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Eduqas A-level Religious Studies (A120) · C2 Theme 4: Religious language
Mini-Lesson

Religious language

6 missions. Guess, learn, then check. Your place is saved.

  1. Mission 1Can you describe God by saying only what God is not?
  2. Mission 2When we call God "good", is it the same good as a good person, or something else?
  3. Mission 3Why does burning a flag upset people more than knocking down a road sign?
  4. Mission 4Is "God loves you" a statement anyone could ever check?
  5. Mission 5If nothing could ever change your mind, are you really claiming anything?
  6. Mission 6Does "God" mean the same in a prayer as it would in a science report?
Mission 1

Mission 1: Can you describe God by saying only what God is not?

Make a guess: Can you describe God by saying only what God is not?

Mission 1

Why talking about God is hard

Why talking about God is hardWords from finite things“wise”“father”God?Classical theists believe God is:infinite · timeless · not a physical object
  • We learn words from finite things we can see and share: "wise" from wise people, "father" from fathers.
  • Classical theists believe God is infinite, timeless, not a physical object, and not one thing among others: this is God's transcendence.
  • So the words may not fit: can a word learned in time describe a God outside time?
  • Your spec names three inherent problems: (1) limited words for an infinite, timeless God; (2) sacred texts and religious statements may seem unintelligible to outsiders; (3) religious language lacks a common shared base of experience: not everyone has met what the words describe.
  • The question for this unit: can talk about God be meaningful, and if so, how?
Mission 1

Cognitive and non-cognitive

Cognitive and non-cognitive languageCognitiveclaims a fact: true or false“God exists.”“Jesus rose fromthe dead.”Non-cognitiveexpresses, praises, commands, shapes a wayof life“Lord, have mercy.”“Hallelujah!”Most believers mean central claims cognitively.
  • Cognitive language makes factual claims: it says how things are, so it is true or false. "God exists." "Jesus rose from the dead."
  • Non-cognitive language does something else: it expresses feelings or commitments, commands, praises or shapes a way of life. It is not true or false as a report of fact. "Lord, have mercy." "Hallelujah."
  • Most believers take central claims ("God created the world") as cognitive: they mean them as true.
  • Hare's bliks, and some readings of Wittgenstein, treat religious language as mainly non-cognitive (–f).
  • The difference matters: a challenge such as verification (see Mission 4) is aimed at cognitive claims.
  • Your spec labels analogy, symbol and myth "non-cognitive". Other boards and many scholars call Aquinas' analogy cognitive. Know both labels and give your reason.
Quick check
?Which statement is most clearly being used non-cognitively?
Mission 1

Univocal and equivocal

Univocal, equivocal: a road with three lanesUnivocal: same meaningblack cat · black caranthropomorphismEquivocal: wholly different meaningcricket bat · bat in a cavewe know nothingAnalogical?a path between
  • Univocal: a word means exactly the same in both uses. "The cat is black"; "the car is black".
  • If "wise" is univocal in "Sophie is wise" and "God is wise", God's wisdom is just like ours, only bigger. The danger: anthropomorphism, making God in human form (a God who learns, forgets, changes mind).
  • Equivocal: the same word with completely different meanings. A cricket bat; a bat in a cave.
  • If "wise" is equivocal, it tells us nothing about God. Why then call God wise rather than foolish? The danger: we can know nothing about God at all.
  • Medieval thinkers asked: is there a path between these two?
  • A third route: the via negativa ("negative way") speaks of God only by saying what God is not (not finite, not in time, not a body). It avoids anthropomorphism, but may say nothing positive.
Mission 1Read the source

Aquinas: neither the same nor different

Thomas Aquinas (c. 1225–1274), Summa Theologiae I, question 13, article 5 (c. 1268):

> "Univocal predication is impossible between God and creatures."

> "Neither, on the other hand, are names applied to God and creatures in a purely equivocal sense, as some have said."

  • His reason against equivocal names: then "from creatures nothing could be known or demonstrated about God at all".

Q1 Why does Aquinas reject univocal language?

Show answer

God is not wise in the limited, separate way a human is wise; the word cannot mean the same.

Q2 What would follow if all words about God were equivocal?

Show answer

We could know or prove nothing about God from the world.

Quick check
?A child pictures God as a very old man with a white beard who sits on a throne above the clouds. Which mistake does Aquinas' account warn against?
Mission check

?A hymn calls God "our faithful friend". Three listeners react. Rae: "God is a friend just as my best mate is, only bigger." Sam: "'Friend' about God has nothing in common with 'friend' about people." Tom: "We can only say God is not unfaithful and not distant." Which description is correct?
Mission 2

Mission 2: When we call God "good", is it the same good as a good person, or something else?

Make a guess: When we call God "good", is it the same good as a good person, or something else?

Mission 2

Analogy: the middle path

Analogy: the middle laneUnivocal: same meaningblack cat · black caranthropomorphismEquivocal: wholly different meaningcricket bat · bat in a cavewe know nothingAnalogical:related but not identical“a mean between pure equivocation andsimple univocation” (ST I.13.5)
  • Recap (see Mission 1): univocal language makes God human-like; equivocal language tells us nothing.
  • Analogy: a word used of God and of creatures with a meaning that is related but not identical: partly the same, partly different.
  • Aquinas: analogy is "a mean between pure equivocation and simple univocation" (Summa Theologiae I.13.5).
  • Why it is possible: God is the cause of creatures, so creatures carry some likeness of God, however faint.
Mission 2Read the source

Aquinas on "healthy"

Thomas Aquinas (c. 1225–1274), Summa Theologiae I, question 13, article 5:

> "Therefore it must be said that these names are said of God and creatures in an analogous sense, i.e. according to proportion."

  • His example (paraphrase): "healthy" is said first of an animal. Medicine is called healthy because it causes health; urine is called healthy because it is a sign of health. One word, related meanings, all pointing to one thing.
  • He adds (I.13.6): goodness and wisdom are "applied primarily to God rather than to creatures", because they flow from God; but we learn the words from creatures first.

Q1 Why is "healthy" neither univocal nor equivocal here?

Show answer

The meanings differ but all relate to the health of the animal.

Q2 According to I.13.6, where does goodness exist most fully?

Show answer

In God; creatures have it by sharing in it.

Mission 2

Analogy of attribution

Analogy of attributionAquinas’ case: “healthy”healthymedicineurinecausesignTextbook case: bread called “good”bakergood breadskill causesGodwisdom in creaturesgoodness in creaturescausecauseBut Aquinas:God is good, in a higher way, not only thecause of good (I.13.2, I.13.6)
  • A quality is attributed to something because of its relation to the thing that has it properly, usually as cause or effect.
  • Aquinas' case: medicine is "healthy" because it causes health in the animal.
  • A common textbook case: we call bread "good", meaning the baker is skilled; the goodness of the bread comes from the baker.
  • Applied to God: God is the cause of all goodness and wisdom in the world, so the words can be used of God.
  • But Aquinas insists on more than "God causes good things": God is good, in a higher way (I.13.2, I.13.6).
Mission 2

Analogy of proper proportion

Analogy of proper proportiondoghumanGodnaturea dog’snaturehumannatureGod’s infinitenaturegood-nessloyal,obedient,healthyhonest,kind, wise?realgoodness,but farbeyond oursSame word, fitted to each kind of being
  • A quality belongs to each thing in proportion to its nature.
  • A good dog: loyal, obedient, healthy. A good person: honest, kind, wise. Same word, fitted to each kind of being.
  • So God's goodness is goodness in proportion to God's infinite nature: real goodness, but far beyond ours.
  • Like a scale: dog's goodness : dog's nature = human goodness : human nature = God's goodness : God's nature.
  • Your spec says "proportion and attribution".
Quick check
?"A good knife cuts well; a good doctor heals; so God's goodness is goodness fitting God's own perfect nature." Which approach is this?
Mission 2

Ian Ramsey: models and qualifiers

Ramsey: model, qualifier, disclosureModel: an ordinary word from experience“good”infinitely goodQualifier: stretches the modeldisclosure:“the penny drops”commitment
  • Ian Ramsey (1915–1972), Bishop of Durham, Religious Language (1957).
  • A model: an ordinary word drawn from experience: "wise", "good", "cause", "father".
  • A qualifier: a word that stretches the model beyond its usual use: "infinitely wise", "first cause", "eternal Father".
  • The qualifier pushes us to keep extending the model until a disclosure happens: a moment of insight where "the penny drops" or "the ice breaks" (Ramsey's phrases).
  • The disclosure is of something beyond the words, which the believer meets with commitment.
  • So religious language is grounded in experience (empirical), yet points beyond it.
Quick check
?In Ramsey's account, what is the job of the word "infinitely" in "God is infinitely good"?
Mission 2

Cognitive or non-cognitive?

  • For Aquinas, "God is good" is true: it says something real about God, though we cannot fully grasp how. A cognitive, realist view.
  • Analogy gives real but limited knowledge: we know that God is good, not fully what God's goodness is like.
  • Ramsey: disclosures give real insight, but always alongside commitment.
  • Your spec places analogy under "non-cognitive". In the exam, show you know the label and its limits: Aquinas intended analogy to tell us truths about God.
Mission 2Diversity

Who uses analogy today?

Who uses analogy today?WhoView of analogyLateran IV (1215),Catholicno likeness without agreater unlikenessPrzywara (1932),Catholicdefends the analogy ofbeingBarth (1932),ReformedProtestantrejects the analogy ofbeing; analogy of faithScotus (c.1266–1308),medieval criticunivocity of being: somewords, e.g. “being”, areunivocalSwinburne (1977),modern philosophymany words about Godused univocally, with care
  • Catholic teaching: the Fourth Lateran Council (1215): between Creator and creature no likeness can be noted without a greater unlikeness (paraphrase). Erich Przywara (1889–1972), Analogia Entis (1932), defended the analogy of being.
  • Reformed Protestant: Karl Barth (1886–1968) called the analogy of being "the invention of Antichrist" (Church Dogmatics I/1, 1932, preface). For Barth, likeness to God is known only through God's revelation in Christ (analogy of faith).
  • Medieval critic: John Duns Scotus (c. 1266–1308): some words, such as "being", must be univocal, or we could not reason about God at all.
  • Modern philosophy: Richard Swinburne (b. 1934), The Coherence of Theism (1977), argues many words about God are used univocally, with care.
Mission 2Evaluate

Does analogy work?

Does analogy work?Analogy lets believers speak meaningfullyabout God.ForAvoids both errors: anthropomorphism(univocal) and emptiness (equivocal)Fits how believers speak: “Father”,“shepherd”, “king” meant as true, yet notliteralGrounded in creation (Romans 1:20, citedby Aquinas)Ramsey: “heavenly Father”: the model“father” stretched by the qualifier“heavenly”AgainstAssumes God is the cause of creatures: asceptic need not accept itProportion with an unknown: we do notknow what God’s goodness amounts toSuffering strains the analogy: what kind ofgoodness allows it?Attribution alone says only that Godcauses good, not that God is goodRamsey’s disclosures are private andcannot be checked; the qualifier does notsay what is disclosedJudge it byDoes it tell us anything? · Does it rest oncontested premises? · Does it fit worship andscripture?
  • Claim: Analogy lets believers speak meaningfully about God.
  • For: It avoids both errors: anthropomorphism (univocal) and emptiness (equivocal).
  • For: It fits how believers speak: "Father", "shepherd", "king" are meant as true, yet not literal.
  • For: It is grounded in creation: "the invisible things of him … are clearly seen, being perceived through the things that are made" (Romans 1:20, WEBBE), a verse Aquinas cites in I.13.5.
  • Against: It assumes God is the cause of creatures; a sceptic who rejects that has no reason to accept the analogy.
  • Against: Proportion with an unknown: if we do not know God's nature, we do not know what God's goodness amounts to.
  • Against: Suffering strains the analogy: what kind of goodness allows what we see?
  • Against: Attribution alone says only that God causes good, not that God is good, as Aquinas himself admits.
  • Against: Ramsey's disclosures are private and cannot be checked by anyone else; and the qualifier does not tell us what is disclosed, so the account may assume the very insight it claims to explain.
  • For: Ramsey's account shows how a teaching such as "heavenly Father" can work: the model "father" (care, authority) is stretched by the qualifier "heavenly", pointing the believer past every human father towards a love without limit.
  • Judgement criteria: Does it tell us anything? Does it rest on contested premises? Does it fit worship and scripture?
Mission 2Worked answer

Comparing usefulness

Comparing usefulness: an answer chainPointAnalogy says more: “God is good” gives real,if limited, contentCounter-pointThe via negativa runs less risk: analogy maysmuggle in human ideas of goodnessLink to a scholarAquinas uses both: what God is not (ST I.3),then analogy (ST I.13)Judgement stepDecide which criterion matters most (content,or safety from error), and argue from it

Task: evaluate whether analogy is more useful than the via negativa.

  • Point: Analogy says more: "God is good" gives real, if limited, content; denials alone may say nothing.
  • Counter-point: The via negativa runs less risk: analogy may smuggle in human ideas of goodness.
  • Link to a scholar: Aquinas uses both: he begins with what God is not (ST I.3) and then speaks by analogy (ST I.13).
  • Judgement step: decide which criterion matters most (content, or safety from error), and argue from it.
Quick check
?Which is a criticism of the analogy of proper proportion in particular?
Mission check

?A sculptor's statue is praised as "beautiful". Someone adds: "So the sculptor must be gifted: the beauty in the statue comes from her." A believer says God is "wise" for a parallel reason: all the wisdom in the world comes from God. Which approach is the believer using?
Mission 3

Mission 3: Why does burning a flag upset people more than knocking down a road sign?

Make a guess: Why does burning a flag upset people more than knocking down a road sign?

Mission 3

Signs and symbols

Sign and symbolSignpointswhat it stands for,by convention:swappableSymbola made-up flagpointsparticipatesthe nation:its powerand dignity
  • A sign points to something by convention: a road sign, a red traffic light, "&". It can be swapped for another without loss.
  • A symbol also points beyond itself, but participates in what it points to.
  • Tillich's own example: a flag shares in the power and dignity of the nation. Insult the flag and people feel the nation is insulted.
  • Nobody feels a road authority is dishonoured when a sign is replaced.
Mission 3

Tillich: what symbols do

Tillich: what symbols dosymbol1pointsbeyond itself2participatesin what itpoints to3opens uplevels ofreality4unlocksdimensionsof the soul5cannot beinvented6grows anddiesDynamics of Faith (1957), ch. 3 (paraphrase)

Paul Tillich (1886–1965), German-American Lutheran theologian, Dynamics of Faith (1957), chapter 3 "Symbols of Faith" (paraphrase):

  • Symbols point beyond themselves (like signs).
  • They participate in the reality they point to.
  • They open up levels of reality otherwise closed to us (as art does).
  • They unlock dimensions of the soul that answer to those levels.
  • They cannot be invented on purpose: they grow from a group's shared unconscious life.
  • They grow and die: when a situation changes, a symbol may lose its power.
Quick check
?On Tillich's account, which is a symbol rather than a sign?
Mission 3

Ultimate concern and being-itself

Ultimate concerneveryday concernsultimate concernbeing-itselfground of beingFor Tillich:nearly everything said about God is symbolic
  • For Tillich, faith is "the state of being ultimately concerned" (Dynamics of Faith, ch. 1): concern for what matters unconditionally.
  • God is that which concerns us ultimately: not a being among beings, but being-itself, the ground of being (Systematic Theology, vol. 1, 1951).
  • So nearly everything said about God is symbolic: "Father", "King", "Lord", even "God is personal".
  • Tillich says that even the word "God" is a symbol for God.
  • Your spec: "God as that which concerns us ultimately (Paul Tillich)".
Mission 3Read the source

My rock and my fortress

> "The LORD is my rock, my fortress, and my deliverer; my God, my rock, in whom I take refuge" (Psalm 18:2, WEBBE)

  • Read literally, the verse says God is a stone and a building. Nobody reads it that way.
  • For Tillich, "rock" and "fortress" are symbols: they open up the experience of safety in God and take part in it.

Q1 Which of Tillich's characteristics fits "fortress" best?

Show answer

It opens up a level of reality: God as the one in whom we are safe, which plain words cannot fully express.

Q2 How would a defender of analogy (see Mission 2) read "rock" differently?

Show answer

Aquinas would call "rock" a metaphor, since it implies a body (ST I.13.3); it rests on a literal truth that analogy can state: God is faithful, in a way proportioned to God's nature. Tillich says both are symbols.

Mission 3Diversity

Symbols across traditions

Symbols across traditionsChristianitycross; bread and wineJudaismmenorah (sevenbranches)Islamcalligraphy of God’snameHinduismOm (Aum)BuddhismDharma wheel (eightspokes)SikhismKhanda
  • Christianity: the cross; bread and wine. Catholic and Orthodox Christians believe Christ is really present in the Eucharist, not only symbolised; many Protestants see a memorial and sign.
  • Judaism: the seven-branched menorah (the Temple lamp); the Shabbat candles.
  • Islam: calligraphy of God's name and Qur'an verses; most Muslims avoid images of God or prophets, and many do not treat the crescent as a religious symbol.
  • Hinduism: Om (Aum), a sacred sound symbol of Brahman.
  • Buddhism: the Dharma wheel: eight spokes for the Noble Eightfold Path.
  • Sikhism: the Khanda: double-edged sword, chakkar (circle) and two kirpans.
Mission 3

Randall: four functions of symbols

Randall: four functions of symbols1 Motivatestir emotions andaction2 Binddraw acommunitytogether3 Communicatewhat literalwords cannot4 Revealan “order ofsplendour”non-cognitive

John Herman Randall Jr (1899–1980), The Role of Knowledge in Western Religion (1958):

  • Religious symbols are non-cognitive: they do not tell us facts about the world; they do something, like music or art.
  • 1. Motivate: they arouse emotions and stir people to act.
  • 2. Bind: they draw a community together around shared commitments.
  • 3. Communicate: they express qualities of experience that literal words cannot.
  • 4. Reveal: they help us see and feel a divine dimension in the world (Randall: an "order of splendour").
  • Using both views: Tillich (participation, ultimate concern) explains what a symbol is; Randall explains what it does.
Quick check
?At a funeral, mourners each light a candle from one central flame. A widow says the flames "say what I cannot put into words." Which of Randall's functions does her comment show most clearly?
Mission 3

Religious language as myth

Three kinds of mythCreationGenesis 1–2; Rig Veda10.90order and purposeGood against evilwar in heaven (Revelation12); Rama and Ravana(Ramayana)darklightHeroic journeya pattern for lifedeparturetrialreturn
  • In this unit, a myth is a story that carries values and insight into the purpose of existence. It does not mean "a false story".
  • Creation myths: Genesis 1–2; the Purusha Sukta (Rig Veda 10.90). They say the world has order and purpose.
  • Myths of good against evil: e.g. the war in heaven (Revelation 12); Rama's victory over Ravana in the Ramayana.
  • Heroic myths: a hero's journey, trial and return, as a pattern for life.
  • Supportive evidence: myths help people face fears of the unknown and pass on religious, social and ethical values across generations.
  • Believers differ: many read Genesis as theological truth in story form; some (e.g. young-earth creationists) read it as literal history and reject the word "myth".
Mission 3Evaluate

Is "myth" a good way to understand religious language?

Is myth a good way to understand religious language?Is “myth” a good way to understandreligious language?ForExplains why stories persist: they carrymeaning and values where science has adifferent accountAllows dialogue with science: Genesisneed not compete with cosmologyAgainstCompeting myths: different traditions’stories conflict; which carries truth?Meanings change over time, so myths maybe social constructsDemythologising (Bultmann, 1941):results vary widelySeems incompatible with science if read asfact; many believers say core events (e.g.the resurrection) are historyJudge it byDoes it respect what believers mean? · Does itkeep any truth-claim? · Can it settle conflictsbetween myths?
  • For: It explains why stories persist: they carry meaning and values even where science has a different account.
  • For: It allows dialogue with science: Genesis need not compete with cosmology.
  • Against: Competing myths: different traditions' stories conflict; which carries truth?
  • Against: Meanings change over time, reflecting each society's values, so myths may be social constructs.
  • Against: Demythologising: Rudolf Bultmann (1884–1976), "New Testament and Mythology" (1941), sought the existential message beneath the myth; results vary widely.
  • Against: Many myths seem incompatible with science if read as fact; many believers say core events (e.g. the resurrection) are history, not myth.
  • Judgement criteria: Does the approach respect what believers mean? Does it keep any truth-claim? Can it settle conflicts between myths?
Mission 3Evaluate

Does symbol help us speak of God?

Does symbol help us speak of God?Symbol helps us speak meaningfully ofGod.ForExplains how believers really uselanguage: “rock”, “light”, “Father” are notliteral, yet matter deeplySymbols move people and communicateacross time; they avoid literalism andanthropomorphismParticipation explains why symbols cannotsimply be swappedAgainstWhat do symbols claim? Paul Edwards(1965): no checkable content“Participates” is unclear: how does a flagshare in a nation’s power?Symbols change and die: the svastika, anancient sign of good fortune, took on adifferent meaning in Europe after the Nazisused itTillich’s “being-itself” is not the personalGod most believers worshipJudge it bycontent gained · fit with worship · clarity ·whether believers mean more than symbol
  • For: It explains how believers really use language: "rock", "light", "Father" are not literal, yet matter deeply.
  • For: Symbols move people and communicate across time; they avoid literalism and anthropomorphism.
  • For: Participation explains why symbols cannot simply be swapped, and why religious language is not mere decoration.
  • Against: If symbols are not literally true, what do they claim? Paul Edwards ("Professor Tillich's Confusions", Mind, 1965) argued they convey no checkable content.
  • Against: "Participates" is unclear: in what sense does a flag share in a nation's power?
  • Against: Symbols change and die: the svastika, an ancient sign of good fortune in Hindu, Buddhist and Jain traditions, took on a different meaning in Europe after the Nazis used it.
  • Against: Tillich's "being-itself" is not the personal God most believers worship.
  • Judgement criteria: content gained · fit with worship · clarity · whether believers mean more than symbol.
  • Spec challenge: "whether a symbol is adequate or gives the right insights".
Quick check
?Which is a criticism of Tillich's view of religious language specifically?
Mission check

?A couple exchange wedding rings. Years later, one loses the ring and is distressed, though it can easily be replaced. How would Tillich explain the distress?
Mission 4

Mission 4: Is "God loves you" a statement anyone could ever check?

Make a guess: Is "God loves you" a statement anyone could ever check?

Mission 4

Logical positivism

From Hume to Hick1748Hume’s Enquiry concerningHuman Understanding1921Wittgenstein’s Tractatus1920s–30sVienna Circle (Schlick)1936Ayer’s Language, Truth andLogic1946Language, Truth and Logic,2nd edition1957 / 1960Hick: Faith and Knowledge;“Theology and Verification”
  • 1920s–30s: the Vienna Circle, a group of philosophers and scientists led by Moritz Schlick (1882–1936), with Rudolf Carnap and others.
  • Inspired by the success of science and by early Wittgenstein.
  • Their aim: a test for which statements are meaningful (tell us something about the world) and which are nonsense.
  • A. J. Ayer (1910–1989) attended the Circle's meetings in 1932–33 and brought its ideas to Britain in Language, Truth and Logic (1936).
Mission 4Read the source

Hume's fork

David Hume (1711–1776), An Enquiry concerning Human Understanding (1748), Section XII, Part III, on any book of theology or metaphysics:

> "Does it contain any abstract reasoning concerning quantity or number? No. Does it contain any experimental reasoning concerning matter of fact and existence? No. Commit it then to the flames: for it can contain nothing but sophistry and illusion."

  • The positivists took Hume's two prongs as the only two kinds of meaningful statement.

Q1 What two kinds of reasoning does Hume accept?

Show answer

Abstract reasoning about quantity and number, such as maths; and experimental reasoning about matters of fact.

Q2 Why would a positivist say a sermon on "God's love" fails Hume's test?

Show answer

It is not maths, and no experiment or observation could settle it.

Mission 4

Analytic and synthetic

Analytic and syntheticAnalytic: true by definition“All bachelors are unmarried.” · “2 + 2 = 4”Synthetic: checked by experience“Water boils at 100 °C at sea level.” · “It israining in Leeds.”Neither → meaningless(logical positivists)“God exists.”on Ayer’s view
  • Analytic statements are true (or false) by definition: "All bachelors are unmarried"; "2 + 2 = 4". Checking the meaning is enough. They tell us nothing new about the world.
  • Synthetic statements are true or false because of how the world is: "It is raining in Leeds"; "Water boils at 100 °C at sea level". You check them by experience.
  • Logical positivists: every meaningful statement is either analytic or empirically verifiable.
  • "God exists" is not true by definition (for them), and no observation could verify it.
Mission 4

Ayer's verification principle

Ayer's verification principleIs it true by definition?yesmeaningful(analytic)noDo we know whatobservations wouldmake it probable?yesmeaningful(synthetic)noliterally meaninglessstrong: conclusive (too strict) · weak: probable(Ayer’s choice) · in principle, not just in practice
  • Language, Truth and Logic (1936), ch. 1 (paraphrase): a statement is factually meaningful only if it is analytic, or if we know what observations would lead us to accept it as true or reject it as false.
  • Strong verification: the statement can be conclusively proved by experience. Ayer thought this too strict.
  • Weak verification (Ayer's choice): experience can make it probable.
  • In principle, not just in practice: Ayer's example, "there are mountains on the far side of the moon", was meaningful in 1936 because we knew what would verify it.
  • Result (ch. 6): talk about a transcendent God is literally meaningless: not false, but saying nothing. So "there is no God" is meaningless too; agnosticism, which treats the question as open, is also ruled out.
  • Your spec: religious and ethical language as meaningless: "God is good", "murder is wrong" (Ayer: ethical words only express feelings, e.g. disapproval).
Quick check
?Which statement would Ayer (1936) count as meaningful?
Mission 4

Problems for the principle

Problems for the verification principleFails its own testneither analytic nor verifiable (Ayer’s reply: aproposal)Rules out universal laws“All water boils at 100 °C at sea level” cannotbe conclusively verifiedRules out history“Julius Caesar crossed the Rubicon” cannot beobserved nowRevised version too generous1946: “direct” and “indirect” verification let inalmost any statement
  • Self-defeating: the principle is neither analytic nor verifiable by observation, so by its own test it is meaningless. (Ayer's later reply: it is a proposal about how to use "meaningful", not a fact.)
  • Universal laws: "All water boils at 100 °C at sea level" can never be conclusively verified: we cannot test every case. Strong verification rules out science itself.
  • History: statements about the past ("Julius Caesar crossed the Rubicon") cannot be observed now.
  • Too generous: Ayer's revised version (2nd edition, 1946: "direct" and "indirect" verification) was shown by critics to let in almost any statement.
  • Ayer later said, in a BBC interview with Bryan Magee (1978), that much of the book's view was mistaken (paraphrase).
Mission 4

Hick: eschatological verification

Hick: the Celestial Citytwo travellers,one roadgood thingsbad thingsthe same for boththe final cornerAfter death (eschatological):verifiable if true; not falsifiable if false
  • John Hick (1922–2012), Faith and Knowledge (1957); "Theology and Verification" (1960).
  • Parable of the Celestial City (paraphrase): two travellers walk one road. One believes it leads to the Celestial City; the other believes it leads nowhere. They meet the same good and bad things on the way. Only at the final corner will one of them be shown to be right.
  • Christian claims are verifiable in principle, after death (eschaton, "the end"): if they are true, believers will experience it.
  • Asymmetry: verifiable if true, but not falsifiable if false (no one would be there to find out).
  • So, even on Ayer's weak principle, "God exists" is meaningful: we know what experience would verify it.
  • Your spec: "the concept of eschatological verification goes against this".
Mission 4Read the source

Face to face

> "For now we see in a mirror, dimly, but then face to face. Now I know in part, but then I will know fully, even as I was also fully known." (1 Corinthians 13:12, WEBBE)

  • Paul expects knowledge of God that is partial now and full later.
  • Hick's travellers live in the "now": the road is ambiguous. The "then" is the final corner.

Q1 How does this verse fit Hick's argument?

Show answer

It expects a future experience in which what believers hope for will be known directly.

Q2 Why would Ayer not be satisfied?

Show answer

The verifying experience depends on life after death, which is itself unverifiable now and contested.

Quick check
?Hick says Christian belief is verifiable but not falsifiable. Why not falsifiable?
Mission 4Evaluate

Does verification make religious language meaningless?

Does verification make religious language meaningless?The verification principle shows thatreligious language is meaningless.ForIt demands what science demands: a clearlink between words and experienceMuch God-talk is compatible with anyexperience: what does it claim?AgainstIt fails its own test; strong verification alsorules out universal laws and historyHick: religious claims are verifiable inprinciple, after deathMuch religious language is not meant asempirical report (symbol, language games)Some claims have empirical content: e.g.that Jesus lived and died under PontiusPilateJudge it byIs the principle itself justified? · Does anyversion avoid its problems? · Does it fit whatbelievers mean?
  • Claim: The verification principle shows that religious language is meaningless.
  • For: It demands what science demands: a clear link between words and experience.
  • For: Much God-talk is compatible with any experience; it is hard to see what it claims.
  • Against: The principle fails its own test; strong verification also rules out universal laws and history.
  • Against: Hick: religious claims are verifiable in principle, after death.
  • Against: Much religious language is not meant as empirical report; a test for science may not fit worship.
  • Against: Some claims have empirical content: e.g. that Jesus lived and died under Pontius Pilate.
  • Judgement criteria: Is the principle itself justified? Does any version avoid its problems? Does it fit what believers mean?
Mission 4Worked answer

Building a judgement

Building a judgement: an answer chainPointHick meets Ayer’s weak, in-principle test: weknow what experience would verify the claimCounter-pointIt assumes personal survival after death, justas unverifiable nowResponseThe test asks only what would verify a claim,as with mountains on the moon in 1936JudgementWeigh the logic of “in principle” against theverifying experience depending on anotherdisputed claim

Task: evaluate the claim that Hick's eschatological verification answers Ayer.

  • Point: It meets Ayer's weak, in-principle test: we know what experience would verify the claim.
  • Counter-point: It assumes personal survival after death, which is just as unverifiable now.
  • Response: Hick says the test asks only what would verify a claim, not whether it can be done today, as with mountains on the moon in 1936.
  • Judgement: Weigh which matters more: the logic of "in principle", or the fact that the verifying experience depends on another disputed claim.
Mission check

?Nadia, a Muslim, says: "After I die, I will stand before God for judgement." Using the ideas of Ayer (1936) and Hick, which statement is correct?
Mission 5

Mission 5: If nothing could ever change your mind, are you really claiming anything?

Make a guess: If nothing could ever change your mind, are you really claiming anything?

Mission 5

From verifying to falsifying

From Popper to FlewPopper (1934)falsifiable = scientific (demarcation: sciencefrom non-science)Flewto assert something = to deny something else(meaning)Popper did not say unfalsifiable meansmeaningless.“Theology and Falsification” (1950–51)FlewHareMitchell
  • Karl Popper (1902–1994), The Logic of Scientific Discovery (1934; English 1959): a scientific theory must be falsifiable: some possible observation could show it wrong. He used this to mark off science from non-science, not to define meaning.
  • Antony Flew (1923–2010) applied the idea to religious assertions: to assert something is to deny something else.
  • "Theology and Falsification", a symposium in the journal University (1950–51), with R. M. Hare and Basil Mitchell; reprinted in New Essays in Philosophical Theology (1955).
Mission 5Read the source

Flew's gardener

Flew's gardenera clearingelectric fencebloodhounds patrolinvisible,intangiblegardener?

Flew, adapting a parable by John Wisdom ("Gods", 1944) (paraphrase):

  • Two explorers find a clearing with flowers and weeds. One says a gardener tends it; the other says no.
  • They wait. No gardener. They put up a barbed-wire electric fence and patrol with bloodhounds. No scream, no movement of the wire, no bark.
  • The believer says: the gardener is invisible, intangible, gives off no scent, makes no sound.
  • The sceptic asks how such a gardener differs from an imaginary one, or from no gardener at all.

Q1 What does each new "invisible, intangible" step do to the believer's claim?

Show answer

It removes another way the claim could be tested, until nothing could count against it.

Q2 What is the gardener a picture of?

Show answer

God, believed to care for the world, though no test detects God.

Mission 5

Flew's challenge

Death by a thousand qualifications“God loves us”“Godloves us”a dot“not merely human love”qualification“inscrutable”qualification“the death by a thousand qualifications”(Flew)
  • A real assertion rules something out. If nothing could count against it, it asserts nothing.
  • Believers qualify their claims to protect them: God's love is "not merely human love", God's plan is "inscrutable".
  • Flew's example (paraphrase): a child dies of cancer; the believer's heavenly Father shows no visible concern; still the believer says God loves us.
  • Each qualification kills the claim a little: "the death by a thousand qualifications" (Flew).
  • His question to believers (paraphrase): what would have to happen to count, for you, as a disproof of God's love, or of God's existence?
Quick check
?Flew asks believers what would count as a disproof of God's love. Why?
Mission 5

Hare: bliks

Hare's bliksThe student’s blikkind donblik“cunning”A sane blik“my steering won’t fail”Bliks frame how evidence is read: neither is anassertion (Hare).
  • R. M. Hare (1919–2002) agreed with Flew that religious claims are not falsifiable assertions, but said they still matter.
  • His parable (paraphrase): a student is convinced that all the university's dons want to murder him. Friends introduce him to the kindest dons; he says it only shows how cunning they are. Nothing can shake him.
  • He has a blik: an unfalsifiable way of seeing the world that frames how all evidence is read.
  • Everyone has bliks: Hare's own example is trusting that his car's steering will not suddenly fail.
  • Bliks can be sane or insane; the difference between them matters a great deal, though neither is an assertion.
  • Religious language, on this view, expresses a blik: non-cognitive, yet meaningful.
Mission 5

Mitchell: the partisan and the stranger

The partisan and the StrangerpartisanStrangerNight meetingseen helpingin enemy uniformevidence againsttrustcounts against, not decisively
  • Basil Mitchell (1917–2011) said religious claims are assertions, and evidence does count against them.
  • His parable (paraphrase): in an occupied country, a resistance fighter (a partisan) meets a Stranger who says he leads the resistance, and asks for trust whatever happens.
  • Sometimes the Stranger is seen helping partisans; sometimes he is seen in enemy uniform, handing patriots over.
  • The partisan feels the strain, but keeps trusting because of that first meeting.
  • So suffering really does count against belief in God's love, but not decisively: faith rests on trust in a person.
  • Mitchell: believers' claims can be provisional hypotheses (dropped at the first counter-evidence), significant articles of faith (challenged, but not easily abandoned), or vacuous formulae (nothing counts). Faith is the middle one.
Quick check
?How does Mitchell's partisan differ from Hare's student?
Mission 5

Swinburne: toys in the cupboard

Swinburne's toys in the cupboard“Do theydance?”no trace leftverifyfalsifyunderstand
  • Richard Swinburne (b. 1934), The Coherence of Theism (1977).
  • Example (paraphrase): suppose some toys come out of the cupboard at night and dance when no one is looking, leaving no trace.
  • No observation could verify or falsify this. Yet we understand exactly what is claimed.
  • So a statement can be meaningful even if it cannot be falsified. Flew and Ayer have confused meaning with testability.
  • Your spec: "concept meaningful even though falsifying the statement is not possible".
Mission 5

Flew replies

  • To Hare: if religious language expresses a blik and not an assertion, it is not what believers mean. Most Christians claim God really exists and really loves.
  • To Mitchell: the Stranger is a man: limited, perhaps unable to help, perhaps forced to hide. God is omnipotent and omniscient, so these excuses do not apply.
  • So, Flew argues, Mitchell is pushed back towards qualifications.
  • Mitchell could reply: the parable shows the logic of trust, not God's reasons; theodicy tries to supply those.
Mission 5Evaluate

Did anyone win the symposium?

Did anyone win the symposium?StrengthWeaknessFlewasks believers whattheir claims rule outPopper’s test is forscience, notmeaning;unfalsifiable claimscan be understood(Swinburne’s toys)Hareexplains whybelievers are notmoved bycounter-evidence;everyone has bliksmakes religionnon-cognitive; hardto tell sane frominsane bliksMitchellkeeps belief asassertion; takessuffering seriouslyFlew: God, unlike theStranger, has nolimits to excuse himJudge it byWhich account fits what believers mean? ·Which takes suffering seriously? · Isfalsifiability the right test of meaning?
  • Flew: strong: asks believers to say what their claims rule out. Weak: Popper's test is for science, not for meaning; some unfalsifiable claims are plainly understood.
  • Swinburne's toys show unfalsifiable claims can be understood.
  • Hare: strong: explains why believers are not moved by counter-evidence; everyone has bliks. Weak: makes religion non-cognitive; it is hard to tell sane from insane bliks without evidence.
  • Mitchell: strong: keeps belief as assertion and takes suffering seriously. Weak: Flew's reply: God, unlike the Stranger, has no limits to excuse him.
  • Judgement criteria: Which account fits what believers mean? Which takes suffering seriously? Is falsifiability the right test of meaning?
Mission 5Worked answer

Using the parables

Using the parables: an answer chainState Flew’s challengenothing counts against belief, so it assertsnothingGive Mitchell’s parablethe Stranger’s mixed behaviour; the partisan’strustDraw the pointevidence counts against belief, but notdecisively: a significant article of faith, not avacuous formulaAdd Flew’s replyGod has no human limitations

Task: explain how Mitchell responds to Flew.

  • State Flew's challenge briefly: nothing counts against belief, so it asserts nothing.
  • Give Mitchell's parable in two sentences: the Stranger's mixed behaviour; the partisan's trust.
  • Draw the point: evidence counts against belief, but not decisively; faith is a significant article of faith, not a vacuous formula.
  • Add Flew's reply to show depth: God has no human limitations.
Mission check

?Lena's brother left home years ago. Some of his actions trouble her, and she admits they count against her belief that he still cares for her. She keeps trusting him because of what she knows of him. Whose view does her attitude best fit?
Mission 6

Mission 6: Does "God" mean the same in a prayer as it would in a science report?

Make a guess: Does "God" mean the same in a prayer as it would in a science report?

Mission 6

Early Wittgenstein: the picture theory

The picture theory“Thecatis on themat.”parts of the sentencematch things in the world“God is love.”no picturecannot be said, onlyshown (Tractatus)early Wittgenstein; later rejected
  • Ludwig Wittgenstein (1889–1951), Austrian-British philosopher, Cambridge.
  • Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus (1921): a meaningful sentence is a picture of a possible fact: its parts match things in the world.
  • What cannot be pictured (ethics, God, the meaning of life) cannot be said; it can only show itself. The book ends by telling us to be silent about it (paraphrase).
  • The Vienna Circle read it as support for verification (see Mission 4). Wittgenstein later rejected the picture theory.
Mission 6

Meaning is use

Words are like tools“Slab!”builders (§2)thanking§23greeting§23one toolbox,different jobs (§11)“The meaning of a word is its use in thelanguage” (§43)
  • Philosophical Investigations (published 1953, after his death): words are like tools in a toolbox: they do many different jobs (§11).
  • His builders (§2, paraphrase): one calls "Slab!" and the other brings a slab. The word is not a picture; it is part of an activity.
  • "The meaning of a word is its use in the language" (§43).
  • To find what a word means, ask how it is used, not what object it names.
  • Your spec: "consider use of language not meaning".
Mission 6

Language games and forms of life

Language games and forms of lifelanguage gamean activity with its own rulesgiving ordersdescribingtelling a joke15 – lovescoreboard“love” in a score“love” in a vowchurchmosquegurdwarasynagogueworship, prayer, confession,care for othersform of life
  • A language game: an activity with its own rules for how words are used. Wittgenstein's list (§23, paraphrase) includes giving orders, describing, telling a joke, thanking, greeting and praying.
  • "Love" means one thing in a tennis score, another in a wedding vow.
  • A form of life: the shared practices and way of living within which a language game makes sense.
  • Religious language belongs to a religious form of life: worship, prayer, confession, care for others.
  • So believers' words are meaningful to participants who know the rules, even if not cognitive in the scientific sense.
Quick check
?A doctor says a patient has "faith" in the treatment; a priest says a person has "faith" in God. What would Wittgenstein say about the word "faith" here?
Mission 6Read the source

Believing in a Last Judgement

Two lives, two picturesa life guided by a LastJudgement “picture”a life without thatpictureWittgenstein:not contradicting each other

From Wittgenstein's 1938 lectures on religious belief, published from students' notes as Lectures and Conversations (1966) (paraphrase):

  • Suppose someone believes in a Last Judgement, and I do not. Am I contradicting him? Wittgenstein says no.
  • The believer has a picture that guides his whole life: it is in his thoughts in every decision.
  • It is not like a weather forecast that evidence could make more or less likely. It is not reasonable in that sense, but not unreasonable either.
  • The unbeliever is not denying the same thing; he does not use that picture at all.

Q1 Why does Wittgenstein say he is not contradicting the believer?

Show answer

They are not making rival claims in one game; the believer's words play a different role in his life.

Q2 How does this differ from Hick's view of belief in life after death (see Mission 4)?

Show answer

Hick treats it as a factual claim verifiable in future; Wittgenstein treats it as a picture that regulates life.

Mission 6

Fideism and coherence

Coherence: judged from withinprayerworshipscripturecare for othersconfessionbeliefsstatementoutside factCoherence theory of trutha statement is true if it fits the beliefs andpractices of the group
  • Fideism (Latin fides, faith): religious belief can be understood and judged only from within faith.
  • Kai Nielsen (1926–2021) called the view of D. Z. Phillips (a follower of Wittgenstein) and others "Wittgensteinian fideism" (1967). Phillips rejected the label.
  • Your spec: language games fit a coherence theory of truth: a statement is true if it coheres with the other beliefs of the group, not by matching an outside fact.
  • Religious statements become expressions of belief and commitment.
Quick check
?Why do supporters of the language-game view say Ayer's verification principle does not defeat religious language?
Mission 6Evaluate

Strengths and weaknesses of language games

Strengths and weaknesses of language gamesLanguage games make religious languagemeaningful.StrengthsAnswers Ayer and Flew: religiouslanguage is meaningful within its gameRespects how believers actually usewordsExplains why believers and atheists oftentalk past each otherWeaknesses1 Corinthians 15:14: most believers meanrealist claimsRejects religious claims that could beempirically checked (e.g. historical claimsabout Jesus)May allow no conversation betweengroupsAny coherent practice could be shieldedfrom criticism (Kai Nielsen)May not give adequate meaning to theword “God”, as a real being who actsJudge it byDoes it fit what believers mean? · Does itallow dialogue and criticism? · Does it answerthe verification challenge?
  • Strengths: answers Ayer and Flew: religious language is meaningful within its game; respects how believers actually use words; explains why believers and atheists often talk past each other.
  • Weakness: most believers mean realist claims. "If Christ has not been raised, then our preaching is in vain and your faith also is in vain." (1 Corinthians 15:14, WEBBE)
  • Weakness: it rejects religious claims that could be empirically checked (e.g. historical claims about Jesus).
  • Weakness: it may allow no conversation between groups: outsiders cannot criticise, and believers cannot persuade.
  • Weakness: any coherent practice could be shielded from criticism, however odd (a worry raised by Kai Nielsen).
  • Weakness: it may not give adequate meaning to the word "God", as a real being who acts.
  • Judgement criteria: Does it fit what believers mean? Does it allow dialogue and criticism? Does it answer the verification challenge?
  • Your spec's challenges: no empirically verifiable truths; no conversation between groups; inadequate meaning for "God".
Mission 6Worked answer

Judging a non-cognitive view

Judging a non-cognitive view: an answer chainPointMeaning is use (PI §43): prayer and worshiphave clear rules for those who take partCounter-point1 Corinthians 15:14: Paul treats theresurrection as a factDevelopPhillips: “fact” means something different infaith; critics: believers mean the ordinarysenseJudgementIs “meaningful to participants” enough, ormust meaning include the claim to be true?

Task: evaluate whether language games show that religious language is meaningful.

  • Point: Meaning is use (Wittgenstein, Philosophical Investigations, §43); prayer and worship have clear rules for those who take part.
  • Counter-point: Paul treats the resurrection as a fact (1 Corinthians 15:14); a game-only meaning loses that claim.
  • Develop: A Wittgensteinian such as D. Z. Phillips would reply that "fact" means something different in faith; critics answer that believers mean the ordinary sense.
  • Judgement: decide whether "meaningful to participants" is enough, or whether meaning must include the claim to be true.
Quick check
?Which criticism of the language-game view uses the believer's own words against it?
Mission check

?At a Passover meal, the leader lifts the matzah and says, "This is the bread of affliction that our ancestors ate in Egypt." A guest whispers, "But it was baked last week." How would a Wittgensteinian answer the guest?
Recap

The big ideas

Mission 1

  • Words learned from finite things struggle to describe an infinite, timeless God; cognitive language makes factual claims, non-cognitive language expresses, praises or guides.
  • Univocal language risks anthropomorphism; equivocal language risks emptiness; Aquinas rejects both (ST I.13.5).

Mission 2

  • Analogy is a middle path between univocal and equivocal language (Aquinas, ST I.13.5): words used of God are related but not identical.
  • Attribution names God through cause and effect; proper proportion fits each quality to each nature; both give real but limited knowledge.
  • Ramsey: models stretched by qualifiers lead to a disclosure ("the penny drops").

Mission 3

  • A sign points by convention; a symbol points and participates (Tillich, Dynamics of Faith, 1957): it opens up reality, cannot be invented and can die.
  • For Tillich, God is being-itself and our ultimate concern; almost all talk of God is symbolic.
  • Randall: symbols are non-cognitive and motivate, bind, communicate and reveal; myths carry values and purpose but face competing myths, change and demythologising.

Mission 4

  • Logical positivists (Vienna Circle; Ayer, Language, Truth and Logic, 1936): a statement is meaningful only if analytic or empirically verifiable; God-talk, atheism and ethics are meaningless.
  • Criticisms: the principle fails its own test and excludes universal laws and history; Hick replies that religious claims are verifiable (not falsifiable) after death, so meaningful.

Mission 5

  • Flew (1950): a claim nothing could count against asserts nothing ("the death by a thousand qualifications").
  • Hare: religious belief is a blik, unfalsifiable but significant; Mitchell: belief is an assertion that evidence counts against, but not decisively; Flew replied to both.
  • Swinburne's toys: a claim can be understood without being falsifiable.

Mission 6

  • Later Wittgenstein (Philosophical Investigations, 1953): meaning is use; language games within forms of life; religious language is meaningful to participants, though often read as not cognitive.
  • Strengths: answers verification and falsification; weaknesses: believers mean realist claims, no dialogue between games, thin meaning for "God".
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Mini-lesson complete!

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You've worked through Religious language for Eduqas A-level Religious Studies. 🎉

  1. Mission 1Can you describe God by saying only what God is not?
  2. Mission 2When we call God "good", is it the same good as a good person, or something else?
  3. Mission 3Why does burning a flag upset people more than knocking down a road sign?
  4. Mission 4Is "God loves you" a statement anyone could ever check?
  5. Mission 5If nothing could ever change your mind, are you really claiming anything?
  6. Mission 6Does "God" mean the same in a prayer as it would in a science report?

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