← IB Economics · HL IB Economics revision
⭐ 0
IB Diploma Economics HL · 2.4 Critique of the maximizing behaviour of consumers and producers
Mini-Lesson

Critique of the maximizing behaviour of consumers and producers

5 missions. Guess, learn, then check. Your place is saved.

  1. Mission 1Why do people pay for a gym every month and then hardly ever go?
  2. Mission 2Why can a used car that runs perfectly be hard to sell for what it is worth?
  3. Mission 3Can changing the pre-ticked box on a form change what millions of people choose?
  4. Mission 4Why would a business stop making more when each extra sale still brings in money?
  5. Mission 5Why might a business choose to earn less profit than it could?

Also part of this unit: 1 mission in Demand; Supply.

Mission 1

Mission 1: Why do people pay for a gym every month and then hardly ever go?

Make a guess: Why do people pay for a gym every month and then hardly ever go?

Mission 1

The rational benchmark

  • Standard theory assumes consumers:
    • are rational: they weigh costs and benefits consistently;
    • maximise utility;
    • have perfect information;
    • are self-interested.
  • Behavioural economics uses psychology to test these assumptions against how people really choose.
  • Where people depart from the benchmark in predictable ways, economists call it a bias.
Mission 1

Bounded rationality

  • Bounded rationality: people try to choose well, but are limited by the information they have, the time they have and the brainpower they can spare.
  • So they often satisfice: choose an option that is "good enough" rather than the best.
  • Imperfect information: buyers often cannot compare quality or hidden fees (e.g. phone contracts, insurance), so even careful choices can miss the best option.
  • Say: "bounded rationality" (limited ability to optimise) — not: "irrational" (no reasoning at all).
Mission 1

Rules of thumb and habit

  • A rule of thumb (heuristic): a mental shortcut that saves time.
    • "Buy the brand I bought last time."
    • "Pick the second-cheapest item on the menu."
  • Shortcuts are often sensible, but they can lead to choices a fully informed optimiser would not make.
Mission 1

Anchoring

Anchoring: the median estimate follows the anchorMedian estimate (%)0255025%Anchor 101045%Anchor 6565Estimates of the share of African countries inthe United NationsSource: Tversky and Kahneman (1974)
  • Anchoring: judgements are pulled towards an initial number (the anchor), even an irrelevant one.
  • Classic experiment (Tversky and Kahneman, 1974): people saw a "random" number, then estimated the percentage of African countries in the United Nations.
    • Group shown 10: median estimate 25%.
    • Group shown 65: median estimate 45%.
  • In shops: "Was 200, now 120" makes 120 look cheap.
  • Framing: the same facts described differently change choices. "90% fat-free" sells better than "10% fat".
Mission 1

Availability

  • Availability bias: people judge how likely an event is by how easily examples come to mind.
  • Vivid, recent or heavily reported events seem more likely than they are.
  • Example: after a widely reported plane crash, some travellers switch to driving, which is riskier per kilometre travelled.
  • Insurance demand often rises just after a disaster nearby, then fades.
Quick check
?A sofa shop displays a "Was 1,500" label above each sofa, crossed out, with the sale price of 900 underneath. Shoppers rate 900 as a bargain, even though similar sofas elsewhere cost 850. Which bias is the shop using?
Mission 1

Bounded self-control

Gym: plan versus realityOne month on a monthly contractover $70a monthon average 4.3 visits a monthover $17per visitmonthly contract$10per visit10-visit passSource: DellaVigna and Malmendier (2006), USgyms
  • Bounded self-control: people make plans for their future selves, then fail to stick to them.
  • Present benefits and costs loom larger than future ones (present bias).
  • Evidence (DellaVigna and Malmendier, 2006, US gyms):
    • Members on monthly contracts paid over $70 a month.
    • They went on average 4.3 times a month.
    • Cost per visit: more than $17, though a 10-visit pass cost $10 per visit.
  • When signing up, people overestimate how often their future self will go.
  • Other examples: saving too little for retirement; snacking against a diet plan.
Mission 1

Bounded selfishness: altruism and fairness

The ultimatum gamePlayer 1Player 2proposes a splitPot of moneyPlayer 1 keepsPlayer 2 getsslider: Player 1 chooses the splitPlayer 2 decidesAcceptboth get paidRejectboth get nothing
  • Bounded selfishness: people care about others, not only themselves.
  • Altruism: giving to charity, donating blood, tipping in a café you will never revisit.
  • Fairness: the ultimatum game.
    • Player 1 splits a sum of money; Player 2 accepts (both get paid) or rejects (both get nothing).
    • A purely self-interested Player 2 accepts any amount above zero.
    • In experiments, offers are typically 40–50% of the sum, and offers under 20% are often rejected.
  • Rejecting money to punish unfairness is not self-interested in the narrow sense.
Quick check
?In an ultimatum game, Player 1 splits 100 and offers Player 2 just 5. Player 2 rejects, so both get nothing. What does the standard rational, self-interested model predict, and what does the rejection suggest?
Mission 1Evaluate

Should economists drop rationality?

  • It depends on stakes and repetition: with large stakes, practice and feedback, people learn and biases shrink.
  • It depends on market forces: firms that misprice lose to rivals, so some biases are offset at market level. Others are exploited (e.g. gym contracts).
  • It depends on predictability: biases that are systematic (anchoring, present bias) can be built into models and policy.
  • Policy uses of these biases: Mission 3.
  • Some behavioural results have been hard to replicate; others, such as anchoring and present bias, are well established.
  • The rational model remains a useful benchmark: it shows what to compare real behaviour against.
Quick check
?A supermarket offers "3 for the price of 2" on cereal boxes that cost 3 each. What percentage discount does a shopper who buys 3 boxes get on the usual price?
Mission check

?Many workers say they should save more for retirement but do not start. In one scheme, workers sign up now to put part of each future pay rise into their pension; nothing leaves today's pay. Many more workers saved more under the scheme. Which bias does the design best get round?
Mission 2

Mission 2: Why can a used car that runs perfectly be hard to sell for what it is worth?

Make a guess: Why can a used car that runs perfectly be hard to sell for what it is worth?

Mission 2

What markets need to know

  • Markets allocate resources well when buyers and sellers know the prices, the quality and the consequences of what they trade.
  • Imperfect information: people lack some of this knowledge, so they make choices they would not make if fully informed.
  • Imperfect information is one limit on rational choice: consumers cannot maximise utility on facts they do not have.
  • Information failure: missing or uneven information leads to a misallocation of resources: a market failure.
Mission 2

Asymmetric information

Who knows more?The seller knows moreSellerBuyer?used car, repair, financial productThe buyer knows moreSeller?Buyerinsurance customer, borrower
  • Asymmetric information: one party to a deal knows more than the other.
  • The seller knows more:
    • a used car's history
    • whether a repair was needed
    • the risks of a financial product
  • The buyer knows more:
    • an insurance customer knows their own health or driving
    • a borrower knows how likely they are to repay
  • The better-informed side can gain at the other's expense, so the other side trades less, or not at all.
  • Say: "asymmetric information" — not: "imperfect information", when one side knows more than the other.
Quick check
?Which situation is an example of asymmetric information?
Mission 2

Hidden quality: the used-car problem

The used-car market shrinksused-car lotbuyers' offer: averagebuyers' offer: lowerBuyers cannot tell good from poor.Owners of good cars keep them:they are driven off the lot.Only poor cars are left.adverse selection
  • Used cars are either good or poor ("lemons"). The seller knows which. The buyer cannot tell.
  • So buyers will pay only what an average car is worth to them.
  • Owners of good cars get less than their car is worth, so many keep them.
  • Fewer good cars on sale → the average falls → buyers offer even less.
  • The market can shrink until mostly poor cars are traded. Good cars that both sides would gladly trade are not sold.
  • Adverse selection: asymmetric information before a deal means the wrong kinds of goods or customers are drawn in. Insurance: at an average premium, high-risk customers buy most, and low-risk ones drop out.
  • Idea from George Akerlof, "The Market for Lemons" (1970).
Mission 2

Worked example: what will a buyer pay?

  • Illustrative data.
Worth to a buyerLowest price its owner accepts
Good car10,0008,000
Poor car4,0003,000
  • Half the cars are good, half are poor. A buyer cannot tell which is which.
  • Expected value to a buyer = 0.5 × 10,000 + 0.5 × 4,000 = 7,000.
  • So buyers offer at most 7,000.
  • Good-car owners want at least 8,000. 7,000 < 8,000 → they withdraw.
  • Now only poor cars are left, so buyers will pay at most 4,000.
  • Every good car is worth more to a buyer (10,000) than to its owner (8,000), yet none is sold.
Mission 2Graph lab

When do good cars disappear?

Same illustrative cars as the previous screen.

When do good cars disappear?PriceQuantity of used cars04,0008,00012,000good-car owners' minimum 8,000poor-car owners' minimum 3,000D1 (offer 7,000)
  • Takeaway: good cars sell only when at least two-thirds of cars on offer are good; below that, the market shrinks to poor cars.
Mission 2

Moral hazard

Before and after the dealBefore the dealhidden information: adverse selectioncontract signedAfter the dealhidden action: moral hazardmore risk; others bear the cost
  • Moral hazard: after a deal, one party takes more risk because someone else bears the cost, and the other party cannot see it.
  • Examples:
    • an insured driver takes less care with the car
    • a worker on a fixed wage, who cannot be monitored, works less hard
    • a bank takes bigger risks if it expects the government to rescue it ("too big to fail")
  • Financial sector: in 2008, governments in the UK, the US and elsewhere rescued large banks. Rescues protect the economy now but can encourage risky lending later.
  • Responses: insurance excess (the customer pays the first part of any claim); rules on how much capital banks must hold.
  • Say: "adverse selection = hidden information before the deal; moral hazard = hidden action after it" — not: the other way round.
Quick check
?A phone insurer offers cover with no excess. Afterwards it finds that customers often take their phones onto building sites without a protective case. Which concept best explains this?
Mission 2

Government responses

Government toolkit for information failureProvide information0–5Hygiene rating: 0 to 5inspected restaurantsNutrition labelon packaged foodLegislation and regulationThe rulebookminimum standards, disclosure
  • Provide information: make it public, free and easy to use.
    • Food hygiene ratings: in England, Wales and Northern Ireland, restaurants are inspected and rated from 0 to 5.
    • Nutrition labels; health campaigns on smoking.
  • Legislation and regulation: minimum standards, compulsory disclosure, consumer rights (e.g. a refund for faulty goods), bans on misleading adverts.
  • Private fixes also exist: warranties, independent inspections, online reviews.
  • Limits: information costs money to collect; people may ignore it; government may not know better than the market (government failure).
Mission 2

Private responses: signalling and screening

  • Signalling: the informed side sends a costly, credible signal of quality.
    • a seller offers a long warranty: only worth it if the product is good
    • a job applicant shows qualifications (Michael Spence, 1973)
    • a firm builds a brand reputation it would lose by cheating
  • Screening: the uninformed side sorts the other side into types.
    • insurers' health questionnaires and medical checks
    • lenders' credit checks
    • a menu of policies: high-risk customers choose low excess with a high premium; low-risk customers choose high excess with a low premium
Quick check
?A car insurer offers two policies: a low premium with a 1,000 excess, or a high premium with a 100 excess. Drivers who expect to claim choose the low excess. What is the insurer doing?
Quick check
?In England, Wales and Northern Ireland, food outlets are inspected and given a hygiene rating from 0 to 5. In England, displaying the rating at the door is voluntary. Which is the strongest reason this may not fully close the information gap in England?
Mission 2Evaluate

Should government close information gaps?

It depends on:

  • The cost of information: inspections and labels cost money; is the gain worth it?
  • Whether people use it: information is ignored if it is complex or people are biased (smokers already see warnings).
  • Whether government knows more: regulators may lack information too (government failure).
  • Private fixes: warranties, reviews and inspections may already close much of the gap.
Mission check

?Online, buyers of second-hand laptops cannot check whether a laptop's battery is healthy. Sellers know. Nothing else changes. Which outcome is most likely?
Mission 3

Mission 3: Can changing the pre-ticked box on a form change what millions of people choose?

Make a guess: Can changing the pre-ticked box on a form change what millions of people choose?

Mission 3

Choice architecture

Choice architecture: the same canteen, two layoutsFruit at the backTillFruit by the tillTill
  • Choice architecture: the way choices are presented to people.
  • Order, layout, wording and the option already selected all affect what people pick.
  • There is no neutral design: a canteen must put something at eye level.
  • Firms use it to sell. Governments can use it to improve choices people say they want to make.
  • Builds on: bounded rationality, inertia, present bias.
Mission 3

Framing

  • Framing: presenting the same information in different ways to influence a choice.
  • "Surgery has a 90% survival rate" vs "a 10% death rate": same fact, but more people choose surgery under the first frame.
  • Loss frames often bite harder than gain frames: "You are losing 300 a year by not insulating" vs "You could save 300 a year".
Mission 3

Nudges

  • Nudge (Thaler and Sunstein, 2008): a change in choice architecture that alters behaviour predictably without banning any option or significantly changing financial incentives.
  • A nudge must be easy and cheap to avoid.
  • Examples: fruit at eye level in a canteen; a letter saying "most people in your area pay their tax on time"; a text reminder before a doctor's appointment.
  • Say: "a nudge keeps every option open" — not: "a nudge is a small tax or a ban".
  • Consumer nudges are one form of government intervention in markets, alongside taxes, subsidies and regulation.
Mission 3

Default choice

Defaults: organ donation and pensionsEffective consent rate (%)05010012%Germany (opt in)99.98%Austria (opt out)Source: Johnson and Goldstein (2003)Eligible private-sector employees in aworkplace pension (%)05010042%201285%2018Source: DWP (2019)
  • Default choice: the option that applies if a person does nothing.
  • People tend to stick with defaults: inertia, effort, and a sense that the default is recommended.
  • Organ donation (Johnson and Goldstein, 2003): effective consent rates.
    • Germany (opt in: you must sign up): 12%.
    • Austria (opt out: you are a donor unless you refuse): 99.98%.
  • UK pensions: since October 2012, employers must automatically enrol eligible workers; they can opt out.
    • Eligible private-sector employees in a workplace pension: 42% in 2012, 85% in 2018.
Mission 3

Worked example: percentage points or per cent?

Workplace pension participation, 2012 and 2018Eligible private-sector employees in aworkplace pension (%)05010042%201285%2018+43percentagepointsSource: DWP (2019)
  • Pension participation rose from 42% to 85%.
  • Change in percentage points: 85 − 42 = 43 percentage points.
  • Percentage change: (85 − 42) ÷ 42 × 100 = 102% (participation roughly doubled).
  • Say: "rose by 43 percentage points" — not: "rose by 43%".
Quick check
?A school canteen moves fruit from the back counter to beside the till. The share of pupils buying fruit rises from 20% to 30% (illustrative data). How large is the rise?
Mission 3

Restricted and mandated choice

  • Restricted choice: the number of options is limited, so people are not overwhelmed and poor options are removed.
    • Example: a pension scheme that offers a handful of well-run funds rather than hundreds.
  • Mandated choice: people must make an active decision; there is no default.
    • Example: an application for a driving licence that cannot be completed until you answer "Do you want to be an organ donor? Yes / No".
  • Mandated choice avoids presuming what people want, but still beats inertia.
Quick check
?Which policy is an example of mandated choice?
Mission 3

Nudges compared with other policies

Policy ladder: nudge, tax, banmost coerciveRegulation (ban)Ban on smoking in enclosed publicplacesoptions banned: yesprice changed: noIndirect taxUK Soft Drinks Industry Levy(2018)options banned: noprice changed: yesNudge (default)Pension auto-enrolmentoptions banned: noprice changed: noleast coercive
PolicyExampleOptions banned?Price changed?
Nudge (default)Pension auto-enrolmentNoNo
Indirect taxUK Soft Drinks Industry Levy (2018)NoYes
Regulation (ban)Ban on smoking in enclosed public placesYesNo
  • Nudges are usually cheap to run and keep freedom of choice.
  • Taxes and bans are stronger tools where harm to others is large or behaviour is hard to shift.
Mission 3Evaluate

How much should we rely on nudges?

  • It depends on the size of effects at scale: in trials by government nudge units, the average effect was about 1.4 percentage points, against about 8.7 in published academic studies (DellaVigna and Linos, 2022).
  • It depends on the default chosen: auto-enrolled workers often stay at the minimum contribution, which may be too low for a comfortable retirement.
  • It depends on who designs the choice: governments can misjudge what is good for people (government failure), and firms use the same tools for profit.
  • Ethics: supporters call it "libertarian paternalism" (guiding while keeping choice). Critics call some nudges manipulation, especially if hidden.
  • Nudges often work best alongside taxes, regulation and information.
Quick check
?A government wants to cut childhood obesity and is choosing between a nudge (healthy food placed at eye level in shops) and a tax on high-sugar foods. Which is the strongest argument for preferring the nudge?
Mission check

?An energy company makes its renewable-electricity tariff the pre-selected option on its sign-up page. Customers can switch to the standard tariff with one click, and neither price changes. Far more new customers now end up on the renewable tariff. Which explanation fits best?
Mission 4

Mission 4: Why would a business stop making more when each extra sale still brings in money?

Make a guess: Why would a business stop making more when each extra sale still brings in money?

Mission 4

Thinking at the margin

  • Profit = TR − TC.
  • Marginal revenue (MR): the extra revenue from selling one more unit.
  • Marginal cost (MC): the extra cost of making one more unit.
  • MR > MC: one more unit adds to profit. Make more.
  • MR < MC: one more unit cuts profit. Make less.
  • Profit is maximised where MC = MR.
  • Say: "profit is maximised where MC = MR" — not: "where revenue is highest" or "where cost per unit is lowest".
Mission 4

Worked example: the profit table

The profit hillRevenue and costs0123456Output (Q)TRTCProfit−1021216146−8profit max0123456TR max (Q = 5)MR and MC of each extra unit18614410668210−212123456Output (Q)MRMCIllustrative data

Illustrative data. Fixed costs are 10. The firm must cut its price to sell more.

Output (Q)Price = ARTRMRTCMCProfit (TR − TC)
0200–10–−10
11818181662
216321420412
314421026616
41248634814
51050244106
6848−25612−8
  • Units 1 to 3: MR > MC. Each adds to profit.
  • Unit 4: MR = 6 but MC = 8. It still brings in money, yet profit falls by 2.
  • Best output: 3 units, profit = 42 − 26 = 16.
  • Not at Q = 5, where TR peaks at 50. Not at Q = 4, where AC is lowest (34 ÷ 4 = 8.5).
  • At Q = 3: AR = 14, AC = 26 ÷ 3 = 8.67. AR > AC: abnormal profit.
Quick check
?Illustrative data. A bakery sells batches of bread at a fixed price of 5 per batch, however many it sells. Its fixed costs are 4. The marginal cost of the 1st to 5th batches is 2, 3, 4, 6 and 8. How many batches maximise its profit?
Mission 4

MC = MR on the diagram

MC = MR on the diagramCosts and revenue0P*AC*Q*OutputAR = DMRMCACabnormal profit = (P* − AC*) × Q*
  • Find Q where MC cuts MR from below. That is the profit-maximising output.
  • Go up from that Q to the AR (demand) curve to read the price.
  • Go up to AC at the same Q to read cost per unit.
  • Profit = (AR − AC) × Q: the rectangle between price and AC.
  • If AR < AC at that output, MC = MR gives the smallest loss the firm can make while producing.
  • Say: "read the price off the demand (AR) curve" — not: "off the point where MC = MR".
Mission 4Graph lab

Find the best output

Find the best outputRevenue, cost, profitOutput0123456−100204060TRTCprofit—MR of thelast unit—MC of thelast unit−10Profit
  • Takeaway: profit climbs while MR > MC and falls once MC > MR, even though revenue is still rising. The peak is the MC = MR output.
Quick check
MC cuts MR at an output of 40Costs and revenue01240OutputAR = DMRMCACIllustrative data
?Illustrative data. On a diagram, MC cuts MR from below at an output of 40, where MC = MR = 12. At an output of 40, average revenue is 25 and average cost is 18. What price does the profit-maximising firm charge, and what is its profit?
Mission 4Evaluate

Do real firms set MC = MR?

It depends on …

  • Information: firms rarely know their exact MC and MR. Many use rules of thumb, such as adding a mark-up to cost.
  • Objectives: owners and managers may aim for growth, sales or a satisfactory profit instead (see Mission 5).
  • Time: a firm may hold prices below the short-run profit-maximising level to keep rivals out or win loyal buyers, aiming at long-run profit.
  • Competition: in fierce competition, firms that stray far from maximum profit may not survive.
  • Judge: MC = MR is a model of how profit-seeking firms behave, more accurate in competitive markets than as a description of how managers decide.
Mission check

?Illustrative data. A water park makes a large profit each year. It is thinking of opening for one extra hour every evening. The extra hour would bring in 900 of ticket and food sales. It would add 1,100 to costs (staff, lighting, heating the pools). What should a profit-maximising water park do?
Mission 5

Mission 5: Why might a business choose to earn less profit than it could?

Make a guess: Why might a business choose to earn less profit than it could?

Mission 5

Why aim for maximum profit?

  • Economic theory usually assumes firms maximise profit: output where MC = MR (see Mission 4).
  • Reasons a firm might:
  • Owners take the risk and want the reward (dividends, a higher share price).
  • Retained profit pays for investment and research.
  • Profit builds a cushion for bad years and makes lenders and investors keen.
  • High profit signals success and pays for growth.
Mission 5

Growth, market share, survival

  • Growth: a bigger firm can gain economies of scale and market power, and spreads its risks. Managers often gain pay and status from size.
  • Market share: a larger share of sales can bring power over price and a strong brand. Firms may cut prices now to win it.
  • Survival: the first aim for many new firms and in recessions. Cover costs, keep cash flowing.
  • Many of these can serve long-run profit while lowering profit today.
Mission 5

Satisficing

  • Satisficing: aiming for a satisfactory level of profit, not the maximum. The term comes from the economist Herbert Simon.
  • Why firms satisfice:
  • Owners and managers are different people. Managers need only enough profit to keep shareholders content.
  • Firms have several stakeholders to keep happy at once.
  • Information is limited. Finding the exact MC = MR point is costly.
  • Satisficing is a minimum target, not a lack of effort. Profit below it brings pressure for change.
Mission 5

CSR and social objectives

  • Corporate social responsibility (CSR): a firm takes account of its impact on society and the environment, beyond what the law requires.
  • Examples: cutting emissions, fair supplier contracts, community projects, staff welfare.
  • Social enterprises and not-for-profit organisations put a social aim first.
  • Real case: in 2022 the founder of the outdoor clothing firm Patagonia transferred its ownership to a trust and a non-profit body. Profit not reinvested in the firm goes to fighting climate change.
  • For CSR: it can attract customers and staff, and protect the brand: long-run profit.
  • Against: Milton Friedman (1970) argued a firm's social responsibility is to increase its profits within the rules; owners, not managers, should choose how to spend on good causes.
Quick check
?A new food-delivery firm sets its prices below its costs to sign up as many customers as possible. It expects to make losses for several years. Which objective best explains this?
Mission 5Evaluate

Do firms really maximise profit?

It depends on …

  • Who controls the firm: an owner-manager may maximise profit; managers of a large company with many small shareholders have more room to pursue other goals.
  • Competition: in fiercely competitive markets, firms that do not aim at maximum profit may not survive.
  • Time horizon: growth, market share and CSR can be routes to long-run profit, so they may not be alternatives at all.
  • Information: firms rarely know MC and MR exactly; rules of thumb can approximate maximum profit.
  • Judge: profit maximisation is a useful assumption for predicting behaviour, but real firms often balance several objectives.
Mission check

?The managers of a large hotel chain aim each year for a level of profit that keeps its shareholders content. Once they reach it, they do not push for more. They avoid price rises and cost cuts that would upset staff and regular guests, even though these would raise profit. Which objective best describes their behaviour?
Recap

The big ideas

Mission 1

  • Bounded rationality, bounded self-control and bounded selfishness are the three main limits to the rational model.
  • Biases such as rules of thumb, anchoring and availability are predictable departures from rational choice.
  • Framing and imperfect information also limit rational choice.

Mission 2

  • Information failure: missing or uneven information leads to a misallocation of resources.
  • Asymmetric information: one side knows more. Hidden quality can drive good products out of a market.
  • Moral hazard: after a deal, people take more risk when others bear the cost.
  • Adverse selection happens before the deal; responses include signalling and screening.
  • Governments respond with information provision and regulation.

Mission 3

  • Choice architecture shapes decisions; framing, defaults, restricted and mandated choices are its tools.
  • A nudge changes behaviour without banning options or significantly changing incentives.
  • Nudges are cheap and preserve choice, but effects at scale can be small and the designer can get it wrong.

Mission 4

  • Profit is maximised where MC = MR (MC cutting MR from below); the price is read off the AR (demand) curve.

Mission 5

  • Theory assumes profit maximisation (MC = MR), but firms may aim for growth, market share, survival, satisfactory profit or social goals.
🏆

Mini-lesson complete!

⭐⭐⭐

You've worked through Critique of maximizing behaviour for IB Economics HL. 🎉

  1. Mission 1Why do people pay for a gym every month and then hardly ever go?
  2. Mission 2Why can a used car that runs perfectly be hard to sell for what it is worth?
  3. Mission 3Can changing the pre-ticked box on a form change what millions of people choose?
  4. Mission 4Why would a business stop making more when each extra sale still brings in money?
  5. Mission 5Why might a business choose to earn less profit than it could?

Your stars: 0 / 0

📣 Smashed it? Share your score

Challenge a friend to beat your stars, or show a parent how you got on.

→ Back to IB Economics · HL