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IB Diploma Economics SL · 2.7 Role of government in microeconomics (part 2 of 2)
Mini-Lesson

Role of government in microeconomics (part 2)

4 missions. Guess, learn, then check. Your place is saved.

  1. Mission 1If everyone gains from a lighthouse, why might no one choose to pay for it?
  2. Mission 2If a vaccine also protects the people around you, why might too few people get one?
  3. Mission 3Should a government tax pollution, ban it, or let firms buy and sell the right to pollute?
  4. Mission 4When a government steps in to fix a market, how can it end up making things worse?
Mission 1

Mission 1: If everyone gains from a lighthouse, why might no one choose to pay for it?

Make a guess: If everyone gains from a lighthouse, why might no one choose to pay for it?

Mission 1

Two tests for any good

Two tests for any goodExcludableNon-excludableRivalNon-rivalPrivate goodsandwich, busseatCommonresourcefish in the openseafilm on astreamingservicePublic gooddefence, floodbarrier, streetlighting
  • Rival: one person's use leaves less for others. A sandwich you eat cannot be eaten by me.
  • Excludable: the seller can stop people who have not paid from using it.
ExcludableNon-excludable
RivalPrivate good: a sandwich, a bus seatCommon resource: fish in the open sea
Non-rivalA film on a streaming servicePublic good: national defence, a flood barrier, street lighting
  • Ask the two questions separately. A good can pass one test and fail the other.
Mission 1

Private goods and public goods

  • Private good: rival and excludable. The price mechanism works: pay, or go without.
  • Public good: non-rival and non-excludable.
  • Non-rival: one more user adds nothing to cost, so the marginal cost of an extra user is zero.
  • Say: "non-excludable: non-payers cannot be stopped from benefiting" — not: "it is free". Someone pays, usually through taxes.
Quick check
?Which of these is closest to a pure public good?
Mission 1

The free rider problem

The free rider problemcost ofbarriercollection tinnot suppliedflood barrierTen houses share one barrier.paysfree rider: benefits, does not payThe tin is short of the cost.A missing market
  • Free rider: someone who benefits from a good without paying for it.
  • Non-excludable → a firm cannot charge, because people can benefit anyway.
  • Each person thinks: "If others pay, I benefit free. If they don't, my payment alone won't be enough."
  • So too few pay. A firm cannot cover its costs and does not supply the good.
  • Result: the good is under-provided or not provided at all: a missing market.
Mission 1Graph lab

Will anyone pay for the flood barrier?

Two neighbours, Ana and Ben, live by a river. A barrier would protect both houses: neither can be excluded. Illustrative data. Each values the protection at 100. The barrier costs 150. Together they value it at 200, more than it costs. If both pay, they split the cost (75 each). If one pays, that person pays all 150.

Will anyone pay for the flood barrier?BenAnaPayDon't payPayDon'tpay25,25−50,100100,−500,0
  • Takeaway: below a cost of 100 one neighbour may pay alone; between 100 and 200 a barrier worth building is not built.
Quick check
?A coastal town has 1,000 households. Each values a new sea wall at 50. The sea wall costs 20,000 to build. (Illustrative data.) Which statement is correct?
Mission 1

Real world: who pays for lighthouses?

  • A lighthouse beam is non-rival (one more ship sees it at no extra cost) and non-excludable at sea.
  • Textbook result: no firm could make ships pay, so the state must provide.
  • In the British Isles, lighthouses are paid for by light dues: a charge on commercial ships when they call at a port.
  • The money goes into the General Lighthouse Fund, overseen by the UK Department for Transport.
  • A ship cannot be excluded from the light. It can be excluded from the port. The charge is tied to something excludable.
  • The dues are compulsory and set by government: closer to a tax than a market price.
Mission 1

How governments respond

How governments provide public goodsTaxpayerspay taxesGovernmentStateproducesorPrivate firmproducescontracting outGood used by everyone: no charge atthe point of use
  • Direct provision: government supplies the good and pays through taxation. Taxes are compulsory, so free riding is overcome.
  • Examples: national defence, flood defences, street lighting.
  • Government may produce the good itself (state employees, state-owned assets).
  • Or government pays a private firm to produce the good. The state still finances it; users still pay nothing at the point of use.
  • This is contracting out to the private sector.
  • The hard part: with no market price, how much does society value the good? Government must estimate it (cost-benefit analysis).
Quick check
?A city council pays a private company to install and maintain all its street lights. Residents pay nothing directly. What has happened?
Mission 1Evaluate

Must the state provide public goods?

It depends on:

  • How non-excludable the good really is. Charging may be possible where users can be shut out (light dues at ports), or once technology allows it (electronic road tolls).
  • Information. Government must guess how much people value the good; it can provide too much or too little (government failure).
  • The cost of taxation and of state production. Contracting out may cut costs, but contracts are hard to write and monitor.
  • Group size. A few neighbours may agree to share a cost; with millions of people, free riding dominates.
Mission check

?A city plans to spray against disease-carrying mosquitoes. Spraying the whole city costs 2 million; residents together value the protection at 5 million. (Illustrative data.) A private firm offers to spray if enough residents sign up and pay. Why is the market likely to under-provide the spraying?
Mission 2

Mission 2: If a vaccine also protects the people around you, why might too few people get one?

Make a guess: If a vaccine also protects the people around you, why might too few people get one?

Mission 2

Benefits that spill over

Spillover benefitMPBexternalbenefitexternalbenefitvaccinatedpersonother peopleother peopleMPBMEBMSB = MPB + MEBNot to scale
  • Marginal private benefit (MPB): the benefit to the buyer of one more unit. It is the demand curve.
  • Marginal external benefit (MEB): the benefit to third parties of one more unit.
  • Marginal social benefit (MSB) = MPB + MEB.
  • Buyers respond to private benefits only. The external benefit is ignored.
  • Example: vaccination. Each vaccinated person also lowers the chance that others catch the disease.
  • Measles vaccination averted an estimated 60 million deaths worldwide in 2000–2023.
  • Goal: 95% coverage with 2 doses. Actual global coverage in 2023: 83% for dose 1, 74% for dose 2.
  • Many things cause that shortfall, such as access, cost and conflict. The spillover is one reason why free choice alone may not close it.
  • Other cases: education, training, restoring old buildings.
Mission 2

Underconsumption on the diagram

Externality in consumptionPrice, costs and benefits0P1Q1Q*underconsumptionQuantityMPBMPC = MSCMSBwelfare loss
  • Step 1: MPC = MSC (no production externality). The market settles where MPB = MPC: Q1, P1.
  • Step 2: MSB lies above MPB by the external benefit. Social optimum Q* where MSB = MSC.
  • Q1 < Q*: the market underconsumes.
  • Step 3: units from Q1 to Q* have MSB above MSC, but are not consumed. The lost surplus is the welfare loss triangle, pointing to the social optimum.
  • Say: "underconsumption" or "underprovision" — not: "demand is too low", which makes it sound like a demand shift.
Mission 2Graph lab

Turn up the spillover

Turn up the spilloverPrice, costs and benefitsQuantityQ1MPBMPC = MSC
  • Takeaway: the market ignores external benefits, so the bigger they are, the further Q1 falls short of Q*.
Quick check
?A diagram shows a positive consumption externality with MPC = MSC.
PointWhere it is
XMPB meets MPC = MSC, at Q1
YMSB meets MPC = MSC, at Q*
ZOn MSB, directly above X at Q1

Which area shows the welfare loss?

Mission 2

Positive production externalities

Positive production externalityPrice, costs and benefits0P1Q1Q*QuantityMPB = MSBMPCMSCMEBwelfare loss
  • Some production benefits third parties. That lowers society's cost.
  • MSC = MPC − MEB. MSC lies below MPC.
  • Example: a firm trains workers who later move to other firms, which gain skills they did not pay for.
  • Example: research that other firms copy and build on.
  • Firms produce where MPC = MPB (Q1). Social optimum where MSC = MSB (Q*).
  • Q1 < Q*: underproduction. Welfare loss triangle between Q1 and Q*.
Quick check
?A firm trains apprentices at its own expense. Many later join rival firms, which gain skilled workers without paying for the training. With no government action, what happens?
Mission 2

Merit goods

  • A merit good is more beneficial to the consumer than they realise.
  • It is underconsumed if left to the market.
  • Examples often given: education, healthcare, vaccination, pensions.
  • Why underconsumed:
  • Imperfect information: people underestimate the long-run benefit to themselves.
  • Short-termism: the cost is now, the benefit years later.
  • External benefits: most merit goods also benefit others.
  • Calling a good "merit" is a value judgement.
  • Merit goods are not public goods: they are rival and excludable (see Mission 1).
Mission 2

The merit-good diagram

Demerit or merit goodPrice, costs and benefits0Q1Q2Q*QuantityMPB(perceived)MPB (fullinformation)MSBMPC = MSCinformation failureexternal benefitwelfare loss
  • Step 1: buyers act on MPB (perceived). Market at Q1, where it meets MPC = MSC.
  • Step 2: with full information, they would value it more: MPB (full information) lies higher. Quantity Q2.
  • Step 3: adding the external benefit gives MSB, higher still. Social optimum Q* where MSB = MSC.
  • Underconsumption: Q1 < Q2 < Q*. Welfare loss: the triangle between Q1 and Q*.
  • Say: "underconsumed because of imperfect information" — not: "underconsumed because it is too expensive".
Quick check
?Many countries provide school education free of charge. Why do economists usually class education as a merit good rather than a public good?
Mission 2

How governments respond

Responses: subsidy and free provisionA subsidyPrice, costs and benefits0Q1Q*QuantityMPBMSBMPC = MSCMPC − subsidysubsidyFree provisionPrice, costs and benefits0Q*Q at P = 0QuantityMPBMSBMPC = MSCFree provision may overshoot or fall short of Q*.
  • Subsidy per unit equal to the MEB at Q*: MPC shifts down to MPC − subsidy. Quantity rises to Q*.
  • Direct provision, free at the point of use: state schools, public health services.
  • At a price of zero, people consume where MPB meets the quantity axis. That may be above or below Q*.
  • Regulation: compulsory schooling to a set age; vaccination requirements in some countries.
  • Information: campaigns that raise perceived MPB.
  • Strengths and limits of each.
Mission 2Evaluate

Should the government step in?

  • It depends on measuring the MEB: hard to value, so the right subsidy is uncertain.
  • It depends on information: if perceived MPB is the problem, information may be cheaper than a subsidy.
  • It depends on opportunity cost: money spent here cannot be spent elsewhere; risk of government failure (see Mission 4).
  • It depends on the value judgement: some argue people should be free to choose; others that the state should ensure access.
Mission 2

Free provision: how much is used?

  • Illustrative data: the graph-lab lines with an external benefit of 4. MPB: P = 30 − 0.1Q. MPC = MSC: P = 6 + 0.1Q. Q* = 140.
  • Free provision: P = 0 → 30 − 0.1Q = 0 → Q = 300.
  • 300 > 140: with these numbers, free provision overshoots the optimum.
  • With a much bigger external benefit, free provision could fall short. External benefit of 40: Q* = 320, above 300.
  • So "free" fixes the price, not necessarily the quantity. Rationing (waiting lists, places) may follow.
Mission check

?A beekeeper sells honey. Her bees also pollinate the fruit trees in neighbouring orchards, raising the orchards' fruit output. The orchard owners pay her nothing. Compared with the social optimum, how much honey does the market produce?
Mission 3

Mission 3: Should a government tax pollution, ban it, or let firms buy and sell the right to pollute?

Make a guess: A factory's smoke harms people nearby. What should a government aim for?

Mission 3

The aim: make the polluter face the full cost

  • Governments intervene to correct market failure, and also to raise revenue, redistribute income and protect consumers.
  • A negative externality: the market produces Qm, more than the social optimum Q*.
  • The fix: make decision-makers face the external cost. This is internalising the externality.
  • The target is Q*, not zero. Some pollution is worth its cost.
  • Two families of tools:
    • market-based: taxes, subsidies, tradable permits, property rights. They change prices or incentives.
    • command and control: regulation, bans, limits. They set rules.
  • Others: information, government provision, agreements between countries.
Mission 3

A tax on each unit

Pigouvian taxCosts and benefits0P*PmP* − taxQ*QmQuantityMPB = MSB = DMPC = SMSCMPC + tax = MSCtaxwelfare loss (overproduction)tax revenue = tax × Q*
  • A Pigouvian tax: a tax per unit equal to the MEC at the social optimum.
  • Firms now pay MPC + tax. Supply shifts up, from MPC to MPC + tax.
  • If MEC is the same for every unit, MPC + tax = MSC.
  • Quantity falls from Qm to Q*. Price rises from Pm to P*.
  • Consumers and producers share the tax; the government gains tax revenue.
  • The welfare loss triangle disappears.
  • Say: "the tax internalises the external cost" — not: "the tax ends the pollution".
Mission 3

Worked example: setting the tax

  • Illustrative data: MPB = MSB = 100 − Q; MPC = 20 + Q; MEC = 20 per unit.
  • No tax: 100 − Q = 20 + Q, so Qm = 40, Pm = 60. Welfare loss = 100.
  • Tax = MEC = 20. New supply: 40 + Q.
  • 100 − Q = 40 + Q, so Q = 30 = Q*.
  • Buyers pay 70 (up 10). Firms keep 70 − 20 = 50 (down 10).
  • Here the burden splits 10: 10, because the curves have equal slopes.
  • Tax revenue = 20 × 30 = 600.
  • Welfare loss = 0: the market now reaches the social optimum.
Mission 3Graph lab

Set the tax

Illustrative data: MPB = MSB = 100 − Q; MPC = 20 + Q; MEC = 20, so MSC = 40 + Q.

Set the taxPrice, costs and benefitsQuantityQ*QmP*MPB = MSBMPCMSC
  • Takeaway: the tax must match the MEC. Too low leaves overproduction; too high causes underproduction.
Quick check
?Illustrative data: MPB = MSB = 120 − Q; MPC = 30 + Q. The MEC is 30 at every output. The government sets a per-unit tax equal to the MEC. How much tax revenue does it raise?
Mission 3

Carbon taxes

Carbon tax on a polluting industryCoal-fired electricityPrice of electricity0P2P1Q2Q1Quantity of electricityDS1S2 = S1 + carbon taxtaxLow-carbon supplierPrice of electricity0Quantity of electricityS (low-carbon)costs unchanged, so relatively cheaper than coal
  • A carbon tax: a tax per tonne of CO₂ emitted, charged on fuels by their carbon content.
  • On a polluting industry, e.g. coal-fired electricity: S1 → S2 (S + tax). Price rises, quantity falls.
  • Low-carbon producers become relatively cheaper. Firms and households switch.
  • Real world: British Columbia, Canada.
    • 2008: tax of C$10 per tonne CO₂e, with the revenue meant to be returned through other tax cuts.
    • 2024: C$80 per tonne.
    • A 2015 review of studies put emissions 5–15% lower than without the tax.
    • 1 April 2025: the tax on consumers was ended, as Canada dropped its national requirement for one.
  • Lesson: a carbon tax can cut emissions, but it lasts only while it keeps political support.
Mission 3

Subsidies for positive externalities

SubsidyCosts and benefits0QmQ*QuantityMPB = DMSBMPC = SMPC − subsidysubsidycost of subsidy = subsidy × Q*
  • Some goods give external benefits (see Mission 2): MSB > MPB, so the market underproduces.
  • A subsidy per unit equal to the MEB at Q*: supply shifts down to MPC − subsidy.
  • Output rises to Q*; price to buyers falls.
  • Cost to the government = subsidy × Q*.
  • Examples: vaccinations, public transport fares, home insulation.
  • Subsidising a clean substitute (e.g. electric buses) also cuts demand for the polluting good.
Mission 3

Rules: regulation and legislation

Regulation(a) A limit on output at Q*Costs and benefits0limit = Q*QmQuantityMPB = MSB = DMPC = SMSC(b) A banCosts and benefits0QuantityMPB = MSB = DMPC = SMSCWhere is Q*?
  • Command and control: the law sets limits, enforced by inspection and fines.
    • emissions standards; limits on output or a cap at Q*
    • bans where the harm is severe: leaded petrol, CFCs
  • Real world: leaded petrol, still sold in 117 countries in 2002, was used for the last time in 2021 (UNEP).
  • Strengths: simple, certain, quick; best when the harm is dangerous at any level.
  • Limits: the same rule for every firm ignores their different costs of cutting; no reward for cutting more than the rule asks; inspection is costly.
Quick check
?A pesticide sold to farmers is found to poison rivers and wildlife even in very small amounts. What is the strongest economic case for banning it rather than taxing it?
Mission 3

Tradable permits

Permit marketPrice of a permit0P2P1Q2Q1Quantity of permits (tonnes)D for permitsS (cap)S1S2Illustrative onlytighter cap: supply shifts left, permit price rises
  • The government sets a cap: the total pollution allowed. It issues that many permits (1 permit = 1 tonne).
  • Permits are given out or auctioned. Firms may buy and sell them.
  • Firms that can cut cheaply cut more and sell spare permits. Firms that find cutting costly buy.
  • Illustrative data: firms A and B each emit 100 t. Cap = 150 permits, 75 each.
    • Cost of cutting 1 t: A 20, B 60.
    • No trade: each cuts 25 t. Cost = 25 × 20 + 25 × 60 = 2,000.
    • Trade at 40 a permit: A cuts 50 t (cost 1,000) and sells 25 permits to B (+1,000). B cuts nothing and pays 1,000.
    • Same total emissions (150 t). Total cost of cutting falls to 1,000.
  • The permit price rises as the cap tightens: a price on pollution, set by the market.
Mission 3

Real world: the EU Emissions Trading System

  • Started 2005: power stations and heavy industry in the EU.
  • The cap falls every year.
  • After the 2008 crisis, demand for permits fell. By 2013 there was a surplus of about 2 billion permits, and prices stayed low for years.
  • Fix: a Market Stability Reserve (from 2019) takes surplus permits off the market.
  • In February 2023 the price reached about €100 per tonne.
  • Lesson: permits fix the quantity; the price depends on how tight the cap is.
Quick check
?Illustrative data: firms X and Y each emit 60 t. Each is given 40 permits, so together they must cut 40 t. Cutting 1 t costs X 15 and Y 45. By how much does permit trading lower the total cost of cutting 40 t?
Mission 3

Information, provision and agreements

EducationCosts and benefits0Q*QmQuantityMPB1MSBMSB = MPB2MPC = MSC = Seducationwelfare loss (overconsumption)
  • Information and education: campaigns, labels, warnings.
    • For a demerit good, people overvalue it. Education lowers MPB towards MSB.
  • Government provision: the state supplies a good with external benefits (vaccinations, public transport), to reach Q*.
  • International agreements: when harm crosses borders (the atmosphere, oceans), e.g. the Paris Agreement.
  • Collective self-governance: users of a shared resource set and enforce their own rules.
Mission 3Evaluate

Which tool works best?

It depends on:

  • Measuring the externality. A tax needs the MEC; a cap needs the right total. Both are hard to value.
  • Elasticity of demand. If demand is price inelastic, a tax cuts output little but raises much revenue.
  • Enforcement and admin costs. Monitoring emissions, collecting taxes and policing bans all cost money.
  • Consequences for stakeholders. Carbon taxes take a bigger share of poorer households' income; returning the revenue can offset this. Firms may move production abroad.
  • Certainty. A permit cap fixes the quantity, not the price; a tax fixes the price, not the quantity.
Mission check

?Illustrative data: a city airport's night flights cause noise. Values per flight:
Flights per nightMPB = MSBMPCMEC
1080205
20703010
30604020
40505030
50406040

The government will charge a fixed tax per flight. Which tax brings the number of flights to the social optimum?

Mission 4

Mission 4: When a government steps in to fix a market, how can it end up making things worse?

Make a guess: Why might a policy meant to fix a market leave it worse off?

Mission 4

When the cure is worse

  • Markets can fail (earlier missions). Governments step in with taxes, subsidies, rules and provision (see Mission 3).
  • But intervention can also go wrong.
  • Government failure: intervention that causes a net welfare loss compared with leaving the market alone. Resources end up misallocated.
  • A policy that has costs, or does not fix the problem fully, is not automatically a failure.
  • The test: is society better or worse off overall than with no intervention?
  • Say: "government failure = intervention leads to a net welfare loss" — not: "any policy that costs money".
Mission 4

Inadequate information

Tax set too highCosts and benefits0Q taxQ*QmQuantityMPB = MSB = DMPC = SMSCMPC + taxtaxwelfare loss (overproduction)new welfare loss (underproduction)old welfare loss
  • To set a Pigouvian tax, the government needs the MEC. It rarely knows it.
  • Also called information gaps.
  • Illustrative data (from Mission 3): MPB = MSB = 100 − Q; MPC = 20 + Q; true MEC = 20.
  • No tax: Qm = 40; welfare loss = 100.
  • The government overestimates the harm and sets a tax of 50.
  • New supply: 70 + Q. 100 − Q = 70 + Q, so Q = 15. Q* is 30.
  • Now underproduction. At Q = 15: MSB = 85, MSC = 55, a gap of 30.
  • New welfare loss = ½ × (30 − 15) × 30 = 225.
  • 225 > 100: society is worse off than with no tax. Government failure.
Mission 4Graph lab

How wrong can the tax be?

Illustrative data: as the previous screen. MEC = 20; the market alone gives a welfare loss of 100.

How wrong can the tax be?Price, costs and benefitsQuantityQ*QmMPB = MSBMPCMSCno-tax loss 100100Welfare losswith this tax
  • Takeaway: a tax a little wrong still helps. A tax far too high can do more harm than the externality.
Quick check
?Illustrative data: MPB = MSB = 60 − Q; MPC = Q. The MEC is 10 at every output, so the market output is 30, the social optimum is 25 and the welfare loss with no tax is 25. The government sets a tax of 30 per unit. What is the new welfare loss, and is this government failure?
Mission 4

Distortions of price signals

Guaranteed price creates a surplusPrice0PminPeQdQeQssurplus: bought into storeQuantityDScost to taxpayers = Pmin × (Qs − Qd)
  • Prices tell producers what to make and consumers what to buy.
  • Taxes, subsidies and price controls change prices. Set badly, they send the wrong signals.
  • Also called price distortion or market distortion.
  • Real world: the European Community's farm policy (CAP) guaranteed farmers high prices and bought up what did not sell.
    • Farmers produced more than consumers wanted.
    • Surpluses filled stores: "butter mountains" and "wine lakes", paid for by taxpayers.
    • From 1984, milk quotas were brought in to limit dairy output.
  • One intervention led to another to fix its side-effects.
Mission 4

Unintended consequences

  • People and firms respond to a policy, sometimes in ways nobody planned.
  • Real world: Mexico City, 1989, "Hoy No Circula" (No Driving Today).
    • Most cars banned from driving one weekday a week, by the last digit of the number plate.
    • Aim: cleaner air.
    • A 2008 study found no evidence that air quality improved.
    • Many households bought an extra car, often an older, more polluting one, to drive on their banned day.
  • Other examples: high taxes on cigarettes can encourage smuggling; rent controls can shrink the supply of rented homes.
Mission 4

Administrative costs

  • Every policy must be designed, run, monitored and enforced.
  • These administrative costs use scarce resources: staff, inspections, IT, legal cases.
  • Firms bear compliance costs too: paperwork, reporting, meeting standards.
  • Illustrative data: a tax on a pollutant removes a welfare loss of 100 a year.
    • Collecting the tax and checking emissions costs 120 a year.
    • Net effect: 100 − 120 = −20. Society is worse off: government failure.
  • Costs can exceed gains when the externality is small, or polluters are many and small.
Mission 4

Conflicting objectives

  • Governments pursue many goals at once: cleaner air, low prices, jobs, tax revenue, re-election.
  • A policy that serves one goal can harm another, so it may be set at the wrong level, or dropped.
  • Real world: the UK planned yearly inflation-linked rises in fuel duty. They were cancelled every year from 2011 to 2025, and duty was cut by 5p a litre in 2022, after fuel prices jumped.
  • Tobacco taxes aim to cut smoking, yet they also raise revenue that depends on people still smoking.
  • Say: "conflicting objectives" — not: "the government did not care". Both goals may be valid.
Mission 4

Capture and political incentives

  • Regulatory capture: a regulator comes to serve the industry it regulates, not the public.
    • Close contacts; staff moving between regulator and industry; lobbying.
  • Asymmetric information in regulation: the firm knows its true costs and harm; the regulator does not. Firms can overstate the cost of meeting rules.
  • Political incentives: politicians face elections. They may favour quick, visible gains over long-term benefits (short-termism), or respond to strong lobby groups.
  • These are why some economists argue that intervention should be limited to clear, large market failures; others argue for better-designed institutions instead.
Quick check
?Illustrative data: a city charges households for rubbish by weight. Households respond as planned and throw away less, a gain to society worth 2 million a year. Weighing every bin, sending bills and chasing unpaid ones costs 3 million a year. Which cause of government failure does this show?
Mission 4Evaluate

Market failure or government failure?

It depends on:

  • The size of the market failure. A large externality can justify intervention even if the policy is imperfect.
  • Information. Where the MEC can be measured, policy can be set closer to the optimum.
  • Flexibility. A tax can be adjusted as evidence comes in; a large project or a ban is harder to undo.
  • Effectiveness. Does the policy change behaviour? Inelastic demand can make a tax raise revenue but cut little harm.
  • Consequences for stakeholders. Who gains and who loses: consumers, producers, workers, taxpayers, the government, third parties.
  • Government failure is a reason to design policy carefully, not proof that intervention never works.
Mission check

?Illustrative data: a market for private bus services gives too few journeys. The welfare loss is 300 a year. The government brings in a subsidy. Afterwards, the welfare loss is 80 a year and the subsidy scheme costs 150 a year to run. Has government failure occurred?
Recap

The big ideas

Mission 1

  • Public goods are non-rival and non-excludable; private goods are rival and excludable.
  • Non-excludability creates free riders, so the market under-provides or fails to provide: a missing market.
  • Government usually provides public goods through taxation.
  • It can also contract out production to private firms.

Mission 2

  • A positive consumption externality puts MSB above MPB, so the market stops at Q1 < Q*, with a welfare loss.
  • A positive production externality puts MSC below MPC, with the same result: Q1 < Q*.
  • Merit goods are underconsumed because of imperfect information and external benefits; calling a good "merit" is a value judgement.
  • Governments may subsidise or provide such goods, often free at the point of use.

Mission 3

  • Correcting an externality means making decision-makers face the external cost or benefit, to reach Q*, not zero.
  • Taxes and subsidies change the price; regulation and bans set rules.
  • Permits cap the total and let trading find the cheapest cuts.

Mission 4

  • Government failure: intervention that causes a net welfare loss compared with the market outcome.
  • Causes: inadequate information, price distortion, unintended consequences, administrative costs, conflicting objectives, regulatory capture and political incentives.
🏆

Mini-lesson complete!

⭐⭐⭐

You've worked through Role of government (part 2) for IB Economics SL. 🎉

  1. Mission 1If everyone gains from a lighthouse, why might no one choose to pay for it?
  2. Mission 2If a vaccine also protects the people around you, why might too few people get one?
  3. Mission 3Should a government tax pollution, ban it, or let firms buy and sell the right to pollute?
  4. Mission 4When a government steps in to fix a market, how can it end up making things worse?

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