Eduqas A-level Religious Studies (A120) · C3 Theme 1: Ethical thought
Mini-Lesson
Ethical thought
7 missions. Guess, learn, then check. Your place is saved.
Mission 1Is something good because God commands it, or does God command it because it is good?
Mission 2Can you practise being brave the way you practise the piano?
Mission 3If a bank robber is brave, is bravery still a virtue?
Mission 4If giving to charity makes you feel good, was it really for others?
Mission 5Can you find goodness in the world, the way a scientist finds mass or temperature?
Mission 6If nobody can define "good", how could anyone know what is good?
Mission 7When you say "stealing is wrong", are you stating a fact or showing how you feel?
Mission 1
Mission 1: Is something good because God commands it, or does God command it because it is good?
Make a guess: Is something good because God commands it, or does God command it because it is good?
Mission 1
Right because God commands
Divine command theory (DCT): an act is right because God commands it and wrong because God forbids it.
God is the origin of morality (God makes moral truth) and its regulator (God's will settles what is binding).
Moral goodness = complying with God's commands.
Moral truths are objective: true whatever any human thinks, because they rest on God's will.
A meta-ethical theory: it says what "right" and "wrong" mean or what makes them true, not only which acts are right.
Mission 1
Why believers hold it
Omnipotence: if anything were good apart from God, God would be bound by it. DCT keeps God sovereign over everything, morality included.
Objectivity: morality is not a matter of opinion or culture; it has a fixed source.
Metaphysical foundation: DCT answers "why is anything really wrong?" with a reason outside human minds.
Motivation and certainty: believers know what to do (revealed commands) and why it matters (obedience to God).
Scripture: moral law is presented as given by God, not invented by people.
Spec wording: DCT as "a requirement of God's omnipotence"; an "objective meta-physical foundation for morality".
Mission 1Read the source
Commands and a hard case
> "I am the LORD your God, who brought you out of the land of Egypt, out of the house of bondage. You shall have no other gods before me." (Exodus 20:2–3, WEBBE)
> "You shall not murder." (Exodus 20:13, WEBBE)
> "Now take your son, your only son, Isaac, whom you love, … Offer him there as a burnt offering …" (Genesis 22:2, WEBBE)
The Ten Commandments open with who commands, not with reasons: the authority is God's.
In Genesis 22 the angel of the LORD stops Abraham at the last moment (22:11–12). Jewish and Christian readers praise Abraham's faith and read the story in different ways (e.g. a test of trust; a rejection of child sacrifice).
Q1 What gives the commandments their authority in Exodus 20:2?
Show answer
The identity of the one commanding: the LORD who freed Israel.
Q2 Why do critics of DCT use Genesis 22?
Show answer
It seems to show God commanding what is normally the gravest wrong, so rightness looks like whatever God wills.
Quick check
?On divine command theory, what makes murder wrong?
Mission 1Read the source
Plato's Euthyphro
Step 1 of 3
Plato (c. 427–347 BCE), Euthyphro, a dialogue set in 399 BCE outside the court where Socrates' trial is about to begin.
Euthyphro is prosecuting his own father, sure that the gods approve. Socrates asks what piety (holiness) is.
> "what all the gods love is pious and holy, and the opposite which they all hate, impious." (Euthyphro, 9e, tr. Jowett)
> "The point which I should first wish to understand is whether the pious or holy is beloved by the gods because it is holy, or holy because it is beloved of the gods." (10a, tr. Jowett)
Q1 Which half of Socrates' question matches DCT?
Show answer
Holy because beloved of the gods: the gods' attitude makes it so.
Q2 Euthyphro's gods are many and quarrel. Why do monotheists still face the question?
Show answer
Swap "the gods love" for "God commands": the same two options remain.
Mission 1
Two horns
Step 1 of 3
The Euthyphro dilemma, restated for one God: is X good because God commands it, or does God command it because it is good?
Horn 1: God commands it because it is good.
Goodness exists independently of God; God recognises it.
Implications: God is not the source of morality; God seems bound by a standard (a problem for omnipotence); we could know right and wrong without God.
Horn 2: It is good because God commands it.
This is DCT.
Implications: if God had commanded cruelty, cruelty would be right (arbitrariness). "God is good" would mean only "God does what God commands" (emptiness).
Quick check
?A believer says: "God commands kindness because kindness is good." Which difficulty does the Euthyphro dilemma raise for this reply?
Mission 1
Arbitrariness and pluralism
Arbitrariness problem: if God's will alone makes right, God's commands have no reason behind them. Morality becomes purely arbitrary, and cruelty could have been a duty.
William of Ockham (c. 1287–1347) is often cited as accepting this: God could command even hatred of God, and it would then be right.
Pluralism objection: different religions (and different groups within one religion) claim different divine commands: on diet, the holy day, marriage, war. Which commands are God's?
Believers' replies to pluralism: a shared core (e.g. love of neighbour, the Golden Rule, Luke 6:31); revelation is true in one tradition; some commands fit a time and place.
Critics' reply: we then need human reasoning to choose between claimed commands, so morality does not rest on command alone.
Mission 1
Adams: a modified theory
Step 1 of 2
Robert Merrihew Adams (1937–2024), "A Modified Divine Command Theory of Ethical Wrongness" (1973), developed in Finite and Infinite Goods (1999).
Wrong = contrary to the commands of a loving God (paraphrase).
God's commands come from God's nature, which is perfectly good: omnibenevolence is part of what God is.
So God would not command cruelty for its own sake. If God did, Adams argued, the believer's idea of wrongness would break down; he would not conclude that cruelty is a duty.
Later Adams: goodness is grounded in God's nature (God is the standard of the good); obligation is grounded in God's commands.
Answers arbitrariness (commands have a reason: God's love) while keeping morality rooted in God.
Critics: is God's nature good by some standard? If so, horn 1 returns. If "good" just names God's nature, the emptiness worry returns.
Spec wording: "divine command based on God's omnibenevolence".
Mission 1Diversity
Will or wisdom?
Voluntarists stress God's will: Ockham (Christian); many Ash'ari theologians in Sunni Islam (al-Ash'ari, 874–936): acts are good or bad because God commands or forbids them.
Mu'tazila (early Islamic school): reason can know good and bad before revelation; God commands what is just.
Thomas Aquinas (1225–1274): God commands in line with God's wisdom; natural law is reason's share in God's eternal law. Most Catholic and many Protestant thinkers follow this path.
Hebrew Bible: Abraham argues with God over Sodom: "Shouldn't the Judge of all the earth do right?" (Genesis 18:25, WEBBE). God is expected to act justly.
Søren Kierkegaard (1813–1855), Fear and Trembling (1843): Abraham's faith involves a "teleological suspension of the ethical": duty to God can stand above the ethical.
Quick check
?In Adams' modified divine command theory, why would a command to torture for fun not make torture right?
Mission 1Evaluate
Is morality what God commands?
Step 1 of 4
Claim: Morality is what God commands.
For: gives objective, universal morality; keeps God sovereign (omnipotence); explains why morality feels like a command and not just advice; fits scripture's presentation of law.
For: Adams' version answers arbitrariness: commands flow from God's loving nature.
Against: the Euthyphro dilemma: either goodness is independent of God, or it is arbitrary.
Against: pluralism: claimed commands conflict; we must judge between them using something other than command.
Against: many non-religious people live morally; morality seems knowable without God.
Judgement criteria: Does a reply to Euthyphro avoid both horns? Is "God is good" still meaningful? Can we know God's commands? Does the view fit believers' own sense that God is just?
AO2 tip: weigh Adams against the strongest form of the dilemma, then reach your own conclusion.
Mission check
?A scholar announces that a newly found ancient text, which she believes is genuine revelation, commands that strangers be deceived for sport. A believer replies: "The God whose commands define right and wrong is perfectly loving. A loving God would not command this, so the text cannot be God's command." Which position is the believer using?
The Euthyphro question is still live: modified theories ground morality in God's nature, and critics ask whether that escapes the dilemma or restates it.
Mission 2
Mission 2: Can you practise being brave the way you practise the piano?
Make a guess: Can you practise being brave the way you practise the piano?
Mission 2
Character, not rules
Most theories ask: "What should I do?" Virtue ethics asks: "What kind of person should I be?"
It is agent-centred: it judges character, then acts as expressions of character.
A virtue (Greek aretē, "excellence") is a settled good quality of character: courage, honesty, generosity.
A good person reliably does good acts, for the right reasons, and wants to.
Intellectual virtues: excellences of thinking, learned by teaching and experience.
Moral virtues: excellences of character (courage, temperance, generosity, truthfulness), formed by habit.
Greek ēthos (character) comes from ethos (habit): Aristotle's own wordplay in Book II.
Eduqas wording: personal qualities that make a person moral; a focus on character rather than specific actions.
Mission 2Read the source
We become what we do
Step 1 of 3
"And so by doing just acts we become just, and by doing acts of temperance and courage we become temperate and courageous." (Nicomachean Ethics II.1, Peters trans.)
Virtues are not in us by nature: a stone that naturally falls cannot be trained to rise. But we are able to acquire them.
Builders learn by building, lyre-players by playing. Character is trained the same way.
So upbringing makes "a great difference, or rather all the difference." (II.1, Peters trans.)
Q1 According to Aristotle, which comes first: just acts or a just character?
Show answer
Just acts, repeated until they become a settled character.
Q2 Why does the stone example matter?
Show answer
It shows virtues are not natural instincts; they must be formed.
Quick check
?How does a person become generous, according to Aristotle?
Mission 2
The golden mean
A moral virtue is a mean between two vices: one of deficiency, one of excess.
Courage: cowardice (deficiency of confidence) · courage · rashness (excess).
Truthfulness about oneself: mock-modesty · truthfulness · boastfulness.
The mean is relative to us: a meal too little for Milo the wrestler is too much for a beginner.
Feeling and acting "at the right times, about the right things, towards the right people, for the right end, and in the right way" (II.6, paraphrase).
Mission 2
Where there is no mean
"But it is not all actions nor all passions that admit of moderation; … as malevolence, shamelessness, envy, and, among acts, adultery, theft, murder." (II.6, Peters trans.)
These are wrong in themselves: there is no right amount of theft.
The mean is not an average: sometimes it lies nearer one extreme (courage is nearer rashness than cowardice).
So it is hard to be good: anyone can get angry; being angry with the right person, to the right degree, at the right time, is rare (II.9, paraphrase).
Say: "the mean is the right response, judged by reason" — not: "the mean is always a moderate amount".
Quick check
?A friend is publicly humiliated and Jo feels angry. Which response fits Aristotle's mean for anger?
Mission check
?Priya is very shy. She stays silent in class debates, even when a classmate is treated unfairly. On Aristotle's account, how could she become courageous?
Courage is trained like a skill, but it is not "more is better": it is the right response, done until it becomes your character. Next: who revived virtue ethics, and can it guide hard choices?
Mission 3
Mission 3: If a bank robber is brave, is bravery still a virtue?
Make a guess: If a bank robber is brave, is bravery still a virtue?
Mission 3Read the source
The Beatitudes
"Blessed are the poor in spirit, for theirs is the Kingdom of Heaven." (Matthew 5:3)
"Blessed are the gentle, for they shall inherit the earth." (Matthew 5:5)
"Blessed are the merciful, for they shall obtain mercy." (Matthew 5:7)
"Blessed are the peacemakers, for they shall be called children of God." (Matthew 5:9)
Jesus describes qualities of character, not rules: humility, gentleness, mercy, peacemaking, purity of heart (5:8).
Like Aristotle: goodness lies in settled character, and leads to blessedness.
Unlike Aristotle: humility and mourning are praised; for Christians, blessedness is a gift of God's kingdom, not achieved by training alone.
Q1 Which Beatitude names a virtue that Aristotle's "great-souled" person, proud of his worth, might lack?
Show answer
The poor in spirit or the gentle: humility.
Q2 Are the Beatitudes commands or descriptions?
Show answer
Christians read them as descriptions of a character that God blesses, which they aim to grow into.
Mission 3
Three challenges
Not a practical guide: "be virtuous" does not say what to do in a dilemma. Reply: the philosopher Rosalind Hursthouse: virtue terms give rules ("do what is honest, not what is cruel"), plus role models.
Cultural relativism: virtues differ by culture: Homeric warriors prized pride; Christians prize humility. Reply: Aristotle and the philosopher Philippa Foot ground virtues in shared human nature and needs.
Virtues used for immoral acts: a brave and loyal bank robber. Reply: Aristotle: virtue includes a right end chosen by practical wisdom; Philippa Foot: courage in a wrongful act does not operate as a virtue.
Practical wisdom (phronesis): the trained judgement that sees what is right in a situation. For Aristotle, no moral virtue exists without it.
Eduqas wording: not a practical guide; cultural relativism; virtues can be used for immoral acts.
Mission 3Diversity
Relativism and the Christian response
Ethical relativism: no moral truth holds for all cultures; what counts as a virtue depends on the society.
Challenge to Christians: if virtues are relative, Christian virtues are one option among many.
Catholic natural law response: virtues are grounded in God-given human nature; Aquinas joined the four cardinal virtues of Greek philosophy (prudence, justice, courage, temperance), read through Aristotle, to the theological virtues (faith, hope, love: 1 Corinthians 13:13).
Pope Benedict XVI warned of a "dictatorship of relativism" (homily, 18 April 2005).
The philosopher Alasdair MacIntyre's response: traditions can be rationally compared by how well they solve their own problems.
The Christian theologian Stanley Hauerwas's response: Christians need not prove a neutral universal ethic; the Church witnesses to a different way of life.
Some liberal Christians accept that virtues are partly culturally shaped, while holding love as universal.
Quick check
?A hospice nurse must decide whether to tell a dying patient a painful truth. She asks, "What would a virtuous nurse do?" Her colleague replies: "That tells me nothing: honesty says tell her, kindness says wait." Which challenge to virtue ethics is the colleague raising?
Mission 3Evaluate
Is virtue ethics useful when faced with a moral dilemma?
Step 1 of 4
Claim: Virtue ethics gives real help when facing a moral dilemma.
For: it attends to the particular case; practical wisdom sees what rules miss.
For: role models and virtue rules ("be honest, be kind") give guidance.
Against: in a true dilemma two virtues clash (honesty vs kindness); "do what the virtuous person would do" may not say which wins.
Against: in a crisis, the person without a formed character gets little immediate help.
Another issue: is being a good person better than just doing good deeds? Good deeds without character may be unreliable; character without deeds achieves nothing.
Judgement criteria: What counts as "useful": a decision procedure, or a better decider? Is any theory more useful in real dilemmas?
Mission check
?For years a company director shows great patience, self-control and nerve while secretly defrauding pensioners. A critic says this proves that virtues can serve immoral ends. Which reply would Aristotle most likely give?
For Aristotle, a "virtue" aimed at a bad end is not a virtue at all; critics still ask whether that reply makes the theory hard to use in real dilemmas. Next: virtue ethics in action on theft and lying.
Mission 4
Mission 4: If giving to charity makes you feel good, was it really for others?
Make a guess: If giving to charity makes you feel good, was it really for others?
Mission 4
Two kinds of egoism
Egoism is agent-focused: it centres on the self-interest of the one who acts. Its opposite is altruism (acting for others' sake).
Psychological egoism (descriptive): everyone does, in fact, always act from self-interest. Thomas Hobbes (1588–1679), Leviathan (1651), is often read this way.
Ethical egoism (normative): everyone ought to act in their own self-interest.
Eduqas links them: ethical egoism is a theory that matches the moral agent's psychological state.
But they are logically separate: if psychological egoism were true, "ought" would add nothing; if false, ethical egoism still needs its own case.
Quick check
?Which statement is an example of ethical egoism?
Mission 4
Long-term self-interest
Ethical egoism is not "do whatever you feel like now".
It asks what serves your long-term interests: health, reputation, friendships, trust.
So an egoist may keep promises, pay taxes and help others: cooperation pays.
Ayn Rand (1905–1982), The Virtue of Selfishness (1964): rational self-interest is a virtue; self-sacrifice is not.
Short-term gain (cheating, stealing) often wrecks long-term interest.
Question for later: does long-term egoism really differ from ordinary morality, or just give it a selfish reason?
Mission 4
Max Stirner: the unique one
Step 1 of 3
Max Stirner (pen name of Johann Kaspar Schmidt, 1806–1856), The Ego and Its Own (Der Einzige und sein Eigentum, 1844).
A Young Hegelian in Berlin; he attacked Feuerbach, who replaced God with "Humanity".
The self is the unique one (der Einzige): it owns itself and is not owned by anything higher.
Spooks (fixed ideas): God, Humanity, the State, Morality, even "the Good". People serve them and sacrifice themselves to them.
Stirner calls these "wheels in the head" (paraphrase): ideas that possess us rather than serving us.
Ownness (Eigenheit): the goal is to be the owner of your thoughts, desires and relationships.
Mission 4Read the source
Is all action self-interested?
Stirner (paraphrase, The Ego and Its Own): the saint and the patriot also serve themselves, but involuntarily: they think they serve a higher cause.
The person who loves another can love freely, because that love is his own and gives him joy; it is not a duty owed to a spook.
So Stirner answers yes: self-interest lies at the root of every action, even if it appears altruistic. The difference is whether you know it and own it.
Q1 What is an involuntary egoist for Stirner?
Show answer
Someone who serves their own interest while believing they serve God, the State or Humanity.
Q2 Does Stirner say we should stop loving others?
Show answer
No: love is fine if it is our own, freely chosen, not owed.
Mission 4
Not egoism for material gain
Step 1 of 3
Stirner rejects egoism as greed for money or possessions.
A person who lives only to get rich is possessed by money: another fixed idea, another master.
The true egoist uses wealth as one of his own things, and drops it when it no longer serves him.
So Stirnerian egoism is about self-ownership, not accumulation.
Say: "Stirner's egoist owns his desires" — not: "Stirner's egoist is greedy".
Mission 4
The union of egoists
Stirner rejects society and the State as bodies that claim to own the individual.
In their place: the union of egoists (Verein von Egoisten).
A voluntary association: each joins because it serves his own interest.
No member is sacrificed to the union; it exists for its members, not they for it.
Anyone may leave when it no longer serves them.
Example (illustrative): friends who meet to play music together, because each enjoys it, with no duty to stay.
Quick check
?Which is the best example of a union of egoists in Stirner's sense?
Mission 4
Three challenges
Destruction of community ethos: if each pursues only self-interest, trust, sacrifice and shared life wither.
Social injustice: the strong pursue their interests; the poor, sick and powerless have nothing to offer and are left out.
A form of bigotry: James Rachels (1941–2003), The Elements of Moral Philosophy (1986): egoism treats one person (me) as more important for no relevant reason, like racism treats one group (paraphrase).
Egoist replies: long-term self-interest supports community; Stirner's union is community freely chosen; egoists need not harm others.
Mission 4Evaluate
Are all moral actions motivated by self-interest?
Step 1 of 3
For: apparent altruism often brings hidden rewards: praise, relief from guilt, a warm glow.
For: Hobbes and Stirner: whatever we do, we do because we want to.
Against: Joseph Butler (1692–1752), Fifteen Sermons (1726): we desire things (a friend's good), and pleasure follows getting them. Pleasure is not the aim.
Against: the theory is unfalsifiable: it redescribes every motive as selfish, so no evidence could count against it.
Against: Christian agape: "You shall love your neighbour as yourself" (Mark 12:31); for Christians, Jesus' self-giving is the model. On many readings, self-love is assumed, not condemned.
Judgement criteria: Is "wanting to" the same as "selfish"? What evidence could settle it?
Quick check
?A banker spends every waking hour chasing a bigger bonus, losing friends and health, and says: "I'm just looking after number one." What would Stirner say?
Mission 4Evaluate
Does ethical egoism inevitably lead to moral evil?
Step 1 of 3
For: with no reason to help those who cannot repay, cruelty to the weak becomes permitted.
For: Plato's Ring of Gyges (Republic II): if you could act unseen, egoism gives no reason to be just.
For: the three challenges: community, injustice, bigotry.
Against: long-term self-interest usually counsels honesty and cooperation.
Against: Stirner's egoist is not possessed by greed and can love freely; unions rest on mutual benefit, not harm.
Against: "inevitably" is strong: egoism may permit evil without requiring it.
AO2 tip: test the key word in the issue ("inevitably", "all") and reach a judgement on it.
Mission check
?A psychological egoist says: "The firefighter who died saving a child only did it to avoid feeling guilty." How would Joseph Butler reply?
Butler's point is that wanting something for another person is still wanting it for them: the pleasure of success follows the desire; it is not the goal. Whether every motive is self-interested remains debated.
Mission 5
Mission 5: Can you find goodness in the world, the way a scientist finds mass or temperature?
Make a guess: Can you find goodness in the world, the way a scientist finds mass or temperature?
Mission 5
Ethics about ethics
Normative ethics asks: what should I do? (Kant, utilitarianism, natural law.)
Meta-ethics asks about moral language and its basis: what does "good" mean? Can "murder is wrong" be true? What would make it true?
Mission 5
Two questions, four positions
Step 1 of 3
Cognitivism: moral statements express beliefs; they can be true or false (factual language).
Non-cognitivism: they express attitudes or commands, not beliefs; not true or false (see Mission 7).
Realism: moral facts exist independently of human minds.
Anti-realism: there are no mind-independent moral facts; morality depends on human attitudes, choices or cultures.
Naturalism and intuitionism are both cognitivist and realist. They disagree about what kind of fact a moral fact is.
Quick check
?Sam says: "'Murder is wrong' is either true or false, and it is made true by a fact that holds whatever anyone thinks." How should Sam's view be classified?
Mission 5
Ethical naturalism
Step 1 of 3
Naturalism: moral terms can be defined by a natural property: something in the world we can observe or study.
So moral statements are cognitivist (they express beliefs that can be true or false): they can be verified or falsified like other facts.
Verified moral statements are objective truths and universal.
Moral facts exist independently of human beings: we discover them, as we discover facts in science.
Candidates for "good": pleasure (Bentham); happiness; what satisfies human needs or flourishing; what a well-ordered society requires (F. H. Bradley).
Mission 5Read the source
Utilitarianism as naturalism
Jeremy Bentham (1748–1832), An Introduction to the Principles of Morals and Legislation (1789), ch. I:
> "Nature has placed mankind under the governance of two sovereign masters, pain and pleasure."
John Stuart Mill (1806–1873), Utilitarianism (1863), ch. IV:
> "the sole evidence it is possible to produce that anything is desirable, is that people do actually desire it."
Right = what produces pleasure (or happiness); wrong = what produces pain. Both are natural, observable states.
So "this act is right" becomes a factual claim about consequences, checkable in principle.
Q1 Where does Bentham locate the standard of right and wrong?
Show answer
In nature: pleasure and pain.
Q2 Which step in Mill's sentence would a critic say slides from "is" to "ought"?
Show answer
From what people do desire to what is desirable, i.e. worth desiring.
Quick check
?Why is Bentham's utilitarianism counted as a form of ethical naturalism?
Mission 5
Bradley: my station and its duties
F. H. Bradley (1846–1924), Ethical Studies (1876), essay V, "My Station and its Duties".
A person is not an isolated individual: we are members of a social organism (family, community, nation).
Morality is self-realisation by fulfilling the duties of my station in that organism.
Those duties are objective features of the world: they can be found by looking at real communities and roles.
So ethical sentences express propositions, made true or false by those features; ethics can be studied in a quasi-scientific way.
Critics: a station can carry unjust duties (e.g. in a corrupt society); Bradley himself said this essay's view was not the whole of morality.
Mission 5Read the source
Hume's is–ought gap
David Hume (1711–1776), A Treatise of Human Nature (1739–40), Book III, Part I, Section I:
> "… instead of the usual copulations of propositions, is, and is not, I meet with no proposition that is not connected with an ought, or an ought not."
Hume noticed moral writers move from facts (what is) to duties (what ought to be) without explanation.
Hume's Law (the is–ought gap): you cannot validly derive an "ought" from premises that contain only "is".
Against naturalism: facts about pleasure or needs do not by themselves give a duty.
Q1 What change in the writers' sentences surprised Hume?
Show answer
From "is / is not" to "ought / ought not".
Q2 What would a naturalist need to bridge the gap?
Show answer
A premise linking fact to value, e.g. "we ought to promote pleasure", which is itself an "ought".
Mission 5
Moore: the naturalistic fallacy and the open question
Step 1 of 2
G. E. Moore (1873–1958), Principia Ethica (1903).
Good is indefinable: it is a simple notion, like yellow. You can point to it, not break it into parts.
The naturalistic fallacy: identifying "good" with any natural property (pleasure, what is desired, what is more evolved).
The open question argument: for any definition, "X is pleasant, but is it good?" is still a sensible, open question. "X is pleasant, but is it pleasant?" is not.
So "good" does not mean "pleasant". Moral facts cannot be reduced to natural ones.
Moore's own view: good is a real, non-natural property known by intuition (see Mission 6).
Quick check
?A naturalist defines "good" as "what increases happiness". How would Moore's open question argument respond?
Mission 5Evaluate
Can "good" be defined in natural terms?
Step 1 of 4
Claim: Moral terms can be defined by natural properties.
For: makes morality objective and knowable by evidence; fits a scientific view of the world; explains why pleasure, pain and needs matter morally; makes moral disagreement resolvable in principle.
Against: Hume's is–ought gap; Moore's open question; naturalists disagree on which property (pleasure? needs? a well-ordered society?); some pleasures seem bad (cruelty enjoyed).
Replies to the critics: Mill and Bradley offer more than a dictionary definition.
Judgement criteria: Does the theory explain why moral facts bind us? Can it survive the open question? Does it fit how people actually argue about morals?
Mission check
?A government report says: "This policy increases average life expectancy. Therefore the government ought to adopt it." It gives no other premise. Which criticism fits this argument most directly?
Hume asks how facts give duties; Moore asks whether "good" can mean any fact at all. Next: Moore's own answer, intuitionism.
Mission 6
Mission 6: If nobody can define "good", how could anyone know what is good?
Make a guess: If nobody can define "good", how could anyone know what is good?
Mission 6
Real but not natural
Non-naturalism: moral properties are real and objective, but not natural properties. You cannot see, measure or test them.
Like naturalism, it is cognitivist and realist: "torturing for fun is wrong" is true, whatever anyone thinks.
Unlike naturalism: "good" cannot be defined by pleasure, happiness or any other natural property (see Mission 5).
So how do we know moral truths? Not by the senses, but by intuition: a direct, rational grasp.
Intuitionism: basic moral truths are indefinable but self-evident.
Mission 6Read the source
Moore on "good"
Step 1 of 2
G. E. Moore (1873–1958), Principia Ethica (1903), ch. I:
> "If I am asked 'What is good?' my answer is that good is good, and that is the end of the matter." (§6)
> "My point is that good is a simple notion, just as yellow is a simple notion" (§7)
You can explain "horse" by its parts. You cannot explain "yellow" to someone who has never seen it: you can only point.
"Good" is like yellow: simple, with no parts to define it by, yet perfectly real.
Moore: we know by intuition which things are good in themselves; he named personal affection and the enjoyment of beauty as the greatest (ch. VI).
Q1 Why is "good is good" not an empty answer, for Moore?
Show answer
Because good is simple: there is nothing more basic to define it by.
Q2 What does the yellow comparison suggest about how we know good?
Show answer
Directly, by acquaintance, not by definition or proof.
Mission 6
Self-evident is not the same as obvious
Self-evident: known by reflecting on the claim itself, without proof from other truths. Compare: "a whole is greater than its part".
Not "obvious to everyone at once": it may take a mature mind and careful thought.
So moral intuition is like the grasp of mathematical axioms, not like a hunch or gut feeling.
Examples intuitionists give: we ought to keep promises; we ought not harm the innocent; gratitude is owed to benefactors.
Quick check
?For an intuitionist, what does it mean to say a basic moral truth is self-evident?
Mission 6
Prichard: we see what we ought to do
H. A. Prichard (1871–1947), "Does Moral Philosophy Rest on a Mistake?", Mind (1912).
Moore intuits good; Prichard intuits obligation: "ought to do" has no definition.
The "mistake": trying to prove our duties, by showing they lead to good results or to our happiness.
Our sense of obligation is "absolutely underivative or immediate" (1912).
Two ways of thinking: general thinking (reasoning about facts and consequences) and moral thinking (directly apprehending what we ought to do in a situation).
If we doubt a duty, "the remedy lies not in any process of general thinking": we must face the actual situation and let moral thinking see the obligation.
Quick check
?Prichard says that if you doubt whether you ought to keep a promise, the remedy is…
Mission 6
What intuitionism claims
Objective moral laws exist independently of human beings.
Moral truths are discovered by using our minds intuitively.
Intuitive ability is innate and the same for all moral agents.
But it needs a mature mind: children and careless thinkers can get it wrong. So intuition is not infallible.
It allows objective moral values without defining them by natural facts or by God's commands.
Spec list, in order: objective; intuitive; innate and same for all; mature mind, not infallible; objective values.
Mission 6
Challenges
No proof: there is no evidence that a moral "intuition" faculty exists; the claim cannot be tested.
Intuitions differ widely: across cultures and between thoughtful people (e.g. on eating animals, on war).
No way to resolve conflicts: if two intuitions clash, intuitionism has no further test to settle which is right.
Queerness: J. L. Mackie (1917–1981), Ethics: Inventing Right and Wrong (1977): non-natural moral properties, and a special faculty to perceive them, would be utterly unlike anything else we know (paraphrase).
Origins: intuitions may come from upbringing, culture or evolution, not insight into moral truth.
Replies: many disputes are about the facts of a case or the weighting of duties (how much each counts when they clash), not about basic duties; disagreement in maths or science does not prove there is no truth; the mature-mind condition explains some differences.
Quick check
?Two thoughtful, well-informed people have opposite, firmly held intuitions about whether eating meat is wrong. Which challenge to intuitionism does this case illustrate most directly?
Mission 6Evaluate
Are moral terms intuitive?
Step 1 of 4
Claim: We know basic moral truths by intuition.
For: avoids the naturalistic fallacy and Hume's gap; explains moral certainty (torturing for fun is wrong, whatever the argument); fits common sense: people do "just know"; allows objective values.
Against: no proof of the faculty; intuitions differ; no way to settle conflicts; queerness; intuitions may be products of culture.
Compare: naturalism (see Mission 5) makes morality testable but faces the open question.
Judgement criteria: Is disagreement at the level of basic principles or of application? Can a theory without a test still give knowledge? Does it explain why morality binds us?
Mission 6Worked answer
An evaluation paragraph
Question: "Moral truths are self-evident." Evaluate this view.
Point: Intuitionism explains moral certainty: some claims, such as "torturing for fun is wrong", seem known more surely than any argument against them.
Support: Moore: good is simple and indefinable, so it can only be known directly.
Support: Prichard: obligation is "absolutely underivative or immediate".
Counter: But intuitions differ widely, and intuitionism offers no test to decide between them.
Response: many disagreements concern the facts of a case, not basic duties; and the mature-mind condition explains why some people see less clearly.
Mini-judgement: The view is strongest for a small core of basic duties, weakest where intuitions conflict.
Mission check
?A hospital ethics committee member says: "I can't prove that deceiving this dying patient about her diagnosis would be wrong, and I can't define 'wrong'. But on careful reflection I simply see that I ought to tell her." Which position is she taking?
Intuitionism keeps moral truth objective by making it known directly. The price is a question it struggles to answer: what if intuitions clash?
Mission 7
Mission 7: When you say "stealing is wrong", are you stating a fact or showing how you feel?
Make a guess: When you say "stealing is wrong", are you stating a fact or showing how you feel?
Mission 7
Logical positivism: the test for meaning
Step 1 of 3
Logical positivism: a movement of the 1920s–30s, centred on the Vienna Circle.
The verification principle: a statement is meaningful only if it is either
analytic: true by definition ("all bachelors are unmarried"), or
empirically verifiable: checkable, at least in principle, by sense experience ("there is milk in the fridge").
Anything else is, literally, meaningless as a statement of fact.
A. J. Ayer (1910–1989) brought it to Britain in Language, Truth and Logic (1936).
Mission 7
Ayer: ethics fails the test
Language, Truth and Logic, ch. 6, "Critique of Ethics and Theology".
"Stealing is wrong" is not analytic (not true by definition) and not verifiable (no observation shows "wrongness").
So it states no fact: ethical words are pseudo-concepts. It is neither true nor false: non-cognitivism.
What it does: expresses the speaker's feeling (approval or disapproval) and aims to arouse feeling in others and stimulate action.
Spec wording: "neither verifiable nor analytic"; made "to express joy or pain"; "expressed to be persuasive".
Mission 7Read the source
Ayer on stealing
Paraphrase of Ayer, Language, Truth and Logic (1936), ch. 6:
If I tell someone, "You acted wrongly in stealing that money", I state nothing more than "You stole that money".
Adding "wrongly" adds no fact. It is as if I had said "You stole that money" "in a peculiar tone of horror", or with exclamation marks.
If I go on to say "Stealing money is wrong", my sentence has no factual meaning: it expresses moral disapproval.
Q1 What does the word "wrongly" add to the sentence, on Ayer's view?
Show answer
No fact: only the speaker's feeling, like a tone of voice.
Q2 Can two people contradict each other about whether stealing is wrong, on this view?
Show answer
Not about a fact: they express different feelings. They can still disagree about the facts of the case.
Mission 7
Boo, hurrah, and not subjectivism
Critics nicknamed emotivism the "boo-hurrah" theory: "Stealing is wrong" ≈ "Stealing: boo!"; "Kindness is good" ≈ "Kindness: hurrah!"
Emotivism is not subjectivism:
Subjectivism: "Stealing is wrong" reports a feeling: it means "I disapprove of stealing", which is true or false (am I really disapproving?).
Emotivism: it expresses the feeling, as a groan does. It reports nothing, so it is neither true nor false.
Ayer: on subjectivism, "X is wrong" and "I disapprove of X" would mean the same, but someone can disapprove of X and deny that X is wrong. So subjectivism fails; emotivism does not face this.
?Which statement gives an emotivist account of "Lying is wrong"?
Mission 7
Challenges and replies
No basic moral principles can be established: nothing is really right or wrong.
Ethical debate becomes pointless: if facts are agreed, all that is left is a clash of feelings.
No universal agreement that some actions are wrong: emotivism cannot say genocide is wrong for everyone, only that people express disapproval.
The verification principle fails its own test: it is neither analytic nor verifiable.
Moral progress (e.g. the abolition of slavery) seems to be more than a change of feelings.
Replies: most moral arguments are about facts, which can be settled (Ayer); attitudes can be changed by reasons (Stevenson).
Quick check
?Two students agree on every fact about animal testing: what is done, how much animals suffer, what medical benefits follow. They still disagree about whether it is wrong. What does Ayer's emotivism say is happening?
Mission 7Evaluate
Objective, subjective or meaningless?
Step 1 of 3
Objective factual basis: naturalism and intuitionism: moral claims are true or false, made true by facts.
Only in the mind of the user: subjectivism (reports of feeling); emotivism (expressions of feeling).
Meaningless? Ayer: no factual meaning, but they have emotive meaning and a use.
For emotivism: explains deep moral disagreement; fits a scientific view of facts; explains why moral words move us to act.
Against: debate seems real; some acts seem wrong whatever anyone feels; the verification principle undermines itself.
Judgement criteria: Does the theory fit how people actually argue? Can it explain moral progress? Does it rest on a sound theory of meaning?
Mission check
?A historian says: "The abolition of the slave trade was moral progress." Which reply could an emotivist like Ayer consistently give?
For Ayer, moral words do things rather than describe things. The debate is whether that can do justice to moral reasoning and moral progress.
Recap
The big ideas
Mission 1
DCT: right is what God commands, wrong is what God forbids; morality is objective and rooted in God's will.
The Euthyphro dilemma: if God commands it because it is good, goodness is independent of God; if it is good because God commands it, morality looks arbitrary. Pluralism adds: which commands are God's?
Adams' modified DCT grounds commands in God's loving nature; critics ask whether this escapes the dilemma.
Mission 2
Virtue ethics asks what kind of person to be.
Moral virtues are formed by habit; each is a mean between deficiency and excess, relative to us; some acts have no mean.
Mission 3
For Christians, the Beatitudes describe a character God blesses: humility, gentleness, mercy, peacemaking.
Challenges: not a practical guide; cultural relativism; virtues used for immoral acts; each has replies.
Mission 4
Psychological egoism says we always act from self-interest; ethical egoism says we ought to, ideally with long-term interests in view.
Stirner: the unique one owns itself; God, State, Humanity and Morality are spooks; he rejects egoism for material gain and proposes a voluntary union of egoists.
Challenges: loss of community ethos, social injustice, arbitrary preference for oneself (Rachels); Butler argues that pleasure follows desire rather than being its aim.
Mission 5
Cognitivism (true or false) vs non-cognitivism; realism (mind-independent facts) vs anti-realism.
Naturalism defines "good" by a natural property, e.g. pleasure (Bentham, Mill).
Bradley: the duties of my station are objective features of the social world.
Challenges: Hume's is–ought gap; Moore's naturalistic fallacy and open question argument.
Mission 6
Non-naturalism: "good" is real and objective but not a natural property; Moore: good is simple and indefinable, like yellow.
Intuitionism: basic moral truths are self-evident to a mature, reflective mind; intuition is not infallible.
Prichard: "ought" is indefinable and known immediately by moral thinking. Challenges: no proof, differing intuitions, no way to resolve conflicts, queerness.
Mission 7
Logical positivism: meaningful statements are analytic or verifiable; Ayer: moral statements are neither, so they express feelings and aim to persuade (non-cognitivism).
Emotivism is not subjectivism: it expresses feeling ("boo!"), it does not report it; challenges: no basic principles, pointless debate, no universal wrongs.
🏆
Mini-lesson complete!
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You've worked through Ethical thought for Eduqas A-level Religious Studies. 🎉
Mission 1Is something good because God commands it, or does God command it because it is good?
Mission 2Can you practise being brave the way you practise the piano?
Mission 3If a bank robber is brave, is bravery still a virtue?
Mission 4If giving to charity makes you feel good, was it really for others?
Mission 5Can you find goodness in the world, the way a scientist finds mass or temperature?
Mission 6If nobody can define "good", how could anyone know what is good?
Mission 7When you say "stealing is wrong", are you stating a fact or showing how you feel?
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