This mini-lesson covers religious language โ how, and whether, human words can talk about God.
Track the big divide: does religious language state facts, or express a way of living?
Work through each screen, answer the questions as you go and collect โญ stars. This is A-level: aim to hold several scholarly views in tension, not just recall one. Press Start when you are ready.
If God is infinite and transcendent, how can finite, human language describe him? Cognitivists hold religious statements make factual claims that are true or false; non-cognitivists hold they do something else (express attitudes, guide life).
Three classic positive strategies: the via negativa, analogy, and symbol.
The via negativa (apophatic way) says we can only state what God is not โ not that he is limited, not that he is a body โ because positive terms drag in human limitation.
Aquinas rejects speaking of God univocally (words mean exactly the same as for us) and equivocally (totally different meanings). Instead, language works by analogy:
Analogy keeps talk of God meaningful without making him just a big human, because creatures resemble their Creator as effects resemble their cause.
Paul Tillich argues religious language is symbolic, not literal. A sign merely points; a symbol participates in the reality it points to and opens up levels of reality (and of the soul) that are otherwise closed.
Challenge (J. H. Randall / others): how do we know what a symbol reveals, or verify it? Symbols can also "die" and lose their power.
The logical positivists (Vienna Circle) and A. J. Ayer (Language, Truth and Logic) held the verification principle: a statement is meaningful only if it is (a) a tautology or (b) empirically verifiable.
Objections: the principle fails its own test (it is neither analytic nor verifiable); it also rules out unverifiable scientific and historical statements.
Antony Flew reframed the challenge using John Wisdom's parable of the invisible gardener: a believer keeps qualifying the claim ("an invisible, intangible gardener") until it is compatible with any evidence and so "dies the death of a thousand qualifications". If nothing could count against "God loves us", the claim asserts nothing.
Two theistic replies in the same symposium:
The later Wittgenstein held that "the meaning of a word is its use" within a language game embedded in a form of life. Different games (science, humour, religion) have their own rules.
On this view, religious language is meaningful within its own game; it is a category mistake for outsiders (like Ayer) to demand it meet the rules of empirical science. Critics (e.g. that this makes religion a self-sealing "fideism") worry it cuts religion off from truth-claims about reality.
Tap a claim, then drop it under the approach it belongs to.
Tap a description, then the thinker it belongs to.
Three strategies: Via negativa (say what God is not), analogy (Aquinas), symbol (Tillich)
Verification: Ayer/Vienna Circle: meaningful = tautology or verifiable; but the principle fails its own test
Falsification: Flew's gardener; Hare's bliks; Mitchell's partisan โ is religious language a genuine assertion?
Wittgenstein: Language games and forms of life: religion meaningful within its own use, but risks fideism
You can now explain each theory of religious language and weigh the cognitive/non-cognitive divide. Press Finish to see your score.
You have worked through religious language for AQA A-level RS. ๐
Your stars: 0 / 0
Next: test yourself in the Evaluate stage Confidence Quiz, then lock it in with Verify.