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IB Diploma Economics HL · 2.11 Market failure: market power (part 2 of 3)
Mini-Lesson

Market failure: market power (part 2)

5 missions. Guess, learn, then check. Your place is saved.

  1. Mission 1If one company controls a whole market, why doesn't it just charge the highest price it can?
  2. Mission 2Why might it make sense for only one company to lay the water pipes in a city?
  3. Mission 3When only a few big firms share a market, why do their prices so often move together?
  4. Mission 4How can two rival firms each make their best choice and still both end up worse off?
  5. Mission 5Why do a few big rival firms so often compete on brand and quality instead of simply cutting prices?
Mission 1

Mission 1: If one company controls a whole market, why doesn't it just charge the highest price it can?

Make a guess: If one company controls a whole market, why doesn't it just charge the highest price it can?

Mission 1

A price maker

Price taker and price makerPerfect competition: price takerPrice0QuantityP = D = AR = MRMonopoly: price makerPrice0QuantityAR = D
  • Pure monopoly: one firm supplies the whole market. No close substitutes. High barriers to entry.
  • Monopoly power: the power to set price above marginal cost. A firm with a large market share can have it without being the only seller.
  • The monopolist's demand curve is the market demand curve: it slopes down.
  • So it is a price maker: it chooses price, or output, but not both. Demand decides the other.
  • Demand = average revenue (AR): the price received per unit.
Mission 1

Where monopoly power comes from

  • Legal barriers: patents, licences, state franchises. A patent normally lasts up to 20 years.
  • Economies of scale: a large incumbent has lower average cost than any small entrant.
  • Control of a key resource or of the network buyers must use.
  • Sunk costs and brand loyalty: entry is costly and hard to recover.
  • Few close substitutes: the fewer the substitutes, the less price elastic the firm's demand.
  • More barriers and fewer substitutes mean more monopoly power, and power that lasts.
Mission 1

Why MR is below AR

Marginal revenue is below average revenueIllustrative dataPrice (AR) and marginal revenue (MR) byquantity10101982863744625Quantityprice (AR)marginal revenue (MR)The same as straight linesPrice0115.511QuantityARMRMR meets the quantity axis half way to AR.
  • Illustrative data. To sell one more unit, the firm must cut the price on every unit.
QuantityPrice (AR)Total revenueMarginal revenue
1101010
29188
38246
47284
56302
  • The 5th unit sells for 6, but the price cut on the first 4 units loses 4. MR = 6 − 4 = 2.
  • So MR < AR at every output after the first.
  • With a straight-line demand curve, MR is twice as steep as AR.
  • Say: "MR lies below AR for a monopolist" — not: "price equals marginal revenue".
Quick check
?Illustrative data. A monopolist can sell 4 units a day at a price of 20, or 5 units a day at a price of 18. What is the marginal revenue of the 5th unit?
Mission 1

Profit is greatest where MR = MC

Profit is greatest where MR = MCCosts, revenue0PmQmOutput (Q)AR = DMRMCAR > MCMR slopes down faster than AR. MC isU-shaped.Output Qm is where MR = MC.Read price off the AR curve at Qm: Pm.
  • If MR > MC, one more unit adds more to revenue than to cost: raise output.
  • If MR < MC, the last unit adds more to cost than to revenue: cut output.
  • So profit is maximised at the output where MR = MC.
  • Price: go up from that output to the demand (AR) curve.
  • At that output AR > MC: the sign of market power.
  • A monopolist always produces where demand is price elastic: MR is positive there.
  • Say: "read price off the AR curve at the MR = MC output" — not: "price is set where MR = MC".
Mission 1Graph lab

Choose the output

Illustrative data: AR = 50 − Q; MC = AC = 10.

Choose the outputPrice and costOutput0102030405001020304050545AR = DMRMC = AC
  • Takeaway: profit peaks where MR = MC (Q = 20), not where revenue or price is highest.
Mission 1

Worked example: price, profit and lost surplus

Worked example: monopoly price, profit and lost surplusIllustrative dataCosts, revenue0Pm = 30Pc = 10Qm = 20Qc = 40Output (Q)AR = DMRMC = ACabnormal profit: (30 − 10) × 20 = 400deadweight loss: ½ × (40 − 20) × (30 − 10)= 200
  • Illustrative data. AR = 50 − Q, so MR = 50 − 2Q. MC = AC = 10.
  • MR = MC: 50 − 2Q = 10, so Q = 20.
  • Price from AR: 50 − 20 = 30.
  • Abnormal profit = (AR − AC) × Q = (30 − 10) × 20 = 400.
  • A competitive industry with the same costs: P = MC = 10, Q = 40.
  • Deadweight loss (a later screen explains it) = ½ × (40 − 20) × (30 − 10) = 200.
Mission 1

Extra profit, normal profit or a loss

Profit, normal profit and loss for a monopolistAbnormal profit: AR > ACCosts, revenue0PmQmOutput (Q)AR = DMRMCACNormal profit: AR = ACCosts, revenue0PmQmOutput (Q)AR = DMRMCACLosses: AR < ACCosts, revenue0PmQmOutput (Q)AR = DMRMCACabnormal profitlosses
  • Profit per unit = AR − AC at the MR = MC output.
  • AR > AC: abnormal profit (also called supernormal profit). AR = AC: normal profit. AR < AC: losses.
  • Short run: a loss-making monopolist keeps producing if price covers AVC. Below AVC it shuts down.
  • Long run: barriers stop entry, so profit above normal can last. A firm that cannot cover AC in the long run leaves.
  • Say: "barriers to entry let abnormal profit persist in the long run" — not: "a monopoly always makes a profit".
Quick check
?Illustrative data. A monopolist maximises profit at an output of 300 units. At that output, AR = 12, ATC = 9 and MC = MR = 6. What is its profit?
Mission 1

Monopoly versus perfect competition

Monopoly compared with perfect competitionCosts, revenue0PmPcQmQcOutput (Q)AR = DMRMC = ACconsumer surplus kepttransferred to the monopolistwelfare (deadweight) lossPerfect competition: P = MC, output Qc, price Pc.Monopoly: MR = MC gives Qm; price Pm is readoff D. Qm < Qc and Pm > Pc.
  • Same costs, constant MC = AC. Compare the two outcomes.
  • Perfect competition: P = MC, output Qc, price Pc.
  • Monopoly: MR = MC, so output is lower (Qm < Qc) and price is higher (Pm > Pc).
  • Rectangle (Pm − Pc) × Qm: consumer surplus transferred to the monopolist.
  • Triangle from Qm to Qc, below D and above MC: units worth more than they cost, never made. This is the deadweight loss.
  • IB: welfare loss from restricted output and higher price.
  • Monopoly is allocatively inefficient: P > MC.
  • Say: "the rectangle is a transfer; the triangle is the deadweight loss" — not: "the whole fall in consumer surplus is lost".
Quick check
Monopoly compared with perfect competitionCosts, revenue0PmPcQmQcOutput (Q)wxyzAR = DMRMC = AC
?A monopoly is compared with a competitive industry with the same constant MC. Which area is the deadweight loss caused by the monopoly?
AreaWhere it is
wTriangle below D and above Pm, from 0 to Qm
xRectangle between Pm and Pc, from 0 to Qm
yTriangle below D and above MC, from Qm to Qc
zRectangle below Pc and above 0, from 0 to Qm
Mission 1

Monopoly power as a market failure

  • Market failure: the market misallocates resources.
  • Monopoly power: price above MC, too little output, a deadweight loss.
  • Risks of markets dominated by very large firms: lower output, higher prices, less consumer choice.
Mission 1Evaluate

Is monopoly always bad?

  • Consumers: higher prices and less choice; but possibly lower prices if economies of scale are large.
  • Workers and suppliers: one dominant buyer may hold down pay or input prices; or profits fund secure jobs.
  • Owners: supernormal profit. Government: more tax on profits.
  • It depends on economies of scale: big enough to outweigh the deadweight loss?
  • It depends on what profit is used for: research and new products, or higher payouts?
  • It depends on barriers: if entry is possible, the threat of rivals can hold prices down.
  • It depends on regulation: price caps and competition law can limit abuse.
Mission check

?Illustrative case: a town's only ferry operator sets one fare for all passengers. At its current fare, its marginal revenue is 4 and its marginal cost is 7 per passenger. What should it do to raise its profit?
Mission 2

Mission 2: Why might it make sense for only one company to lay the water pipes in a city?

Make a guess: Why might it make sense for only one company to lay the water pipes in a city?

Mission 2

What makes a monopoly natural

Average cost keeps fallingPrice / cost0economies of scaleQuantityLRACDAverage cost falls across the whole market.
  • Some industries have huge fixed costs and low marginal costs: water pipes, rail track, power grids.
  • So average cost keeps falling as output rises, across the whole market.
  • Natural monopoly: one firm can supply the whole market at a lower average cost than two or more firms could.
  • A second network would duplicate the fixed cost: wasteful.
  • Say: "natural monopoly" for a cost reason — not: "a monopoly protected by law or a patent".
Mission 2

Worked example: one network or two?

  • Illustrative data. A town needs 300 connections. The network costs 1,200 (fixed). Each connection adds 2 (marginal cost).
  • One firm: AC = 1,200 ÷ 300 + 2 = 4 + 2 = 6.
  • Two firms, 150 connections each: AC = 1,200 ÷ 150 + 2 = 8 + 2 = 10.
  • Splitting the market raises average cost from 6 to 10.
  • Same marginal cost; the difference is the fixed cost spread over fewer users.
Quick check
?Illustrative data. A rail line has a fixed cost of 900 and a marginal cost of 3 per journey. The market is 150 journeys. If two firms each build their own line and each carries 75 journeys, what is each firm's average cost?
Mission 2

The natural monopoly diagram

The natural monopoly diagramPrice / cost0P1P2P3Q1Q2Q3Quantitynatural monopolyP = ACP = MCAR = DMRLRACMCMR = MCloss at P = MCMC lies below AC while AC is falling.Three possible prices: MR = MC (unregulated), P= AC and P = MC.At P = MC, price is below AC: a loss.
  • AC (LRAC) falls across the whole demand curve. MC lies below AC.
  • Three possible prices:
    • Unregulated: MR = MC. High price, low output, profit above normal.
    • P = AC: normal profit. Output higher, price lower.
    • P = MC: the allocatively efficient output. But P < AC: a loss.
  • So a natural monopoly cannot be allocatively efficient and cover its costs without help.
  • Say: "MC is below AC whenever AC is falling" — not: "MC is above AC".
Mission 2

Worked example: three prices

Worked example: three pricesPrice / cost022104180300360QuantityAR = DMRACMCAC 14AC 9Illustrative data: AR = 40 − 0.1Q, MC = 4, AC =1,800/Q + 4.
  • Illustrative data. AR = 40 − 0.1Q. MC = 4. Fixed cost = 1,800.
  • Unregulated (MR = MC): 40 − 0.2Q = 4 → Q = 180, P = 22. AC = 1,800 ÷ 180 + 4 = 14.
    • Profit = (22 − 14) × 180 = 1,440.
  • P = AC: Q = 300, P = 10. AC = 1,800 ÷ 300 + 4 = 10. Normal profit.
  • P = MC: Q = 360, P = 4. AC = 1,800 ÷ 360 + 4 = 9.
    • Loss = (9 − 4) × 360 = 1,800: the whole fixed cost.
Mission 2Graph lab

Set the price cap

Same natural monopoly. A regulator sets a maximum price (price cap).

Set the price capPrice, costsQuantity18022AR = DMRMCAC
  • Takeaway: lowering the cap raises output; profit is normal at P = AC (10); below that the firm makes a loss.
Mission 2

Price caps: RPI − X

  • UK regulators of privatised utilities (e.g. Ofwat for water, Ofgem for energy) cap prices.
  • The classic formula, first used in 1984, is RPI − X: prices may rise each year by inflation (RPI) minus X%.
  • Worked example: RPI = 4%, X = 2. Maximum price rise = 4 − 2 = 2%. A price of 50 can rise to 51.
  • If the firm cuts costs by more than X, it keeps the extra profit: an incentive to be efficient.
  • Water added K for investment: RPI − X + K. Newer UK caps use other inflation measures (CPI or CPIH); the idea is the same.
  • Regulators in other countries use the same idea, often as CPI − X.
  • A price cap is one form of regulation: a government response to the abuse of market power.
Quick check
?Illustrative data. A regulated firm's price cap is RPI − X. RPI inflation is 3% and X is set at 5. What can the firm do to its price this year?
Mission 2

Other ways to regulate

  • Profit (rate-of-return) regulation: profit capped at a % of capital.
    • Risk: little reason to cut costs; firms may over-invest to raise the allowed profit.
  • Quality standards: a price cap can tempt a firm to cut quality. Regulators set standards (e.g. leaks, delays).
  • Performance targets: fines or rewards linked to service, e.g. punctuality or customer complaints.
  • Fines for abuse of market power: e.g. the European Commission fined Google €2.42 billion in 2017 for favouring its own shopping service.
  • Impact: lower prices and higher output, but possibly less profit for investment.
Mission 2

Who should own it?

  • Nationalisation (public ownership): the state owns the firm.
    • For: can price nearer MC; long-term investment; no supernormal profit to shareholders.
    • Against: weak profit incentive, so costs may drift up (X-inefficiency); political interference; funding competes with other public spending.
  • Privatisation: sale of state firms to private owners.
    • For: profit motive cuts costs; access to private capital.
    • Against: a private natural monopoly still needs regulation; profit may come before investment.
  • Example: water in England and Wales was privatised in 1989. Scottish Water is publicly owned.
  • Either way, each area is still served by a single network of water pipes.
  • The evidence on which model performs better is mixed; it depends on regulation and management.
Mission 2

Can big be good?

  • Advantages of large firms with market power:
    • Economies of scale, including natural monopolies: lower AC than many small firms.
    • Abnormal profits can finance R&D, and so innovation.
  • These must be weighed against higher prices, lower output and less choice (see Mission 1).
Mission 2Evaluate

Does regulation work?

  • It depends on information: the firm knows its costs better than the regulator. X may be set too low or too high.
  • It depends on regulatory capture: a regulator may come to serve the industry it regulates.
  • It depends on quality: price caps can lead to cost cuts that harm service, unless standards are enforced.
  • It depends on investment: tight caps may squeeze money for new pipes, track and cables.
Mission check

?Illustrative case: a small town is served by one broadband network that costs a lot to build but very little to connect each extra home. A second firm plans to build its own full network and win half the town's homes. Assuming total demand does not change, what happens to the average cost of supplying a home?
Mission 3

Mission 3: When only a few big firms share a market, why do their prices so often move together?

Make a guess: When only a few big firms share a market, why do their prices so often move together?

Mission 3

A few firms dominate

  • Oligopoly: a market dominated by a few large firms.
  • High barriers to entry (economies of scale, brands, patents, high start-up costs).
  • Products may be identical (cement, crude oil) or differentiated (cars, smartphones, supermarkets).
  • Much non-price competition: advertising, branding, loyalty schemes (more in Mission 5).
Mission 3

Interdependence

  • Interdependence: each firm's best choice depends on what its rivals do.
  • So every decision (price, output, advertising) brings uncertainty: how will rivals react?
  • If one firm cuts its price, rivals may match the cut to protect their sales. All end up with lower prices and little extra market share.
  • If one firm raises its price, rivals may not follow, and it loses customers to them.
  • Matching cuts can spiral into a price war: each firm undercuts the others, and profits fall for all.
  • Say: "oligopolists are interdependent" — not: "oligopolists ignore their rivals" or "oligopolists always collude".
Mission 3

Compete or collude?

  • Non-collusive oligopoly: firms compete; each decides alone.
  • Collusive oligopoly: firms cooperate to limit competition, e.g. fixing prices or sharing out markets.
  • Overt (explicit) collusion: a formal agreement. A cartel is a group of firms that agree on prices or output.
  • Tacit collusion: no agreement, but firms behave as if there were one, e.g. following a price leader.
  • Why collude? Less uncertainty, higher joint profit, keeping new firms out.
  • Why not? Cartels are illegal in most countries, there may be fines, and members may cheat.
Mission 3

When does a cartel work?

  • A cartel is more likely to hold when there are:
    • few firms (easier to agree and to watch each other)
    • similar costs and similar products (easier to agree one price)
    • high barriers to entry (no newcomers to undercut the cartel)
    • easy monitoring of rivals' prices and output (cheating gets spotted)
    • stable demand (less pressure to break ranks)
    • weak enforcement of competition law
  • Consequences: higher prices, lower output, high profit for members, less choice; buyers lose surplus.
Quick check
?Four firms in a market are thinking of forming a cartel. Which set of conditions makes the cartel most likely to last?
Mission 3

A cartel acts like a monopoly

Cartel as monopolyPrice0Pcartel20Qcartel80QuantityAR = DMRMC = AC2020Cartel: MR = MC at Q = 40, price P = 60 read upto AR. Competitive benchmark: P = 20, Q = 80.joint profit, shared out as two quotas of 20
  • The members act as one firm: they face the industry demand curve.
  • Joint profit is greatest where industry MR = MC. Price is read up to AR.
  • Members then share the output out as quotas.
  • Illustrative data: AR = 100 − Q; MC = AC = 20 for every member.
    • Cartel: MR = 100 − 2Q = 20, so Q = 40, P = 60.
    • Competitive benchmark: P = MC = 20, Q = 80.
  • IB: a collusive oligopoly maximises joint profit as a monopolist would.
Mission 3

Worked example: the pull to cheat

CheatingProfit of each firm (illustrative data)800800Both keep toquota875700A cheats750750Both cheatFirm AFirm B
  • Illustrative data: two firms, A and B. AR = 100 − Q. MC = AC = 20.
  • Cartel quotas: 20 each. Q = 40, P = 60. Profit each: (60 − 20) × 20 = 800.
  • A secretly produces 25. Q = 45, so P = 100 − 45 = 55.
    • A: (55 − 20) × 25 = 875. A gains.
    • B: (55 − 20) × 20 = 700. B loses.
  • If both produce 25: Q = 50, P = 50. Each earns (50 − 20) × 25 = 750.
  • Each firm gains by cheating, whatever the other does. Together they lose. (Payoff matrix in Mission 4.)
Mission 3Graph lab

Break the quota?

Illustrative data as the previous screen. B keeps to its quota of 20.

Break the quota?800A's profit800B's profit1,600Joint profit
  • Takeaway: cheating pays the cheater (up to a point) but lowers joint profit and the other member's profit.
Quick check
?Illustrative data as an earlier screen: AR = 100 − Q, MC = AC = 20, quotas of 20 each. Firm A produces 30; firm B keeps to 20. What is B's profit?
Mission 3

Real cartels

  • OPEC: set up in 1960 by Iran, Iraq, Kuwait, Saudi Arabia and Venezuela. Members agree production targets to influence the world oil price.
  • Truck makers (EU): in 2016 the European Commission fined truck makers a total of €2.93 billion for colluding on prices from 1997 to 2011.
  • One member, MAN, revealed the cartel and was not fined: the law rewards the first to confess.
  • OPEC is made up of governments, not private firms. Competition laws on cartels do not apply to it in the same way.
Mission 3Evaluate

Is oligopoly good or bad?

  • Costs: prices above MC (allocative inefficiency); collusion transfers surplus to firms; heavy advertising may add to costs.
  • Benefits: economies of scale can mean low average costs; abnormal profit can fund research and development, and so innovation; non-price competition can raise quality and choice.
  • It depends on conduct: fierce rivalry (even price wars) helps buyers; collusion harms them.
  • It depends on barriers: if entry is possible, the threat of new firms limits high prices.
  • It depends on regulation: the chance of being caught and fined.
Mission check

?Illustrative case: three airlines fly the same route at similar fares. One airline thinks about cutting its fare by 10%. Which is the strongest reason it may decide not to?
Mission 4

Mission 4: How can two rival firms each make their best choice and still both end up worse off?

Make a guess: How can two rival firms each make their best choice and still both end up worse off?

Mission 4

A game between firms

  • Game theory studies decisions where your result depends on others' choices too.
  • Every game has:
    • players (here, two firms)
    • strategies (the choices open to each player, e.g. high price or low price)
    • payoffs (what each player gets, e.g. profit, for each pair of choices)
  • Oligopoly fits: firms are interdependent (see Mission 3).
  • Say: "a strategy is a choice of action" — not: "a strategy is a payoff".
Mission 4

The payoff matrix

Cartel matrixFirm BB keeps toquotaB cheatsFirm AA keeps toquotaA cheats800, 800700, 875875, 700750, 750Nash equilibriumCells: (A's profit, B's profit)Illustrative data
  • Illustrative data: the cartel from Mission 3. Each firm either keeps to its quota (20 units) or cheats (25 units).
B keeps to quotaB cheats
A keeps to quota800, 800700, 875
A cheats875, 700750, 750
  • Each cell: (A's profit, B's profit). A chooses the row; B chooses the column.
  • Example: A keeps to quota, B cheats → A earns 700, B earns 875.
Mission 4

Dominant strategy

Cartel matrixFirm BB keeps toquotaB cheatsFirm AA keeps toquotaA cheats800, 800700, 875875, 700750, 750Nash equilibriumCells: (A's profit, B's profit)Illustrative data
  • A dominant strategy is best for a player whatever the other player does.
  • Method: fix the rival's choice, then compare your payoffs.
  • A's view:
    • If B keeps to quota: cheat 875 > keep 800.
    • If B cheats: cheat 750 > keep 700.
  • So cheating is A's dominant strategy. B's payoffs mirror A's, so B's dominant strategy is also to cheat.
  • Say: "dominant strategy: best whatever the rival does" — not: "the strategy with the biggest number in the matrix".
Quick check
?Illustrative data. Two firms, P and Q, each choose a high or a low price. Each cell shows (P's profit, Q's profit).
Q: high priceQ: low price
P: high price100, 9040, 110
P: low price120, 5060, 60

What is firm P's dominant strategy?

Mission 4

Nash equilibrium

Cartel matrixFirm BB keeps toquotaB cheatsFirm AA keeps toquotaA cheats800, 800700, 875875, 700750, 750Nash equilibriumCells: (A's profit, B's profit)Illustrative data
  • Nash equilibrium: an outcome where no player can do better by changing only its own strategy, given the other's choice.
  • Check each cell: would either player want to switch?
  • In the cartel game: (cheat, cheat) → (750, 750).
    • A switching to "keep" gets 700 < 750. B switching gets 700 < 750. No one gains: Nash equilibrium.
  • (keep, keep) → (800, 800) is not a Nash equilibrium: each firm could earn 875 by cheating.
  • When both players have a dominant strategy, the Nash equilibrium is where they both play it.
  • Say: "no player has an incentive to change strategy alone" — not: "both players get their best possible payoff".
Mission 4

The prisoner's dilemma

The prisoner's dilemmaFirm BB keeps toquotaB cheatsFirm AA keeps toquotaA cheats800, 800700, 875875, 700750, 750best togetherNash equilibriumarrow: each firm's incentive to cheatIllustrative data
  • The story: two suspects are questioned in separate rooms. Each can confess or stay silent.
  • Confessing is each one's dominant strategy. Both confess, yet both would get shorter sentences if both stayed silent.
  • A prisoner's dilemma: each player follows its own dominant strategy, and both end up worse off than if they had cooperated.
  • The cartel game is a prisoner's dilemma:
    • Nash equilibrium: (cheat, cheat): 750 each.
    • Cooperation: (keep, keep): 800 each.
  • Why cooperation fails: neither firm can trust the other, and a cartel agreement cannot be enforced in court.
Mission 4Graph lab

Can a penalty hold the cartel together?

Illustrative data as an earlier screen. The cartel agrees a penalty that any member caught cheating must pay. It is taken off the cheater's payoff.

Can a penalty hold the cartel together?Firm BFirm AKeepCheatKeep toquotaCheat800,800700,875875,700750,750
  • Takeaway: keeping to the quota is dominant only when cheating pays less whatever the rival does: here a penalty above 75.
Mission 4

Why the monopoly outcome is hard to reach

  • Illustrative data as (AR = 100 − Q, MC = AC = 20):
OutcomePriceTotal output
Monopoly (cartel keeps to quotas)6040
Both cheat (Nash equilibrium)5050
Perfect competition (P = MC)2080
  • Each firm's incentive to cheat pulls price below the monopoly price.
  • But price stays above, and output below, the perfectly competitive outcome.
  • Firms that meet again and again (a repeated game) may keep cooperating: cheating today could start a price war tomorrow.
Quick check
?Illustrative data as the earlier screens: AR = 100 − Q, MC = AC = 20; quota 20 each; "cheat" means producing 25. What is the market price at the Nash equilibrium of this game?
Mission 4Evaluate

How useful is game theory?

  • It shows why oligopolists are interdependent, and why cartels are unstable.
  • It depends on whether the game is one-off or repeated: repeated play makes cooperation easier (match what the rival did last time).
  • It depends on information: real firms rarely know their rivals' payoffs.
  • It depends on the number of firms: real markets often have more than two.
  • It depends on rationality: firms may value trust, reputation or market share, not just this period's profit.
  • Policy use: leniency rules turn a cartel into a prisoner's dilemma. The first member to confess is not fined (as with MAN in Mission 3).
Mission check

?Illustrative data. Two rival phone makers each choose whether to run a large advertising campaign. Each cell: (A's profit, B's profit).
B advertisesB does not
A advertises30, 3070, 10
A does not10, 7050, 50

Which statement is correct?

Mission 5

Mission 5: Why do a few big rival firms so often compete on brand and quality instead of simply cutting prices?

Make a guess: Why do a few big rival firms so often compete on brand and quality instead of simply cutting prices?

Mission 5

Rivals watching rivals

  • Oligopoly: a few large firms dominate the market (see Mission 3).
  • Firms are interdependent: each firm's best move depends on how its rivals react.
  • Two ways to win customers:
    • Price competition: cutting prices below rivals'.
    • Non-price competition: anything else that wins customers: branding, advertising, quality, design, service.
Mission 5

Worked example: a price war

Price warDaily profit, two rival firms (illustrative data)Profit AProfit BPrice 10400Price 10400Price 9450Price 10240400 at the startPrice 9330Price 9330400 at the startBoth charge 10 and sell 100 units. AC = 6, soeach earns (10 - 6) × 100 = 400.A cuts to 9 and sells 150: profit 450. B keeps 10and sells 60: profit 240.B matches at 9: both sell 110 and earn 330. Bothare worse off than at the start. B might cut to 8,then A to 7: a price war.
  • Illustrative data. Two firms, A and B. Each sells 100 units a day at 10. AC = 6 for both.
    • Profit each: (10 − 6) × 100 = 400.
  • A cuts its price to 9. B keeps 10.
    • A sells 150: profit (9 − 6) × 150 = 450. B sells 60: profit 240.
  • B matches: both charge 9 and sell 110 each.
    • Profit each: (9 − 6) × 110 = 330. Both are worse off than at the start.
  • B might cut to 8, then A to 7: a price war. Prices fall towards cost; profit is squeezed.
  • Consumers gain in the short run. Weaker firms may leave, leaving fewer rivals in the long run.
  • This is the risk of a price war: a reason oligopolists are tempted to collude.
Quick check
?Illustrative data. Two rival firms each sell 200 units a week at a price of 5, with an average cost of 3. One firm cuts its price to 4. The other matches at once, and each now sells 220 units. What is each firm's weekly profit after the price cut?
Mission 5

Non-price competition

Non-price competitionPrice0QuantityDD1D2Non-price competition aims to shift demand right(D1 to D2) and make it less price elastic: steeper.
  • Methods:
    • Product differentiation: design, quality, features, new models.
    • Branding and advertising.
    • Loyalty schemes: points, rewards, memberships.
    • Service: delivery, after-sales care, opening hours, location.
    • Packaging and research and development (R&D).
  • Aim 1: shift the firm's demand curve to the right (D1 → D2): more sold at every price.
  • Aim 2: make demand less price elastic: loyal customers stay even if price rises.
  • Say: "an increase in demand" (a shift) — not: "an extension of demand", which is a movement along the curve.
Mission 5

Why a few rivals prefer it

  • A price cut can be copied in hours. A new design, a strong brand or a loyal customer base takes rivals much longer to copy.
  • It avoids a price war that would hurt every firm.
  • Strong brands raise barriers to entry: a newcomer must spend heavily just to be noticed.
  • Costs:
    • Advertising raises costs, which may be passed on in higher prices.
    • Competitive advertising can cancel out: each firm spends more, market shares barely change.
  • Benefits: informative advertising helps buyers choose; competition on quality and R&D brings better products.
  • Because price cuts tend to be matched, prices in these markets often stay stable for long periods.
Quick check
?A firm in an oligopoly launches a successful advertising campaign for its product. What is the campaign trying to do to the demand curve for its product?
Mission 5Evaluate

Is rivalry between a few big firms good for consumers?

  • It depends on whether low prices last: a price war helps buyers, unless it drives rivals out and prices rise later.
  • It depends on the type of non-price competition: better products and useful information, or advertising that only raises costs.
  • It depends on barriers to entry: heavy branding can keep new rivals out.
  • It depends on time: rivalry in R&D can bring large long-run gains.
Mission check

?Illustrative case: two coffee chains have most of the coffee shops in a city. Chain A is choosing between cutting all its prices by 10% and launching a loyalty app that gives a free drink after every ten bought. Which is the strongest reason the app may raise A's profit more than the price cut?
Recap

The big ideas

Mission 1

  • A monopolist faces the downward-sloping market demand, so MR < AR.
  • It produces where MR = MC and reads price off AR: higher price, lower output than perfect competition.
  • Result: a transfer of surplus to the firm and a deadweight (welfare) loss; possible X-inefficiency, but possible economies of scale and research.

Mission 2

  • A natural monopoly has falling average cost across the whole market, so one firm supplies most cheaply.
  • Unregulated, it sets MR = MC; P = AC gives normal profit; P = MC is efficient but loss-making.
  • Regulators use price caps (RPI − X), profit limits, quality and performance targets; owners may be public or private.

Mission 3

  • Oligopoly: a few large firms, high barriers, interdependence and uncertainty.
  • Firms can compete or collude: overtly (cartels) or tacitly (price leadership). Cartels act like a monopoly but each member is tempted to cheat.

Mission 4

  • Payoff matrix: players, strategies, payoffs; each cell is (row player, column player).
  • Dominant strategy: best whatever the rival does. Nash equilibrium: no player gains by changing only its own strategy.
  • Prisoner's dilemma: each plays its dominant strategy, and both end up worse off than if they had cooperated. That is why cartels are unstable.

Mission 5

  • Oligopolists are interdependent: a price cut is likely to be matched, so price wars squeeze everyone's profit.
  • Non-price competition (branding, quality, loyalty, service) aims to shift demand right and make it less price elastic.
🏆

Mini-lesson complete!

⭐⭐⭐

You've worked through Market power (part 2) for IB Economics HL. 🎉

  1. Mission 1If one company controls a whole market, why doesn't it just charge the highest price it can?
  2. Mission 2Why might it make sense for only one company to lay the water pipes in a city?
  3. Mission 3When only a few big firms share a market, why do their prices so often move together?
  4. Mission 4How can two rival firms each make their best choice and still both end up worse off?
  5. Mission 5Why do a few big rival firms so often compete on brand and quality instead of simply cutting prices?

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