
    • 150 · 220 · 280 · 340 · 400 · 460 · 520 · 650 · 900
  • Median = 400. Relative line = 0.6 × 400 = 240.
  • Below 240: two households (150, 220). Relative poverty rate = 2/9 = 22%.
  • Ten years later, in real terms: the bottom three gain 2%; everyone else gains 20%.
    • New median = 400 × 1.2 = 480. New line = 0.6 × 480 = 288.
    • Bottom three now: 153 · 224.4 · 285.6. All below 288.
    • Relative poverty rate = 3/9 = 33%.
  • Absolute line fixed at 200 (real terms): one household below it before (150), one after (153).
  • Everyone got richer. Relative poverty rose; absolute poverty did not.
Quick check
?Over 20 years, the real income of every household in a country doubles, including the median household's. The poverty lines are 60% of the median (relative) and a fixed basket of basic needs (absolute). What happens?
Mission 4

Poverty lines in practice

  • International poverty line (World Bank): $3.00 a day per person, at 2021 prices, adjusted for purchasing power parity (PPP).
    • PPP: adjusts for what money buys in each country, so $3.00 means the same basket everywhere.
    • It is an absolute line. It replaced $2.15 a day (2017 prices) in June 2025.
    • Higher lines for richer countries: $4.20 and $8.30 a day.
  • UK: relative low income = below 60% of median household income, before or after housing costs (BHC/AHC).
  • The UK also uses an "absolute low income" line: 60% of the 2010/11 median, held fixed in real terms.
  • Elsewhere: the EU counts people below 60% of their country's median; the OECD compares countries at 50%.
Mission 4

Case: the numbers

  • World, below the international line:
    • 1990: around 2.3 billion people.
    • 2025: around 831 million: about 1 in 10 people.
  • UK, 2023/24, median income £650 a week (BHC). Line: 0.6 × 650 = £390 a week.
    • Relative low income: 17% of people BHC; 21% AHC.
    • Children: 31% AHC. Pensioners: 16% AHC.
  • These figures are for a couple with no children. So the UK relative line is about £28 a day each (390 ÷ 7 ÷ 2): far above the World Bank's $3.00 a day.
  • One country can cut absolute poverty fast while relative poverty barely moves.
Mission 4

Causes of poverty

Causes of povertyIndividuals and householdsunemploymentlow paylow skillssicknesscaring dutieslarge familiesdiscriminationlittle wealthpovertyEconomy and governmentrecessionrising prices ofessentialschanges to taxes andbenefitsconflict and climateshocks
  • Individuals and households:
    • unemployment, low pay, part-time or insecure work
    • low human capital: few skills or qualifications
    • sickness, disability, caring duties, old age
    • large families or one earner (e.g. lone parents)
    • discrimination (gender, ethnicity, disability) and unequal opportunity
    • owning little wealth or property: no income from rent, interest or profit
  • Economy and government:
    • recession, rising prices of essentials (food, energy, rents)
    • changes to taxes and benefits
    • conflict, weak institutions, climate shocks (low-income countries)
Mission 4

What changes the poverty count?

  • Absolute poverty falls when the real incomes of the poor rise.
  • Relative poverty falls only when the poor's incomes rise faster than the median.
  • So a recession can cut relative poverty: the median falls while benefits and pensions hold steady.
  • And fast growth can raise relative poverty, if gains go mostly to middle and high earners.
  • Say: "relative poverty fell because the median fell" — not: "the poor became better off".
Mission 4

The poverty trap

  • Poverty trap: a low-income worker gains little from earning more, because means-tested benefits are withdrawn and taxes start as income rises.
  • The share of each extra unit of income lost this way is the effective marginal tax rate (EMTR).
  • Illustrative: an EMTR of 70% means 100 more earned leaves only 30 more to spend.
  • Result: weak incentive to work more hours, train or seek promotion; families stay near the poverty line.
  • Worked numbers and policy fixes: an earlier lesson.
Mission 4

Effects of poverty and inequality

  • Individuals: worse health and shorter lives, poorer diet, stress, lower school results, debt.
  • Firms: lower demand for most goods; workers with less training and lower productivity.
  • Economy:
    • low human capital → lower productivity and growth
    • higher spending on benefits and health care; less tax paid
  • Counter-argument: some inequality gives incentives to work, train and take risks.
Quick check
?During a recession, median household income falls by 5% in real terms. State pensions are held constant in real terms, and most pensioners' income comes from the state pension. What is most likely to happen to measured relative poverty among pensioners?
Mission check

?Over ten years, the real incomes of the poorest fifth of a country's households rise by 15%. Median real household income rises by 40%. Which outcome is most likely?
Recap

The big ideas

Mission 1

  • Nationalisation, privatisation, regulation and deregulation answer two different questions: who owns the firm, and what rules it faces.
  • Privatisation and deregulation can cut costs and prices where rivals can enter; natural monopolies still need regulation.
  • Regulators face asymmetric information and the risk of regulatory capture.

Mission 2

  • Choice architecture shapes decisions; framing, defaults, restricted and mandated choices are its tools.
  • A nudge changes behaviour without banning options or significantly changing incentives.
  • Nudges are cheap and preserve choice, but effects at scale can be small and the designer can get it wrong.

Mission 3

  • Government failure: intervention that causes a net welfare loss compared with the market outcome.
  • Causes: inadequate information, price distortion, unintended consequences, administrative costs, conflicting objectives, regulatory capture and political incentives.
  • In macro policy: time lags, poor data and forecasts, conflicting objectives, side-effects such as crowding out.

Mission 4

  • Absolute poverty: below a fixed real line for basic needs. Relative poverty: below a share (often 60%) of the median.
  • Growth cuts absolute poverty more reliably than relative poverty; a recession can even cut relative poverty.
🏆

Mini-lesson complete!

⭐⭐⭐

You've worked through Policies to correct market failure; Equity and redistribution of income and wealth for Cambridge International AS & A Level Economics. 🎉

  1. Mission 1Should a country's trains, water pipes and power lines be run by the state or by private companies?
  2. Mission 2Can changing the pre-ticked box on a form change what millions of people choose?
  3. Mission 3When a government steps in to fix a market, how can it end up making things worse?
  4. Mission 4If almost everyone in a country gets richer, can more people end up counted as poor?

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