AQA A-level Religious Studies (7062) · Section A: Religious language; Section A: Miracles (part 2 of 2)
Mini-Lesson
Religious language; Miracles (part 2)
4 missions. Guess, learn, then check. Your place is saved.
Mission 1If nothing could ever change your mind, are you really claiming anything?
Mission 2Does "God" mean the same in a prayer as it would in a science report?
Mission 3If a train stops a few feet from a child for an ordinary reason, can it still be a miracle?
Mission 4Could any amount of eyewitness evidence make it reasonable to believe a miracle happened?
Mission 1
Mission 1: If nothing could ever change your mind, are you really claiming anything?
Make a guess: If nothing could ever change your mind, are you really claiming anything?
Mission 1
From verifying to falsifying
Karl Popper (1902–1994), The Logic of Scientific Discovery (1934; English 1959): a scientific theory must be falsifiable: some possible observation could show it wrong. He used this to mark off science from non-science, not to define meaning.
Antony Flew (1923–2010) applied the idea to religious assertions: to assert something is to deny something else.
"Theology and Falsification", a symposium in the journal University (1950–51), with R. M. Hare and Basil Mitchell; reprinted in New Essays in Philosophical Theology (1955).
Mission 1Read the source
Flew's gardener
Step 1 of 4
Flew, adapting a parable by John Wisdom ("Gods", 1944) (paraphrase):
Two explorers find a clearing with flowers and weeds. One says a gardener tends it; the other says no.
They wait. No gardener. They put up a barbed-wire electric fence and patrol with bloodhounds. No scream, no movement of the wire, no bark.
The believer says: the gardener is invisible, intangible, gives off no scent, makes no sound.
The sceptic asks how such a gardener differs from an imaginary one, or from no gardener at all.
Q1 What does each new "invisible, intangible" step do to the believer's claim?
Show answer
It removes another way the claim could be tested, until nothing could count against it.
Q2 What is the gardener a picture of?
Show answer
God, believed to care for the world, though no test detects God.
Mission 1
Flew's challenge
Step 1 of 3
A real assertion rules something out. If nothing could count against it, it asserts nothing.
Believers qualify their claims to protect them: God's love is "not merely human love", God's plan is "inscrutable".
Flew's example (paraphrase): a child dies of cancer; the believer's heavenly Father shows no visible concern; still the believer says God loves us.
Each qualification kills the claim a little: "the death by a thousand qualifications" (Flew).
His question to believers (paraphrase): what would have to happen to count, for you, as a disproof of God's love, or of God's existence?
Quick check
?Flew asks believers what would count as a disproof of God's love. Why?
Mission 1
Hare: bliks
R. M. Hare (1919–2002) agreed with Flew that religious claims are not falsifiable assertions, but said they still matter.
His parable (paraphrase): a student is convinced that all the university's dons want to murder him. Friends introduce him to the kindest dons; he says it only shows how cunning they are. Nothing can shake him.
He has a blik: an unfalsifiable way of seeing the world that frames how all evidence is read.
Everyone has bliks: Hare's own example is trusting that his car's steering will not suddenly fail.
Bliks can be sane or insane; the difference between them matters a great deal, though neither is an assertion.
Religious language, on this view, expresses a blik: non-cognitive, yet meaningful.
Mission 1
Mitchell: the partisan and the stranger
Step 1 of 3
Basil Mitchell (1917–2011) said religious claims are assertions, and evidence does count against them.
His parable (paraphrase): in an occupied country, a resistance fighter (a partisan) meets a Stranger who says he leads the resistance, and asks for trust whatever happens.
Sometimes the Stranger is seen helping partisans; sometimes he is seen in enemy uniform, handing patriots over.
The partisan feels the strain, but keeps trusting because of that first meeting.
So suffering really does count against belief in God's love, but not decisively: faith rests on trust in a person.
Mitchell: believers' claims can be provisional hypotheses (dropped at the first counter-evidence), significant articles of faith (challenged, but not easily abandoned), or vacuous formulae (nothing counts). Faith is the middle one.
Quick check
?How does Mitchell's partisan differ from Hare's student?
Mission 1
Flew replies
To Hare: if religious language expresses a blik and not an assertion, it is not what believers mean. Most Christians claim God really exists and really loves.
To Mitchell: the Stranger is a man: limited, perhaps unable to help, perhaps forced to hide. God is omnipotent and omniscient, so these excuses do not apply.
So, Flew argues, Mitchell is pushed back towards qualifications.
Mitchell could reply: the parable shows the logic of trust, not God's reasons; theodicy tries to supply those.
Mission 1Evaluate
Did anyone win the symposium?
Step 1 of 3
Flew: strong: asks believers to say what their claims rule out. Weak: Popper's test is for science, not for meaning; some unfalsifiable claims are plainly understood.
Hare: strong: explains why believers are not moved by counter-evidence; everyone has bliks. Weak: makes religion non-cognitive; it is hard to tell sane from insane bliks without evidence.
Mitchell: strong: keeps belief as assertion and takes suffering seriously. Weak: Flew's reply: God, unlike the Stranger, has no limits to excuse him.
Judgement criteria: Which account fits what believers mean? Which takes suffering seriously? Is falsifiability the right test of meaning?
Mission 1Worked answer
Using the parables
Task: explain how Mitchell responds to Flew.
State Flew's challenge briefly: nothing counts against belief, so it asserts nothing.
Give Mitchell's parable in two sentences: the Stranger's mixed behaviour; the partisan's trust.
Draw the point: evidence counts against belief, but not decisively; faith is a significant article of faith, not a vacuous formula.
Add Flew's reply to show depth: God has no human limitations.
Mission check
?Lena's brother left home years ago. Some of his actions trouble her, and she admits they count against her belief that he still cares for her. She keeps trusting him because of what she knows of him. Whose view does her attitude best fit?
Flew asked what belief rules out; Hare said belief is a way of seeing; Mitchell said belief is trust that feels the strain. Next: what if religious language is a different game altogether?
Mission 2
Mission 2: Does "God" mean the same in a prayer as it would in a science report?
Make a guess: Does "God" mean the same in a prayer as it would in a science report?
Mission 2
Early Wittgenstein: the picture theory
Ludwig Wittgenstein (1889–1951), Austrian-British philosopher, Cambridge.
Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus (1921): a meaningful sentence is a picture of a possible fact: its parts match things in the world.
What cannot be pictured (ethics, God, the meaning of life) cannot be said; it can only show itself. The book ends by telling us to be silent about it (paraphrase).
The Vienna Circle read it as support for verification. Wittgenstein later rejected the picture theory.
Mission 2
Meaning is use
Philosophical Investigations (published 1953, after his death): words are like tools in a toolbox: they do many different jobs (§11).
His builders (§2, paraphrase): one calls "Slab!" and the other brings a slab. The word is not a picture; it is part of an activity.
"The meaning of a word is its use in the language" (§43).
To find what a word means, ask how it is used, not what object it names.
Mission 2
Language games and forms of life
Step 1 of 3
A language game: an activity with its own rules for how words are used. Wittgenstein's list (§23, paraphrase) includes giving orders, describing, telling a joke, thanking, greeting and praying.
"Love" means one thing in a tennis score, another in a wedding vow.
A form of life: the shared practices and way of living within which a language game makes sense.
Religious language belongs to a religious form of life: worship, prayer, confession, care for others.
So believers' words are meaningful to participants who know the rules, even if not cognitive in the scientific sense.
Quick check
?A doctor says a patient has "faith" in the treatment; a priest says a person has "faith" in God. What would Wittgenstein say about the word "faith" here?
Mission 2Read the source
Believing in a Last Judgement
From Wittgenstein's 1938 lectures on religious belief, published from students' notes as Lectures and Conversations (1966) (paraphrase):
Suppose someone believes in a Last Judgement, and I do not. Am I contradicting him? Wittgenstein says no.
The believer has a picture that guides his whole life: it is in his thoughts in every decision.
It is not like a weather forecast that evidence could make more or less likely. It is not reasonable in that sense, but not unreasonable either.
The unbeliever is not denying the same thing; he does not use that picture at all.
Q1 Why does Wittgenstein say he is not contradicting the believer?
Show answer
They are not making rival claims in one game; the believer's words play a different role in his life.
Q2 How does this differ from Hick's view of belief in life after death?
Show answer
Hick treats it as a factual claim verifiable in future; Wittgenstein treats it as a picture that regulates life.
Quick check
?Why do supporters of the language-game view say Ayer's verification principle does not defeat religious language?
Mission 2Diversity
Aquinas and Wittgenstein compared
Aquinas:cognitive; words about God are true by analogy, because creatures reflect God their cause.
Wittgenstein: often read as non-cognitive: meaning lies in use within a form of life, not in describing God.
Shared ground: both reject naive literal (univocal) talk; both treat religious language as distinctive.
Different tests: Aquinas asks "is it true of God?"; Wittgenstein asks "what role does it play?"
Aquinas' value today: still central in Catholic theology; some Thomists, e.g. Herbert McCabe (1926–2001), combined Aquinas with Wittgenstein's attention to grammar.
Mission 2Evaluate
Strengths and weaknesses of language games
Step 1 of 4
Strengths: answers Ayer and Flew: religious language is meaningful within its game; respects how believers actually use words; explains why believers and atheists often talk past each other.
Weakness: most believers mean realist claims. "If Christ has not been raised, then our preaching is in vain and your faith also is in vain." (1 Corinthians 15:14, WEBBE)
Weakness: it rejects religious claims that could be empirically checked (e.g. historical claims about Jesus).
Weakness: it may allow no conversation between groups: outsiders cannot criticise, and believers cannot persuade.
Weakness: any coherent practice could be shielded from criticism, however odd (a worry raised by Kai Nielsen).
Weakness: it may not give adequate meaning to the word "God", as a real being who acts.
Judgement criteria: Does it fit what believers mean? Does it allow dialogue and criticism? Does it answer the verification challenge?
Mission 2Worked answer
Judging a non-cognitive view
Task: evaluate whether language games show that religious language is meaningful.
Point: Meaning is use (Wittgenstein, Philosophical Investigations, §43); prayer and worship have clear rules for those who take part.
Counter-point: Paul treats the resurrection as a fact (1 Corinthians 15:14); a game-only meaning loses that claim.
Develop: A Wittgensteinian such as D. Z. Phillips would reply that "fact" means something different in faith; critics answer that believers mean the ordinary sense.
Judgement: decide whether "meaningful to participants" is enough, or whether meaning must include the claim to be true.
AO2 tip: weigh a strength against a weakness and say which carries more weight, and why.
Quick check
?Which criticism of the language-game view uses the believer's own words against it?
Mission check
?At a Passover meal, the leader lifts the matzah and says, "This is the bread of affliction that our ancestors ate in Egypt." A guest whispers, "But it was baked last week." How would a Wittgensteinian answer the guest?
Words take their meaning from the life they are part of; the question is whether that is all religious words mean. Across: negation, analogy, symbol, verification, falsification and language games each answer the same problem differently.
Mission 3
Mission 3: If a train stops a few feet from a child for an ordinary reason, can it still be a miracle?
Make a guess: If a train stops a few feet from a child for an ordinary reason, can it still be a miracle?
Mission 3
Two questions behind every definition
Step 1 of 3
Every definition of miracle answers two separate questions.
What kind of event? A violation of natural law, or a natural event that happens at a striking moment?
What makes it a miracle? A real act of God in the world (realist), or the meaning the event has within a community of faith (anti-realist)?
Keep the two questions apart: a natural event can still be understood realistically as God's act.
Your spec names both pairs: realist / anti-realist; violation / natural event.
Mission 3
Aquinas: beyond the usual order
Thomas Aquinas (c. 1225–1274), Summa Contra Gentiles III, chapters 100–101 (c. 1259–65).
A miracle is done by God outside the order usually followed in nature (paraphrase). God, who made that order, is not bound by it.
Three degrees, ranked by how far the event exceeds nature:
1st: God does what nature could never do (his examples: the sun going backwards; the sea opening a path).
2nd: God does what nature can do, but not in this order (someone living after death; seeing after blindness).
3rd: God does what nature does, but without natural causes (a fever cured instantly by God, though medicine could cure it).
A realist account: miracles are real divine acts.
Mission 3Read the source
Hume's definition
David Hume (1711–1776), An Enquiry concerning Human Understanding (1748), Section X, "Of Miracles", Part I:
> "A miracle is a violation of the laws of nature; …"
And in Hume's footnote to the same passage:
> "A miracle may be accurately defined, a transgression of a law of nature by a particular volition of the Deity, or by the interposition of some invisible agent."
Q1 What two things must be true for an event to count as a miracle on Hume's footnote definition?
Show answer
A law of nature is broken; the breaking is caused by God's will or by an invisible agent.
Q2 Would Aquinas' third degree count as a miracle on Hume's definition?
Show answer
Arguably not: the cure is something nature does anyway, so no law is clearly broken.
Quick check
?A man who has been blind for years is said to see again instantly when a holy person prays for him. Where would Aquinas place this event?
Mission 3
Holland: the contingency miracle
Step 1 of 4
R. F. Holland (1923–2013), "The Miraculous", American Philosophical Quarterly (1965).
His example (paraphrase): a child's toy car is stuck on a level crossing. A train comes round a bend. The driver faints, for medical reasons; the brakes apply automatically; the train stops a few feet from the child. The mother thanks God.
Every step has a natural explanation. No law is broken.
Yet the mother calls it a miracle, and Holland says she may: a contingency miracle is a remarkable, beneficial coincidence that is taken religiously as a sign.
So a miracle can be a natural event: what matters is its timing and what it means.
Mission 3
Swinburne: religious significance
Richard Swinburne (b. 1934), The Concept of Miracle (1970).
A miracle is an event of an extraordinary kind, "brought about by a god, and of religious significance".
Religious significance: an event that God causes for no purpose would not be a miracle. It must show something about God or answer prayer.
He keeps a violation model, but re-defines it: a non-repeatable counter-instance to a law of nature (an event that breaks a law but gives no reason to rewrite it). Defended against Hume in Mission 4.
A realist account: miracles are real acts of God, and they mean something.
Mission 3
Realist and anti-realist
Step 1 of 3
Realist: "A miracle happened" is true if God really caused the event, whether or not anyone believes it. Aquinas, Hume's definition and Swinburne are realist accounts.
Anti-realist: "miracle" expresses how a community of faith sees an event; its truth lies in that way of seeing and living, not in a hidden extra cause.
Holland's account is often read as a step towards anti-realism: the event is natural; its being a miracle depends on its being taken religiously. But a believer who takes it so may still hold that God really acted.
Critics of anti-realism: most believers mean that God really acted; a miracle that is only a way of seeing may not be what they claim.
Anti-realism does not call miracle stories lies: it says miracle-talk is not a claim about an extra cause in the world.
Quick check
?Which statement expresses an anti-realist view of miracles?
Mission 3Evaluate
Do the definitions contradict each other?
Step 1 of 4
Claim: The definitions of miracle contradict each other, so the word has no single meaning.
For: Hume requires a broken law; Holland says no law need be broken. Both cannot be the necessary condition.
For: Realist and anti-realist views disagree about whether a miracle-claim says anything about the world.
Against: They answer different questions: Hume and Aquinas define the event; Holland and Swinburne stress its meaning.
Against: Swinburne combines both: an extraordinary event and religious significance.
Judgement criteria: Does a definition fit how believers use the word? Does it fit the biblical idea of a sign? Can it be tested? Does it make God's action credible?
Quick check
?Which feature is essential to Holland's idea of a contingency miracle?
Mission check
?A child is found alive after six days under a collapsed building, kept alive by an air pocket and a burst water pipe. Ana, a Christian, says: "God really acted here, guiding events, though no law of nature was broken." Ben, also a Christian, says: "Calling it a miracle expresses how our community receives it as gift; it is not a claim about an extra cause." Which classification is correct?
An ordinary event can be called a miracle in two very different ways: as a real act of God through nature, or as a way of seeing. A later mission: is it ever reasonable to believe a miracle report?
Mission 4
Mission 4: Could any amount of eyewitness evidence make it reasonable to believe a miracle happened?
Make a guess: Could any amount of eyewitness evidence make it reasonable to believe a miracle happened?
Mission 4
Hume: weigh the evidence
Step 1 of 3
David Hume (1711–1776), Scottish empiricist: knowledge comes from experience.
An Enquiry concerning Human Understanding (1748), Section X, Part I.
A wise person proportions belief to the evidence.
A law of nature rests on uniform experience: every observed case, without exception.
A miracle report sets testimony against that uniform experience.
So the evidence against any miracle is as strong as evidence can be.
Hume does not claim miracles are logically impossible. He claims it is never reasonable to believe a report of one.
Mission 4Read the source
Hume's maxim
Hume, Enquiry (1748), Section X, Part I:
> "A wise man, therefore, proportions his belief to the evidence."
> "no testimony is sufficient to establish a miracle, unless the testimony be of such a kind, that its falsehood would be more miraculous, than the fact, which it endeavours to establish"
Q1 A friend says she saw a dead man walk. What two possibilities does Hume tell you to compare?
Show answer
That she is mistaken or lying; that the dead man walked.
Q2 Which does Hume think will always be the less miraculous?
Show answer
That the witness is mistaken or lying: people often are; the dead never rise in uniform experience.
Mission 4
Hume: four practical arguments
Step 1 of 3
Part II adds four points about real miracle reports:
Witnesses: no miracle in history is attested by enough people of good sense, education and reputation to rule out error or deceit.
Susceptibility: people love surprise and wonder, and enjoy passing on marvellous stories; religious zeal can make even honest people exaggerate.
Origins: miracle stories abound chiefly among "ignorant and barbarous nations", and fade as learning grows (Hume's phrase).
Contrary claims: "in matters of religion, whatever is different is contrary". Miracles of rival religions are used to prove rival systems, so their testimonies cancel out.
Quick check
?A student writes: "Hume proves that miracles are impossible." Which correction is most accurate?
Mission 4
Swinburne replies to Hume
Richard Swinburne (b. 1934), The Concept of Miracle (1970); The Existence of God (1979).
Laws of nature: a law describes what normally happens. A non-repeatable counter-instance breaks a law without giving any reason to revise it. So a violation is coherent.
More kinds of evidence than testimony: our own memories, others' testimony, physical traces (e.g. medical records), and our understanding of what is physically possible.
Principle of testimony: believe what others report unless there is good reason not to.
Witnesses: Hume's standards (a "sufficient number" of witnesses of "education"; "barbarous nations") are vague or prejudiced.
Contrary claims: reports cancel out only if each miracle supports a doctrine that contradicts the other's. Many miracle reports support no rival doctrine at all.
Quick check
?A sceptic says: "Christians, Muslims and Hindus all report miracles, so their reports cancel each other out." Which reply is Swinburne's?
Mission 4
Wiles: a God who does not intervene
Maurice Wiles (1923–2005), Anglican priest and Oxford theologian; God's Action in the World (1986).
God acts in the world as a whole: his single act is creating and sustaining the universe.
An interventionist God who heals one person but does not prevent the horrors of Auschwitz or Hiroshima would be arbitrary and partial, and so not worthy of worship (paraphrase).
So God does not intervene in particular events. Miracle stories keep value as expressions of faith and meaning.
Mission 4
Comparing Hume and Wiles
Starting point: Hume: empiricist philosopher, sceptical about religion. Wiles: Christian theologian.
Kind of argument: Hume: epistemological (what it is reasonable to believe). Wiles: theological and moral (what God would do).
Conclusion: Hume: never reasonable to believe a miracle report. Wiles: God does not act by intervention.
Shared ground: both reject belief in violation miracles.
Difference: Hume's view leaves faith without miracle evidence; Wiles keeps faith in God and reinterprets miracle.
Quick check
?Which pairing correctly states why each thinker rejects belief in violation miracles?
Mission 4
What this means for religion
If Hume is right: faith cannot be built on miracle reports as evidence. Hume's ironic close: the Christian religion "even at this day cannot be believed by any reasonable person without one" (1748).
If Wiles is right: prayer for intervention and some biblical miracles must be rethought; God is creator and sustainer, not an occasional intervener.
The resurrection: for most Christians it is the central miracle: "If Christ has not been raised, then our preaching is in vain and your faith also is in vain" (1 Corinthians 15:14, WEBBE). Rejecting all miracles is a large step for them.
Mission check
?Two hundred villagers, including two doctors, say they saw a woman's paralysed arm move freely at once during a festival. A follower of Hume applies the maxim from Part I. What must they ask?
Hume never says a miracle cannot happen. He says testimony can never outweigh uniform experience. Swinburne answers him by defending both the idea of a violation and the evidence for one.
Wiles reaches a similar conclusion from God's goodness.
Recap
The big ideas
Mission 1
Flew (1950): a claim nothing could count against asserts nothing ("the death by a thousand qualifications").
Hare: religious belief is a blik, unfalsifiable but significant; Mitchell: belief is an assertion that evidence counts against, but not decisively; Flew replied to both.
Mission 2
Later Wittgenstein (Philosophical Investigations, 1953): meaning is use; language games within forms of life; religious language is meaningful to participants, though often read as not cognitive.
Strengths: answers verification and falsification; weaknesses: believers mean realist claims, no dialogue between games, thin meaning for "God".
Mission 3
Definitions answer two questions: what kind of event (violation or natural event) and what makes it a miracle (a real act of God, or a community's way of seeing).
Aquinas (three degrees beyond the usual order), Hume (transgression of a law of nature) and Swinburne (extraordinary, caused by God, religiously significant) are realist; Holland's contingency miracle is a natural coincidence taken religiously.
Mission 4
Hume: a wise person proportions belief to evidence; uniform experience always outweighs testimony to a miracle; Part II adds witnesses, susceptibility, origins and contrary claims.
Swinburne: violations are coherent (non-repeatable counter-instances); more evidence than testimony; contrary claims need not cancel.
Wiles: an intervening God would be arbitrary (Auschwitz, Hiroshima), so God acts only through the whole of creation. Hume's objection is about evidence; Wiles' is about God.
🏆
Mini-lesson complete!
⭐⭐⭐
You've worked through Religious language; Miracles (part 2) for AQA A-level Religious Studies. 🎉
Mission 1If nothing could ever change your mind, are you really claiming anything?
Mission 2Does "God" mean the same in a prayer as it would in a science report?
Mission 3If a train stops a few feet from a child for an ordinary reason, can it still be a miracle?
Mission 4Could any amount of eyewitness evidence make it reasonable to believe a miracle happened?
Your stars: 0 / 0
📣 Smashed it? Share your score
Challenge a friend to beat your stars, or show a parent how you got on.