5 missions. Guess, learn, then check. Your place is saved.
Make a guess: If one company controls a whole market, why doesn't it just charge the highest price it can?
| Quantity | Price (AR) | Total revenue | Marginal revenue |
|---|---|---|---|
| 1 | 10 | 10 | 10 |
| 2 | 9 | 18 | 8 |
| 3 | 8 | 24 | 6 |
| 4 | 7 | 28 | 4 |
| 5 | 6 | 30 | 2 |
Illustrative data: AR = 50 − Q; MC = AC = 10.
| Area | Where it is |
|---|---|
| w | Triangle below D and above Pm, from 0 to Qm |
| x | Rectangle between Pm and Pc, from 0 to Qm |
| y | Triangle below D and above MC, from Qm to Qc |
| z | Rectangle below Pc and above 0, from 0 to Qm |
A monopolist weighs each extra sale: the best price is where MR = MC, not the highest price it could charge.
Make a guess: Why might it make sense for only one company to lay the water pipes in a city?
Same natural monopoly. A regulator sets a maximum price (price cap).
Where average cost falls across the whole market, a second network duplicates the fixed cost. That is why such industries usually have one supplier, and why its prices are regulated.
Make a guess: When only a few big firms share a market, why do their prices so often move together?
Illustrative data as the previous screen. B keeps to its quota of 20.
In oligopoly, every price decision depends on how rivals react. That is why prices often stay put or move together.
Make a guess: How can two rival firms each make their best choice and still both end up worse off?
| B keeps to quota | B cheats | |
|---|---|---|
| A keeps to quota | 800, 800 | 700, 875 |
| A cheats | 875, 700 | 750, 750 |
| Q: high price | Q: low price | |
|---|---|---|
| P: high price | 100, 90 | 40, 110 |
| P: low price | 120, 50 | 60, 60 |
What is firm P's dominant strategy?
Illustrative data as an earlier screen. The cartel agrees a penalty that any member caught cheating must pay. It is taken off the cheater's payoff.
| Outcome | Price | Total output |
|---|---|---|
| Monopoly (cartel keeps to quotas) | 60 | 40 |
| Both cheat (Nash equilibrium) | 50 | 50 |
| Perfect competition (P = MC) | 20 | 80 |
| B advertises | B does not | |
|---|---|---|
| A advertises | 30, 30 | 70, 10 |
| A does not | 10, 70 | 50, 50 |
Which statement is correct?
In a prisoner's dilemma, each player's dominant strategy leads to a Nash equilibrium that leaves both worse off than cooperating.
Make a guess: Why do a few big rival firms so often compete on brand and quality instead of simply cutting prices?
With a few rivals, a price cut is quickly matched; non-price competition is harder to copy.
Mission 1
Mission 2
Mission 3
Mission 4
Mission 5
You've worked through Market power (part 2) for IB Economics HL. 🎉
Your stars: 0 / 0