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Pearson Edexcel A-level Economics A (9EC0) · 3.4 Market structures (part 2 of 2)
Mini-Lesson

Market structures (part 2)

6 missions. Guess, learn, then check. Your place is saved.

  1. Mission 1Why do a few big rival firms so often compete on brand and quality instead of simply cutting prices?
  2. Mission 2If one company controls a whole market, why doesn't it just charge the highest price it can?
  3. Mission 3Why can two people sitting side by side on the same train have paid very different fares?
  4. Mission 4Why might it make sense for only one company to lay the water pipes in a city?
  5. Mission 5Why would a firm refuse to hire a worker who would add more to its sales than they are paid?
  6. Mission 6Can a market with only one firm still behave as if it were full of competitors?
Mission 1

Mission 1: Why do a few big rival firms so often compete on brand and quality instead of simply cutting prices?

Make a guess: Why do a few big rival firms so often compete on brand and quality instead of simply cutting prices?

Mission 1

Rivals watching rivals

  • Oligopoly: a few large firms dominate the market.
  • Firms are interdependent: each firm's best move depends on how its rivals react.
  • Two ways to win customers:
    • Price competition: cutting prices below rivals'.
    • Non-price competition: anything else that wins customers: branding, advertising, quality, design, service.
Mission 1

Worked example: a price war

Price warDaily profit, two rival firms (illustrative data)Profit AProfit BPrice 10400Price 10400Price 9450Price 10240400 at the startPrice 9330Price 9330400 at the startBoth charge 10 and sell 100 units. AC = 6, soeach earns (10 - 6) × 100 = 400.A cuts to 9 and sells 150: profit 450. B keeps 10and sells 60: profit 240.B matches at 9: both sell 110 and earn 330. Bothare worse off than at the start. B might cut to 8,then A to 7: a price war.
  • Illustrative data. Two firms, A and B. Each sells 100 units a day at 10. AC = 6 for both.
    • Profit each: (10 − 6) × 100 = 400.
  • A cuts its price to 9. B keeps 10.
    • A sells 150: profit (9 − 6) × 150 = 450. B sells 60: profit 240.
  • B matches: both charge 9 and sell 110 each.
    • Profit each: (9 − 6) × 110 = 330. Both are worse off than at the start.
  • B might cut to 8, then A to 7: a price war. Prices fall towards cost; profit is squeezed.
  • Consumers gain in the short run. Weaker firms may leave, leaving fewer rivals in the long run.
Quick check
?Illustrative data. Two rival firms each sell 200 units a week at a price of 5, with an average cost of 3. One firm cuts its price to 4. The other matches at once, and each now sells 220 units. What is each firm's weekly profit after the price cut?
Mission 1

Stable prices, leaders and followers

  • Because a price cut is likely to be matched, prices in oligopoly are often stable ("sticky") for long periods (the kinked demand curve).
  • Price leadership: one firm, often the largest, changes its price and rivals follow.
  • Tacit agreement: firms keep prices in line with no formal deal and no contact.
  • Following a leader's price is hard to prove as collusion. An agreement to fix prices is a cartel and is illegal.
  • Say: "tacit collusion" for following without agreement — not: "a cartel", which needs an agreement.
Mission 1

Predatory pricing

Predatory pricingPrice0TimeAVCpredator's pricerival exitsprice raisedPrice is cut below AVC (losses now), the rivalleaves, then price rises above its old level(market power later).
  • Predatory pricing: setting price below cost to drive a rival out of the market, then raising price once it has gone.
  • A common test: is price below average variable cost (AVC)?
  • The predator makes losses now for market power later. It needs deep pockets and some way to stop rivals returning.
  • It is illegal as an abuse of a dominant position (UK Competition Act 1998; EU competition law).
  • Real case: in 2003 the European Commission fined Wanadoo, a French internet provider, €10.35 million for predatory pricing of broadband.
  • Hard part: telling predation apart from fierce, fair competition, which also lowers prices.
Mission 1

Limit pricing

Limit pricingPrice0PmPlimitQmQlimitQuantityMC = AC(incumbent)entrant'smin ACD = ARMRsupernormal profit at the limit priceIllustrative data. Pm: profit-maximising price(MR = MC). Plimit: at the entrant's minimum AC.
  • Limit pricing: an established firm sets a price low enough to deter entry, at or just below a possible entrant's minimum average cost.
  • The established firm often has lower costs (economies of scale, experience). So at the limit price it still makes supernormal profit, just less than the short-run maximum.
  • Structural barriers come from the market itself: economies of scale, sunk costs, patents.
  • Behavioural barriers come from firms' strategy: limit pricing, predatory pricing, heavy advertising.
  • Say: "limit pricing keeps price above the firm's own average cost" — not: "selling below cost", which is predatory pricing.
Mission 1Graph lab

The price that keeps rivals out

Illustrative data. An established firm: AC = MC = 6. Market demand: P = 20 − 0.1Q. A rival with a minimum AC of 10 enters only if it expects the price to stay above 10.

The price that keeps rivals outPriceQuantity01001502000610206014DAC = MC (firm)rival's minimum AC
  • Takeaway: the limit price is set by the rival's costs; at 10 the firm still earns 400, against 490 at 13.
Quick check
?Illustrative data. An established firm has an average cost of 20. Its profit-maximising price is 34. A possible entrant has a minimum average cost of 26 and will enter only if it expects the price to stay above 26. Which price is limit pricing?
Mission 1

Non-price competition

Non-price competitionPrice0QuantityDD1D2Non-price competition aims to shift demand right(D1 to D2) and make it less price elastic: steeper.
  • Methods:
    • Product differentiation: design, quality, features, new models.
    • Branding and advertising.
    • Loyalty schemes: points, rewards, memberships.
    • Service: delivery, after-sales care, opening hours, location.
    • Packaging and research and development (R&D).
  • Aim 1: shift the firm's demand curve to the right (D1 → D2): more sold at every price.
  • Aim 2: make demand less price elastic: loyal customers stay even if price rises.
  • Say: "an increase in demand" (a shift) — not: "an extension of demand", which is a movement along the curve.
Mission 1

Why a few rivals prefer it

  • A price cut can be copied in hours. A new design, a strong brand or a loyal customer base takes rivals much longer to copy.
  • It avoids a price war that would hurt every firm.
  • Strong brands raise barriers to entry: a newcomer must spend heavily just to be noticed.
  • Costs:
    • Advertising raises costs, which may be passed on in higher prices.
    • Competitive advertising can cancel out: each firm spends more, market shares barely change.
  • Benefits: informative advertising helps buyers choose; competition on quality and R&D brings better products.
Quick check
?A firm in an oligopoly launches a successful advertising campaign for its product. What is the campaign trying to do to the demand curve for its product?
Mission 1Evaluate

Is rivalry between a few big firms good for consumers?

  • It depends on whether low prices last: a price war helps buyers, unless it is predatory and prices rise later.
  • It depends on the type of non-price competition: better products and useful information, or advertising that only raises costs.
  • It depends on barriers to entry: limit pricing and heavy branding can keep new rivals out.
  • It depends on time: rivalry in R&D can bring large long-run gains.
Mission check

?Illustrative case: two coffee chains have most of the coffee shops in a city. Chain A is choosing between cutting all its prices by 10% and launching a loyalty app that gives a free drink after every ten bought. Which is the strongest reason the app may raise A's profit more than the price cut?
Mission 2

Mission 2: If one company controls a whole market, why doesn't it just charge the highest price it can?

Make a guess: If one company controls a whole market, why doesn't it just charge the highest price it can?

Mission 2

A price maker

Price taker and price makerPerfect competition: price takerPrice (£)0QuantityAR = MR = DMonopoly: price makerPrice (£)0QuantityAR = D
  • Pure monopoly: one firm supplies the whole market. No close substitutes. High barriers to entry.
  • Monopoly power: the power to set price above marginal cost. A firm with a large market share can have it without being the only seller.
  • The monopolist's demand curve is the market demand curve: it slopes down.
  • So it is a price maker: it chooses price, or output, but not both. Demand decides the other.
  • Demand = average revenue (AR): the price received per unit.
Mission 2

Where monopoly power comes from

  • Legal barriers: patents, licences, state franchises. A patent normally lasts up to 20 years.
  • Economies of scale: a large incumbent has lower average cost than any small entrant.
  • Control of a key resource or of the network buyers must use.
  • Sunk costs and brand loyalty: entry is costly and hard to recover.
  • Few close substitutes: the fewer the substitutes, the less price elastic the firm's demand.
  • More barriers and fewer substitutes mean more monopoly power, and power that lasts.
Mission 2

Why MR is below AR

Marginal revenue is below average revenueIllustrative dataPrice (AR) and marginal revenue (MR) byquantity10101982863744625Quantityprice (AR)marginal revenue (MR)The same as straight linesPrice (£)0115.511QuantityARMRMR meets the quantity axis half way to AR.
  • Illustrative data. To sell one more unit, the firm must cut the price on every unit.
QuantityPrice (AR)Total revenueMarginal revenue
1101010
29188
38246
47284
56302
  • The 5th unit sells for 6, but the price cut on the first 4 units loses 4. MR = 6 − 4 = 2.
  • So MR < AR at every output after the first.
  • With a straight-line demand curve, MR is twice as steep as AR.
  • Say: "MR lies below AR for a monopolist" — not: "price equals marginal revenue".
Quick check
?Illustrative data. A monopolist can sell 4 units a day at a price of 20, or 5 units a day at a price of 18. What is the marginal revenue of the 5th unit?
Mission 2

Profit is greatest where MR = MC

Profit is greatest where MR = MCCosts and revenue (£)0PmQmOutput (Q)AR = DMRMCMR slopes down faster than AR. MC isU-shaped.Output Qm is where MR = MC.Read price off the AR curve at Qm: Pm.
  • If MR > MC, one more unit adds more to revenue than to cost: raise output.
  • If MR < MC, the last unit adds more to cost than to revenue: cut output.
  • So profit is maximised at the output where MR = MC.
  • Price: go up from that output to the demand (AR) curve.
  • A monopolist always produces where demand is price elastic: MR is positive there.
  • Say: "read price off the AR curve at the MR = MC output" — not: "price is set where MR = MC".
Mission 2Graph lab

Choose the output

Illustrative data: AR = 50 − Q; MC = AC = 10.

Choose the outputPrice and costOutput0102030405001020304050545AR = DMRMC = AC
  • Takeaway: profit peaks where MR = MC (Q = 20), not where revenue or price is highest.
Mission 2

Worked example: price, profit and lost surplus

Worked example: monopoly price, profit and lost surplusIllustrative dataCosts and revenue (£)0Pm = 30Pc = 10Qm = 20Qc = 40Output (Q)AR = DMRMC = ACsupernormal profit: (30 − 10) × 20 = 400deadweight loss: ½ × (40 − 20) × (30 − 10)= 200
  • Illustrative data. AR = 50 − Q, so MR = 50 − 2Q. MC = AC = 10.
  • MR = MC: 50 − 2Q = 10, so Q = 20.
  • Price from AR: 50 − 20 = 30.
  • Supernormal profit = (AR − AC) × Q = (30 − 10) × 20 = 400.
  • A competitive industry with the same costs: P = MC = 10, Q = 40.
  • Deadweight loss (a later screen explains it) = ½ × (40 − 20) × (30 − 10) = 200.
Mission 2

Extra profit, normal profit or a loss

Profit, normal profit and loss for a monopolistSupernormal profit: AR > ACCosts and revenue (£)0PmQmOutput (Q)AR = DMRMCACNormal profit: AR = ACCosts and revenue (£)0PmQmOutput (Q)AR = DMRMCACLoss: AR < ACCosts and revenue (£)0PmQmOutput (Q)AR = DMRMCACsupernormal profitloss
  • Profit per unit = AR − AC at the MR = MC output.
  • AR > AC: supernormal profit. AR = AC: normal profit. AR < AC: a loss.
  • Short run: a loss-making monopolist keeps producing if price covers AVC. Below AVC it shuts down.
  • Long run: barriers stop entry, so profit above normal can last. A firm that cannot cover AC in the long run leaves.
  • Say: "barriers to entry let supernormal profit persist in the long run" — not: "a monopoly always makes a profit".
Quick check
?Illustrative data. A monopolist maximises profit at an output of 300 units. At that output, AR = 12, ATC = 9 and MC = MR = 6. What is its profit?
Mission 2

Monopoly versus perfect competition

Monopoly compared with perfect competitionCosts and revenue (£)0PmPcQmQcOutput (Q)AR = DMRMC = ACconsumer surplus kepttransferred to the monopolistdeadweight lossPerfect competition: P = MC, output Qc, price Pc.Monopoly: MR = MC gives Qm; price Pm is readoff D. Qm < Qc and Pm > Pc.
  • Same costs, constant MC = AC. Compare the two outcomes.
  • Perfect competition: P = MC, output Qc, price Pc.
  • Monopoly: MR = MC, so output is lower (Qm < Qc) and price is higher (Pm > Pc).
  • Rectangle (Pm − Pc) × Qm: consumer surplus transferred to the monopolist.
  • Triangle from Qm to Qc, below D and above MC: units worth more than they cost, never made. This is the deadweight loss.
  • Monopoly is allocatively inefficient: P > MC.
  • Say: "the rectangle is a transfer; the triangle is the deadweight loss" — not: "the whole fall in consumer surplus is lost".
Quick check
Monopoly compared with perfect competitionCosts and revenue (£)0PmPcQmQcOutput (Q)wxyzAR = DMRMC = AC
?A monopoly is compared with a competitive industry with the same constant MC. Which area is the deadweight loss caused by the monopoly?
AreaWhere it is
wTriangle below D and above Pm, from 0 to Qm
xRectangle between Pm and Pc, from 0 to Qm
yTriangle below D and above MC, from Qm to Qc
zRectangle below Pc and above 0, from 0 to Qm
Mission 2

Static and dynamic efficiency

X-inefficiencyCosts and revenue (£)0Output (Q)AR = DMRAC1AC2AC1: the lowest possible costAC2: costs drift higherX-inefficiency: the gap between them
  • Allocative: P > MC, so output is too low.
  • Productive: output is usually not at the lowest point of AC.
  • X-inefficiency: with no rivals, costs can drift above the lowest possible AC: slack management, waste.
  • Dynamic efficiency may go either way:
    • Supernormal profit can fund research and development, and a patent protects the reward.
    • But a firm safe behind barriers may feel little pressure to innovate.
  • Say: "X-inefficiency" for costs above the lowest possible AC — not: "productive inefficiency".
Mission 2

Economies of scale versus efficiency

Economies of scale and monopolyIllustrative dataCosts and revenue (£)0Pc = 30Pm = 28Qc = 20Qm = 22Output (Q)AR = DMRMC = ACMC = ACmany small firms: MC = AC = 30one large firm: MC = AC = 6Competitive: price 30, output 20. Large firm:price 28, output 22.
  • Illustrative data. Same demand, AR = 50 − Q.
  • Many small firms with no economies of scale: MC = AC = 30. Price 30, output 20.
  • One large firm with economies of scale: MC = AC = 6.
    • MR = MC: Q = 22, P = 28.
  • The monopoly charges less and sells more, and still earns supernormal profit.
  • It is still allocatively inefficient: P (28) > MC (6).
Mission 2Evaluate

Is monopoly always bad?

  • Consumers: higher prices and less choice; but possibly lower prices if economies of scale are large.
  • Workers and suppliers: one dominant buyer may hold down pay or input prices; or profits fund secure jobs.
  • Owners: supernormal profit. Government: more tax on profits.
  • It depends on economies of scale: big enough to outweigh the deadweight loss?
  • It depends on what profit is used for: research and new products, or higher payouts?
  • It depends on barriers: if entry is possible, the threat of rivals can hold prices down (see Mission 6).
  • It depends on regulation: price caps and competition law can limit abuse.
Mission check

?Illustrative case: a town's only ferry operator sets one fare for all passengers. At its current fare, its marginal revenue is 4 and its marginal cost is 7 per passenger. What should it do to raise its profit?
Mission 3

Mission 3: Why can two people sitting side by side on the same train have paid very different fares?

Make a guess: Why can two people sitting side by side on the same train have paid very different fares?

Mission 3

Same product, different prices

  • Price discrimination: charging different buyers different prices for the same good or service, for reasons not linked to cost.
  • Examples: peak and off-peak train fares; child and adult cinema tickets; student discounts.
  • Not price discrimination: a higher price because supplying costs more (e.g. delivery to a remote island).
  • Say: "price discrimination" only when cost is the same — not: for any price difference.
Mission 3

Three conditions

Three conditions for price discrimination1 Market powera price maker, not a price taker2 Groups with different elasticityLess elastichigher pricePED −1.4More elasticlower pricePED −33 No resalelow pricehigh priceIllustrative data.

1. Market power: the firm must be a price maker. A price taker cannot set prices.

2. Separate groups with different price elasticities of demand, and a way to tell them apart (age, time, place, ID). The group with the more elastic demand gets the lower price.

3. No resale: buyers at the low price must not be able to sell on to those charged more.

  • If resale is easy, the low-price group buys for everyone (market seepage or arbitrage).
Quick check
?A firm with market power plans to charge students a lower price than other adults for an identical product. Its costs are the same for both groups. Which situation would stop this plan from raising its profit?
Mission 3

Third degree: the diagram

Third-degree price discriminationMarket 1: less price elastic demandPrice0P1Q1QuantityAR1 = D1MR1MC = ACMarket 2: more price elastic demandPrice0P2Q2QuantityAR2 = D2MR2MC = AC
  • Two markets, the same MC (constant).
  • In each market, the firm produces where MR = MC.
  • Price in each market is read off its own AR (demand) curve.
  • The less price elastic market pays the higher price.
  • The more elastic market pays less: a high price there would lose too many sales.
  • Say: "the higher price is charged in the market where demand is less price elastic" — not: "the richer group always pays more".
Mission 3

Worked example: business travellers and students

Worked example: business travellers and studentsBusiness travellersAR = 120 − Q, MR = 120 − 2QPrice0702050QuantityARMRMC = ACStudentsAR = 40 − 0.5Q, MR = 40 − QPrice0302020QuantityARMRMC = ACIllustrative data. The two graphs use differentscales.
  • Illustrative data. MC = AC = 20.
  • Business travellers: AR = 120 − Q, so MR = 120 − 2Q.
    • MR = MC: Q = 50, P = 70.
  • Students: AR = 40 − 0.5Q, so MR = 40 − Q.
    • MR = MC: Q = 20, P = 30.
  • PED at those prices: business −1.4; students −3. Students pay less.
  • One price for all: the best single price is 70. Students (who pay at most 40) buy nothing.
    • Output 50; profit (70 − 20) × 50 = 2,500.
  • Price discrimination: output 70; profit 2,500 + (30 − 20) × 20 = 2,700.
Mission 3Graph lab

Who pays more?

Same two markets as the previous screen. Now the students' demand grows: at every price, students want to buy more.

Who pays more?StudentsPriceQuantity01002000801202030AR (students)MRMCBusiness travellersPriceQuantity01002000401205070AR (business)MRMC
  • Takeaway: each market has its own MR = MC price. The less elastic group pays more; when both groups have the same PED, they pay the same price.
Quick check
?Illustrative data. A firm sells in two separate markets with the same constant MC = 10. In market A, AR = 70 − 2Q, so MR = 70 − 4Q. In market B, AR = 30 − 0.5Q, so MR = 30 − Q. Which prices maximise its profit?
Mission 3

Who gains and who loses?

  • Producers: more profit. It may fund investment, or keep a service running (e.g. a rail route).
  • Consumers in the high-price group: pay more; lose consumer surplus.
  • Consumers in the low-price group: may be served for the first time.
  • In an earlier screen, students were served only under price discrimination.
  • Total output: may rise. Then some deadweight loss is removed.
  • Real example: the 16–25 Railcard gives one third off most rail fares in Great Britain.
Mission 3Evaluate

Good or bad?

  • It depends on output: if total output rises, welfare can rise; if it does not, welfare usually falls.
  • It depends on who pays more: lower prices for students, children or pensioners can help equity; higher prices for those who must travel at peak times may not.
  • It depends on use of profit: research and investment, or higher payouts to owners?
  • It depends on costs of separating groups: checking ID, building booking systems.
  • It depends on fairness: buyers may see personalised prices as exploitation.
Mission check

?Illustrative case: a theme park charges local residents less than tourists for an identical day ticket. Its costs are the same for both groups. Which pair of conditions is needed for this to earn more profit than one price for all?
Mission 4

Mission 4: Why might it make sense for only one company to lay the water pipes in a city?

Make a guess: Why might it make sense for only one company to lay the water pipes in a city?

Mission 4

What makes a monopoly natural

Average cost keeps fallingPrice / cost0economies of scaleQuantityLRACDAverage cost falls across the whole market.
  • Some industries have huge fixed costs and low marginal costs: water pipes, rail track, power grids.
  • So average cost keeps falling as output rises, across the whole market.
  • Natural monopoly: one firm can supply the whole market at a lower average cost than two or more firms could.
  • A second network would duplicate the fixed cost: wasteful.
  • Say: "natural monopoly" for a cost reason — not: "a monopoly protected by law or a patent".
Mission 4

Worked example: one network or two?

  • Illustrative data. A town needs 300 connections. The network costs 1,200 (fixed). Each connection adds 2 (marginal cost).
  • One firm: AC = 1,200 ÷ 300 + 2 = 4 + 2 = 6.
  • Two firms, 150 connections each: AC = 1,200 ÷ 150 + 2 = 8 + 2 = 10.
  • Splitting the market raises average cost from 6 to 10.
  • Same marginal cost; the difference is the fixed cost spread over fewer users.
Quick check
?Illustrative data. A rail line has a fixed cost of 900 and a marginal cost of 3 per journey. The market is 150 journeys. If two firms each build their own line and each carries 75 journeys, what is each firm's average cost?
Mission 4

The natural monopoly diagram

The natural monopoly diagramPrice / cost0P1P2P3Q1Q2Q3QuantityP = ACP = MCAR = DMRLRACMCMR = MCloss at P = MCMC lies below AC while AC is falling.Three possible prices: MR = MC (unregulated), P= AC and P = MC.At P = MC, price is below AC: a loss.
  • AC (LRAC) falls across the whole demand curve. MC lies below AC.
  • Three possible prices:
    • Unregulated: MR = MC. High price, low output, profit above normal.
    • P = AC: normal profit. Output higher, price lower.
    • P = MC: the allocatively efficient output. But P < AC: a loss.
  • So a natural monopoly cannot be allocatively efficient and cover its costs without help.
  • Say: "MC is below AC whenever AC is falling" — not: "MC is above AC".
Mission 4

Worked example: three prices

Worked example: three pricesPrice / cost022104180300360QuantityAR = DMRACMCAC 14AC 9Illustrative data: AR = 40 − 0.1Q, MC = 4, AC =1,800/Q + 4.
  • Illustrative data. AR = 40 − 0.1Q. MC = 4. Fixed cost = 1,800.
  • Unregulated (MR = MC): 40 − 0.2Q = 4 → Q = 180, P = 22. AC = 1,800 ÷ 180 + 4 = 14.
    • Profit = (22 − 14) × 180 = 1,440.
  • P = AC: Q = 300, P = 10. AC = 1,800 ÷ 300 + 4 = 10. Normal profit.
  • P = MC: Q = 360, P = 4. AC = 1,800 ÷ 360 + 4 = 9.
    • Loss = (9 − 4) × 360 = 1,800: the whole fixed cost.
Mission 4Graph lab

Set the price cap

Same natural monopoly. A regulator sets a maximum price (price cap).

Set the price capPrice, costsQuantity18022AR = DMRMCAC
  • Takeaway: lowering the cap raises output; profit is normal at P = AC (10); below that the firm makes a loss.
Mission 4

Price caps: RPI − X

  • UK regulators of privatised utilities (e.g. Ofwat for water, Ofgem for energy) cap prices.
  • The classic formula, first used in 1984, is RPI − X: prices may rise each year by inflation (RPI) minus X%.
  • Worked example: RPI = 4%, X = 2. Maximum price rise = 4 − 2 = 2%. A price of 50 can rise to 51.
  • If the firm cuts costs by more than X, it keeps the extra profit: an incentive to be efficient.
  • Water added K for investment: RPI − X + K. Newer UK caps use other inflation measures (CPI or CPIH); the idea is the same.
Quick check
?Illustrative data. A regulated firm's price cap is RPI − X. RPI inflation is 3% and X is set at 5. What can the firm do to its price this year?
Mission 4

Other ways to regulate

  • Profit (rate-of-return) regulation: profit capped at a % of capital.
    • Risk: little reason to cut costs; firms may over-invest to raise the allowed profit.
  • Quality standards: a price cap can tempt a firm to cut quality. Regulators set standards (e.g. leaks, delays).
  • Performance targets: fines or rewards linked to service, e.g. punctuality or customer complaints.
  • Impact: lower prices and higher output, but possibly less profit for investment.
Mission 4

Who should own it?

  • Nationalisation (public ownership): the state owns the firm.
    • For: can price nearer MC; long-term investment; no supernormal profit to shareholders.
    • Against: weak profit incentive, so costs may drift up (X-inefficiency); political interference; funding competes with other public spending.
  • Privatisation: sale of state firms to private owners.
    • For: profit motive cuts costs; access to private capital.
    • Against: a private natural monopoly still needs regulation; profit may come before investment.
  • Example: water in England and Wales was privatised in 1989. Scottish Water is publicly owned.
  • Either way, each area is still served by a single network of water pipes.
  • The evidence on which model performs better is mixed; it depends on regulation and management.
Mission 4Evaluate

Does regulation work?

  • It depends on information: the firm knows its costs better than the regulator. X may be set too low or too high.
  • It depends on regulatory capture: a regulator may come to serve the industry it regulates.
  • It depends on quality: price caps can lead to cost cuts that harm service, unless standards are enforced.
  • It depends on investment: tight caps may squeeze money for new pipes, track and cables.
  • Effects to weigh: prices, output, employment, profit, efficiency, quality, choice, economic welfare.
Mission check

?Illustrative case: a small town is served by one broadband network that costs a lot to build but very little to connect each extra home. A second firm plans to build its own full network and win half the town's homes. Assuming total demand does not change, what happens to the average cost of supplying a home?
Mission 5

Mission 5: Why would a firm refuse to hire a worker who would add more to its sales than they are paid?

Make a guess: A firm is the only big employer in town. One more worker would add more to its sales than the wage it pays. Why might it still not hire them?

Mission 5

One buyer

  • Monopsony: a market with a single buyer (or one dominant buyer).
  • In a labour market: one employer hires most of the workers with a particular skill or in a particular place.
  • Examples: a mine or factory in a remote town · a state health service that employs most of a country's nurses.
  • In a product market: a few large retailers buying from many small farmers.
  • A monopsonist is a wage setter, not a wage taker.
  • Say: "monopsony" (one buyer) — not: "monopoly" (one seller).
Mission 5

Why one more worker costs more than the wage

Supply and marginal cost of labourWage rate (W)0LQuantity of labour (L)ACL = SMCLGap: extra pay for workers already hired
  • A monopsonist faces the whole upward-sloping supply curve of labour.
  • To attract one more worker it must raise the wage.
  • It must pay that higher wage to all its workers, not just the new one.
  • So the marginal cost of labour is above the wage.
  • Labels: ACL = S (average cost of labour = the wage) and MCL (marginal cost of labour), drawn above ACL.
Mission 5

Worked example: the cost of one more worker

  • Illustrative data. A firm is the only employer in its town. Wage needed to attract L workers: W = 4 + 2L (per hour).
  • Total cost of labour = L × W. Marginal cost = change in total cost when one more worker is hired.
Workers (L)Wage neededTotal wage billMarginal cost of labourMRP
166631
28161027
310301423
412481819
514702215
616962611
  • 5th worker: the wage rises from 12 to 14 for all 5 workers. Wage bill: 48 → 70. Marginal cost = 22, not 14.
Quick check
?Use the table in the previous screen. The firm employs 3 workers at a wage of 10 an hour. What is the marginal cost of hiring a 4th worker?
Mission 5

The monopsony diagram

MonopsonyWage rate (W)0WcWmLmLcQuantity of labour (L)MRP = DACL = SMCLA wage taker would hire Lc at WcHire where MRP = MCL: employment LmWm is read from the supply curve: Wm < Wc, Lm< Lc
  • Step 1: the supply of labour and the MRP curve. If the employer acted as a wage taker, it would hire where they cross: Wc, Lc.
  • Step 2: draw MCL above ACL = S. Profit is greatest where MRP = MCL: employment Lm.
  • Step 3: the firm pays the lowest wage that attracts Lm workers. Read down to the supply curve: wage Wm.
  • Result: Wm < Wc and Lm < Lc. Fewer workers, lower pay.
  • The last worker hired at Lm adds more revenue (MRP) than they are paid (Wm).
  • Say: "read the wage from the supply curve" — not: from the MRP or the marginal cost curve.
Mission 5Graph lab

How many workers?

How many workers?Wage, MRP, costWorkers23456010203016ACL = SMCLMRP = D25Profit from labour
  • Takeaway: the monopsonist stops where MRP = marginal cost of labour, even though the next worker's MRP is above their wage. In the table from an earlier screen it hires 4 workers at a wage of 12. A wage taker facing the same curves would hire 5 at about 14, so the firm turns down a 5th worker who would add 15 to its sales and be paid 14.
Quick check
?On a monopsony diagram, the firm employs Lm. What does the vertical distance between the MRP curve and the supply curve at Lm show?
Mission 5

Monopsony without one employer

  • Firms can set wages even when there are several employers, if workers cannot easily switch.
  • Imperfect information: workers do not know what other firms pay or which jobs are open.
  • Immobility and switching costs: long commutes, housing costs, family ties, firm-specific skills.
  • Each firm then faces an upward-sloping supply of labour, so it has some monopsony power.
  • Employers acting together can do the same. Real case: in 2015 a US court approved a $415 million settlement of a lawsuit claiming that Apple, Google, Intel and Adobe agreed not to recruit each other's staff, holding pay down.
  • Union power can offset monopsony power (a later screen, a later lesson).
Mission 5

Monopsony in product markets

  • Large retailers buy food from many small farmers and suppliers.
  • Conditions: few buyers, many sellers, suppliers with few other outlets.
  • Costs: lower prices for suppliers; late payments or sudden contract changes; suppliers cut investment or leave the industry; less choice and quality.
  • Benefits: lower costs can be passed on as lower prices for consumers if retailers compete; a big buyer can counter the power of a monopoly seller (a state health service buying medicines from a patent holder).
  • Real case (UK): the Groceries Code Adjudicator, set up on 25 June 2013, enforces a code on how retailers with UK grocery turnover above £1 billion treat their direct suppliers. It can investigate and fine.
Mission 5

Limiting monopsony power

  • Trade unions: bargain as one seller of labour.
  • Minimum wages: can raise both pay and employment in a monopsony.
  • Regulation and competition policy: codes of practice, fines, bans on no-poaching deals.
  • Better information and mobility: job adverts with pay ranges, help with moving.
  • Nationalisation: state ownership puts a dominant buyer under public control. Risks: weak incentives to be efficient, and the state itself may use its buying power.
Mission 5

Bilateral monopoly

Bilateral monopolyWage rate (W)0WmLmQuantity of labour (L)MRP = DACL = SMCLRange of possible wages: bargainingUnion: pushes the wage upEmployer: pushes the wage down
  • Bilateral monopoly: a monopsony buyer faces a monopoly seller. In labour: one employer and one trade union.
  • The employer wants Wm at Lm.
  • At Lm, each worker's MRP is above Wm, so the union can press for more. The most the firm would pay to keep Lm workers is the MRP at Lm.
  • The wage settles somewhere between Wm and MRP at Lm. Where exactly is indeterminate: it depends on bargaining power.
  • Union power: share of workers in the union, strike threat, the firm's profits, the law, public support.
  • A union wage between Wm and Wc can raise both pay and employment.
Quick check
?Illustrative data: rows from the monopsony worked example (W = 4 + 2L).
Workers (L)Wage neededMarginal cost of labourMRP
3101423
4121819
5142215

A union now represents all the firm's workers, and the firm still employs at least 4 workers. Within what range of hourly wages would we expect the agreed wage to fall?

Mission 5

Evaluate: is monopsony always harmful?

It depends on…

  • Elasticity of labour supply to the firm: the more easily workers can leave, the less the firm can cut pay.
  • Whether savings reach consumers: in a competitive retail market, lower costs can mean lower prices.
  • Countervailing power: a big buyer facing a big seller may bring the price closer to the competitive level.
  • The long run: low pay and low supplier prices can reduce training, investment and supply.
  • Who is protected: unions, minimum wages and regulators can limit the power.
Mission check

?A region has many apple farmers but only one buyer, a juice company. To buy more apples it must offer a higher price, and it pays that price on all the apples it buys. Compared with a market where many buyers compete (same supply, same value of apples to buyers), what would we expect?
Mission 6

Mission 6: Can a market with only one firm still behave as if it were full of competitors?

Make a guess: Can a market with only one firm still behave as if it were full of competitors?

Mission 6

The threat of entry

Threat of entrythe marketone firmopen doorpotentialentrantsA perfectly contestable market has:free entry and free exit (no sunk costs)the same technology for entrantsperfect information about prices and profits
  • A contestable market: one where new firms can enter and leave easily, so the threat of entry disciplines the firms already there.
  • What counts is how easy it is to get in and out, not how many firms there are now.
  • Perfectly contestable market:
    • free entry and free exit: no sunk costs
    • entrants can use the same technology and reach the same costs as incumbents
    • perfect information about prices and profits
  • In theory, even a market with one firm can be perfectly contestable.
  • William Baumol and colleagues set out the theory in 1982.
Mission 6

Sunk costs

Sunk vs recoverablesunk costcannot be recoveredon exitlaunch advertisingspecialist researcha non-refundablelicencemachinery with noother userecoverable on exitcan be sold, leased orendeda delivery vanan aircraftrent on a short lease
  • Sunk cost: a cost that cannot be recovered when a firm leaves the market.
  • Examples: launch advertising, specialist research, a non-refundable licence, machinery with no other use.
  • Not sunk: a delivery van or an aircraft, which can be sold or leased to someone else.
  • Sunk costs are a barrier to exit, and so a barrier to entry: an entrant risks losing them if it has to leave.
  • Say: "a sunk cost cannot be recovered on exit" — not: "a sunk cost is any fixed cost". Rent on a short lease is fixed but can be ended.
Quick check
?A firm is thinking of starting a new bus service on a local route. Which of these costs is most likely to be a sunk cost?
Mission 6

Worked example: hit-and-run entry

Hit-and-runPrice0100Quantityincumbent price 15entrant14price falls to ACprice = AC:normal profit onlyAC = 10entrant leavesentrant's profit: (14 - 10) × 100 = 400Incumbent: price 15, above AC = 10.No sunk costs: the entrant leaves with nothinglost.
  • Illustrative data. One incumbent charges 15. Its AC = 10: supernormal profit of 5 a unit.
  • An entrant with the same AC of 10 undercuts at 14.
  • It sells 100 units before the incumbent can react.
  • Profit while there: (14 − 10) × 100 = 400.
  • The incumbent cuts its price. The entrant leaves. No sunk costs, so it loses nothing on exit.
  • This is hit-and-run competition: enter, take the profit, leave.
  • So the incumbent's best defence is to price at AC from the start: normal profit only.
Mission 6Graph lab

How high can the price go?

Illustrative data. Incumbent AC = MC = 10. Its profit-maximising price is 16. A hit-and-run entrant would sell 100 units before the incumbent reacts. It enters if its profit while there is greater than its sunk cost of entry.

How high can the price go?PriceQuantity01003000162020010DAC = MCprofit-maximising price 16
  • Takeaway: the higher the sunk costs, the higher the price the incumbent can safely charge. The market is less contestable.
Quick check
?Illustrative data. An incumbent has an average cost of 8. A hit-and-run entrant with the same costs would sell 50 units before the incumbent could react, and would have sunk costs of 150. It enters only if its profit while there is greater than its sunk costs. What is the highest price the incumbent can charge without attracting entry?
Mission 6

Contestability and efficiency

Contestable natural monopolyPrice0PmP = ACQmQcQuantityACMCD = ARMRMonopoly: MR = MC gives Pm and Qm.Contestable: price is pushed down to P = AC, atQc.
  • In a perfectly contestable market, in the long run:
    • Normal profit only (P = AC). Any supernormal profit invites hit-and-run entry.
    • Productive efficiency: a firm that does not produce at the lowest possible cost is undercut.
    • X-inefficiency is squeezed out: slack is punished.
    • With two or more firms, P = MC: allocative efficiency.
  • A single firm with falling AC (a natural monopoly) prices at P = AC, not P = MC: P = MC would mean a loss.
  • So behaviour depends on how easy entry is, not just on how many firms there are now.
Mission 6

Barriers to entry and exit

  • Every barrier makes a market less contestable.
  • Barriers to entry:
    • Sunk costs: start-up advertising, specialist equipment.
    • Economies of scale: an entrant starts small with higher AC.
    • Product differentiation and branding: loyal customers.
    • Intellectual property (patents, copyright) and R&D spending.
    • Legal barriers: licences, regulation.
    • Incumbents' strategy: limit pricing, predatory pricing (see Mission 1).
  • Barriers to exit: sunk costs written off, long contracts, redundancy payments.
Quick check
?A market is served by one firm whose average cost falls over the whole range of market demand. The market is perfectly contestable. In the long run, where will the firm set its price?
Mission 6

Real markets: how contestable?

  • Airline routes were the classic example: aircraft can move from route to route, so entry to one route looks cheap.
  • The EU opened its internal air market fully in 1997: any EU airline could fly any route inside the EU. Low-cost airlines entered many routes.
  • But later studies of US routes found fares were lower where more airlines actually flew. The threat of entry alone did not hold fares down fully.
  • Reasons: airport slots, branding, loyalty schemes and incumbents' fast price cuts.
  • Usefulness of the model:
    • It explains why some firms with large market shares still keep prices low.
    • It shows that market structure is not everything: conduct depends on entry conditions.
    • Few real markets are perfectly contestable.
Mission 6Evaluate

Does contestability protect consumers?

  • Advantages: lower prices, normal profit, productive efficiency, pressure to innovate, without the need for many firms.
  • Disadvantages: supernormal profit is low, so there may be less to spend on R&D; firms may focus on short-run survival.
  • It depends on the size of sunk costs: high sunk costs, little threat.
  • It depends on how fast incumbents react: a quick price cut makes hit-and-run unprofitable.
  • It depends on information: entrants must know profits are there.
  • It depends on policy: removing barriers (deregulation, opening markets) may do more than breaking up firms.
Mission check

?Illustrative case: one coach company runs the only service between two towns. It earns large supernormal profits. Which change is most likely to make it lower its fares, even though no rival has yet entered?
Recap

The big ideas

Mission 1

  • Oligopolists are interdependent: a price cut is likely to be matched, so price wars squeeze everyone's profit.
  • Non-price competition (branding, quality, loyalty, service) aims to shift demand right and make it less price elastic.
  • Predatory pricing is below cost to remove a rival; limit pricing sets price just low enough to deter entry.

Mission 2

  • A monopolist faces the downward-sloping market demand, so MR < AR.
  • It produces where MR = MC and reads price off AR: higher price, lower output than perfect competition.
  • Result: a transfer of surplus to the firm and a deadweight (welfare) loss; possible X-inefficiency, but possible economies of scale and research.

Mission 3

  • Price discrimination: different prices for the same product, not explained by cost.
  • Conditions: market power; groups with different PED that can be told apart; no resale.
  • Third degree: MR = MC in each market; the less elastic market pays more.

Mission 4

  • A natural monopoly has falling average cost across the whole market, so one firm supplies most cheaply.
  • Unregulated, it sets MR = MC; P = AC gives normal profit; P = MC is efficient but loss-making.
  • Regulators use price caps (RPI − X), profit limits, quality and performance targets; owners may be public or private.

Mission 5

  • A monopsonist must raise the wage for all workers to hire one more, so the marginal cost of labour is above the wage.
  • It hires where MRP = MCL and pays the wage on the supply (ACL) curve: lower wage, lower employment than a competitive market.
  • In bilateral monopoly the wage is indeterminate between Wm and the MRP at Lm.

Mission 6

  • A contestable market has low barriers to entry and exit; the threat of entry disciplines incumbents.
  • With no sunk costs, hit-and-run entry removes supernormal profit: price is pushed towards average cost.
  • Real markets are rarely perfectly contestable: sunk costs, branding and quick responses protect incumbents.
🏆

Mini-lesson complete!

⭐⭐⭐

You've worked through Market structures (part 2) for Edexcel A-level Economics A. 🎉

  1. Mission 1Why do a few big rival firms so often compete on brand and quality instead of simply cutting prices?
  2. Mission 2If one company controls a whole market, why doesn't it just charge the highest price it can?
  3. Mission 3Why can two people sitting side by side on the same train have paid very different fares?
  4. Mission 4Why might it make sense for only one company to lay the water pipes in a city?
  5. Mission 5Why would a firm refuse to hire a worker who would add more to its sales than they are paid?
  6. Mission 6Can a market with only one firm still behave as if it were full of competitors?

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