Eduqas A-level Religious Studies (A120) · C3 Theme 2: Deontological ethics (part 2 of 2)
Mini-Lesson
Deontological ethics (part 2)
4 missions. Guess, learn, then check. Your place is saved.
Mission 1Is switching off a machine morally different from giving a lethal injection?
Mission 2Are some human goods so basic that you may never act against one, even to get a better result?
Mission 3Can it be right to break a moral rule without doing anything morally evil?
Mission 4Should punishment pay back the past or protect the future, and may a state ever take a life?
Mission 1
Mission 1: Is switching off a machine morally different from giving a lethal injection?
Make a guess: Is switching off a machine morally different from giving a lethal injection?
Mission 1
Natural law applied
Primary precept: preservation of life. A secondary precept follows: never directly kill an innocent human being.
Aquinas on suicide (Summa Theologiae II-II q. 64 a. 5, paraphrase): it goes against natural self-love, injures the community, and takes what belongs to God.
So voluntary euthanasia and assisted suicide are wrong: the person's consent does not change what the act is.
Also against ordered society: doctors would become agents of death.
Internal and external acts: a doctor's compassionate intention (internal act) is good, but it cannot make a killing (external act) good. Both must be good.
Real and apparent goods: ending suffering by ending life is an apparent good, wrongly reasoned; the real good is relief of suffering while life is preserved.
Natural law is absolutist here: no exceptions for hard cases.
Mission 1
Double effect and proportionate means
Step 1 of 4
Double effect: an act with a good and a bad effect may be done if the act is not wrong in itself, the bad effect is not intended or the means to the good, and there is a proportionate reason.
Pain relief: strong painkillers given to relieve pain may be right even if they may shorten life, as long as death is foreseen, not intended (Pius XII, 1957; Catechism 2279).
Proportionate means (1980 Declaration, paraphrase): no one must accept treatment that is too burdensome or out of proportion to its expected benefit. Refusing it is accepting death, not causing it.
(Older terms: ordinary and extraordinary means.)
So natural law separates euthanasia from good end-of-life care by intention and proportion, not by whether the doctor acts or omits.
Critics: intention is hidden; a large dose "to relieve pain" might be euthanasia in disguise.
Quick check
?A Catholic man with advanced lung disease refuses to go back on a ventilator, knowing he will die within days. He says, "I am not trying to die; I just cannot bear this treatment any longer." How would natural law, as taught by the Catholic Church, judge his choice?
Mission 1Evaluate
Does natural law's absolute rule work today?
Step 1 of 4
Claim: Aquinas' natural law gives a workable approach to voluntary euthanasia in contemporary society.
For: A clear, absolute rule (never directly kill the innocent) protects the vulnerable and doctors' role.
For: Double effect and proportionate means still allow good palliative care and refusal of burdensome treatment.
Against: An absolute ban may leave some people in suffering that cannot be relieved.
Against: It rests on a belief in a creator God and God-given purposes that many people today do not share.
Judgement criteria: Does it respect both life and the person? Is the intention/foresight distinction usable in practice? Should human law follow it in a plural society?
Mission check
?A hospice doctor gives a dying patient increasing doses of morphine to control severe pain, knowing this may shorten his life by some hours. In another hospital, a doctor gives a patient a drug whose only purpose is to stop the heart, at the patient's request. What would natural law conclude?
For natural law the line is drawn by intention, not by whether the doctor acts or stands back; some philosophers argue that neither line has moral weight on its own.
Mission 2
Mission 2: Are some human goods so basic that you may never act against one, even to get a better result?
Make a guess: Are some human goods so basic that you may never act against one, even to get a better result?
Mission 2
Natural law, rebuilt
John Finnis (b. 1940), Australian legal philosopher at Oxford and Notre Dame; Natural Law and Natural Rights (1980; 2nd edition 2011).
Developed with the American philosopher Germain Grisez (1929–2018): often called New Natural Law.
Aim: restate Aquinas' natural law so it can be argued for without first proving God or arguing from facts about human biology.
Finnis is a Catholic, but he presents his theory as open to anyone who reasons carefully about what is good for human beings.
He still uses Aquinas' first principle: good is to be done and pursued, and evil avoided.
Mission 2
Theoretical and practical reason
Theoretical reason asks what is the case: facts about the world and human nature.
Practical reason asks what is to be done: what is worth pursuing.
Finnis: we grasp the basic goods by practical reason. We do not deduce them from facts about nature.
So he avoids deriving an "ought" from an "is" (the objection to older natural law;).
The goods are self-evident: anyone with experience can see that, for example, knowledge is worth having for its own sake.
Mission 2
The seven basic goods
Life: including health and safety.
Knowledge: knowing truth for its own sake.
Friendship (sociability): harmony with other people.
Play: activity enjoyed for its own sake.
Aesthetic experience: appreciating beauty.
Practical reasonableness: using intelligence to shape one's own choices and character.
Religion: concern with the ultimate source of meaning and value, however a person understands it.
All are equally basic and incommensurable: none can be measured against another on a single scale.
Quick check
?Why does Finnis call the basic goods "self-evident"?
Mission 2
The nine requirements of practical reasonableness
Step 1 of 3
How to pursue the goods well (Eduqas wording, with Finnis' own name in brackets):
1. View life as a whole (a coherent plan of life).
2. No arbitrary preference amongst the goods (values).
3. Basic goods apply equally to all (no arbitrary preference amongst persons).
4. Do not become obsessed with one project (detachment).
5. Use effort to improve (commitment).
6. Plan your actions to do the most good (efficiency, within reason: consequences count, but only limitedly).
7. Never harm a basic good (respect for every basic value in every act).
8. Foster the common good of your community.
9. Act in line with your conscience (and lawful authority).
Mission 2Read the source
Requirement 7
Finnis, Natural Law and Natural Rights (1980), chapter V (paraphrase):
> One should not choose to do any act which of itself does nothing but damage or impede a basic good, even for the sake of promoting other goods or preventing harm.
Requirement 6 lets consequences matter, within reason. Requirement 7 sets the limit: no good may be directly attacked as a means.
Because the goods are incommensurable, Finnis says we cannot add up "more good" to justify destroying one.
Q1 Could killing one innocent person to save five be justified on this principle?
Show answer
No: it directly attacks the good of life.
Q2 Which requirement allows consequences to count at all?
Show answer
6: efficiency, within reason.
Quick check
?A surgeon refuses to operate on a patient because he dislikes the patient's nationality. Which of Finnis' requirements does he most directly break?
Mission 2
The common good and authority
Common good: the conditions that let every member of a community pursue the basic goods for themselves (peace, justice, education, health care).
People will not all agree on how to coordinate their lives. So a community needs authority: someone able to make rules everyone follows.
Law is justified when it serves the common good. Authority can require things that individuals would not choose alone (taxes, traffic rules).
An unjust law (one that does not serve the common good) loses its moral authority, though there may still be reasons to obey it to avoid greater harm.
So for Finnis, morality and law are linked through practical reason, not only through God's command.
Mission 2
Applying Finnis: immigration
Common good and authority: a political community may make rules about who can enter and settle, to protect peace, order and public services.
Requirement 3: a migrant's basic goods count as much as a citizen's; no arbitrary preference on grounds of race or religion.
Requirement 7: a state may limit entry, but may never choose to attack a basic good, e.g. leaving people to drown as a deterrent.
Requirement 6: border policy should be planned efficiently, within reason: weigh capacity, integration, need.
Finnis himself has defended a state's right to limit immigration; other new natural lawyers stress the duty to refugees. The theory frames the debate; it does not settle every quota.
Mission 2
Applying Finnis: capital punishment
Finnis: punishment is justified. It restores the fairness an offender upset by taking unfair advantage over others.
But execution intends a person's death: a choice to destroy the basic good of life (requirement 7).
So Finnis concludes, disagreeing with Aquinas, that capital punishment is wrong (Aquinas, 1998).
Imprisonment can serve punishment's purposes without attacking life.
Critics (e.g. Edward Feser) argue Finnis departs from Aquinas and from Catholic tradition before 2018.
Mission 2Diversity
Finnis and proportionalism compared
Shared: both develop Aquinas; both are Catholic in origin; both care about the common good.
Finnis: some acts are never permitted: directly attacking a basic good. Goods are incommensurable, so there is no "weighing".
Proportionalism (see Mission 3): a rule may be broken for a proportionate reason; pre-moral goods and evils are weighed, guided by agape.
Immigration: Finnis: authority sets fair rules, never attacking life. Proportionalist: entry or refusal each need proportionate reason.
Capital punishment: Finnis: always wrong (intends death). Proportionalist: wrong if prison protects society; open in extreme cases.
Finnis, like Grisez, was one of proportionalism's sharpest critics (Finnis, Moral Absolutes, 1991).
Mission 2Evaluate
Is Finnis' natural law acceptable in contemporary society?
Step 1 of 4
Claim: Finnis' natural law is acceptable in a diverse, contemporary society.
For: Does not depend on religious belief; the basic goods are recognisable across cultures.
For: Firm protection for every person: no one may be sacrificed for the majority (requirement 7).
Against: Who decides the list? Critics ask why seven, and why these. Some say "religion" is not a good for everyone.
Against: Absolute limits can seem rigid in hard cases. Finnis' own conclusions on sexuality have been strongly criticised as discriminatory, though he argues they follow from the theory.
Judgement criteria: Are the goods truly self-evident? Can incommensurable goods guide real choices? Does it serve believers and non-believers alike?
Quick check
?On capital punishment, which pairing of views is accurate?
Mission check
?A town council is promised money for a new hospital if it publishes a safety report it knows to be false. How would Finnis judge the offer?
For Finnis, the goods are not points to be totalled. Some choices are ruled out whatever the result, and that is what makes his natural law different from proportionalism.
Mission 3
Mission 3: Can it be right to break a moral rule without doing anything morally evil?
Make a guess: Can it be right to break a moral rule without doing anything morally evil?
Mission 3
The problem with exceptionless rules
Aquinas' natural law gives secondary precepts: e.g. do not kill the innocent, do not lie.
Traditional Catholic moral theology holds that some acts are intrinsically evil: wrong in themselves, whatever the intention or circumstances.
Hard cases press on this: a lie that would save a life; a treatment that saves a mother but ends a pregnancy.
The doctrine of double effect helps in some cases, but only where the harm is not intended.
Proportionalism asks: can a rule be broken, in a rare case, without the act being morally wrong?
Mission 3
Where proportionalism came from
Step 1 of 3
A debate among Catholic moral theologians, mostly from the 1960s to the 1980s.
Peter Knauer SJ re-read double effect (1965): what matters is whether there is a proportionate reason for allowing a harm.
Louis Janssens (1908–2001), "Ontic Evil and Moral Evil" (1972); Josef Fuchs SJ (1912–2005); Richard McCormick SJ (1922–2000) developed the idea, especially in the United States.
The debate sharpened after Humanae Vitae (1968), Pope Paul VI's teaching that artificial contraception is always wrong.
Bernard Hoose, Proportionalism: The American Debate and its European Roots (1987), surveys the whole debate and draws out what the proportionalists share.
Mission 3Read the source
The proportionalist maxim
Hoose's overview gathers the proportionalists' central principle (paraphrase):
> A moral rule should not be broken, unless there is a proportionate reason that would justify breaking it.
Rules stay in force. They are the normal guide, not mere advice.
The exception needs a reason in proportion to the harm done: serious harm needs a serious reason.
Eduqas wording of the maxim begins: "it is never right to go against a principle unless …"
Q1 Does the maxim say rules are unimportant?
Show answer
No: breaking one always needs a justifying reason.
Q2 What must the reason be "in proportion" to?
Show answer
The evil involved in breaking the rule.
Mission 3
Pre-moral (ontic) evil and moral evil
Step 1 of 3
Pre-moral evil (also ontic or non-moral evil): a harm or loss in itself, before any moral judgement: pain, injury, death, loss of property, a false statement.
Moral evil: an act that is morally wrong: causing pre-moral evil without a proportionate reason.
Example: a surgeon amputates a gangrenous leg. Losing a leg is a pre-moral evil; saving the patient's life is a proportionate reason; the act is not morally evil.
So for proportionalists, an act cannot be judged wrong from its physical description alone ("cutting off a leg").
Intention, circumstances and consequences are all weighed.
Quick check
?To shelter a refugee family from a militia, Lena tells the militia that no one is in her house. How would a proportionalist describe the false statement itself?
Mission 3
Good acts and right acts
Step 1 of 3
Proportionalists separate two questions.
Goodness belongs to the person: acting from love, with good motives. Good or bad.
Rightness belongs to the act: does it bring about the best possible balance of pre-moral good over pre-moral evil? Right or wrong.
So a good person can do a wrong act (meaning well, misjudging the situation), and a right act can be done from bad motives.
Eduqas puts the distinction like this: a good act follows the moral rule; a right act may not be a good act, but brings about the lesser of two evils.
Example: Lena's lie breaks the rule (not a good act, on Eduqas' wording), yet it is the right act.
Mission 3
Proportion based on agape; a hybrid
How is proportion measured? Hoose's overview stresses agape: Christian self-giving love for every person affected.
The proportionate reason must be the one love would recognise, not convenience or self-interest.
Deontological side: rules and duties remain the starting point and normally bind.
Teleological side: in a conflict, the outcome (the balance of goods and evils) decides.
So proportionalism is often called a hybrid of natural law.
Quick check
?Which statement best expresses how a proportionalist treats a rule such as "do not lie"?
Mission 3Diversity
Critics and defenders within Catholic ethics
Pope John Paul II, Veritatis Splendor (1993), §§ 75–83 (paraphrase): rejects proportionalism by name; some acts are intrinsically evil "on account of their very object" (§ 80), and no intention or circumstance makes them right.
Germain Grisez and John Finnis (see Mission 2): basic goods are incommensurable: they cannot be measured on one scale, so "weighing" them is an illusion.
Defenders (McCormick; Hoose): proportionalists do not say "the end justifies any means"; they say an act's object cannot be fixed without its circumstances. Many claim this continues Aquinas' own reasoning.
Official Catholic teaching since 1993 follows Veritatis Splendor; proportionalist reasoning survives mainly among revisionist theologians.
Protestant ethicists, with no fixed list of intrinsically evil acts, often reason in a similar way.
Mission 3
Applying it: immigration
Principle: a state may control its borders for the common good; people should obey just laws.
Principle: the life and dignity of every person; love of the stranger (e.g. Leviticus 19:34; Matthew 25:35).
A person who crosses a border unlawfully causes a pre-moral evil (breaking a just law). Fleeing persecution or starvation may be a proportionate reason.
A state that refuses entry also causes pre-moral evil (harm to the migrant). It needs a proportionate reason too: e.g. a real threat to security, or services unable to cope.
Agape weighs both citizens and migrants. Proportionalists can reach different conclusions on quotas; the method is shared, not the answer.
Compare Catholic teaching: richer nations should welcome foreigners as far as they are able; authorities may set conditions (Catechism 2241, paraphrase).
Mission 3
Applying it: capital punishment
Principle: do not kill. Aquinas allowed public authority to execute serious criminals for the common good (Summa Theologiae II-II, q. 64, a. 2).
Proportionalist question: is there a proportionate reason for the pre-moral evil of a death?
If prison can protect society, there is no proportionate reason: execution would be a moral evil.
A proportionalist might allow it only where no other means of protection exists. That is close to John Paul II's Evangelium Vitae (1995) § 56: such cases are very rare, if not practically non-existent (paraphrase).
Since 2018 the Catechism (2267) calls the death penalty inadmissible. Agape for the offender also counts in the weighing.
Mission 3Evaluate
Does proportionalism promote immoral behaviour?
Step 1 of 4
Claim: Proportionalism opens the door to immoral behaviour.
For: Anyone can claim a "proportionate reason"; the test is subjective. Small exceptions may grow (slippery slope).
For: If goods are incommensurable (Grisez, Finnis), the weighing cannot be done. Veritatis Splendor: some acts are always wrong.
Against: Rules remain the normal guide; only a reason in proportion, judged by agape, can justify an exception.
Against: It avoids legalism's cruelty in rare hard cases, and double effect already weighs proportion.
Judgement criteria: Can goods really be compared? Who judges proportion? Does it keep or dissolve natural law? Does it fit how Christians actually reason in hard cases?
Spec issue: "the extent to which Proportionalism promotes immoral behaviour".
Mission 3Worked answer
Explaining a key distinction
Task: explain the proportionalist distinction between pre-moral and moral evil.
Point: Pre-moral (ontic) evil is a harm in itself, such as pain, death or a false statement; moral evil is causing it without a proportionate reason.
Scholar: Janssens named the distinction; Hoose's overview treats it as central to the debate.
Example: amputating a gangrenous leg causes pre-moral evil, but saving life is a proportionate reason, so the act is right.
Develop: So an act cannot be condemned from its physical description alone, against the idea of intrinsically evil acts.
AO1: use the spec's terms exactly: "pre-moral/ontic evil", "proportionate reason", "lesser of two evils".
Mission check
?A ship's captain, caught in a storm, throws the passengers' cargo overboard so the ship will not sink. A proportionalist is asked to judge the act. Which judgement fits proportionalism?
A proportionalist never says the rule does not matter. The harm stays real; the question is whether love can find a reason big enough to justify it.
Mission 4
Mission 4: Should punishment pay back the past or protect the future, and may a state ever take a life?
Make a guess: Should punishment pay back the past or protect the future, and may a state ever take a life?
Mission 4
Five purposes of punishment
Retribution: the offender gets what they deserve; punishment fits the crime. Looks back.
Deterrence: discourage this offender (individual) and others (general) from crime. Looks forward.
Protection: keep the public safe from a dangerous offender.
Rehabilitation (reform): help the offender change and return to society.
Vindication: uphold the authority of the law and publicly affirm the rights that were violated.
Retributive theories (e.g. Kant) look back to guilt; utilitarian theories (e.g. Bentham) look forward to consequences.
Quick check
?A judge gives a long sentence, saying: "The public must see that the law means what it says, and the victim's rights must be publicly affirmed." Which purpose is the judge appealing to?
Mission 4
Capital punishment: the debate
UK: last executions 1964; abolished for murder 1965 (made permanent 1969; Northern Ireland 1973); abolished for all crimes 1998.
For: retribution (Kant: justice requires the murderer's death, Metaphysics of Morals, 1797); deterrence; permanent protection; justice for victims' families.
For: John Stuart Mill (1868 speech in Parliament) supported it for the worst murders as more humane than lifelong imprisonment.
Against: deterrent effect disputed; ends any chance of reform; risk of unequal application; the sanctity and dignity of every life.
Mission 4
Finnis and proportionalism compared
Finnis (see Mission 2): punishment restores the fairness an offender upset. Execution intends a death, directly attacking the basic good of life, so it is always wrong.
Proportionalism (see Mission 3): death is a pre-moral evil; it needs a proportionate reason. Where prison protects society there is none.
Immigration: Finnis: the common good needs authority to set fair rules, but no policy may directly attack migrants' basic goods. Proportionalism: entry and refusal each need proportionate reason, weighed with agape.
Finnis rejects proportionalism's weighing: the basic goods are incommensurable (cannot be measured on one scale).
Compare Aquinas: he allowed public authority to execute a dangerous offender for the common good (Summa Theologiae II-II, q. 64, a. 2); Catholic teaching since 2018 (Catechism §2267) calls the death penalty inadmissible.
Spec issue: "the extent to which Finnis' natural law is a better ethic than proportionalism or vice versa".
Quick check
?Which statement about natural law and capital punishment is accurate?
Mission 4Evaluate
Can capital punishment ever be justified?
Step 1 of 4
Claim: Capital punishment can be morally justified for the worst crimes.
For: Retribution: some crimes deserve death (Kant); Aquinas allowed it for the common good.
For: It may deter and permanently protects; Mill thought it more humane than life imprisonment.
Against: Human dignity (Catechism §2267, 2018); Finnis: intending death is always wrong; no room for reform or mercy.
Judgement criteria: Is punishment mainly backward- or forward-looking? Can the state be trusted with irreversible power? Does dignity belong to offenders too?
Mission check
?A man serving life for murder is terminally ill after 25 years in prison and asks for compassionate release. The victim's family say: "He must serve the full sentence because of what he did, whatever good his release might do." Which purpose of punishment are they appealing to?
The same sentence can be argued for by looking back (desert) or forward (consequences); mercy asks whether justice can bend without breaking.
Recap
The big ideas
Mission 1
Natural law forbids directly ending innocent life but, through double effect and proportionate means, allows strong pain relief and refusal of burdensome treatment.
Internal and external acts must both be good; ending life to end suffering is an apparent, not a real, good.
Nine requirements of practical reasonableness guide choices; requirement 7 forbids directly attacking any basic good. Authority and law are justified by the common good.
Applied: states may regulate immigration but never attack life; capital punishment is wrong because it intends death. Proportionalism instead weighs goods.
Mission 3
Proportionalist maxim: do not break a moral rule unless there is a proportionate reason that justifies it.
Pre-moral (ontic) evil is harm in itself; moral evil is causing it without proportionate reason. Goodness belongs to the person, rightness to the act; proportion is judged by agape.
Critics (Veritatis Splendor; Grisez and Finnis) say some acts are intrinsically evil and goods cannot be weighed.
Mission 4
Five purposes: retribution, deterrence, protection, rehabilitation, vindication; responsibility (and diminished responsibility) shapes what is deserved.
Capital punishment: Aquinas allowed it for the common good; Catholic teaching now calls it inadmissible; SE and VE ask about love, justice and mercy; Bentham and Mill disagreed.
Finnis: never intend death; proportionalism: only with proportionate reason, which prison now removes.
🏆
Mini-lesson complete!
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You've worked through Deontological ethics (part 2) for Eduqas A-level Religious Studies. 🎉
Mission 1Is switching off a machine morally different from giving a lethal injection?
Mission 2Are some human goods so basic that you may never act against one, even to get a better result?
Mission 3Can it be right to break a moral rule without doing anything morally evil?
Mission 4Should punishment pay back the past or protect the future, and may a state ever take a life?
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