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OCR A-level Economics (H460) · 4 Market structures (part 2 of 2)
Mini-Lesson

Market structures (part 2)

5 missions. Guess, learn, then check. Your place is saved.

  1. Mission 1Why can a popular new kind of café make big profits at first, then only just cover its costs later?
  2. Mission 2Why do some markets have thousands of sellers while others have only one or two?
  3. Mission 3When only a few big firms share a market, why do their prices so often move together?
  4. Mission 4Why do a few big rival firms so often compete on brand and quality instead of simply cutting prices?
  5. Mission 5Can a market with only one firm still behave as if it were full of competitors?
Mission 1

Mission 1: Why can a popular new kind of café make big profits at first, then only just cover its costs later?

Make a guess: Why can a popular new kind of café make big profits at first, then only just cover its costs later?

Mission 1

Many firms, different products

  • Monopolistic competition: many firms, each selling a differentiated product.
  • Low barriers to entry and exit.
  • Each firm has a little price-setting power: its product is not identical to rivals'.
  • Examples: cafés, hairdressers, restaurants, takeaways, a new style of café such as bubble tea.
  • Firms are small, so each one acts independently: it does not plan around one rival's reaction.
Mission 1

Standing out: non-price competition

  • Product differentiation: real or perceived differences (quality, design, location, service, brand).
  • Non-price competition: competing on anything but price: branding, advertising, loyalty cards, opening hours, new menu items.
  • Aim 1: shift the firm's demand curve right (more customers at each price).
  • Aim 2: make demand less price elastic (customers less willing to switch).
  • Say: "the firm's demand curve slopes downward because its product is differentiated" — not: "because it has few rivals".
Quick check
?A hairdresser in a busy town centre raises its price slightly. It loses some customers but not all of them. Which best explains why?
Mission 1

The short run

Monopolistic competition in the short runPrice0P1Q1QuantityAR = DMRACMCsupernormal profitDemand slopes down. MR lies below it.MR = MC gives output Q1. Price is read up toAR.AR > AC at Q1: supernormal profit.Illustrative data.
  • Profit is maximised where MR = MC. Price is read up to the AR curve.
  • AR > AC: supernormal profit. AR < AC: a loss. AR = AC: normal profit.
  • In the short run, this looks just like the monopoly diagram. The difference is what happens next.
Mission 1

Worked example: short-run profit

Monopolistic competition in the short runPrice0P1Q1QuantityAR = DMRACMCsupernormal profitDemand slopes down. MR lies below it.MR = MC gives output Q1. Price is read up toAR.AR > AC at Q1: supernormal profit.Illustrative data.
  • Illustrative data. A new bubble tea shop.
  • Demand: AR = 30 − 0.2Q, so MR = 30 − 0.4Q.
  • Costs: MC = 0.2Q. AC = 360/Q + 0.1Q.
  • MR = MC: 30 − 0.4Q = 0.2Q, so Q = 50.
  • Price from AR: 30 − 0.2 × 50 = 20.
  • AC at Q = 50: 360/50 + 0.1 × 50 = 7.2 + 5 = 12.2.
  • Supernormal profit = (AR − AC) × Q = (20 − 12.2) × 50 = 390.
Mission 1

From short run to long run

From short run to long runPrice0P1P2P3Q3Q2Q1QuantityACMCAR1 = D1MR1AR2 = D2MR2AR3 = D3MR3P2 = ACsupernormal profitlossSupernormal profit: new firms enter.Entry: each firm's demand shifts left andbecomes more price elastic.Normal profit: AR2 touches AC. Entry stops.Loss: firms leave and each remaining firm'sdemand shifts right.
  • Profit above normal is a signal. Barriers are low, so new firms enter.
  • Each firm loses some customers to the newcomers: its demand curve shifts left.
  • More close substitutes: demand becomes more price elastic.
  • Entry stops when AR just touches (is tangent to) AC: normal profit.
  • Losses work the other way: firms leave, and each remaining firm's demand shifts right until AR touches AC again.
  • Say: "each firm's demand curve shifts left as firms enter" — not: "the market demand curve falls".
Mission 1Graph lab

Let new firms in

Illustrative data. Start: 4 shops; each earns a profit of 390.

Let new firms inPrice and costOutput of one shop020406080100010305020AR = DMRMCAClowest AC
  • Takeaway: entry continues until profit is normal, at the point where AR touches AC to the left of the lowest point of AC.
Mission 1

Worked example: the long run

From short run to long runPrice0P1P2P3Q3Q2Q1QuantityACMCAR1 = D1MR1AR2 = D2MR2AR3 = D3MR3P2 = ACsupernormal profitlossSupernormal profit: new firms enter.Entry: each firm's demand shifts left andbecomes more price elastic.Normal profit: AR2 touches AC. Entry stops.Loss: firms leave and each remaining firm'sdemand shifts right.
  • Illustrative data. After entry, each shop's demand: AR = 18 − 0.125Q, so MR = 18 − 0.25Q.
  • Costs are unchanged: MC = 0.2Q; AC = 360/Q + 0.1Q.
  • MR = MC: 18 − 0.25Q = 0.2Q, so Q = 40.
  • Price: 18 − 0.125 × 40 = 13.
  • AC at Q = 40: 360/40 + 0.1 × 40 = 9 + 4 = 13.
  • P = AC: profit per unit 0. Normal profit.
  • PED at the chosen price: SR −2; LR −2.6. Demand is more elastic after entry.
Mission 1

Excess capacity

Excess capacityPrice01384060excess capacityQuantitylowest ACP > MCAR2 = D2MR2ACMCOutput 40 is below 60, the output at lowest AC.P = 13 is above MC = 8.Illustrative data.
  • The long-run tangency is on the falling part of AC.
  • So output is below the output at the lowest AC: excess capacity.
  • In the previous screen: output 40; lowest AC (12) at 60. Excess capacity = 60 − 40 = 20 units.
  • Not productively efficient: P = AC = 13 > lowest AC = 12.
  • Not allocatively efficient: P = 13 > MC = 8. Buyers value one more unit more than it costs to make.
  • Say: "excess capacity: output is below the level that minimises AC" — not: "the firm has too many workers".
Quick check
?Illustrative data. In long-run equilibrium, a monopolistically competitive firm produces 18 units at a price of 34. At that output, AC = 34 and MC = 18. Its AC is lowest at 30 units, where AC = 30. Which describes this firm?
Mission 1

Compared with the other models

Long run: three market structuresPerfect competitionPrice0QuantityACMCAR = DMonopolistic competitionPrice0QuantityACMCAR = DMRMonopolyPrice0QuantityACMCAR = DMRsupernormal profit can lastIllustrative diagrams. Same cost curves in each.
Long runPerfect competitionMonopolistic competitionMonopoly
ProductsIdenticalDifferentiatedUnique
BarriersNoneLowHigh
Demand facing firmHorizontalDownward, quite elasticDownward, less elastic
ProfitNormalNormalAbove normal can last
P and MCP = MCP > MCP > MC
Output at lowest AC?YesNo: excess capacityNot usually
  • The key gain over perfect competition: variety. Buyers can choose the café, style or location they like best.
Mission 1

Advertising

AdvertisingPrice0QuantityACAC1AR1AR2AC2Advertising shifts demand right and makes itless price elastic.It also raises costs: AC shifts up.
  • Advertising aims to shift the firm's demand right and make it less price elastic (brand loyalty).
  • It also raises costs: AC shifts up.
  • Short run: if extra sales outweigh the extra cost, profit rises.
  • Long run: rivals copy the idea, and new firms enter. Profit returns to normal.
  • Informative advertising (prices, opening hours, what is new) helps buyers choose.
  • Persuasive advertising (image, brand) may add to costs and prices without making the product better.
Quick check
?A nail salon launches a successful advertising campaign that makes its customers more loyal. In the short run, what happens to the salon's demand curve?
Mission 1Evaluate

Is excess capacity a waste?

  • It depends on how much buyers value variety: a slightly higher price than perfect competition may be the cost of choice.
  • It depends on how elastic demand is: with many close substitutes, demand is very elastic, the tangency is near the lowest AC, and the excess capacity is small.
  • It depends on the type of advertising: informative or persuasive.
  • It depends on dynamic efficiency: normal profit leaves little to fund research, but rivalry pushes firms to try new products.
  • It depends on how realistic the model is: some firms build brands, or win locations, that rivals cannot easily copy.
Mission check

?Illustrative case: a town has a few gyms making large profits. Opening a gym is easy, and each gym differs a little in equipment and classes. New gyms open until the market settles. Which describes a typical gym in the new long-run equilibrium?
Mission 2

Mission 2: Why do some markets have thousands of sellers while others have only one or two?

Make a guess: Why can a town have dozens of hair salons but only one company running the water pipes?

Mission 2

The spectrum of competition

Spectrum of competitionBarriersto entryControlover priceFirmsPerfectcompetitionMonopolisticcompetitionOligopolyMonopolyEach dot is a firm. Bars show a rough rank, notdata.
Perfect competitionMonopolistic competitionOligopolyMonopoly
Number of firmsVery manyManyA few dominateOne
ProductIdentical (homogeneous)DifferentiatedIdentical or differentiatedNo close substitutes
Barriers to entryNoneLowHighVery high
Control over priceNoneSomeConsiderableHigh
  • Example of monopolistic competition: hairdressers, cafés, pizza restaurants in a town.
  • Oligopoly: firms are interdependent: each must think about how rivals will react.
Mission 2

Barriers to entry

  • A barrier to entry is anything that makes it hard for new firms to enter a market.
TypeExamples
LegalPatents, licences, the sole right to run a service (e.g. a local water or power network)
CostEconomies of scale, high start-up costs, sunk costs (costs that cannot be recovered on leaving)
MarketBrand loyalty, heavy advertising, product differentiation
PhysicalControl of a key resource, the best locations, owning the network
  • Why they matter: without barriers, supernormal profit attracts entrants, whose extra supply competes it away. With high barriers, firms can keep supernormal profit in the long run.
Quick check
?Building a new steel works costs billions. The two existing producers each make so much steel that their average cost is far below what any new, smaller rival could achieve. Which barrier to entry does this describe?
Mission 2

Concentration ratios

Concentration ratioGreat Britain grocery market shares (% ofsales)4-firm CR = 66.1%28.215.711.610.68.325.6Tesco 28.2%Sainsbury's 15.7%Asda 11.6%Aldi 10.6%Morrisons 8.3%Others 25.6%Others: all remaining grocers, incl. Lidl, Co-opand independents (100 − 74.4).Source: Kantar, 12 weeks to 2 November 2025
  • Market share = firm's sales ÷ total market sales × 100.
  • n-firm concentration ratio = combined market share of the n largest firms.
  • Great Britain grocery shares (Kantar, 12 weeks to 2 November 2025): Tesco 28.2%, Sainsbury's 15.7%, Asda 11.6%, Aldi 10.6%, Morrisons 8.3%.
  • 4-firm CR = 28.2 + 15.7 + 11.6 + 10.6 = 66.1%.
  • 5-firm CR = 66.1 + 8.3 = 74.4%.
  • A high ratio suggests oligopoly. There is no single official cut-off, so always state n.
  • Limits: the result depends on how the market is defined (all groceries or one product? national or local?). It does not show whether the top firms are equal in size or one dominates.
Quick check
?The table shows market shares in a country's mobile phone network market (illustrative data).
FirmMarket share (%)
P12
Q30
R8
S22
T18
All others10

What is the 3-firm concentration ratio?

Mission check

?In which market are existing firms most likely to keep earning more than normal profit in the long run?
Mission 3

Mission 3: When only a few big firms share a market, why do their prices so often move together?

Make a guess: When only a few big firms share a market, why do their prices so often move together?

Mission 3

A few firms dominate

  • Oligopoly: a market dominated by a few large firms.
  • High barriers to entry (economies of scale, brands, patents, high start-up costs).
  • Products may be identical (cement, crude oil) or differentiated (cars, smartphones, supermarkets).
  • Much non-price competition: advertising, branding, loyalty schemes (more in Mission 4).
Mission 3

Interdependence

  • Interdependence: each firm's best choice depends on what its rivals do.
  • So every decision (price, output, advertising) brings uncertainty: how will rivals react?
  • If one firm cuts its price, rivals may match the cut to protect their sales. All end up with lower prices and little extra market share.
  • If one firm raises its price, rivals may not follow, and it loses customers to them.
  • Matching cuts can spiral into a price war: each firm undercuts the others, and profits fall for all.
  • Say: "oligopolists are interdependent" — not: "oligopolists ignore their rivals" or "oligopolists always collude".
Mission 3

Compete or collude?

  • Non-collusive oligopoly: firms compete; each decides alone.
  • Collusive oligopoly: firms cooperate to limit competition, e.g. fixing prices or sharing out markets.
  • Overt (explicit) collusion: a formal agreement. A cartel is a group of firms that agree on prices or output.
  • Tacit collusion: no agreement, but firms behave as if there were one, e.g. following a price leader.
  • Why collude? Less uncertainty, higher joint profit, keeping new firms out.
  • Why not? Cartels are illegal in most countries, there may be fines, and members may cheat.
Mission 3

When does a cartel work?

  • A cartel is more likely to hold when there are:
    • few firms (easier to agree and to watch each other)
    • similar costs and similar products (easier to agree one price)
    • high barriers to entry (no newcomers to undercut the cartel)
    • easy monitoring of rivals' prices and output (cheating gets spotted)
    • stable demand (less pressure to break ranks)
    • weak enforcement of competition law
  • Consequences: higher prices, lower output, high profit for members, less choice; buyers lose surplus.
Quick check
?Four firms in a market are thinking of forming a cartel. Which set of conditions makes the cartel most likely to last?
Mission 3

A cartel acts like a monopoly

Cartel as monopolyPrice0Pcartel20Qcartel80QuantityAR = DMRMC = AC2020Cartel: MR = MC at Q = 40, price P = 60 read upto AR. Competitive benchmark: P = 20, Q = 80.joint profit, shared out as two quotas of 20
  • The members act as one firm: they face the industry demand curve.
  • Joint profit is greatest where industry MR = MC. Price is read up to AR.
  • Members then share the output out as quotas.
  • Illustrative data: AR = 100 − Q; MC = AC = 20 for every member.
    • Cartel: MR = 100 − 2Q = 20, so Q = 40, P = 60.
    • Competitive benchmark: P = MC = 20, Q = 80.
Mission 3

Worked example: the pull to cheat

CheatingProfit of each firm (illustrative data)800800Both keep toquota875700A cheats750750Both cheatFirm AFirm B
  • Illustrative data: two firms, A and B. AR = 100 − Q. MC = AC = 20.
  • Cartel quotas: 20 each. Q = 40, P = 60. Profit each: (60 − 20) × 20 = 800.
  • A secretly produces 25. Q = 45, so P = 100 − 45 = 55.
    • A: (55 − 20) × 25 = 875. A gains.
    • B: (55 − 20) × 20 = 700. B loses.
  • If both produce 25: Q = 50, P = 50. Each earns (50 − 20) × 25 = 750.
  • Each firm gains by cheating, whatever the other does. Together they lose. (Payoff matrix in another lesson.)
Mission 3Graph lab

Break the quota?

Illustrative data as the previous screen. B keeps to its quota of 20.

Break the quota?800A's profit800B's profit1,600Joint profit
  • Takeaway: cheating pays the cheater (up to a point) but lowers joint profit and the other member's profit.
Quick check
?Illustrative data as an earlier screen: AR = 100 − Q, MC = AC = 20, quotas of 20 each. Firm A produces 30; firm B keeps to 20. What is B's profit?
Mission 3

Price leadership and tacit collusion

  • Price leadership: one firm changes its price; the others follow.
    • Dominant-firm leadership: the largest firm leads.
    • Barometric leadership: a firm that reads market conditions well leads.
  • No meeting and no agreement: this is tacit collusion, which is hard to prove.
  • Result: prices that move together and stay stable for long periods.
Mission 3

The kinked demand curve

Kinked demandPrice0P = 10Q = 100QuantityrelativelyelasticrelativelyinelasticAR = DMRMC1MC2Rivals ignore a price rise but match a cut, so ARhas a kink at the current price.MR has a vertical gap at Q = 100: from 5 downto below zero (-15).MC1 and MC2 both pass through the gap in MR.
  • A model of price rigidity in non-collusive oligopoly.
  • Assumption: rivals do not follow a price rise, but do match a price cut.
  • Above the current price: demand is relatively price elastic (a rise loses many sales).
  • Below the current price: demand is relatively price inelastic (a cut wins few sales).
  • So the demand (AR) curve has a kink at the current price, and MR has a vertical gap below the kink.
  • MC can rise or fall within the gap with no change in profit-maximising price or output.
  • Limits: it does not explain how the starting price was set, and firms do change prices (e.g. when all face a cost rise).
Mission 3

Worked example: PED and revenue at the kink

Kinked demandPrice0P = 10Q = 100QuantityrelativelyelasticrelativelyinelasticAR = DMRMC1MC2Rivals ignore a price rise but match a cut, so ARhas a kink at the current price.MR has a vertical gap at Q = 100: from 5 downto below zero (-15).MC1 and MC2 both pass through the gap in MR.
  • Illustrative data. Current price 10; quantity 100. Total revenue = 10 × 100 = 1,000.
  • Rise to 11: rivals do not follow; Q falls to 80.
    • PED = −20% ÷ +10% = −2 (elastic). TR = 11 × 80 = 880. TR falls.
  • Cut to 9: rivals match; Q rises to only 104.
    • PED = +4% ÷ −10% = −0.4 (inelastic). TR = 9 × 104 = 936. TR falls.
  • Either change cuts revenue, so the firm keeps the price at 10.
  • MR just left of the kink = 5; just right of it, MR is below zero (−15). Any MC curve passing through this gap (here, MC of 5 or less at Q = 100) keeps output at 100.
Quick check
?A firm faces a kinked demand curve, with the kink at its current price. Its marginal cost rises, but the new MC curve still passes through the vertical gap in MR. What happens?
Mission 3

Real cartels

  • OPEC: set up in 1960 by Iran, Iraq, Kuwait, Saudi Arabia and Venezuela. Members agree production targets to influence the world oil price.
  • Truck makers (EU): in 2016 the European Commission fined truck makers a total of €2.93 billion for colluding on prices from 1997 to 2011.
  • One member, MAN, revealed the cartel and was not fined: the law rewards the first to confess.
  • In the UK, cartels are illegal under the Competition Act 1998. The CMA investigates them.
  • OPEC is made up of governments, not private firms. Competition laws on cartels do not apply to it in the same way.
Mission 3Evaluate

Is oligopoly good or bad?

  • Costs: prices above MC (allocative inefficiency); collusion transfers surplus to firms; heavy advertising may add to costs.
  • Benefits: economies of scale can mean low average costs; supernormal profit can fund research and new products (dynamic efficiency); non-price competition can raise quality and choice.
  • It depends on conduct: fierce rivalry (even price wars) helps buyers; collusion harms them.
  • It depends on barriers: if entry is possible, the threat of new firms limits high prices (see Mission 5).
  • It depends on regulation: the chance of being caught and fined.
Mission check

?Illustrative case: three airlines fly the same route at similar fares. One airline thinks about cutting its fare by 10%. Which is the strongest reason it may decide not to?
Mission 4

Mission 4: Why do a few big rival firms so often compete on brand and quality instead of simply cutting prices?

Make a guess: Why do a few big rival firms so often compete on brand and quality instead of simply cutting prices?

Mission 4

Rivals watching rivals

  • Oligopoly: a few large firms dominate the market (see Mission 3).
  • Firms are interdependent: each firm's best move depends on how its rivals react.
  • Two ways to win customers:
    • Price competition: cutting prices below rivals'.
    • Non-price competition: anything else that wins customers: branding, advertising, quality, design, service.
Mission 4

Worked example: a price war

Price warDaily profit, two rival firms (illustrative data)Profit AProfit BPrice 10400Price 10400Price 9450Price 10240400 at the startPrice 9330Price 9330400 at the startBoth charge 10 and sell 100 units. AC = 6, soeach earns (10 - 6) × 100 = 400.A cuts to 9 and sells 150: profit 450. B keeps 10and sells 60: profit 240.B matches at 9: both sell 110 and earn 330. Bothare worse off than at the start. B might cut to 8,then A to 7: a price war.
  • Illustrative data. Two firms, A and B. Each sells 100 units a day at 10. AC = 6 for both.
    • Profit each: (10 − 6) × 100 = 400.
  • A cuts its price to 9. B keeps 10.
    • A sells 150: profit (9 − 6) × 150 = 450. B sells 60: profit 240.
  • B matches: both charge 9 and sell 110 each.
    • Profit each: (9 − 6) × 110 = 330. Both are worse off than at the start.
  • B might cut to 8, then A to 7: a price war. Prices fall towards cost; profit is squeezed.
  • Consumers gain in the short run. Weaker firms may leave, leaving fewer rivals in the long run.
Quick check
?Illustrative data. Two rival firms each sell 200 units a week at a price of 5, with an average cost of 3. One firm cuts its price to 4. The other matches at once, and each now sells 220 units. What is each firm's weekly profit after the price cut?
Mission 4

Stable prices, leaders and followers

  • Because a price cut is likely to be matched, prices in oligopoly are often stable ("sticky") for long periods (the kinked demand curve).
  • Price leadership: one firm, often the largest, changes its price and rivals follow.
  • Tacit agreement: firms keep prices in line with no formal deal and no contact.
  • Following a leader's price is hard to prove as collusion. An agreement to fix prices is a cartel and is illegal.
  • Say: "tacit collusion" for following without agreement — not: "a cartel", which needs an agreement.
Mission 4

Predatory pricing

Predatory pricingPrice0TimeAVCpredator's pricerival exitsprice raisedPrice is cut below AVC (losses now), the rivalleaves, then price rises above its old level(market power later).
  • Predatory pricing: setting price below cost to drive a rival out of the market, then raising price once it has gone.
  • A common test: is price below average variable cost (AVC)?
  • The predator makes losses now for market power later. It needs deep pockets and some way to stop rivals returning.
  • It is illegal as an abuse of a dominant position (UK Competition Act 1998; EU competition law).
  • Real case: in 2003 the European Commission fined Wanadoo, a French internet provider, €10.35 million for predatory pricing of broadband.
  • Hard part: telling predation apart from fierce, fair competition, which also lowers prices.
Mission 4

Limit pricing

Limit pricingPrice0PmPlimitQmQlimitQuantityMC = AC(incumbent)entrant'smin ACD = ARMRsupernormal profit at the limit priceIllustrative data. Pm: profit-maximising price(MR = MC). Plimit: at the entrant's minimum AC.
  • Limit pricing: an established firm sets a price low enough to deter entry, at or just below a possible entrant's minimum average cost.
  • The established firm often has lower costs (economies of scale, experience). So at the limit price it still makes supernormal profit, just less than the short-run maximum.
  • Structural barriers come from the market itself: economies of scale, sunk costs, patents.
  • Behavioural barriers come from firms' strategy: limit pricing, predatory pricing, heavy advertising.
  • Say: "limit pricing keeps price above the firm's own average cost" — not: "selling below cost", which is predatory pricing.
Mission 4Graph lab

The price that keeps rivals out

Illustrative data. An established firm: AC = MC = 6. Market demand: P = 20 − 0.1Q. A rival with a minimum AC of 10 enters only if it expects the price to stay above 10.

The price that keeps rivals outPriceQuantity01001502000610206014DAC = MC (firm)rival's minimum AC
  • Takeaway: the limit price is set by the rival's costs; at 10 the firm still earns 400, against 490 at 13.
Quick check
?Illustrative data. An established firm has an average cost of 20. Its profit-maximising price is 34. A possible entrant has a minimum average cost of 26 and will enter only if it expects the price to stay above 26. Which price is limit pricing?
Mission 4

Non-price competition

Non-price competitionPrice0QuantityDD1D2Non-price competition aims to shift demand right(D1 to D2) and make it less price elastic: steeper.
  • Methods:
    • Product differentiation: design, quality, features, new models.
    • Branding and advertising.
    • Loyalty schemes: points, rewards, memberships.
    • Service: delivery, after-sales care, opening hours, location.
    • Packaging and research and development (R&D).
  • Aim 1: shift the firm's demand curve to the right (D1 → D2): more sold at every price.
  • Aim 2: make demand less price elastic: loyal customers stay even if price rises.
  • Say: "an increase in demand" (a shift) — not: "an extension of demand", which is a movement along the curve.
Mission 4

Why a few rivals prefer it

  • A price cut can be copied in hours. A new design, a strong brand or a loyal customer base takes rivals much longer to copy.
  • It avoids a price war that would hurt every firm.
  • Strong brands raise barriers to entry: a newcomer must spend heavily just to be noticed.
  • Costs:
    • Advertising raises costs, which may be passed on in higher prices.
    • Competitive advertising can cancel out: each firm spends more, market shares barely change.
  • Benefits: informative advertising helps buyers choose; competition on quality and R&D brings better products.
Quick check
?A firm in an oligopoly launches a successful advertising campaign for its product. What is the campaign trying to do to the demand curve for its product?
Mission 4Evaluate

Is rivalry between a few big firms good for consumers?

  • It depends on whether low prices last: a price war helps buyers, unless it is predatory and prices rise later.
  • It depends on the type of non-price competition: better products and useful information, or advertising that only raises costs.
  • It depends on barriers to entry: limit pricing and heavy branding can keep new rivals out.
  • It depends on time: rivalry in R&D can bring large long-run gains.
Mission check

?Illustrative case: two coffee chains have most of the coffee shops in a city. Chain A is choosing between cutting all its prices by 10% and launching a loyalty app that gives a free drink after every ten bought. Which is the strongest reason the app may raise A's profit more than the price cut?
Mission 5

Mission 5: Can a market with only one firm still behave as if it were full of competitors?

Make a guess: Can a market with only one firm still behave as if it were full of competitors?

Mission 5

The threat of entry

Threat of entrythe marketone firmopen doorpotentialentrantsA perfectly contestable market has:free entry and free exit (no sunk costs)the same technology for entrantsperfect information about prices and profits
  • A contestable market: one where new firms can enter and leave easily, so the threat of entry disciplines the firms already there.
  • What counts is how easy it is to get in and out, not how many firms there are now.
  • Perfectly contestable market:
    • free entry and free exit: no sunk costs
    • entrants can use the same technology and reach the same costs as incumbents
    • perfect information about prices and profits
  • In theory, even a market with one firm can be perfectly contestable.
  • William Baumol and colleagues set out the theory in 1982.
Mission 5

Sunk costs

Sunk vs recoverablesunk costcannot be recoveredon exitlaunch advertisingspecialist researcha non-refundablelicencemachinery with noother userecoverable on exitcan be sold, leased orendeda delivery vanan aircraftrent on a short lease
  • Sunk cost: a cost that cannot be recovered when a firm leaves the market.
  • Examples: launch advertising, specialist research, a non-refundable licence, machinery with no other use.
  • Not sunk: a delivery van or an aircraft, which can be sold or leased to someone else.
  • Sunk costs are a barrier to exit, and so a barrier to entry: an entrant risks losing them if it has to leave.
  • Say: "a sunk cost cannot be recovered on exit" — not: "a sunk cost is any fixed cost". Rent on a short lease is fixed but can be ended.
Quick check
?A firm is thinking of starting a new bus service on a local route. Which of these costs is most likely to be a sunk cost?
Mission 5

Worked example: hit-and-run entry

Hit-and-runPrice0100Quantityincumbent price 15entrant14price falls to ACprice = AC:normal profit onlyAC = 10entrant leavesentrant's profit: (14 - 10) × 100 = 400Incumbent: price 15, above AC = 10.No sunk costs: the entrant leaves with nothinglost.
  • Illustrative data. One incumbent charges 15. Its AC = 10: supernormal profit of 5 a unit.
  • An entrant with the same AC of 10 undercuts at 14.
  • It sells 100 units before the incumbent can react.
  • Profit while there: (14 − 10) × 100 = 400.
  • The incumbent cuts its price. The entrant leaves. No sunk costs, so it loses nothing on exit.
  • This is hit-and-run competition: enter, take the profit, leave.
  • So the incumbent's best defence is to price at AC from the start: normal profit only.
Mission 5Graph lab

How high can the price go?

Illustrative data. Incumbent AC = MC = 10. Its profit-maximising price is 16. A hit-and-run entrant would sell 100 units before the incumbent reacts. It enters if its profit while there is greater than its sunk cost of entry.

How high can the price go?PriceQuantity01003000162020010DAC = MCprofit-maximising price 16
  • Takeaway: the higher the sunk costs, the higher the price the incumbent can safely charge. The market is less contestable.
Quick check
?Illustrative data. An incumbent has an average cost of 8. A hit-and-run entrant with the same costs would sell 50 units before the incumbent could react, and would have sunk costs of 150. It enters only if its profit while there is greater than its sunk costs. What is the highest price the incumbent can charge without attracting entry?
Mission 5

Contestability and efficiency

Contestable natural monopolyPrice0PmP = ACQmQcQuantityACMCD = ARMRMonopoly: MR = MC gives Pm and Qm.Contestable: price is pushed down to P = AC, atQc.
  • In a perfectly contestable market, in the long run:
    • Normal profit only (P = AC). Any supernormal profit invites hit-and-run entry.
    • Productive efficiency: a firm that does not produce at the lowest possible cost is undercut.
    • X-inefficiency is squeezed out: slack is punished.
    • With two or more firms, P = MC: allocative efficiency.
  • A single firm with falling AC (a natural monopoly) prices at P = AC, not P = MC: P = MC would mean a loss.
  • So behaviour depends on how easy entry is, not just on how many firms there are now.
Mission 5

Barriers to entry and exit

  • Every barrier makes a market less contestable.
  • Barriers to entry:
    • Sunk costs: start-up advertising, specialist equipment.
    • Economies of scale: an entrant starts small with higher AC.
    • Product differentiation and branding: loyal customers.
    • Intellectual property (patents, copyright) and R&D spending.
    • Legal barriers: licences, regulation.
    • Incumbents' strategy: limit pricing, predatory pricing (see Mission 4).
  • Barriers to exit: sunk costs written off, long contracts, redundancy payments.
Quick check
?A market is served by one firm whose average cost falls over the whole range of market demand. The market is perfectly contestable. In the long run, where will the firm set its price?
Mission 5

Real markets: how contestable?

  • Airline routes were the classic example: aircraft can move from route to route, so entry to one route looks cheap.
  • The EU opened its internal air market fully in 1997: any EU airline could fly any route inside the EU. Low-cost airlines entered many routes.
  • But later studies of US routes found fares were lower where more airlines actually flew. The threat of entry alone did not hold fares down fully.
  • Reasons: airport slots, branding, loyalty schemes and incumbents' fast price cuts.
  • Usefulness of the model:
    • It explains why some firms with large market shares still keep prices low.
    • It shows that market structure is not everything: conduct depends on entry conditions.
    • Few real markets are perfectly contestable.
Mission 5Evaluate

Does contestability protect consumers?

  • Advantages: lower prices, normal profit, productive efficiency, pressure to innovate, without the need for many firms.
  • Disadvantages: supernormal profit is low, so there may be less to spend on R&D; firms may focus on short-run survival.
  • It depends on the size of sunk costs: high sunk costs, little threat.
  • It depends on how fast incumbents react: a quick price cut makes hit-and-run unprofitable.
  • It depends on information: entrants must know profits are there.
  • It depends on policy: removing barriers (deregulation, opening markets) may do more than breaking up firms.
Mission check

?Illustrative case: one coach company runs the only service between two towns. It earns large supernormal profits. Which change is most likely to make it lower its fares, even though no rival has yet entered?
Recap

The big ideas

Mission 1

  • Many firms, differentiated products, low barriers: each firm has a downward-sloping, fairly elastic demand curve.
  • Short run: MR = MC; profit above normal or a loss is possible. Long run: entry or exit leaves normal profit (AR tangent to AC).
  • Long run: excess capacity and P > MC, but buyers get variety.

Mission 2

  • Market structures range from perfect competition to monopoly, by number of firms, product differentiation, barriers to entry and control over price.
  • Barriers to entry (legal, cost, market, physical) let firms keep supernormal profit in the long run.
  • n-firm concentration ratio = combined market share of the n largest firms.

Mission 3

  • Oligopoly: a few large firms, high barriers, interdependence and uncertainty.
  • Firms can compete or collude: overtly (cartels) or tacitly (price leadership). Cartels act like a monopoly but each member is tempted to cheat.
  • Kinked demand curve: rivals match cuts but not rises, so prices are rigid; MC can move within the MR gap.

Mission 4

  • Oligopolists are interdependent: a price cut is likely to be matched, so price wars squeeze everyone's profit.
  • Non-price competition (branding, quality, loyalty, service) aims to shift demand right and make it less price elastic.
  • Predatory pricing is below cost to remove a rival; limit pricing sets price just low enough to deter entry.

Mission 5

  • A contestable market has low barriers to entry and exit; the threat of entry disciplines incumbents.
  • With no sunk costs, hit-and-run entry removes supernormal profit: price is pushed towards average cost.
  • Real markets are rarely perfectly contestable: sunk costs, branding and quick responses protect incumbents.
🏆

Mini-lesson complete!

⭐⭐⭐

You've worked through Market structures (part 2) for OCR A-level Economics. 🎉

  1. Mission 1Why can a popular new kind of café make big profits at first, then only just cover its costs later?
  2. Mission 2Why do some markets have thousands of sellers while others have only one or two?
  3. Mission 3When only a few big firms share a market, why do their prices so often move together?
  4. Mission 4Why do a few big rival firms so often compete on brand and quality instead of simply cutting prices?
  5. Mission 5Can a market with only one firm still behave as if it were full of competitors?

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