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OCR A-level Economics (H460) · 2.11 Government intervention and government failure (part 2 of 2)
Mini-Lesson

Government intervention and government failure (part 2)

4 missions. Guess, learn, then check. Your place is saved.

  1. Mission 1Why can a huge harvest leave farmers with less money than a small one?
  2. Mission 2Should a country's trains, water pipes and power lines be run by the state or by private companies?
  3. Mission 3When should a government stop big firms from merging, fixing prices or growing too powerful?
  4. Mission 4When a government steps in to fix a market, how can it end up making things worse?
Mission 1

Mission 1: Why can a huge harvest leave farmers with less money than a small one?

Make a guess: Why can a huge harvest leave farmers with less money than a small one?

Mission 1

Why crop prices jump

Volatile commodity pricePrimary commodity: steep DPrice0P1P2Q1Q2QuantityDS1S2Big price fall, small rise in quantityManufactured product: flatter DPrice0QuantityDS1S2Same supply shift: small price fall
  • Primary commodities: raw materials and crops, e.g. cocoa, coffee, wheat, copper, oil.
  • Their supply shifts often and without warning: weather, pests, disease, strikes at mines.
  • Once a crop is harvested, supply is almost fixed for the season: a near-vertical short-run supply curve.
  • Demand is price inelastic: buyers cut back little when price rises, so the demand curve is drawn steep.
  • Inelastic demand + supply shifts = large price swings for small changes in quantity.
  • Say: "a bumper harvest shifts supply to the right; price falls and there is an extension of demand" — not: "demand increases".
Mission 1

Why both curves are so steep

Primary commoditiesManufactured products
PEDLow: necessities (food, fuel, materials) with few substitutesHigher: many close substitutes (brands, models)
PESLow: crops take months or years to grow; new mines take years to open; land and machinery are hard to switch to other uses; perishable crops cannot be stored for longHigher: factories add shifts, use spare capacity and hold stocks of finished goods
  • Example: a new cocoa tree takes several years to bear its first pods, so a high cocoa price cannot quickly raise output.
  • Both PED and PES are usually less than 1 in the short run (ignoring the minus sign for PED).
  • In the long run both become more elastic: farmers replant, buyers find substitutes.
Mission 1

Worked example: a bigger harvest, less money

Harvest and revenueIllustrative dataPoor harvest: 80 × $6080$4,800Normal harvest: 90 × $4090$3,600Bumper harvest: 100 × $20100$2,000Quantity (thousand tonnes)Revenue ($ thousand) = price × quantity
  • Illustrative data: a world market for a crop. Quantity in thousand tonnes; price in $ per tonne.
  • Normal harvest: 90 sold at $40. Revenue = 40 × 90 = $3,600 thousand.
  • Bumper harvest: 100. Buyers take the extra only if the price falls to $20.
  • Revenue = 20 × 100 = $2,000 thousand.
  • %ΔQ = (100 − 90) ÷ 90 × 100 = +11.1%. %ΔP = (20 − 40) ÷ 40 × 100 = −50%.
  • PED = 11.1 ÷ −50 = −0.22: price inelastic.
  • Poor harvest: 80, price rises to $60. Revenue = 60 × 80 = $4,800 thousand.
  • Inelastic demand: price changes by a bigger percentage than quantity, so revenue moves the same way as price and the opposite way to the harvest. A bigger crop earns less; a smaller crop earns more.
  • Shortcut: %ΔP ≈ %ΔQ ÷ PED. With PED −0.22, an 11% rise in quantity needs about a 50% price fall.
Quick check
?Illustrative data: a frost cuts the world coffee harvest by 5%. Short-run PED for coffee is −0.25. Roughly how does the world price of coffee change, so that buyers' quantity demanded falls by 5%?
Mission 1

Why volatile prices matter

  • Producers: farm incomes rise and crash from year to year; planning and borrowing become risky, so investment falls.
  • Signals: planting decisions are made on last year's price, so a high price can lead to over-planting and a later crash.
  • Countries: many low-income countries earn most export revenue from one or two commodities: primary product dependency.
  • UNCTAD calls a country commodity-dependent when commodities make up more than 60% of its merchandise exports.
  • Export earnings, tax revenue and the exchange rate all swing with the commodity price.
  • Case: in 2024 cocoa futures passed $10,000 per tonne for the first time, after poor harvests in West Africa. Many cocoa farmers in Ghana and Côte d'Ivoire sell at prices set in advance by their governments, so they gained much less than the world price rise.
Quick check
?A world price rise for copper ore and a world price rise for smartphones are each the same percentage. Which best explains why the quantity of copper ore supplied rises much less in the next 6 months?
Mission 1

The buffer stock scheme

Buffer stock schemePrice ($ per tonne)PmaxPePminQuantity (thousand tonnes)free pricefree priceDS1S2S3Normal harvest: price inside the band;the agency does nothingBumper harvest: free price below Pmin.Excess supply: agency buys; stockgrowsPoor harvest: free price above Pmax.Excess demand: agency sells; stockshrinksIllustrative data. Quantity axis does not start atzero.
  • Buffer stock scheme: an agency holds a stock of a storable commodity and buys or sells it to keep the price inside a band.
  • Floor: the minimum price. Ceiling: the maximum price.
  • Step 1: normal harvest. Price is inside the band. The agency does nothing.
  • Step 2: bumper harvest. The free-market price would fall below the floor. The agency buys the excess supply at the floor price and adds it to the stock.
  • Step 3: poor harvest. The free-market price would rise above the ceiling. The agency sells from its stock at the ceiling price.
  • Needs: a commodity that can be stored, money to buy in good years, and a stock to sell in bad years.
Mission 1Graph lab

Hold the band

Illustrative data: the crop from an earlier screen. Floor $30, ceiling $50. Normal harvest 90, price $40.

Hold the bandPrice ($)Quantity (thousand tonnes)7080100110020406090DS (harvest 90)floor $30ceiling $50
  • Takeaway: the agency buys or sells only the gap between harvest and quantity demanded at the floor or ceiling price.
Mission 1

Worked example: three harvests

  • Illustrative data: demand from an earlier screen; band $30–$50.
  • Normal (90): free price $40, inside the band. No action.
  • Bumper (100): free price $20. At the floor of $30, buyers take 95. Agency buys 100 − 95 = 5, costing 5 × 30 = $150 thousand.
  • Poor (80): free price $60. At the ceiling of $50, buyers want 85. Agency sells 85 − 80 = 5, earning 5 × 50 = $250 thousand.
  • Farm revenue without the scheme: $2,000–$4,800 thousand.
  • With the scheme: bumper 30 × 100 = $3,000 thousand; poor 50 × 80 = $4,000 thousand.
  • Incomes are more stable. Here the stock is back where it started, because good and bad years balanced out.
Quick check
?A buffer stock diagram shows a downward-sloping demand curve D and a band between a floor price Pmin and a ceiling price Pmax.
PointMeaning
Q1quantity of a normal harvest
Q2quantity demanded at Pmin
Q3quantity of this year's bumper harvest (vertical supply S2)

To hold the price at Pmin, what quantity must the agency buy?

Mission 1Evaluate

Why many schemes collapsed

  • It depends on where the band is set. Nobody knows the long-run equilibrium price. A band set too high means the agency buys year after year: the stock and the bill keep growing.
  • It depends on whether a change is temporary or permanent. A scheme can smooth good and bad years, but not a lasting fall in demand or rise in supply.
  • It depends on storage. Coffee and metals store; fresh fruit does not. Storage costs money every year.
  • It depends on funding. The agency must have money to buy in a run of bumper years.
  • Case: the International Tin Council ran out of funds defending the tin price in October 1985; tin trading on the London Metal Exchange was suspended and the price collapsed.
  • Case: Australia's wool reserve price scheme was suspended in February 1991 with a stockpile of 4.7 million bales, which took until 2001 to sell.
  • Supporters reply: with a band near the long-run average and enough funds, a scheme can reduce income swings for poor producers.
Quick check
?Illustrative data: a coffee buffer stock agency sets a band of $3.00–$3.60 per kg. Over five years the free-market price would have been $2.70, $2.80, $3.20, $2.60 and $2.90. What is the most likely outcome if the band is kept unchanged?
Mission check

?Illustrative data: a drought cuts a tea-exporting country's harvest by 10%. Harvests fall by a similar amount across the region, and the world price of tea rises by 40%. What happens to the country's tea export revenue, and why?
Mission 2

Mission 2: Should a country's trains, water pipes and power lines be run by the state or by private companies?

Make a guess: Should a country's trains, water pipes and power lines be run by the state or by private companies?

Mission 2

Four tools, four meanings

  • Nationalisation: the state takes a firm or industry into public ownership.
  • Privatisation: transfer of a firm or activity from the public sector to the private sector.
  • Regulation: rules set by government or an appointed regulator, e.g. on prices, quality, safety or entry.
  • Deregulation: removing rules that restrict entry, prices or how firms operate.
  • Ownership (who owns it) and market structure (how many rivals) are separate questions.
  • Say: "privatisation changes the owner" — not: "privatisation creates competition".
Mission 2

Forms of privatisation

Ownership and control mapWho owns?publicsectorprivatesectorprivatisationnationalisationWho provides?state staffprivatecontractorcontractingoutstate still paysWho may enter?private rivallicence gatestatemonopolyderegulation / liberalisation
  • Sale of a state-owned firm: shares sold to the public or a buyer (denationalisation). E.g. British Telecom (1984).
  • Contracting out (competitive tendering): the state still pays for a service but invites private firms to bid to provide it, e.g. bin collection.
  • Liberalisation: opening a state monopoly to private rivals (a form of deregulation).
  • Public–private partnership (PPP): a private firm finances, builds and often runs a public project (e.g. a hospital); the state pays over many years.
  • Sale of state assets, e.g. land or council houses.
Mission 2

The case for privatisation

  • Profit motive: private owners gain from cutting costs, so less X-inefficiency (waste when a firm faces little pressure to keep costs down).
  • Shareholder pressure: a poorly run firm's share price falls, and it risks a takeover.
  • Competition, where the industry allows rivals: lower prices, more choice.
  • Access to private capital for investment, without adding to government borrowing.
  • One-off revenue for the government from the sale.
  • Less political interference in pricing and investment decisions.
  • Example: the UK sold telecoms (1984), gas (1986), water in England and Wales (1989), electricity (1990–91) and rail (1994–97).
Mission 2

The case against, and renationalisation

  • A natural monopoly (one network serves the whole market most cheaply, e.g. a power grid) sold whole stays a monopoly: a private monopoly still needs regulation.
  • Short-termism: dividends may come before long-term investment.
  • Social objectives may be dropped, e.g. loss-making rural routes.
  • Sale price: if shares are sold too cheaply, taxpayers lose; the one-off revenue replaces a flow of future profits.
  • Fragmentation: splitting a network among many firms can raise coordination costs.
  • Renationalisation arguments: run for the public interest, cheaper public borrowing, no dividends to pay out, one integrated network.
  • Example: Railtrack (privatised rail infrastructure) was replaced in 2002 by Network Rail, now a public body. A 2024 law lets passenger train services in Great Britain return to public ownership as contracts end.
Quick check
?A city council stops using its own staff to clean public parks. It invites private firms to bid, and pays the winning firm to do the work for five years. The parks stay free to use. Which policy is this?
Mission 2

Deregulation, licences and prohibitions

Licence capFare (Price)0PeQeRides per day (Quantity)DS = MCFree market: D meets S = MC at Pe, Qe.
  • A licence limits who may operate (e.g. taxis, mobile spectrum). A prohibition bans an activity outright.
  • Deregulation removes barriers, so new firms can enter: supply rises, prices fall, choice widens.
  • Example: the US Airline Deregulation Act (1978) ended government control of fares and routes.
  • Example: UK local buses outside London were deregulated in 1986: any licensed operator could run a route.
  • Risks: firms "cherry-pick" profitable routes; safety and quality may suffer; financial deregulation can raise risk-taking.
  • Say: "deregulation lowers barriers to entry" — not: "deregulation means no rules at all".
Mission 2Graph lab

Lift the licence cap

Illustrative data. A city caps taxi licences, limiting rides to 5,000 a day. Fare: 20. Cost of the last ride (MC): 11.

Lift the licence capFare, costRides per day5,0002011DS = MClicence capgap 9
  • Takeaway: removing an entry limit shifts the market to where price = MC. The gap was a reward for holding a licence.
Licence capFare (Price)020PePe = 14115,000QeQe = 8,000Rides per day (Quantity)DS = MCLicence capcap removedlicence reward: the gap between fare andcostFree market: D meets S = MC at Pe, Qe.Entry allowed: rides rise and the fare falls to thecost of the last ride.
Mission 2

Worked example: competitive tendering

  • Illustrative data. A council's in-house refuse service costs 1.20 million a year.
  • Bids: Firm X 0.96 million; Firm Y 1.02 million.
  • Saving with X = 1.20 − 0.96 = 0.24 million. As a %: 0.24 ÷ 1.20 × 100 = 20%.
  • Saving with Y = 0.18 million = 15%.
  • But the cheapest bid is not always best value: check quality standards, penalties for missed collections, and staff terms.
  • Example: UK councils had to tender services such as refuse collection after the Local Government Act 1988.
  • PPP example: the UK's Private Finance Initiative (from 1992) built hospitals and schools. In 2018 the UK government stopped signing new PFI deals, after the National Audit Office questioned their value for money. Supporters point to projects delivered on time and risk passed to private firms.
Quick check
?Illustrative data. A hospital spends 2.50 million a year on its own cleaning staff. After tendering, it accepts a bid of 2.00 million a year. What is the percentage saving?
Mission 2

What regulators do

  • Where competition is weak, a regulator acts for consumers in its place.
  • Role: set price caps, quality and service standards; grant licences; give rivals fair access to networks; fine firms that break the rules.
  • UK examples: Ofwat (water), Ofgem (energy), Ofcom (communications), the Office of Rail and Road.
Mission 2

When regulators fail

  • Asymmetric information: the firm knows its costs better than the regulator. It may overstate costs to win a looser price cap.
  • Regulatory capture: a regulator comes to act in the interests of the firms it regulates, not consumers.
  • Why capture happens:
    • The regulator relies on the industry for information and expert staff.
    • A revolving door: staff move between regulator and industry.
    • A few firms gain a lot and lobby hard; millions of consumers each lose a little.
  • Example: after the 2010 Deepwater Horizon oil spill, the US Minerals Management Service, criticised as too close to the industry it oversaw, was broken up (2010–11).
  • Say: "regulatory capture" — not: "the regulator was bribed". Capture can happen without any law being broken.
Quick check
?Illustrative case: a country's rail regulator hires most of its senior staff from the train companies. Over ten years it approves every fare rise the companies ask for, using cost figures that only the companies collect. Which problem does this best show?
Mission 2

Supply side: shifting LRAS

LRAS shiftPrice level0P1P2Y1Y2Real GDP (Y)ADLRAS1LRAS2Privatisation and deregulation, if they work:LRAS shifts right, real GDP rises and the pricelevel falls.
  • Privatisation and deregulation aim to raise efficiency, competition and incentives to innovate.
  • If they work, the economy's productive capacity rises: LRAS shifts right (LRAS1 → LRAS2).
  • With AD unchanged: real GDP rises and the price level falls.
  • Limits: effects take time; a private monopoly may not become more efficient; gains may be small for the whole economy.
Mission 2Evaluate

Does it work?

  • It depends on competition: privatising a firm that faces rivals differs from selling a natural monopoly.
  • It depends on regulation: information, capture and the regulator's powers.
  • It depends on time: cost savings may come fast; under-investment may show only years later.
  • It depends on objectives: efficiency and low prices, or universal service and equity?
  • Evidence on ownership is mixed: many studies find that competition and regulation matter at least as much as who owns the firm.
Mission check

?Illustrative case: a government sells its state-owned national electricity grid as a single company. There is still only one grid, and the government sets up no regulator. What is the most likely result for the price of using the grid?
Mission 3

Mission 3: When should a government stop big firms from merging, fixing prices or growing too powerful?

Make a guess: When should a government stop big firms from merging, fixing prices or growing too powerful?

Mission 3

Why have competition policy?

  • Market power can mean higher prices, lower output, less choice and a deadweight loss.
  • Firms with little competition may also let costs drift up (X-inefficiency) and innovate less.
  • Competition policy: laws and authorities that promote competition and stop firms abusing market power.
Mission 3

Three targets

Three targets1Anti-competitive agreementscartels, price fixing, sharing out markets2Abuse of a dominant positione.g. predatory pricing, refusing to supplyrivals3Mergersthat would substantially lessencompetition

1. Anti-competitive agreements (restrictive practices): cartels, price fixing, sharing out markets, bid rigging.

2. Abuse of a dominant position: e.g. predatory pricing (pricing below cost to drive out a rival), refusing to supply rivals, forcing buyers to take one product to get another.

3. Mergers that would substantially lessen competition.

  • Being large is not illegal. Abusing that position is.
  • The key question: would buyers face higher prices, lower quality or less choice?
  • A firm facing cheap imports or easy entry by rivals has little power to raise prices, even with a large share.
Mission 3

UK and EU rules

  • Competition and Markets Authority (CMA), since 2014: investigates cartels, abuse of dominance and mergers.
  • Competition Act 1998: bans anti-competitive agreements and abuse of a dominant position. Fines up to 10% of worldwide turnover.
  • Enterprise Act 2002: merger control; taking part in a cartel can be a criminal offence.
  • Leniency: the first cartel member to report can avoid a fine. This makes cartels unstable.
  • Regulators (e.g. Ofgem, Ofwat, Ofcom) also have competition powers in their industries.
  • Real case: in 2019 the CMA blocked the merger of Sainsbury's and Asda, two of the largest UK supermarket chains.
  • EU (awareness only): the European Commission enforces bans on cartels and abuse of dominance. In 2016 it fined truck makers €2.93 billion for a price-fixing cartel, and in 2017 Google €2.42 billion for abusing its dominance in online search.
  • Since the end of 2020 the Commission no longer rules on UK markets. The CMA does.
Quick check
?Which of these is most likely to break competition law?
Mission 3

Worked example: a merger

  • Illustrative data. Market shares (%): A 30, B 20, C 15, D 10, others 25 (each under 5).
  • Three-firm concentration ratio (CR3) before: 30 + 20 + 15 = 65%.
  • B and C propose to merge: share 35%.
  • CR3 after: 35 + 30 + 10 = 75%.
  • Merger types: horizontal (same stage, rivals: B + C), vertical (supplier and buyer), conglomerate (unrelated markets).
  • Horizontal mergers get the closest scrutiny: they remove a rival directly.
  • The authority can clear the merger, clear it with conditions (e.g. sell some stores), or block it.
  • Against the loss of a rival, it weighs any cost savings passed on to buyers.
Mission 3Graph lab

What does a cartel cost buyers?

Illustrative data. Market demand: P = 50 − Q. MC = AC = 10. A cartel acts like a monopoly: P = 30, Q = 20. Competition would give P = 10, Q = 40.

What does a cartel cost buyers?PriceQuantity0400102040502030CSDMC = AC
  • Takeaway: ending a cartel returns its profit to buyers and removes the deadweight loss.
Cartel vs competitionPrice0PcartelPcomp2040QuantityCSprofitDWLD = ARMC = ACconsumer surplus (CS) under the cartelcartel profit: (30 - 10) × 20deadweight loss (DWL)Illustrative data. Cartel: P = 30, Q = 20.Competition: P = 10, Q = 40.
Quick check
?Illustrative data. Market demand is P = 80 − 2Q and MC = AC = 20. A cartel sets Q = 15 and P = 50, earning a profit of 450. Under competition, P = 20 and Q = 30. If the cartel is broken up, by how much does consumer surplus rise?
Mission 3

Other tools to promote competition

  • Break up a monopoly into competing firms.
  • Price controls and regulation: price caps (RPI − X), quality targets.
  • Ban unfair trading practices: e.g. misleading pricing, forcing suppliers into unfair terms.
  • Deregulation: remove legal barriers to entry (see Mission 2).
  • Competitive tendering: firms bid for the right to supply a public service.
  • Privatisation: sell state-owned firms, often opening the market to rivals (see Mission 2).
  • Help for small businesses: grants, simpler rules, access to finance.
  • Make markets more contestable: lower barriers to entry so the threat of entry disciplines incumbents.
Mission 3

Impact on the economy

  • Prices: fall as cartels end and rivals enter.
  • Output and employment: output rises towards the competitive level. Jobs may rise across the market, though a merger blocked or a firm broken up can also cost jobs at the firm itself.
  • Profit: supernormal profit is squeezed.
  • Efficiency: allocative (P nearer MC), productive and X-efficiency improve. Dynamic efficiency may rise or fall.
  • Quality and choice: rivals compete to attract buyers.
  • Economic welfare: deadweight loss falls.
Mission 3Evaluate

How well does competition policy work?

  • It depends on information: proving a cartel, or telling predation from fierce competition, is hard and slow.
  • It depends on the size of the market: blocking a merger may stop a firm reaching the scale it needs to compete with global rivals.
  • It depends on dynamic efficiency: large firms' supernormal profit may fund R&D.
  • It depends on fines: too small to deter, or passed on to buyers?
  • It depends on the authority: regulatory capture (it comes to side with the firms it oversees) and the cost of investigations.
  • It depends on contestability: where entry is easy, the threat of entry may protect buyers without intervention.
Mission check

?Illustrative case: four firms supply cement in a country, with market shares of 35%, 25%, 20% and 20%. The two smallest firms propose to merge, saying it will cut their costs. Which finding gives the strongest economic case for the competition authority to allow the merger?
Mission 4

Mission 4: When a government steps in to fix a market, how can it end up making things worse?

Make a guess: Why might a policy meant to fix a market leave it worse off?

Mission 4

When the cure is worse

  • Markets can fail (earlier missions). Governments step in with taxes, subsidies, rules and provision.
  • But intervention can also go wrong.
  • Government failure: intervention that causes a net welfare loss compared with leaving the market alone. Resources end up misallocated.
  • A policy that has costs, or does not fix the problem fully, is not automatically a failure.
  • The test: is society better or worse off overall than with no intervention?
  • Say: "government failure = intervention leads to a net welfare loss" — not: "any policy that costs money".
Mission 4

Inadequate information

Tax set too highCosts and benefits0Q taxQ*QmQuantityMPB = MSB = DMPC = SMSCMPC + taxtaxwelfare loss (overproduction)new welfare loss (underproduction)old welfare loss
  • To set a Pigouvian tax, the government needs the MEC. It rarely knows it.
  • Also called information gaps.
  • Illustrative data: MPB = MSB = 100 − Q; MPC = 20 + Q; true MEC = 20.
  • No tax: Qm = 40; welfare loss = 100.
  • The government overestimates the harm and sets a tax of 50.
  • New supply: 70 + Q. 100 − Q = 70 + Q, so Q = 15. Q* is 30.
  • Now underproduction. At Q = 15: MSB = 85, MSC = 55, a gap of 30.
  • New welfare loss = ½ × (30 − 15) × 30 = 225.
  • 225 > 100: society is worse off than with no tax. Government failure.
Mission 4Graph lab

How wrong can the tax be?

Illustrative data: as the previous screen. MEC = 20; the market alone gives a welfare loss of 100.

How wrong can the tax be?Price, costs and benefitsQuantityQ*QmMPB = MSBMPCMSCno-tax loss 100100Welfare losswith this tax
  • Takeaway: a tax a little wrong still helps. A tax far too high can do more harm than the externality.
Quick check
?Illustrative data: MPB = MSB = 60 − Q; MPC = Q. The MEC is 10 at every output, so the market output is 30, the social optimum is 25 and the welfare loss with no tax is 25. The government sets a tax of 30 per unit. What is the new welfare loss, and is this government failure?
Mission 4

Distortions of price signals

Guaranteed price creates a surplusPrice0PminPeQdQeQssurplus: bought into storeQuantityDScost to taxpayers = Pmin × (Qs − Qd)
  • Prices tell producers what to make and consumers what to buy.
  • Taxes, subsidies and price controls change prices. Set badly, they send the wrong signals.
  • Also called price distortion or market distortion.
  • Real world: the European Community's farm policy (CAP) guaranteed farmers high prices and bought up what did not sell.
    • Farmers produced more than consumers wanted.
    • Surpluses filled stores: "butter mountains" and "wine lakes", paid for by taxpayers.
    • From 1984, milk quotas were brought in to limit dairy output.
  • One intervention led to another to fix its side-effects.
Mission 4

Unintended consequences

  • People and firms respond to a policy, sometimes in ways nobody planned.
  • Real world: Mexico City, 1989, "Hoy No Circula" (No Driving Today).
    • Most cars banned from driving one weekday a week, by the last digit of the number plate.
    • Aim: cleaner air.
    • A 2008 study found no evidence that air quality improved.
    • Many households bought an extra car, often an older, more polluting one, to drive on their banned day.
  • Other examples: high taxes on cigarettes can encourage smuggling; rent controls can shrink the supply of rented homes.
Mission 4

Administrative costs

  • Every policy must be designed, run, monitored and enforced.
  • These administrative costs use scarce resources: staff, inspections, IT, legal cases.
  • Firms bear compliance costs too: paperwork, reporting, meeting standards.
  • Illustrative data: a tax on a pollutant removes a welfare loss of 100 a year.
    • Collecting the tax and checking emissions costs 120 a year.
    • Net effect: 100 − 120 = −20. Society is worse off: government failure.
  • Costs can exceed gains when the externality is small, or polluters are many and small.
Mission 4

Conflicting objectives

  • Governments pursue many goals at once: cleaner air, low prices, jobs, tax revenue, re-election.
  • A policy that serves one goal can harm another, so it may be set at the wrong level, or dropped.
  • Real world: the UK planned yearly inflation-linked rises in fuel duty. They were cancelled every year from 2011 to 2025, and duty was cut by 5p a litre in 2022, after fuel prices jumped.
  • Tobacco taxes aim to cut smoking, yet they also raise revenue that depends on people still smoking.
  • Say: "conflicting objectives" — not: "the government did not care". Both goals may be valid.
Mission 4

Capture and political incentives

  • Regulatory capture: a regulator comes to serve the industry it regulates, not the public.
    • Close contacts; staff moving between regulator and industry; lobbying.
  • Asymmetric information in regulation: the firm knows its true costs and harm; the regulator does not. Firms can overstate the cost of meeting rules.
  • Political incentives: politicians face elections. They may favour quick, visible gains over long-term benefits (short-termism), or respond to strong lobby groups.
  • These are why some economists argue that intervention should be limited to clear, large market failures; others argue for better-designed institutions instead.
Quick check
?Illustrative data: a city charges households for rubbish by weight. Households respond as planned and throw away less, a gain to society worth 2 million a year. Weighing every bin, sending bills and chasing unpaid ones costs 3 million a year. Which cause of government failure does this show?
Mission 4Evaluate

Market failure or government failure?

It depends on:

  • The size of the market failure. A large externality can justify intervention even if the policy is imperfect.
  • Information. Where the MEC can be measured, policy can be set closer to the optimum.
  • Flexibility. A tax can be adjusted as evidence comes in; a large project or a ban is harder to undo.
  • Effectiveness. Does the policy change behaviour? Inelastic demand can make a tax raise revenue but cut little harm.
  • Consequences for stakeholders. Who gains and who loses: consumers, producers, workers, taxpayers, the government, third parties.
  • Government failure is a reason to design policy carefully, not proof that intervention never works.
Mission check

?Illustrative data: a market for private bus services gives too few journeys. The welfare loss is 300 a year. The government brings in a subsidy. Afterwards, the welfare loss is 80 a year and the subsidy scheme costs 150 a year to run. Has government failure occurred?
Recap

The big ideas

Mission 1

  • Primary commodity prices are volatile: supply shifts often, and both PED and PES are low.
  • With inelastic demand, a bigger harvest can mean lower revenue.
  • A buffer stock buys at the floor in good years and sells at the ceiling in bad years; it fails if the band is set above the long-run price or funds run out.

Mission 2

  • Nationalisation, privatisation, regulation and deregulation answer two different questions: who owns the firm, and what rules it faces.
  • Privatisation and deregulation can cut costs and prices where rivals can enter; natural monopolies still need regulation.
  • Regulators face asymmetric information and the risk of regulatory capture.
  • As supply-side policies, they aim to shift LRAS to the right.

Mission 3

  • Competition policy targets anti-competitive agreements, abuse of dominance and mergers that would substantially lessen competition.
  • UK: the CMA enforces the Competition Act 1998 and the Enterprise Act 2002; fines up to 10% of worldwide turnover. The EU has parallel rules.

Mission 4

  • Government failure: intervention that causes a net welfare loss compared with the market outcome.
  • Causes: inadequate information, price distortion, unintended consequences, administrative costs, conflicting objectives, regulatory capture and political incentives.
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Mini-lesson complete!

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You've worked through Government intervention and failure (part 2) for OCR A-level Economics. 🎉

  1. Mission 1Why can a huge harvest leave farmers with less money than a small one?
  2. Mission 2Should a country's trains, water pipes and power lines be run by the state or by private companies?
  3. Mission 3When should a government stop big firms from merging, fixing prices or growing too powerful?
  4. Mission 4When a government steps in to fix a market, how can it end up making things worse?

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