Now the home currency depreciates 5% against partners' currencies.
Home ULC in partners' currency falls by 5%: 101.9 × 0.95 = 96.8: more competitive.
So the exchange rate can outweigh wage and productivity changes.
Mission 1
Relative export prices
Relative export prices = index of home export prices ÷ index of rivals' export prices (in a common currency) × 100.
Illustrative data: home export price index 104, rivals' 102. Relative export prices = 104 ÷ 102 × 100 = 102.0: less price competitive.
Home currency depreciates 3%: 104 × 0.97 ÷ 102 × 100 = 98.9: more price competitive.
Export prices depend on ULC, but also on other costs (energy, materials), profit margins and the exchange rate.
Say: "relative export prices" compare our export prices with rivals' export prices — not: with our import prices (that is the terms of trade).
Quick check
?Which change would make a country's relative export price index fall, so it becomes more price competitive?
Mission 1
What drives competitiveness
Price factors:
wage costs relative to productivity (investment, skills, technology, management)
the exchange rate
inflation relative to trading partners
taxes, regulation, energy costs, infrastructure
Non-price factors: quality, design, innovation (research and development), reliability, branding.
Economies of scale: a large firm, even a monopoly, may have low enough costs to compete worldwide. But without competition at home it may become X-inefficient.
Mission 1
Real case: Spain and Germany in the euro
Nominal unit labour costs, index 2015 = 100 (Eurostat):
2000
2008
Change
Spain
80.1
105.2
+31.3%
Germany
84.5
86.3
+2.0%
Both use the euro, so no exchange rate change between them.
Current account, 2007 (IMF): Spain −9.4% of GDP; Germany +6.5%.
ULC is not the whole story: Spain's credit and construction boom also pulled in imports.
Quick check
?In the case above, why could Spain not use a depreciation to restore its price competitiveness against Germany?
Mission 1
Benefits and problems
Benefits of being competitive:
export-led growth and more jobs
a stronger current account
more inward FDI
economies of scale from bigger markets
Problems of being uncompetitive:
current account deficits and falling shares of world markets
deindustrialisation and structural unemployment in exposed industries
slower growth; pressure on the currency, so dearer imports and inflation
less inward investment
Competing on low wages keeps costs down but also keeps living standards down. Competing on productivity raises both.
Mission 1Evaluate
How useful are the measures?
It depends on:
Non-price factors: a country with high relative ULC can still win on quality and brand.
Sector mix: ULC averages over the whole economy; exporters may differ from the average.
The exchange rate: it can swing relative costs fast, and reverse just as fast.
The route: lower relative ULC from productivity growth is lasting; from wage cuts it lowers living standards.
Mission check
?Illustrative data. In a year, Country K's labour cost per worker rises 6% and its output per worker rises 6%. Its trading partners' unit labour costs, in their own currencies, do not change. K's currency appreciates 10% against theirs. What happens to K's relative unit labour costs?
Competitiveness is relative and measured in a common currency. Pay, productivity and the exchange rate all count.
Mission 2
Mission 2: Should a country's trains, water pipes and power lines be run by the state or by private companies?
Make a guess: Should a country's trains, water pipes and power lines be run by the state or by private companies?
Mission 2
Four tools, four meanings
Nationalisation: the state takes a firm or industry into public ownership.
Privatisation: transfer of a firm or activity from the public sector to the private sector.
Regulation: rules set by government or an appointed regulator, e.g. on prices, quality, safety or entry.
Deregulation: removing rules that restrict entry, prices or how firms operate.
Ownership (who owns it) and market structure (how many rivals) are separate questions.
Say: "privatisation changes the owner" — not: "privatisation creates competition".
Mission 2
Forms of privatisation
Sale of a state-owned firm: shares sold to the public or a buyer (denationalisation). E.g. British Telecom (1984).
Contracting out (competitive tendering): the state still pays for a service but invites private firms to bid to provide it, e.g. bin collection.
Liberalisation: opening a state monopoly to private rivals (a form of deregulation).
Public–private partnership (PPP): a private firm finances, builds and often runs a public project (e.g. a hospital); the state pays over many years.
Sale of state assets, e.g. land or council houses.
Mission 2
The case for privatisation
Profit motive: private owners gain from cutting costs, so less X-inefficiency (waste when a firm faces little pressure to keep costs down).
Shareholder pressure: a poorly run firm's share price falls, and it risks a takeover.
Competition, where the industry allows rivals: lower prices, more choice.
Access to private capital for investment, without adding to government borrowing.
One-off revenue for the government from the sale.
Less political interference in pricing and investment decisions.
Example: the UK sold telecoms (1984), gas (1986), water in England and Wales (1989), electricity (1990–91) and rail (1994–97).
Mission 2
The case against, and renationalisation
A natural monopoly (one network serves the whole market most cheaply, e.g. a power grid) sold whole stays a monopoly: a private monopoly still needs regulation.
Short-termism: dividends may come before long-term investment.
Social objectives may be dropped, e.g. loss-making rural routes.
Sale price: if shares are sold too cheaply, taxpayers lose; the one-off revenue replaces a flow of future profits.
Fragmentation: splitting a network among many firms can raise coordination costs.
Renationalisation arguments: run for the public interest, cheaper public borrowing, no dividends to pay out, one integrated network.
Example: Railtrack (privatised rail infrastructure) was replaced in 2002 by Network Rail, now a public body. A 2024 law lets passenger train services in Great Britain return to public ownership as contracts end.
Quick check
?A city council stops using its own staff to clean public parks. It invites private firms to bid, and pays the winning firm to do the work for five years. The parks stay free to use. Which policy is this?
Mission 2
Nationalisation: evaluate
For:
Can price nearer MC and serve social aims (e.g. universal service), not just profit.
Long-term investment in networks; account for externalities.
Rescue of a failing firm that the economy relies on, e.g. the bank Northern Rock (UK, 2008).
Against:
Weak profit incentive: X-inefficiency; losses may be covered by taxpayers (a "soft budget").
Political interference, e.g. prices held down before elections.
Investment competes with schools and hospitals for public money.
Cost of compensating the previous owners.
Mission 2
Deregulation, licences and prohibitions
A licence limits who may operate (e.g. taxis, mobile spectrum). A prohibition bans an activity outright.
Deregulation removes barriers, so new firms can enter: supply rises, prices fall, choice widens.
Example: the US Airline Deregulation Act (1978) ended government control of fares and routes.
Example: UK local buses outside London were deregulated in 1986: any licensed operator could run a route.
Risks: firms "cherry-pick" profitable routes; safety and quality may suffer; financial deregulation can raise risk-taking.
Say: "deregulation lowers barriers to entry" — not: "deregulation means no rules at all".
Mission 2Graph lab
Lift the licence cap
Illustrative data. A city caps taxi licences, limiting rides to 5,000 a day. Fare: 20. Cost of the last ride (MC): 11.
Takeaway: removing an entry limit shifts the market to where price = MC. The gap was a reward for holding a licence.
Step 1 of 3
Mission 2
Worked example: competitive tendering
Illustrative data. A council's in-house refuse service costs 1.20 million a year.
Bids: Firm X 0.96 million; Firm Y 1.02 million.
Saving with X = 1.20 − 0.96 = 0.24 million. As a %: 0.24 ÷ 1.20 × 100 = 20%.
Saving with Y = 0.18 million = 15%.
But the cheapest bid is not always best value: check quality standards, penalties for missed collections, and staff terms.
Example: UK councils had to tender services such as refuse collection after the Local Government Act 1988.
PPP example: the UK's Private Finance Initiative (from 1992) built hospitals and schools. In 2018 the UK government stopped signing new PFI deals, after the National Audit Office questioned their value for money. Supporters point to projects delivered on time and risk passed to private firms.
Quick check
?Illustrative data. A hospital spends 2.50 million a year on its own cleaning staff. After tendering, it accepts a bid of 2.00 million a year. What is the percentage saving?
Mission 2
What regulators do
Where competition is weak, a regulator acts for consumers in its place.
Role: set price caps, quality and service standards; grant licences; give rivals fair access to networks; fine firms that break the rules.
UK examples: Ofwat (water), Ofgem (energy), Ofcom (communications), the Office of Rail and Road.
Mission 2
When regulators fail
Asymmetric information: the firm knows its costs better than the regulator. It may overstate costs to win a looser price cap.
Regulatory capture: a regulator comes to act in the interests of the firms it regulates, not consumers.
Why capture happens:
The regulator relies on the industry for information and expert staff.
A revolving door: staff move between regulator and industry.
A few firms gain a lot and lobby hard; millions of consumers each lose a little.
Example: after the 2010 Deepwater Horizon oil spill, the US Minerals Management Service, criticised as too close to the industry it oversaw, was broken up (2010–11).
Say: "regulatory capture" — not: "the regulator was bribed". Capture can happen without any law being broken.
Quick check
?Illustrative case: a country's rail regulator hires most of its senior staff from the train companies. Over ten years it approves every fare rise the companies ask for, using cost figures that only the companies collect. Which problem does this best show?
Mission 2Evaluate
Does it work?
It depends on competition: privatising a firm that faces rivals differs from selling a natural monopoly.
It depends on regulation: information, capture and the regulator's powers.
It depends on time: cost savings may come fast; under-investment may show only years later.
It depends on objectives: efficiency and low prices, or universal service and equity?
Evidence on ownership is mixed: many studies find that competition and regulation matter at least as much as who owns the firm.
Mission check
?Illustrative case: a government sells its state-owned national electricity grid as a single company. There is still only one grid, and the government sets up no regulator. What is the most likely result for the price of using the grid?
Privatising a monopoly without competition or regulation swaps a public monopoly for a private one.
Mission 3
Mission 3: When only a few big firms share a market, why do their prices so often move together?
Make a guess: When only a few big firms share a market, why do their prices so often move together?
Mission 3
A few firms dominate
Oligopoly: a market dominated by a few large firms.
High barriers to entry (economies of scale, brands, patents, high start-up costs).
Products may be identical (cement, crude oil) or differentiated (cars, smartphones, supermarkets).
Much non-price competition: advertising, branding, loyalty schemes.
Mission 3
Interdependence
Interdependence: each firm's best choice depends on what its rivals do.
So every decision (price, output, advertising) brings uncertainty: how will rivals react?
If one firm cuts its price, rivals may match the cut to protect their sales. All end up with lower prices and little extra market share.
If one firm raises its price, rivals may not follow, and it loses customers to them.
Matching cuts can spiral into a price war: each firm undercuts the others, and profits fall for all.
Say: "oligopolists are interdependent" — not: "oligopolists ignore their rivals" or "oligopolists always collude".
Mission 3
Compete or collude?
Non-collusive oligopoly: firms compete; each decides alone.
Collusive oligopoly: firms cooperate to limit competition, e.g. fixing prices or sharing out markets.
Overt (explicit) collusion: a formal agreement. A cartel is a group of firms that agree on prices or output.
Tacit collusion: no agreement, but firms behave as if there were one, e.g. following a price leader.
Why collude? Less uncertainty, higher joint profit, keeping new firms out.
Why not? Cartels are illegal in most countries, there may be fines, and members may cheat.
Mission 3
When does a cartel work?
A cartel is more likely to hold when there are:
few firms (easier to agree and to watch each other)
similar costs and similar products (easier to agree one price)
high barriers to entry (no newcomers to undercut the cartel)
easy monitoring of rivals' prices and output (cheating gets spotted)
stable demand (less pressure to break ranks)
weak enforcement of competition law
Consequences: higher prices, lower output, high profit for members, less choice; buyers lose surplus.
Quick check
?Four firms in a market are thinking of forming a cartel. Which set of conditions makes the cartel most likely to last?
Mission 3
A cartel acts like a monopoly
Step 1 of 2
The members act as one firm: they face the industry demand curve.
Joint profit is greatest where industry MR = MC. Price is read up to AR.
Members then share the output out as quotas.
Illustrative data: AR = 100 − Q; MC = AC = 20 for every member.
Cartel: MR = 100 − 2Q = 20, so Q = 40, P = 60.
Competitive benchmark: P = MC = 20, Q = 80.
Mission 3
Worked example: the pull to cheat
Illustrative data: two firms, A and B. AR = 100 − Q. MC = AC = 20.
A secretly produces 25. Q = 45, so P = 100 − 45 = 55.
A: (55 − 20) × 25 = 875. A gains.
B: (55 − 20) × 20 = 700. B loses.
If both produce 25: Q = 50, P = 50. Each earns (50 − 20) × 25 = 750.
Each firm gains by cheating, whatever the other does. Together they lose. (Payoff matrix in Mission 4.)
Mission 3Graph lab
Break the quota?
Illustrative data as the previous screen. B keeps to its quota of 20.
Takeaway: cheating pays the cheater (up to a point) but lowers joint profit and the other member's profit.
Quick check
?Illustrative data as an earlier screen: AR = 100 − Q, MC = AC = 20, quotas of 20 each. Firm A produces 30; firm B keeps to 20. What is B's profit?
Mission 3
Price leadership and tacit collusion
Price leadership: one firm changes its price; the others follow.
Dominant-firm leadership: the largest firm leads.
Barometric leadership: a firm that reads market conditions well leads.
No meeting and no agreement: this is tacit collusion, which is hard to prove.
Result: prices that move together and stay stable for long periods.
Mission 3
Real cartels
OPEC: set up in 1960 by Iran, Iraq, Kuwait, Saudi Arabia and Venezuela. Members agree production targets to influence the world oil price.
Truck makers (EU): in 2016 the European Commission fined truck makers a total of €2.93 billion for colluding on prices from 1997 to 2011.
One member, MAN, revealed the cartel and was not fined: the law rewards the first to confess.
In the UK, cartels are illegal under the Competition Act 1998. The CMA investigates them.
OPEC is made up of governments, not private firms. Competition laws on cartels do not apply to it in the same way.
Mission 3Evaluate
Is oligopoly good or bad?
Costs: prices above MC (allocative inefficiency); collusion transfers surplus to firms; heavy advertising may add to costs.
Benefits: economies of scale can mean low average costs; supernormal profit can fund research and new products (dynamic efficiency); non-price competition can raise quality and choice.
It depends on conduct: fierce rivalry (even price wars) helps buyers; collusion harms them.
It depends on barriers: if entry is possible, the threat of new firms limits high prices.
It depends on regulation: the chance of being caught and fined.
Mission check
?Illustrative case: three airlines fly the same route at similar fares. One airline thinks about cutting its fare by 10%. Which is the strongest reason it may decide not to?
In oligopoly, every price decision depends on how rivals react. That is why prices often stay put or move together.
Mission 4
Mission 4: How can two rival firms each make their best choice and still both end up worse off?
Make a guess: How can two rival firms each make their best choice and still both end up worse off?
Mission 4
A game between firms
Game theory studies decisions where your result depends on others' choices too.
Every game has:
players (here, two firms)
strategies (the choices open to each player, e.g. high price or low price)
payoffs (what each player gets, e.g. profit, for each pair of choices)
Oligopoly fits: firms are interdependent (see Mission 3).
Say: "a strategy is a choice of action" — not: "a strategy is a payoff".
Mission 4
The payoff matrix
Step 1 of 3
Illustrative data: the cartel from Mission 3. Each firm either keeps to its quota (20 units) or cheats (25 units).
B keeps to quota
B cheats
A keeps to quota
800, 800
700, 875
A cheats
875, 700
750, 750
Each cell: (A's profit, B's profit). A chooses the row; B chooses the column.
Example: A keeps to quota, B cheats → A earns 700, B earns 875.
Mission 4
Dominant strategy
Step 3 of 3
A dominant strategy is best for a player whatever the other player does.
Method: fix the rival's choice, then compare your payoffs.
A's view:
If B keeps to quota: cheat 875 > keep 800.
If B cheats: cheat 750 > keep 700.
So cheating is A's dominant strategy. B's payoffs mirror A's, so B's dominant strategy is also to cheat.
Say: "dominant strategy: best whatever the rival does" — not: "the strategy with the biggest number in the matrix".
Quick check
?Illustrative data. Two firms, P and Q, each choose a high or a low price. Each cell shows (P's profit, Q's profit).
Q: high price
Q: low price
P: high price
100, 90
40, 110
P: low price
120, 50
60, 60
What is firm P's dominant strategy?
Mission 4
Nash equilibrium
Step 3 of 3
Nash equilibrium: an outcome where no player can do better by changing only its own strategy, given the other's choice.
Check each cell: would either player want to switch?
In the cartel game: (cheat, cheat) → (750, 750).
A switching to "keep" gets 700 < 750. B switching gets 700 < 750. No one gains: Nash equilibrium.
(keep, keep) → (800, 800) is not a Nash equilibrium: each firm could earn 875 by cheating.
When both players have a dominant strategy, the Nash equilibrium is where they both play it.
Say: "no player has an incentive to change strategy alone" — not: "both players get their best possible payoff".
Mission 4
The prisoner's dilemma
The story: two suspects are questioned in separate rooms. Each can confess or stay silent.
Confessing is each one's dominant strategy. Both confess, yet both would get shorter sentences if both stayed silent.
A prisoner's dilemma: each player follows its own dominant strategy, and both end up worse off than if they had cooperated.
The cartel game is a prisoner's dilemma:
Nash equilibrium: (cheat, cheat): 750 each.
Cooperation: (keep, keep): 800 each.
Why cooperation fails: neither firm can trust the other, and a cartel agreement cannot be enforced in court.
Mission 4Graph lab
Can a penalty hold the cartel together?
Illustrative data as an earlier screen. The cartel agrees a penalty that any member caught cheating must pay. It is taken off the cheater's payoff.
Takeaway: keeping to the quota is dominant only when cheating pays less whatever the rival does: here a penalty above 75.
Mission 4
No dominant strategy
Not every player has a dominant strategy. Find the Nash equilibrium by checking best responses.
Illustrative data. Each cell: (X's profit, Y's profit).
Y: low price
Y: high price
X: low price
30, 40
60, 20
X: high price
20, 50
70, 30
Y: low is better whether X is low (40 > 20) or high (50 > 30). Y's dominant strategy: low.
X: if Y is low, X picks low (30 > 20); if Y is high, X picks high (70 > 60). X has no dominant strategy.
X expects Y to play low, so X plays low. Nash equilibrium: (low, low) → (30, 40).
Some games have more than one Nash equilibrium. A game can have a Nash equilibrium even when neither player has a dominant strategy.
Quick check
?Illustrative data. Two firms each choose technology standard 1 or standard 2. Each cell: (X's profit, Y's profit).
Y: standard 1
Y: standard 2
X: standard 1
50, 40
10, 10
X: standard 2
5, 15
40, 50
Which outcome or outcomes are Nash equilibria?
Mission 4
Why the monopoly outcome is hard to reach
Illustrative data as (AR = 100 − Q, MC = AC = 20):
Outcome
Price
Total output
Monopoly (cartel keeps to quotas)
60
40
Both cheat (Nash equilibrium)
50
50
Perfect competition (P = MC)
20
80
Each firm's incentive to cheat pulls price below the monopoly price.
But price stays above, and output below, the perfectly competitive outcome.
Firms that meet again and again (a repeated game) may keep cooperating: cheating today could start a price war tomorrow.
Quick check
?Illustrative data as the earlier screens: AR = 100 − Q, MC = AC = 20; quota 20 each; "cheat" means producing 25. What is the market price at the Nash equilibrium of this game?
Mission 4Evaluate
How useful is game theory?
It shows why oligopolists are interdependent, and why cartels are unstable.
It depends on whether the game is one-off or repeated: repeated play makes cooperation easier (match what the rival did last time).
It depends on information: real firms rarely know their rivals' payoffs.
It depends on the number of firms: real markets often have more than two.
It depends on rationality: firms may value trust, reputation or market share, not just this period's profit.
Policy use: leniency rules turn a cartel into a prisoner's dilemma. The first member to confess is not fined (as with MAN in Mission 3).
Mission check
?Illustrative data. Two rival phone makers each choose whether to run a large advertising campaign. Each cell: (A's profit, B's profit).
B advertises
B does not
A advertises
30, 30
70, 10
A does not
10, 70
50, 50
Which statement is correct?
In a prisoner's dilemma, each player's dominant strategy leads to a Nash equilibrium that leaves both worse off than cooperating.
Mission 5
Mission 5: When should a government stop big firms from merging, fixing prices or growing too powerful?
Make a guess: When should a government stop big firms from merging, fixing prices or growing too powerful?
Mission 5
Why have competition policy?
Market power can mean higher prices, lower output, less choice and a deadweight loss.
Firms with little competition may also let costs drift up (X-inefficiency) and innovate less.
Competition policy: laws and authorities that promote competition and stop firms abusing market power.
2. Abuse of a dominant position: e.g. predatory pricing (pricing below cost to drive out a rival), refusing to supply rivals, forcing buyers to take one product to get another.
3. Mergers that would substantially lessen competition.
Being large is not illegal. Abusing that position is.
The key question: would buyers face higher prices, lower quality or less choice?
A firm facing cheap imports or easy entry by rivals has little power to raise prices, even with a large share.
Mission 5
UK and EU rules
Competition and Markets Authority (CMA), since 2014: investigates cartels, abuse of dominance and mergers.
Competition Act 1998: bans anti-competitive agreements and abuse of a dominant position. Fines up to 10% of worldwide turnover.
Enterprise Act 2002: merger control; taking part in a cartel can be a criminal offence.
Leniency: the first cartel member to report can avoid a fine. This makes cartels unstable.
Regulators (e.g. Ofgem, Ofwat, Ofcom) also have competition powers in their industries.
Real case: in 2019 the CMA blocked the merger of Sainsbury's and Asda, two of the largest UK supermarket chains.
EU (awareness only): the European Commission enforces bans on cartels and abuse of dominance. In 2016 it fined truck makers €2.93 billion for a price-fixing cartel, and in 2017 Google €2.42 billion for abusing its dominance in online search.
Since the end of 2020 the Commission no longer rules on UK markets. The CMA does.
Quick check
?Which of these is most likely to break competition law?
Mission 5
Worked example: a merger
Illustrative data. Market shares (%): A 30, B 20, C 15, D 10, others 25 (each under 5).
Merger types: horizontal (same stage, rivals: B + C), vertical (supplier and buyer), conglomerate (unrelated markets).
Horizontal mergers get the closest scrutiny: they remove a rival directly.
The authority can clear the merger, clear it with conditions (e.g. sell some stores), or block it.
Against the loss of a rival, it weighs any cost savings passed on to buyers.
Mission 5Graph lab
What does a cartel cost buyers?
Illustrative data. Market demand: P = 50 − Q. MC = AC = 10. A cartel acts like a monopoly: P = 30, Q = 20. Competition would give P = 10, Q = 40.
Takeaway: ending a cartel returns its profit to buyers and removes the deadweight loss.
Quick check
?Illustrative data. Market demand is P = 80 − 2Q and MC = AC = 20. A cartel sets Q = 15 and P = 50, earning a profit of 450. Under competition, P = 20 and Q = 30. If the cartel is broken up, by how much does consumer surplus rise?
Ban unfair trading practices: e.g. misleading pricing, forcing suppliers into unfair terms.
Deregulation: remove legal barriers to entry (see Mission 2).
Competitive tendering: firms bid for the right to supply a public service.
Privatisation: sell state-owned firms, often opening the market to rivals (see Mission 2).
Help for small businesses: grants, simpler rules, access to finance.
Make markets more contestable: lower barriers to entry so the threat of entry disciplines incumbents.
Mission 5
Impact on the economy
Prices: fall as cartels end and rivals enter.
Output and employment: output rises towards the competitive level. Jobs may rise across the market, though a merger blocked or a firm broken up can also cost jobs at the firm itself.
Profit: supernormal profit is squeezed.
Efficiency: allocative (P nearer MC), productive and X-efficiency improve. Dynamic efficiency may rise or fall.
Quality and choice: rivals compete to attract buyers.
Economic welfare: deadweight loss falls.
Mission 5Evaluate
How well does competition policy work?
It depends on information: proving a cartel, or telling predation from fierce competition, is hard and slow.
It depends on the size of the market: blocking a merger may stop a firm reaching the scale it needs to compete with global rivals.
It depends on dynamic efficiency: large firms' supernormal profit may fund R&D.
It depends on fines: too small to deter, or passed on to buyers?
It depends on the authority: regulatory capture (it comes to side with the firms it oversees) and the cost of investigations.
It depends on contestability: where entry is easy, the threat of entry may protect buyers without intervention.
Mission check
?Illustrative case: four firms supply cement in a country, with market shares of 35%, 25%, 20% and 20%. The two smallest firms propose to merge, saying it will cut their costs. Which finding gives the strongest economic case for the competition authority to allow the merger?
The test is not size or profit but whether buyers would lose: higher prices, less choice or lower quality.
Recap
The big ideas
Mission 1
ULC = labour cost per worker ÷ output per worker. High wages with high productivity can still mean low ULC.
Relative ULC and relative export prices compare a country with its rivals in a common currency. Rising = less competitive.
Productivity, inflation, the exchange rate and non-price factors drive competitiveness.
Mission 2
Nationalisation, privatisation, regulation and deregulation answer two different questions: who owns the firm, and what rules it faces.
Privatisation and deregulation can cut costs and prices where rivals can enter; natural monopolies still need regulation.
Regulators face asymmetric information and the risk of regulatory capture.
Mission 3
Oligopoly: a few large firms, high barriers, interdependence and uncertainty.
Firms can compete or collude: overtly (cartels) or tacitly (price leadership). Cartels act like a monopoly but each member is tempted to cheat.
Mission 4
Payoff matrix: players, strategies, payoffs; each cell is (row player, column player).
Dominant strategy: best whatever the rival does. Nash equilibrium: no player gains by changing only its own strategy.
Prisoner's dilemma: each plays its dominant strategy, and both end up worse off than if they had cooperated. That is why cartels are unstable.
Mission 5
Competition policy targets anti-competitive agreements, abuse of dominance and mergers that would substantially lessen competition.
UK: the CMA enforces the Competition Act 1998 and the Enterprise Act 2002; fines up to 10% of worldwide turnover. The EU has parallel rules.
🏆
Mini-lesson complete!
⭐⭐⭐
You've worked through Market structures (part 3) for Eduqas A-level Economics. 🎉
Mission 1What makes one country's goods cheaper to buy than another's, even when wages are higher?
Mission 2Should a country's trains, water pipes and power lines be run by the state or by private companies?
Mission 3When only a few big firms share a market, why do their prices so often move together?
Mission 4How can two rival firms each make their best choice and still both end up worse off?
Mission 5When should a government stop big firms from merging, fixing prices or growing too powerful?
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