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Cambridge International AS & A Level Economics (9708) · 3.2 Methods and effects of government intervention in markets; 3.3 Addressing income and wealth inequality (part 2 of 2)
Mini-Lesson

Methods and effects of government intervention in markets; Addressing income and wealth inequality (part 2)

4 missions. Guess, learn, then check. Your place is saved.

  1. Mission 1Why can a huge harvest leave farmers with less money than a small one?
  2. Mission 2Should a government tax pollution, ban it, or let firms buy and sell the right to pollute?
  3. Mission 3How can you sum up who gets what in a whole country with a single number?
  4. Mission 4Why can a pay rise leave a low-income family barely any better off?
Mission 1

Mission 1: Why can a huge harvest leave farmers with less money than a small one?

Make a guess: Why can a huge harvest leave farmers with less money than a small one?

Mission 1

Why crop prices jump

Volatile commodity pricePrimary commodity: steep DPrice0P1P2Q1Q2QuantityDS1S2Big price fall, small rise in quantityManufactured product: flatter DPrice0QuantityDS1S2Same supply shift: small price fall
  • Primary commodities: raw materials and crops, e.g. cocoa, coffee, wheat, copper, oil.
  • Their supply shifts often and without warning: weather, pests, disease, strikes at mines.
  • Once a crop is harvested, supply is almost fixed for the season: a near-vertical short-run supply curve.
  • Demand is price inelastic: buyers cut back little when price rises, so the demand curve is drawn steep.
  • Inelastic demand + supply shifts = large price swings for small changes in quantity.
  • Say: "a bumper harvest shifts supply to the right; price falls and there is an extension of demand" — not: "demand increases".
Mission 1

Why both curves are so steep

Primary commoditiesManufactured products
PEDLow: necessities (food, fuel, materials) with few substitutesHigher: many close substitutes (brands, models)
PESLow: crops take months or years to grow; new mines take years to open; land and machinery are hard to switch to other uses; perishable crops cannot be stored for longHigher: factories add shifts, use spare capacity and hold stocks of finished goods
  • Example: a new cocoa tree takes several years to bear its first pods, so a high cocoa price cannot quickly raise output.
  • Both PED and PES are usually less than 1 in the short run (ignoring the minus sign for PED).
  • In the long run both become more elastic: farmers replant, buyers find substitutes.
Mission 1

Worked example: a bigger harvest, less money

Harvest and revenueIllustrative dataPoor harvest: 80 × $6080$4,800Normal harvest: 90 × $4090$3,600Bumper harvest: 100 × $20100$2,000Quantity (thousand tonnes)Revenue ($ thousand) = price × quantity
  • Illustrative data: a world market for a crop. Quantity in thousand tonnes; price in $ per tonne.
  • Normal harvest: 90 sold at $40. Revenue = 40 × 90 = $3,600 thousand.
  • Bumper harvest: 100. Buyers take the extra only if the price falls to $20.
  • Revenue = 20 × 100 = $2,000 thousand.
  • %ΔQ = (100 − 90) ÷ 90 × 100 = +11.1%. %ΔP = (20 − 40) ÷ 40 × 100 = −50%.
  • PED = 11.1 ÷ −50 = −0.22: price inelastic.
  • Poor harvest: 80, price rises to $60. Revenue = 60 × 80 = $4,800 thousand.
  • Inelastic demand: price changes by a bigger percentage than quantity, so revenue moves the same way as price and the opposite way to the harvest. A bigger crop earns less; a smaller crop earns more.
  • Shortcut: %ΔP ≈ %ΔQ ÷ PED. With PED −0.22, an 11% rise in quantity needs about a 50% price fall.
Quick check
?Illustrative data: a frost cuts the world coffee harvest by 5%. Short-run PED for coffee is −0.25. Roughly how does the world price of coffee change, so that buyers' quantity demanded falls by 5%?
Mission 1

Why volatile prices matter

  • Producers: farm incomes rise and crash from year to year; planning and borrowing become risky, so investment falls.
  • Signals: planting decisions are made on last year's price, so a high price can lead to over-planting and a later crash.
  • Countries: many low-income countries earn most export revenue from one or two commodities: primary product dependency.
  • UNCTAD calls a country commodity-dependent when commodities make up more than 60% of its merchandise exports.
  • Export earnings, tax revenue and the exchange rate all swing with the commodity price.
  • Case: in 2024 cocoa futures passed $10,000 per tonne for the first time, after poor harvests in West Africa. Many cocoa farmers in Ghana and Côte d'Ivoire sell at prices set in advance by their governments, so they gained much less than the world price rise.
Quick check
?A world price rise for copper ore and a world price rise for smartphones are each the same percentage. Which best explains why the quantity of copper ore supplied rises much less in the next 6 months?
Mission 1

The buffer stock scheme

Buffer stock schemePrice ($ per tonne)PmaxPePminQuantity (thousand tonnes)free pricefree priceDS1S2S3Normal harvest: price inside the band;the agency does nothingBumper harvest: free price below Pmin.Excess supply: agency buys; stockgrowsPoor harvest: free price above Pmax.Excess demand: agency sells; stockshrinksIllustrative data. Quantity axis does not start atzero.
  • Buffer stock scheme: an agency holds a stock of a storable commodity and buys or sells it to keep the price inside a band.
  • Floor: the minimum price. Ceiling: the maximum price.
  • Step 1: normal harvest. Price is inside the band. The agency does nothing.
  • Step 2: bumper harvest. The free-market price would fall below the floor. The agency buys the excess supply at the floor price and adds it to the stock.
  • Step 3: poor harvest. The free-market price would rise above the ceiling. The agency sells from its stock at the ceiling price.
  • Needs: a commodity that can be stored, money to buy in good years, and a stock to sell in bad years.
Mission 1Graph lab

Hold the band

Illustrative data: the crop from an earlier screen. Floor $30, ceiling $50. Normal harvest 90, price $40.

Hold the bandPrice ($)Quantity (thousand tonnes)7080100110020406090DS (harvest 90)floor $30ceiling $50
  • Takeaway: the agency buys or sells only the gap between harvest and quantity demanded at the floor or ceiling price.
Mission 1

Worked example: three harvests

  • Illustrative data: demand from an earlier screen; band $30–$50.
  • Normal (90): free price $40, inside the band. No action.
  • Bumper (100): free price $20. At the floor of $30, buyers take 95. Agency buys 100 − 95 = 5, costing 5 × 30 = $150 thousand.
  • Poor (80): free price $60. At the ceiling of $50, buyers want 85. Agency sells 85 − 80 = 5, earning 5 × 50 = $250 thousand.
  • Farm revenue without the scheme: $2,000–$4,800 thousand.
  • With the scheme: bumper 30 × 100 = $3,000 thousand; poor 50 × 80 = $4,000 thousand.
  • Incomes are more stable. Here the stock is back where it started, because good and bad years balanced out.
Quick check
?A buffer stock diagram shows a downward-sloping demand curve D and a band between a floor price Pmin and a ceiling price Pmax.
PointMeaning
Q1quantity of a normal harvest
Q2quantity demanded at Pmin
Q3quantity of this year's bumper harvest (vertical supply S2)

To hold the price at Pmin, what quantity must the agency buy?

Mission 1Evaluate

Why many schemes collapsed

  • It depends on where the band is set. Nobody knows the long-run equilibrium price. A band set too high means the agency buys year after year: the stock and the bill keep growing.
  • It depends on whether a change is temporary or permanent. A scheme can smooth good and bad years, but not a lasting fall in demand or rise in supply.
  • It depends on storage. Coffee and metals store; fresh fruit does not. Storage costs money every year.
  • It depends on funding. The agency must have money to buy in a run of bumper years.
  • Case: the International Tin Council ran out of funds defending the tin price in October 1985; tin trading on the London Metal Exchange was suspended and the price collapsed.
  • Case: Australia's wool reserve price scheme was suspended in February 1991 with a stockpile of 4.7 million bales, which took until 2001 to sell.
  • Supporters reply: with a band near the long-run average and enough funds, a scheme can reduce income swings for poor producers.
Quick check
?Illustrative data: a coffee buffer stock agency sets a band of $3.00–$3.60 per kg. Over five years the free-market price would have been $2.70, $2.80, $3.20, $2.60 and $2.90. What is the most likely outcome if the band is kept unchanged?
Mission check

?Illustrative data: a drought cuts a tea-exporting country's harvest by 10%. Harvests fall by a similar amount across the region, and the world price of tea rises by 40%. What happens to the country's tea export revenue, and why?
Mission 2

Mission 2: Should a government tax pollution, ban it, or let firms buy and sell the right to pollute?

Make a guess: A factory's smoke harms people nearby. What should a government aim for?

Mission 2

The aim: make the polluter face the full cost

  • Governments intervene to correct market failure, and also to raise revenue, redistribute income and protect consumers.
  • A negative externality: the market produces Qm, more than the social optimum Q*.
  • The fix: make decision-makers face the external cost. This is internalising the externality.
  • The target is Q*, not zero. Some pollution is worth its cost.
  • Two families of tools:
    • market-based: taxes, subsidies, tradable permits, property rights. They change prices or incentives.
    • command and control: regulation, bans, limits. They set rules.
  • Others: information, government provision, agreements between countries.
Mission 2

A tax on each unit

Pigouvian taxCosts and benefits0P*PmP* − taxQ*QmQuantityMPB = MSB = DMPC = SMSCMPC + tax = MSCtaxwelfare loss (overproduction)tax revenue = tax × Q*Specific: parallelAd valorem: pivotPQSS + taxPQSS + tax
  • A Pigouvian tax: a tax per unit equal to the MEC at the social optimum.
  • Firms now pay MPC + tax. Supply shifts up, from MPC to MPC + tax.
  • If MEC is the same for every unit, MPC + tax = MSC.
  • Quantity falls from Qm to Q*. Price rises from Pm to P*.
  • Consumers and producers share the tax; the government gains tax revenue.
  • The welfare loss triangle disappears.
  • Specific tax: a fixed amount per unit. Parallel shift.
  • Ad valorem tax: a percentage of the price. The gap widens as price rises (a pivot).
  • Say: "the tax internalises the external cost" — not: "the tax ends the pollution".
Mission 2

Worked example: setting the tax

  • Illustrative data: MPB = MSB = 100 − Q; MPC = 20 + Q; MEC = 20 per unit.
  • No tax: 100 − Q = 20 + Q, so Qm = 40, Pm = 60. Welfare loss = 100.
  • Tax = MEC = 20. New supply: 40 + Q.
  • 100 − Q = 40 + Q, so Q = 30 = Q*.
  • Buyers pay 70 (up 10). Firms keep 70 − 20 = 50 (down 10).
  • Here the burden splits 10: 10, because the curves have equal slopes.
  • Tax revenue = 20 × 30 = 600.
  • Welfare loss = 0: the market now reaches the social optimum.
Mission 2Graph lab

Set the tax

Illustrative data: MPB = MSB = 100 − Q; MPC = 20 + Q; MEC = 20, so MSC = 40 + Q.

Set the taxPrice, costs and benefitsQuantityQ*QmP*MPB = MSBMPCMSC
  • Takeaway: the tax must match the MEC. Too low leaves overproduction; too high causes underproduction.
Quick check
?Illustrative data: MPB = MSB = 120 − Q; MPC = 30 + Q. The MEC is 30 at every output. The government sets a per-unit tax equal to the MEC. How much tax revenue does it raise?
Mission 2

Carbon taxes

Carbon tax on a polluting industryCoal-fired electricityPrice of electricity0P2P1Q2Q1Quantity of electricityDS1S2 = S1 + carbon taxtaxLow-carbon supplierPrice of electricity0Quantity of electricityS (low-carbon)costs unchanged, so relatively cheaper than coal
  • A carbon tax: a tax per tonne of CO₂ emitted, charged on fuels by their carbon content.
  • On a polluting industry, e.g. coal-fired electricity: S1 → S2 (S + tax). Price rises, quantity falls.
  • Low-carbon producers become relatively cheaper. Firms and households switch.
  • Real world: British Columbia, Canada.
    • 2008: tax of C$10 per tonne CO₂e, with the revenue meant to be returned through other tax cuts.
    • 2024: C$80 per tonne.
    • A 2015 review of studies put emissions 5–15% lower than without the tax.
    • 1 April 2025: the tax on consumers was ended, as Canada dropped its national requirement for one.
  • Lesson: a carbon tax can cut emissions, but it lasts only while it keeps political support.
Mission 2

Subsidies for positive externalities

SubsidyCosts and benefits0QmQ*QuantityMPB = DMSBMPC = SMPC − subsidysubsidycost of subsidy = subsidy × Q*
  • Some goods give external benefits: MSB > MPB, so the market underproduces.
  • A subsidy per unit equal to the MEB at Q*: supply shifts down to MPC − subsidy.
  • Output rises to Q*; price to buyers falls.
  • Cost to the government = subsidy × Q*.
  • Examples: vaccinations, public transport fares, home insulation.
  • Subsidising a clean substitute (e.g. electric buses) also cuts demand for the polluting good.
  • Subsidies can also be specific (per unit) or ad valorem (a percentage).
Mission 2

Rules: regulation and legislation

Regulation(a) A limit on output at Q*Costs and benefits0limit = Q*QmQuantityMPB = MSB = DMPC = SMSC(b) A banCosts and benefits0QuantityMPB = MSB = DMPC = SMSCWhere is Q*?
  • Command and control: the law sets limits, enforced by inspection and fines.
    • emissions standards; limits on output or a cap at Q*
    • bans where the harm is severe: leaded petrol, CFCs
    • prohibitions and licences (only licensed firms may produce); production quotas
  • Real world: leaded petrol, still sold in 117 countries in 2002, was used for the last time in 2021 (UNEP).
  • Strengths: simple, certain, quick; best when the harm is dangerous at any level.
  • Limits: the same rule for every firm ignores their different costs of cutting; no reward for cutting more than the rule asks; inspection is costly.
  • Deregulation: removing rules whose costs exceed their benefits.
  • Price controls (minimum and maximum prices) are another tool.
Quick check
?A pesticide sold to farmers is found to poison rivers and wildlife even in very small amounts. What is the strongest economic case for banning it rather than taxing it?
Mission 2

Tradable permits

Permit marketPrice of a permit0P2P1Q2Q1Quantity of permits (tonnes)D for permitsS (cap)S1S2Illustrative onlytighter cap: supply shifts left, permit price rises
  • The government sets a cap: the total pollution allowed. It issues that many permits (1 permit = 1 tonne).
  • Permits are given out or auctioned. Firms may buy and sell them.
  • Firms that can cut cheaply cut more and sell spare permits. Firms that find cutting costly buy.
  • Illustrative data: firms A and B each emit 100 t. Cap = 150 permits, 75 each.
    • Cost of cutting 1 t: A 20, B 60.
    • No trade: each cuts 25 t. Cost = 25 × 20 + 25 × 60 = 2,000.
    • Trade at 40 a permit: A cuts 50 t (cost 1,000) and sells 25 permits to B (+1,000). B cuts nothing and pays 1,000.
    • Same total emissions (150 t). Total cost of cutting falls to 1,000.
  • The permit price rises as the cap tightens: a price on pollution, set by the market.
Mission 2

Real world: the EU Emissions Trading System

  • Started 2005: power stations and heavy industry in the EU.
  • The cap falls every year.
  • After the 2008 crisis, demand for permits fell. By 2013 there was a surplus of about 2 billion permits, and prices stayed low for years.
  • Fix: a Market Stability Reserve (from 2019) takes surplus permits off the market.
  • In February 2023 the price reached about €100 per tonne.
  • Lesson: permits fix the quantity; the price depends on how tight the cap is.
Quick check
?Illustrative data: firms X and Y each emit 60 t. Each is given 40 permits, so together they must cut 40 t. Cutting 1 t costs X 15 and Y 45. By how much does permit trading lower the total cost of cutting 40 t?
Mission 2

Property rights and bargaining

  • Externalities often arise because property rights are missing or unclear: no one owns the river or the air.
  • Assign the right, and the parties can bargain. This is the Coase idea.
  • Illustrative data: a factory gains 300 a year by dumping waste in a river. A fish farm downstream loses 500.
    • Fish farm owns the river: the factory would pay at most 300 to dump; the farm needs at least 500. No dumping.
    • Factory owns the river: the farm pays it between 300 and 500 to stop. No dumping.
  • Either way the efficient outcome is reached. The right decides who pays.
  • Limits: many victims (city air), high bargaining costs, harm hard to trace or measure.
Mission 2

Information, provision and agreements

EducationCosts and benefits0Q*QmQuantityMPB1MSBMSB = MPB2MPC = MSC = Seducationwelfare loss (overconsumption)
  • Information and education: campaigns, labels, warnings.
    • For a demerit good, people overvalue it. Education lowers MPB towards MSB.
  • Government provision: the state supplies a good with external benefits (vaccinations, public transport), to reach Q*.
Mission 2Evaluate

Which tool works best?

It depends on:

  • Measuring the externality. A tax needs the MEC; a cap needs the right total. Both are hard to value.
  • Elasticity of demand. If demand is price inelastic, a tax cuts output little but raises much revenue.
  • Enforcement and admin costs. Monitoring emissions, collecting taxes and policing bans all cost money.
  • Consequences for stakeholders. Carbon taxes take a bigger share of poorer households' income; returning the revenue can offset this. Firms may move production abroad.
  • Certainty. A permit cap fixes the quantity, not the price; a tax fixes the price, not the quantity.
Mission check

?Illustrative data: a city airport's night flights cause noise. Values per flight:
Flights per nightMPB = MSBMPCMEC
1080205
20703010
30604020
40505030
50406040

The government will charge a fixed tax per flight. Which tax brings the number of flights to the social optimum?

Mission 3

Mission 3: How can you sum up who gets what in a whole country with a single number?

Make a guess: How can you sum up who gets what in a whole country with a single number?

Mission 3

Income is a flow, wealth is a stock

Flow and stockincome(per year)wealth(at a point in time)interest,rent,dividends
  • Income: a flow of money over a period, e.g. per year.
    • wages, rent, interest, dividends, profit, government benefits
  • Wealth: a stock of assets owned at a point in time, minus debts.
    • property, savings, shares, pension funds
  • They feed each other: wealth earns income (rent, interest, dividends); saved income builds wealth.
  • So inequality in wealth tends to create inequality in income, and the reverse.
  • Say: "wealth is a stock; income is a flow" — not: "wealthy" means "high income". A retired homeowner can be wealthy on a low income.
Quick check
?Which of these is a change in a household's wealth rather than its income?
Mission 3

The Lorenz curve

Lorenz curve and GiniCumulative % of income01001540100Cumulative % of populationABLine of equalityLorenz curveGini = A ÷ (A + B)
  • Line up everyone from poorest to richest.
  • Horizontal axis: cumulative % of population. Vertical axis: cumulative % of income (or wealth).
  • Line of equality: the 45° line. The bottom 20% get 20%, the bottom 40% get 40%, and so on.
  • The Lorenz curve shows the actual shares. It sags below the line of equality.
  • Read it: a point at (40, 15) means the poorest 40% receive 15% of income.
  • The further the curve from the line of equality, the more unequal the distribution.
Mission 3

The Gini coefficient

Lorenz curve and GiniCumulative % of income01001540100Cumulative % of populationABLine of equalityLorenz curveGini = A ÷ (A + B)
  • Gini coefficient = A ÷ (A + B).
    • A: area between the line of equality and the Lorenz curve.
    • B: area under the Lorenz curve.
  • 0 = perfect equality. 1 = perfect inequality (one person has everything). Often shown as 0–100.
  • UK disposable household income: Gini 32.9 on the 0–100 scale (financial year ending 2024, ONS).
  • Great Britain household wealth: Gini about 0.6, or 60 on the 0–100 scale (2018–2020, ONS). The richest 10% of households held 43% of all wealth; the poorest half held 9%.
  • World Bank Gini estimates (0–100 scale): South Africa 63.0 (2014); Brazil 48.9 (2020); Slovak Republic 23.2 (2019).
  • Countries survey in different years, so compare with care.
  • Limits: two different Lorenz curves can give the same Gini; a Gini does not show where the inequality lies, or how rich the country is.
Mission 3

Worked example: from quintiles to a Lorenz curve

Quintile constructionCumulative % of income0100553015520406080100Q1Q2Q3Q4Q5Cumulative % of populationLine of equalityLorenz curveQ1 poorest fifth ... Q5 richest fifthIllustrative data
  • Illustrative data. Income shares of each fifth (quintile) of households, poorest first: 5%, 10%, 15%, 25%, 45%.
  • Step 1: add the shares up as you go (cumulative).
    • 5 → 5 + 10 = 15 → 15 + 15 = 30 → 30 + 25 = 55 → 55 + 45 = 100.
  • Step 2: plot (20, 5), (40, 15), (60, 30), (80, 55), (100, 100). Start at (0, 0).
  • Step 3: join the points; draw the line of equality for comparison.
Mission 3

Worked example: calculating the Gini

Quintile constructionCumulative % of income0100553015520406080100Q1Q2Q3Q4Q5Cumulative % of populationLine of equalityLorenz curveQ1 poorest fifth ... Q5 richest fifthIllustrative data
  • Same data. Use fractions: each fifth is 0.2 wide.
  • Area B (under the Lorenz curve) = sum of five trapeziums, each 0.2 × (left height + right height) ÷ 2:
    • 0.2 × (0 + 0.05 + 0.05 + 0.15 + 0.15 + 0.30 + 0.30 + 0.55 + 0.55 + 1.00) ÷ 2 = 0.2 × 3.10 ÷ 2 = 0.31
  • Area under the line of equality: A + B = 0.5.
  • A = 0.5 − 0.31 = 0.19.
  • Gini = A ÷ (A + B) = 0.19 ÷ 0.5 = 0.38.
Quick check
?Income shares by quintile, poorest first: 8%, 12%, 17%, 23%, 40%. (Illustrative data.) On the Lorenz curve, what is the vertical value at 60% of the population?
Quick check
?Income shares by quintile, poorest first: 4%, 9%, 15%, 22%, 50%. The area under the Lorenz curve is 0.29. (Illustrative data.) What is the Gini coefficient?
Mission 3Graph lab

Moving the curve

Illustrative data. Quintile shares: 5%, 10%, 15%, 25%, 45%. Gini 0.38.

Moving the curveCumulative % of incomeCumulative % of population020406080100020406080100line of equalityLorenz curve
  • Takeaway: shifting income from richer to poorer groups pulls the Lorenz curve towards the line of equality; here the Gini falls from 0.38 to 0.30.
Quick check
?Two countries' Lorenz curves for income are drawn on one diagram. Country X's curve lies further from the line of equality than country Y's at every point. What can you conclude?
Mission 3

Why is income unequal?

  • Human capital: education and skills raise productivity and pay.
  • Ownership of wealth: land, property and shares earn rent, interest and dividends; inheritance passes them on.
  • Inequality of opportunity: family background affects schooling, contacts and health.
  • Discrimination by gender, ethnicity and others.
  • Power: bargaining power of unions, employers with monopsony power, top executives.
  • Tax and benefit policy: progressive taxes and benefits narrow gaps; regressive taxes widen them.
  • Globalisation and technological change: raise the pay of scarce skills; some routine jobs move abroad or are automated.
Mission 3Evaluate

How much inequality is a problem?

It depends on:

  • Values. Fairness is a normative judgement; people disagree on how equal outcomes should be.
  • Causes. Inequality from effort and skill is viewed differently from inequality from inheritance, luck or discrimination.
  • Mobility. Wide gaps matter more if children of poor families stay poor.
  • Living standards of the poorest. Rising inequality with rising absolute incomes differs from falling incomes at the bottom.
  • Measurement. Income or wealth? Before or after taxes and benefits? Wealth is distributed far more unequally than income.
Mission check

?In country P, the Gini coefficient for household income is 0.30 and for household wealth is 0.65. (Illustrative data.) What can you conclude?
Mission 4

Mission 4: Why can a pay rise leave a low-income family barely any better off?

Make a guess: Why can a pay rise leave a low-income family barely any better off?

Mission 4

Equity is not equality

Equal vs equitableequality: same shareequity: fair shareshare givenwhat the person needs
  • Equality: everyone gets the same (income, wealth or opportunity).
  • Equity: a fair distribution. What is fair is a value judgement (normative).
  • Horizontal equity: people in the same position are treated the same (same income → same tax).
  • Vertical equity: people in different positions are treated differently (higher income → pay more).
  • Equality of outcome vs equality of opportunity: many argue fairness needs the second, not the first.
  • Say: "an equitable distribution" (fair) — not: "an equal distribution", unless you mean identical shares.
Mission 4

Why redistribute?

  • In a free market, income depends on the factors you own and what they earn: wages, rent, interest, profit.
  • Some own little: low skills, no property, unable to work. Their market income may be very low.
  • Many economists call a very unequal outcome a market failure: markets can be efficient yet produce an inequitable result.
  • Redistribution: government moves income or wealth from richer to poorer households, using:
    • taxes, transfers and benefits, state-provided services, and laws on pay.
Mission 4

Progressive, proportional, regressive

Tax ratesAverage tax rate (%)024.5%12%30,00080,000IncomeprogressiveproportionalregressiveIllustrative tax bands (marginal rates)0%20%40%30,000average 12%80,000average 24.5%Bands: 0% to 12,000; 20% to 50,000; 40%above. Illustrative data.
  • Compare the average tax rate (tax ÷ income) at different incomes:
    • Progressive: average rate rises as income rises.
    • Proportional: average rate stays the same.
    • Regressive: average rate falls as income rises.
  • Marginal tax rate: the rate on the next unit of income.
  • Illustrative data. Tax bands: 0% on the first 12,000; 20% from 12,000 to 50,000; 40% above 50,000.
    • Income 30,000: tax = 20% × 18,000 = 3,600. Average rate = 3,600 ÷ 30,000 = 12%. Marginal rate 20%.
    • Income 80,000: tax = 20% × 38,000 + 40% × 30,000 = 7,600 + 12,000 = 19,600. Average rate = 24.5%. Marginal rate 40%.
  • Average rate rises with income: progressive.
  • Taxes on spending (e.g. VAT) are usually regressive relative to income: poorer households spend a bigger share of income.
  • Wealth: inheritance tax and capital gains tax redistribute wealth as well as income.
Quick check
?Using the bands in the previous screen (0% on the first 12,000; 20% from 12,000 to 50,000; 40% above 50,000), what is the average tax rate on an income of 60,000?
Mission 4

Transfers: universal or means-tested?

Universal vs means-testedBenefit received0Incomeuniversalmeans-tested
  • Transfer payments: money paid by government with nothing produced in return: pensions, unemployment and disability benefits, child benefit.
  • Universal benefit: paid to everyone in a group, whatever their income (e.g. a state pension for all over an age).
  • Means-tested benefit: paid only to those with low income or wealth (e.g. the UK's Universal Credit).
UniversalMeans-tested
CostHigh: goes to rich and poorLower: targeted at the poor
Take-upHigh: no test, no stigmaLower: complex, some feel stigma
Work incentiveNot withdrawn as earnings riseWithdrawn as earnings rise: poverty trap
Mission 4

The poverty trap

The poverty trapNet income (£)0Gross earnings (£)taper 55%EMTR 67.6%keep everythingbenefitused upOf £100 extra earnings:£28 income tax and NI£39.60 benefit withdrawn£32.40 kept
  • Poverty trap: as a low earner earns more, benefits are withdrawn and taxes start, so they keep little of the rise.
  • Effective marginal tax rate (EMTR): share of an extra unit of earnings lost to tax and benefit withdrawal.
  • Case: UK, Universal Credit. For each extra £1 of net earnings, benefit falls by 55p (the taper rate, cut from 63% in November 2021).
  • Worked example: a basic-rate taxpayer on Universal Credit earns £100 more.
    • Income tax 20% + National Insurance 8% = £28. Net earnings rise by £72.
    • Benefit withdrawn: 55% × £72 = £39.60.
    • Kept: £72 − £39.60 = £32.40.
    • EMTR = 1 − 0.72 × 0.45 = 67.6%.
  • Say: combine the rates by multiplying what is kept (0.72 × 0.45) — not: by adding them (28% + 55% = 83%), since the taper applies to net earnings.
Mission 4Graph lab

Change the taper

The poverty trapNet income (£)0Gross earnings (£)taper 55%EMTR 67.6%keep everythingbenefitused upOf £100 extra earnings:£28 income tax and NI£39.60 benefit withdrawn£32.40 kept

Line: net income (after tax and benefits) against gross earnings. Flat line = nothing kept; 45° line = everything kept.

Change the taperNet income (£)Extra gross earnings a month (£)01,0002,0003,00006001,2001,8002,400flat: nothing kept45°: everything keptnet incomebenefit runs out
  • Takeaway: a higher taper flattens the line (stronger trap) but ends benefit sooner (cheaper). A lower taper helps work incentives but stretches benefit to higher earners.
Quick check
?Illustrative data. A worker pays income tax at 20% on extra earnings. A means-tested benefit is withdrawn at 60% of each extra unit of net (after-tax) earnings. What is the worker's effective marginal tax rate?
Mission 4

Negative income tax

Negative income taxIncome after NIT0G = 6,00015,000Earningsincome = earningsNITbreak-evenreceives paymentpays taxIllustrative data
  • Negative income tax (NIT): one system replaces separate taxes and benefits.
    • Everyone is guaranteed a minimum income, G.
    • Each unit earned reduces the payment by a fixed rate, t.
    • Below the break-even income (G ÷ t), people receive money; above it they pay tax.
  • Illustrative data. G = 6,000; t = 40%. Break-even = 6,000 ÷ 0.4 = 15,000.
    • Earn 5,000: payment = 6,000 − 0.4 × 5,000 = 4,000. Total income 9,000.
  • Strengths: simple; no gap between tax and benefit systems; everyone keeps 60% of each extra unit.
  • Weaknesses: a low t is costly (break-even very high); a high t recreates the poverty trap; G may be too low for some needs (disability).
Mission 4

Universal basic income

  • Universal basic income (UBI): a regular cash payment to every adult, with no means test and no work condition.
  • For:
    • no withdrawal as earnings rise, so no poverty trap from the benefit itself
    • simple; full take-up; no stigma
    • security when work is irregular
  • Against:
    • very costly: paid to all, so higher taxes, which raise marginal tax rates for earners
    • may reduce work for some (an income effect)
    • a flat payment ignores different needs (disability, housing costs)
  • Case: Finland, 2017–2018. 2,000 unemployed people received €560 a month, tax-free, with no conditions.
    • Employment: recipients worked 78 days on average in the second year, about 6 more than a control group.
    • Recipients reported better wellbeing and less financial stress.
    • Limits: not universal (unemployed only), two years, small sample; other benefit rules changed in 2018, which blurs the result.
Mission 4

Minimum wages

Minimum wageWage (W)0WminWeWminWmLdLmLminLeLsexcess supply of labourQuantity of labour (L)SACL = SD = MRPMCL
  • A legal minimum wage: a price floor in the labour market.
  • Competitive labour market: a minimum above the equilibrium wage raises pay for those in work but may cut jobs (excess supply of labour).
  • Monopsony employer: a minimum wage can raise pay and employment.
  • Evidence is mixed:
    • Card and Krueger (1994), New Jersey fast food: no fall in employment after a rise.
    • Other studies find job losses, especially for young and low-skilled workers or after large rises.
  • Targeting: helps the low-paid, but many poor households have no one in work, and some low-paid workers live in better-off households.
  • Size matters: small rises close to the market wage are less likely to cost jobs than large ones.
Mission 4

Services, skills and fair treatment

  • State provision of merit goods: free or subsidised education and health care benefit poorer households most, relative to income.
  • Human capital: training and schooling raise future earnings: tackles a cause of poverty, not just the symptom.
  • Targeted spending: free school meals, housing support, help with energy bills.
  • Anti-discrimination laws: equal pay for equal work; open hiring and promotion.
  • Trade-off: slow to work (years for education to raise pay), but can raise efficiency as well as equity.
Quick check
?A government replaces a means-tested benefit with a universal payment of the same maximum amount, paid to everyone whatever their income. What is the most likely effect?
Mission 4Evaluate

Equity or efficiency?

  • Redistribution often involves a trade-off: more equity, but weaker incentives and some lost output.
  • It depends on:
    • rates: high tax rates and high withdrawal rates weaken incentives more
    • how people respond: if labour supply hardly changes with pay, little output is lost
    • design: universal vs targeted benefits
    • one system or many: a negative income tax vs separate, overlapping taxes and benefits
    • use of the money: spending on education and health can raise productivity, so equity and efficiency go together
  • Moral and political judgement: how much inequality is fair, and how much output to give up for it, is normative. Economics measures the trade-off; it cannot settle it.
Mission check

?A government wants to weaken the poverty trap for low-income working families on a means-tested benefit. Which change would do this most directly?
Recap

The big ideas

Mission 1

  • Primary commodity prices are volatile: supply shifts often, and both PED and PES are low.
  • With inelastic demand, a bigger harvest can mean lower revenue.
  • A buffer stock buys at the floor in good years and sells at the ceiling in bad years; it fails if the band is set above the long-run price or funds run out.

Mission 2

  • Correcting an externality means making decision-makers face the external cost or benefit, to reach Q*, not zero.
  • Taxes and subsidies change the price; regulation and bans set rules.
  • Permits cap the total and let trading find the cheapest cuts.
  • With clear property rights and low bargaining costs, the parties can bargain to the efficient outcome.

Mission 3

  • Income is a flow; wealth is a stock. Wealth is usually distributed more unequally than income.
  • The Lorenz curve shows cumulative shares; the further it sags from the line of equality, the higher the Gini coefficient (0 = perfect equality, 1 = perfect inequality).
  • Causes include human capital, wealth ownership, discrimination, power, tax and benefits, and technology.
  • Gini = A ÷ (A + B); with quintile data, area B is the sum of five trapeziums.

Mission 4

  • Equity is fairness, a value judgement; equality means identical shares.
  • Progressive taxes: the average tax rate rises with income.
  • Means-tested benefits target the poor but create a poverty trap: a high effective marginal tax rate.
  • UBI, minimum wages and human capital policies trade off cost, targeting and incentives.
🏆

Mini-lesson complete!

⭐⭐⭐

You've worked through Intervention in markets; Income and wealth inequality (part 2) for Cambridge International AS & A Level Economics. 🎉

  1. Mission 1Why can a huge harvest leave farmers with less money than a small one?
  2. Mission 2Should a government tax pollution, ban it, or let firms buy and sell the right to pollute?
  3. Mission 3How can you sum up who gets what in a whole country with a single number?
  4. Mission 4Why can a pay rise leave a low-income family barely any better off?

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