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CCEA GCE Economics (AS and A2) · Monetary policy and the financial sector; Fiscal policy: deficits and debt; Macroeconomic policy in a global economy (part 2 of 2)
Mini-Lesson

Monetary policy and the financial sector; Fiscal policy: deficits and debt; Macroeconomic policy in a global economy (part 2)

5 missions. Guess, learn, then check. Your place is saved.

  1. Mission 1If people in finance are paid to judge risk, how can a whole market get it so badly wrong?
  2. Mission 2When interest rates can go no lower, how can a central bank still get people spending?
  3. Mission 3Why does a government's borrowing jump in a recession even when nobody votes for it?
  4. Mission 4When a government borrows more, can it leave firms with less to invest?
  5. Mission 5Why can the right cure for one slump be the wrong cure for the next?
Mission 1

Mission 1: If people in finance are paid to judge risk, how can a whole market get it so badly wrong?

Make a guess: If people in finance are paid to judge risk, how can a whole market get it so badly wrong?

Mission 1

Finance and the real economy

Finance and the real economyFinancial sectorSavingsLoansPaymentsReal economyJobsOutput
  • The real economy: the production of goods and services, jobs and incomes.
  • The financial sector serves it: it moves savings to borrowers, runs payments, and shares out risk.
  • It works well when prices of assets and loans reflect real risks and returns.
  • When finance misprices risk, money flows to the wrong uses, and a crash can cut lending, spending and jobs.
  • So failures in financial markets matter far beyond the banks.
Mission 1

Asymmetric information

Asymmetric informationAsymmetric information?knows moreAdverse selectionbefore the dealMoral hazardafter the deal
  • Asymmetric information: one side of a deal knows more than the other.
  • Borrowers know more about their ability to repay than lenders.
  • Sellers of financial products know more than buyers: complex terms, hidden fees.
  • Adverse selection (before the deal): high interest rates attract the riskiest borrowers.
  • Moral hazard (after the deal): someone protected from risk takes more of it.
  • UK example: payment protection insurance (PPI) was mis-sold with loans for years; banks paid about 38 billion pounds in compensation by 2020.
  • 2000s US: lenders who sold mortgages on to investors had little reason to check borrowers; buyers of the bundles could not see the risk.
Quick check
?A lender sells each mortgage it makes to investors within weeks, earning a fee every time. The investors cannot check each borrower. What market failure does this create?
Mission 1

Externalities: risk that others pay for

External cost of risky lendingCosts and benefits0Q*Q1Quantity of risky lendingwelfarelossMPB = MSBMPCMSCgap between MPC and MSC = external costof crashes
  • When a bank takes risks, it weighs its own costs and gains (MPC, MPB).
  • A crash also hurts third parties: firms that lose credit, workers who lose jobs, taxpayers who fund rescues.
  • So the marginal social cost of risky lending is above the private cost: MSC > MPC.
  • The market lends at Q1 (MPB = MPC). The social optimum is Q* (MSB = MSC).
  • Too much risky lending: the shaded triangle is the welfare loss.
Mission 1

Speculation and bubbles

Asset price bubblePriceTimeit will keeprisingit will keeprisingNasdaq Composite: peak March 2000,about −78% by October 2002Illustrative shape
  • Speculation: buying an asset to sell it later at a higher price, not to use it.
  • A bubble: an asset's price rises far above the value its future income can justify.
  • Rising prices draw in buyers who expect more rises; demand shifts right; prices rise again.
  • When expectations turn, everyone tries to sell; the price crashes.
  • Real-world: the US technology share index (the Nasdaq Composite) peaked in March 2000, then fell by about 78% by October 2002.
  • Say: "a rise in expected future prices shifts demand to the right" — not: "higher prices increase demand".
Mission 1Graph lab

The bubble machine

Housing market, illustrative data. Price index on the vertical axis, quantity of homes bought on the horizontal.

The bubble machinePriceQuantity of homesQ1P1D1S
  • Takeaway: expectations shift demand, so beliefs about prices can push prices up, and then down, with no change in the homes themselves.
Quick check
?Illustrative data: in a housing market, prices rose 15% last year and the number of buyers this year is higher still. Which explanation is consistent with demand theory?
Mission 1

Herding and animal spirits

  • Herding: people copy what others are doing, assuming the crowd knows something.
  • For a fund manager, being wrong with everyone else is safer for their career than being wrong alone.
  • Animal spirits (Keynes, 1936): waves of optimism and fear drive decisions, not careful calculation.
  • Long booms make people forget risk: borrowing and debt build up while things look safe.
Mission 1

When finance fails, the real economy pays

  • Credit: banks with losses cut lending; firms cancel investment.
  • Debt: households with big debts cut spending when house prices fall.
  • Wealth effect: falling asset prices make people feel poorer, so consumption falls.
  • Confidence: fear spreads, and firms and households wait.
  • AD falls, output and jobs fall: a financial crash becomes a recession.
  • So a healthy financial sector supports growth, but its failures can damage the whole economy.
Mission 1Evaluate

Can regulators stop bubbles?

  • For acting: lean against booms with macroprudential tools. UK example: from 2014 the FPC limited the share of new mortgages at 4.5 times income or more to 15%.
  • For acting: better information rules and fines reduce mis-selling and rigging.
  • Against: bubbles are hard to spot in time; rising prices may reflect real changes.
  • Against: rules can push risk to less regulated lenders; and popping a bubble can cause the crash it aims to avoid.
  • It depends on: how quickly a bubble can be recognised; how much of it is funded by borrowing; and whether rules cover all lenders, not just banks.
Mission check

?Illustrative data: the price of a rare collectible digital token rises by 300% in a year. Nothing about how it can be used has changed. Most buyers say they bought it because they expect to sell it at a higher price. Which explanation and risk fit best?
Mission 2

Mission 2: When interest rates can go no lower, how can a central bank still get people spending?

Make a guess: When interest rates can go no lower, how can a central bank still get people spending?

Mission 2

When the usual tool runs out

Policy rate at the floorBank Rate (%)02007200820092010floor5.75 (July 2007)0.5(March 2009)Schematic: steps between the two labelledvalues are not exact data
  • The usual tool: cut the policy interest rate to make borrowing cheaper.
  • In the UK: the MPC cut Bank Rate from 5.75% (2007) to 0.5% (March 2009).
  • Rates cannot go far below zero: people could hold cash at 0% instead. This floor is the zero (or effective) lower bound.
  • With the economy still weak, central banks turned to unconventional tools.
  • Main one: quantitative easing (QE).
Mission 2

What QE is

QE flowsCentral bankPension fundBankgiltnewreservesdeposit +
  • QE: the central bank creates new central bank reserves (electronic money) and uses them to buy assets, mainly government bonds.
  • UK government bonds are called gilts.
  • It buys from investors such as pension funds and insurers, not straight from the government.
  • The seller's bank account is credited: broad money (bank deposits) rises; banks' reserves rise.
  • So QE increases the money supply while the policy rate is stuck near zero.
  • Say: "the central bank creates reserves to buy bonds" — not: "prints banknotes and gives them away".
Quick check
?Which statement best describes quantitative easing?
Mission 2

How QE reaches spending

QE transmissionCentral bank buys bondsPrice of bonds0P2P1Q1Q2Quantity of bondsyield ↓SD1D2Yields ↓Loan rates ↓Asset prices ↑Wealth ↑Currency ↓Exports ↑Price level0P2P1Y1Y2YfeReal national output (Y)SRASLRASAD1AD2
  • 1. Bond prices up, yields down. Big purchases raise bond prices. A bond's yield (its return) moves the opposite way to its price.
  • 2. Lower long-term interest rates. Government bond yields are a benchmark, so mortgage and business loan rates tend to fall.
  • 3. Portfolio rebalancing. Sellers use their new money to buy other assets (shares, company bonds): their prices rise, firms can borrow more cheaply.
  • 4. Wealth effect. Higher asset prices make owners feel richer: more consumption.
  • 5. Exchange rate. Lower yields can make the currency less attractive: it tends to fall, exports become cheaper.
  • 6. Confidence. It signals the central bank will act.
  • Result: AD shifts right, raising real output and the price level towards the inflation target.
Mission 2

Worked example: price up, yield down

  • Illustrative data. A bond pays a fixed 3 a year, for ever.
  • Yield = annual payment ÷ price × 100.
  • Price 100: 3 ÷ 100 × 100 = 3%.
  • QE buying pushes the price to 120: 3 ÷ 120 × 100 = 2.5%.
  • Price 150: 3 ÷ 150 × 100 = 2%.
  • The payment is fixed, so paying more for it means a lower return.
  • Say: "higher bond prices mean lower yields" — not: "bond prices and interest rates rise together".
Quick check
?Illustrative data. A bond pays a fixed 4 a year, for ever. After central bank purchases, its price rises from 100 to 125. What is its yield now?
Mission 2Graph lab

Can QE close the gap?

Illustrative data. Real output 950; full-employment output 1000; policy rate already near zero. A negative output gap of 50.

Can QE close the gap?Price levelReal national output (Y)950105YfeSRASAD
  • Takeaway: with low confidence, 200 of QE lifts output only to about 963; with high confidence, 200 closes the gap, and 400 overshoots to 1050, with the price level up to 115.
Mission 2

Reversing QE

Quantitative tighteningCentral bank sells bondsPrice of bonds0P1P2Q1Q2Quantity of bondsyield ↑DS1S2Price level0P2P1Y1Y2YfeReal national output (Y)SRASLRASAD2AD1
  • Quantitative tightening (QT): the central bank shrinks its bond holdings.
  • Two ways: stop reinvesting as bonds mature, or sell bonds back to investors.
  • Reserves and deposits shrink: the money supply contracts.
  • The chain runs in reverse: bond prices fall, yields rise, borrowing costs rise: AD tends to shift left.
  • UK: the MPC decided to begin reducing its stock of bonds in February 2022.
  • Central banks try to reverse QE gradually and predictably, so markets are not shocked.
Mission 2

Other ways the money supply changes

  • Open market operations (OMO): the central bank buys short-term government securities to add reserves (expand), or sells them to drain reserves (contract).
  • Minimum reserve requirements: a higher required share of deposits held as reserves cuts banks' lending (contract); a lower one lets them lend more (expand).
  • Policy rate (base or discount rate): a higher rate makes borrowing costlier, so less new lending and slower money growth.
  • QE is OMO on a huge scale, in long-term bonds, when the policy rate is at the floor.
Mission 2

Real world: QE in practice

  • The Bank of England began QE in March 2009, with Bank Rate at 0.5%.
  • In total it bought £895 billion of bonds: £875 billion of gilts and £20 billion of company bonds.
  • The last increase was announced in November 2020, in the pandemic.
  • Question to weigh: why did central banks buy on this scale, and what happens when they stop?
Mission 2Evaluate

Does QE work?

It depends on:

  • Confidence. If households and firms want to save and banks will not lend, new reserves sit idle: "pushing on a string".
  • Who gains. Higher bond, share and house prices help people who own them, which may widen wealth inequality. Supporters reply that QE protected jobs and incomes.
  • Timing and exit. Too much for too long risks inflation; unwinding risks bond-market disruption and losses for the central bank.
  • In the UK, those losses are covered by HM Treasury, so they fall on taxpayers.
  • Evidence. Most studies find early QE lowered long-term yields. How much it raised output and inflation is still debated.
Mission check

?A central bank bought large amounts of government bonds during a slump. Years later, with inflation above target, it starts selling some of the bonds back to investors. Other things equal, what is the most likely effect?
Mission 3

Mission 3: Why does a government's borrowing jump in a recession even when nobody votes for it?

Make a guess: Why does a government's borrowing jump in a recession even when nobody votes for it?

Mission 3

Two ways the budget changes

Discretionary and automatic changes to the budgetDiscretionarya deliberate decisionBudget cuts incometax rateNew road planAutomatichappens on its ownTax revenue rises andfalls with incomesTransfer spendingrises and falls withthe cycle
  • Discretionary fiscal policy: a deliberate decision to change tax rates or government spending. E.g. a budget that cuts income tax or funds new roads.
  • Automatic stabilisers: changes in tax revenue and transfer spending that happen on their own as the economy moves through the trade cycle (also called the business cycle). No new decision is needed.
  • Tax rates and benefit rules stay the same. What changes is how much income, spending and unemployment there is.
Mission 3

How stabilisers work

Income and disposable income in a recessionBefore: income 60,000IncomeRecession: income 40,000IncomeDisposable income48,000Tax 12,000Tax 6,000Disposable income34,000BenefitsAfter tax34,000Disposable incomeIncome falls from 60,000 to 40,000.Tax falls from 12,000 to 6,000: by half, whileincome falls by a third.With a benefit top-up, disposable income falls byless than income.Tax: 0% up to 10,000 · 20% from 10,000 toIllustrative data.

In a recession:

  • Incomes fall → income tax paid falls. Spending falls → sales taxes (VAT) collected fall.
  • With a progressive tax, tax falls proportionally more than income.
  • Unemployment rises → unemployment benefit payments rise.
  • So disposable income falls by less than income. Consumption, and AD, fall by less.

Illustrative data:

  • Income tax: 0% on the first 10,000 · 20% from 10,000 to 50,000 · 40% above 50,000.
  • Income falls from 60,000 to 40,000 (−33%). Tax falls from 12,000 to 6,000 (−50%).
  • In a boom, the reverse: tax rises faster than income and benefit spending falls. This slows the rise in AD.
  • Say: "automatic stabilisers reduce the size of fluctuations" — not: "they stop recessions".
Quick check
?Which of these is an automatic stabiliser at work?
Mission 3Graph lab

Cushion the fall

Illustrative data: private investment falls by 100. Households spend 80% of any change in their disposable income. The slider sets the net tax rate: the share of any change in income that is taken in tax or made up by benefits.

Cushion the fallRounds of lost spending100R180R264R351R441R533R6500Total fall
  • Takeaway: the stronger the automatic stabilisers, the smaller the multiplier and the milder the downturn.
Quick check
?Illustrative data: income tax is 0% on the first 10,000, 20% from 10,000 to 50,000, and 40% above 50,000. A worker's income falls from 70,000 to 45,000. By how much does the worker's income after tax fall?
Mission 3

Stabilisers and the deficit

Trade cycle and budget balanceReal national output (Y)TimeBoomRecessionBudget balance (% of GDP)0tax receipts fall,benefits risetax receipts rise,benefits fallIllustrative data.
  • Lower tax revenue + higher benefit spending = a bigger deficit in a recession, with no new decision.
  • In a boom the deficit shrinks (or a surplus grows) automatically.
  • This automatic part is the cyclical deficit. Discretionary choices change the structural deficit.
  • So a deficit may result from automatic policy, from discretionary policy, or from both at once.
  • 2008–09 example: UK borrowing rose to about 10% of GDP in 2009–10. Part was automatic (falling tax receipts, rising benefit claims). Part was discretionary, e.g. a temporary VAT cut from 17.5% to 15% (December 2008 to December 2009).
Mission 3

Automatic vs discretionary: strengths and limits

Automatic stabilisers:

  • Fast: no time lag for recognising the problem or passing a law.
  • Work in both directions: they cushion recessions and cool booms.
  • But partial: they reduce fluctuations; they do not remove them.

Discretionary policy:

  • Can be larger and targeted (e.g. at infrastructure or at low-income households).
  • But faces time lags: recognising the problem, deciding, then putting it into effect. It may arrive after recovery has begun.
  • Can face political pressure: tax cuts and spending rises are popular; reversing them in a boom is not.
Mission 3

Fiscal rules

  • A fiscal rule is a lasting limit on borrowing or debt, set to build lenders' trust and resist political pressure to overspend.
  • Examples:
  • EU rules: deficit no more than 3% of GDP; debt no more than 60% of GDP.
  • UK (2024): balance the current budget (borrow only to invest) and have a debt measure falling as a share of GDP, both by 2029–30.
  • Design problem: a rule on the actual deficit can force tax rises or cuts in a recession, which works against the automatic stabilisers.
  • So many rules target the structural (cyclically adjusted) balance, a forecast year, or have escape clauses. The EU suspended its deficit limits from 2020 to 2023.
  • Trade-off: flexible rules let stabilisers work; strict rules are more credible.
Quick check
?A country has a rule that its actual deficit must not exceed 3% of GDP. A recession pushes the deficit from 2% to 4% of GDP. To obey the rule at once, the government raises tax rates. What is the likely effect?
Mission 3Evaluate

How much can stabilisers do?

It depends on:

  • Progressivity and benefits: steeper tax rates and fuller unemployment benefits give a bigger cushion. Countries with larger public sectors tend to have stronger stabilisers.
  • Size of the shock: in a deep recession stabilisers cushion only part of the fall; discretionary policy may be needed too.
  • Debt and rules: high debt or strict rules on the actual deficit can force governments to work against the stabilisers.
  • Incentives: high marginal tax rates and generous benefits may reduce incentives to work, a long-run cost to weigh.
  • Confidence: if households save rather than spend, even well-designed support raises AD less.
Mission check

?Country A has a progressive income tax and pays unemployment benefits. Country B charges every adult the same fixed amount of tax and pays no unemployment benefits. Both suffer the same fall in exports. Neither government takes any new decision. Which statement is correct?
Mission 4

Mission 4: When a government borrows more, can it leave firms with less to invest?

Make a guess: When a government borrows more, can it leave firms with less to invest?

Mission 4

Competing for the same savings

Competing for the same savingsSavingwiderGovernmentborrowingPrivate investmentpipe widenspipe narrowsInterest rate ↑
  • To finance a deficit, the government borrows: it sells bonds to savers, banks and pension funds.
  • Firms also borrow to invest. Both compete for the same pool of saving.
  • More government borrowing can push up interest rates and so reduce private investment.
  • Crowding out: an increase in government spending or borrowing that reduces private sector spending.
  • Two kinds: financial crowding out works through higher interest rates. Resource crowding out happens near full employment: workers and materials used by the state are not available to private firms.
Mission 4

The loanable funds market

The loanable funds marketReal interest rate (r)5%4%450500550Quantity of loanable fundsSD1D1D2Illustrative data (billion); quantity axis does notstart at zeroCrowded out: 50 (500 to 450)Extra saving: 50 (500 to 550)
  • Supply of loanable funds: from saving. Higher real interest rates encourage more saving.
  • Demand for loanable funds: from borrowers: firms' investment plus government borrowing.
  • Illustrative data (billion): at a real interest rate of 4%, saving = private investment = 500.
  • The government borrows an extra 100. Demand shifts right by 100: D1 → D2.
  • New equilibrium: real interest rate 5%, total lending 550.
  • At 5%, private investment falls to 450. 50 is crowded out.
  • The other 50 comes from extra saving drawn out by the higher rate.
  • Say: "private investment falls" — not: "the government takes firms' money". The higher price of borrowing does the work.
Mission 4Graph lab

How much is crowded out?

How much is crowded out?Real interest rate (r, %)Quantity of loanable funds02685004%SD
  • Takeaway: the less saving responds to interest rates, the more crowding out.
Quick check
?Illustrative data: a loanable funds diagram shows the following.
Real interest rateTotal lendingPrivate investment
Before4%500 billion500 billion
After the government borrows an extra 200 billion5%650 billion450 billion

By how much has private investment been crowded out?

Mission 4

Short run and long run

Government borrowing and long-run growthLong-run aggregate supplyPrice level0Yfe1Yfe2Real national output (Y)LRAS1LRAS2LRAS2′No crowding out: LRAS shifts right.Crowding out: a smaller shift, to LRAS2′.The same idea as a PPCCapital goods0Consumer goodsPPC1PPC2PPC2′

Short run:

  • A higher real interest rate cuts interest-sensitive spending: business investment, new homes, cars bought on credit.
  • This offsets part of the rise in AD from the extra government spending.

Long run:

  • Less private investment → the capital stock grows more slowly.
  • So productive capacity grows more slowly: a smaller rightward shift of LRAS (the PPC grows less).
  • Exception: if the government borrows to build public capital (roads, broadband, training), total capital may still grow.
Quick check
?At full employment, a government increases its deficit spending, financed by borrowing. Saving responds only slightly to interest rates. Which is the most likely long-run effect?
Mission 4

Debt, interest and credit ratings

  • A large debt means large interest payments every year. That money cannot pay for schools, health or lower taxes: debt interest crowds out other public spending.
  • If lenders worry about repayment, they demand a higher yield on government bonds. Agencies may downgrade the credit rating.
  • Government bond yields are a benchmark: when they rise, firms' and households' borrowing costs tend to rise too, deepening crowding out.
  • Example: Greece's rating was cut to "junk" in April 2010, and its borrowing costs soared.
Mission 4

When crowding out is small, or turns to crowding in

Crowding inReal interest rate (r)0r2r1Q1Q2Quantity of loanable fundsSD1D2Flat supply, spare capacity: r barely rises.A Keynesian view: crowding inGovernment spendingIncomes and sales ↑Private investment ↑ (accelerator)

Crowding out is smaller when:

  • The economy is in a deep recession: spare capacity, high saving, weak private demand for loans. Extra borrowing raises interest rates very little.
  • The central bank holds interest rates down (rate cuts, QE).
  • Foreign lenders supply funds at little extra cost.

Crowding in (a Keynesian view): government spending raises incomes and sales. Firms then invest more to meet demand (the accelerator).

  • Public capital (roads, research, broadband) can make private investment more profitable.
  • Example: Japan's gross government debt is over 200% of GDP, yet its 10-year bond yield was held near 0% for several years from 2016. The Bank of Japan's bond buying explains part of this.
Mission 4Evaluate

How big is crowding out?

It depends on:

  • Spare capacity: large near full employment; small in a deep recession.
  • Saving and investment responses: if saving barely responds to interest rates, or investment is very sensitive to them, crowding out is larger.
  • Monetary policy and openness: a central bank holding rates down, or inflows of foreign saving, reduce it.
  • What the money buys: public capital can crowd in private investment; spending on current items is less likely to.
  • Confidence: if high debt makes lenders nervous, yields rise and crowding out grows.
  • The evidence is contested. Monetarist and new classical economists stress crowding out; Keynesian economists stress crowding in during recessions.
Quick check
?In which situation is crowding out likely to be smallest?
Mission check

?An economy is at full employment. The government cuts its budget deficit, so it borrows 100 billion less each year. The supply of loanable funds slopes upward. What happens in the loanable funds market?
Mission 5

Mission 5: Why can the right cure for one slump be the wrong cure for the next?

Make a guess: When an economy slumps, what should a government do first?

Mission 5

The toolkit and the policy mix

  • Three sets of tools:
    • Fiscal policy: government spending and taxes.
    • Monetary policy: interest rates, the money supply, QE.
    • Supply-side policies: raise productive capacity (education, incentives, competition).
  • Policy mix: how these are combined at one time.
  • Fiscal and monetary policy can push the same way (both expansionary) or opposite ways (one expansionary, one contractionary).
  • Policies that shift AD are demand-side; policies that shift LRAS are supply-side.
Mission 5

Combining fiscal and monetary policy

Combining fiscal and monetary policyPrice level0P2P1P1Y1Y1Y2Yfenegative output gapReal national output (Y)AD1SRASLRASAD2AD3fiscalmonetarySpending up → demand for money up → rates up.Money supply up → rates down.
  • Step 1: start with real output below full employment.
  • This is a negative output gap.
  • Step 2: both expansionary: AD shifts right for two reasons. Real output and the price level both rise.
  • Step 3: the interest rate:
    • Fiscal expansion raises incomes and spending, so demand for money rises: rates are pushed up.
    • Monetary expansion raises the money supply: rates are pushed down.
    • Overall change: indeterminate. It depends on which effect is bigger.
  • Opposite directions flip this: the interest-rate change is certain, the AD change is not.
    • Expansionary fiscal + contractionary monetary: interest rate up; AD uncertain.
    • Contractionary fiscal + expansionary monetary: interest rate down; AD uncertain.
  • Say: "the change in the interest rate is indeterminate" — not: "it stays the same".
Mission 5Graph lab

Mix the policies

Illustrative data. Start: real output 960, full employment at 1,000, interest rate 5%.

Mix the policiesPrice levelReal national output (Y)960100LRASSRASADstart 5%5%Interest rate
  • Takeaway: two pushes the same way make the AD change certain; two pushes in opposite ways make the interest-rate change certain.
Quick check
?A government cuts its spending to reduce a budget deficit. At the same time, the central bank buys government bonds to increase the money supply. Which outcome is certain?
Mission 5

Demand shocks and supply shocks

Demand shock and supply shockDemand shock: AD shifts leftPrice level0P1P2Y2Y1Real national output (Y)AD1SRASLRASAD2Supply shock: SRAS shifts leftPrice level0P2P1Y2Y1Real national output (Y)ADSRAS1LRASSRAS2Output falls, price level rises: stagflation
  • An external shock starts outside the economy and outside the government's control.
  • Demand shock: e.g. a world recession cuts demand for exports.
    • AD shifts left. Real output and the price level fall.
    • Expansionary policy can push both back up: no conflict.
  • Supply shock: e.g. world energy prices jump.
    • SRAS shifts left. Real output falls and the price level rises: stagflation.
    • Raising AD helps jobs but adds to inflation. Cutting AD slows inflation but deepens the slump: a policy dilemma.
  • First step in any crisis: diagnose the shock.
  • Say: "a cost-push supply shock" — not: "inflation caused by too much spending".
Mission 5

Conflicts and trade-offs

  • Hitting one objective can make another harder:
    • Inflation vs unemployment: in the short run, along the SRPC, lower inflation may mean higher unemployment.
    • Growth vs the current account: faster growth raises imports.
    • Growth vs the environment: more output can mean more pollution and resource use.
    • Growth vs equality: gains may go mostly to some groups.
  • Unintended consequences: e.g. very low interest rates for years can push up house and share prices.
  • Macroeconomic perspectives differ:
    • Keynesian: markets can stay in a slump for a long time; demand-side policy helps.
    • Classical / monetarist: markets self-correct; policy should keep inflation low and boost supply.
  • Say: "a trade-off" when one objective is given up for another — not: "the policy failed".
Quick check
?A country that imports most of its energy is hit by a sharp rise in world energy prices. Unemployment and inflation both rise. Which statement is most accurate?
Mission 5

The Great Depression

  • USA, 1929–33: real GDP fell by about a quarter; unemployment reached about 25% in 1933.
  • Thousands of banks failed. The money supply fell by about a third.
    • The Federal Reserve did little to stop it.
    • The Smoot–Hawley tariffs (1930) raised taxes on imports; other countries hit back.
  • Recovery began after 1933: the US left the gold standard; the New Deal brought public works and bank reform.
  • UK: governments aimed to balance the budget and cut spending in 1931.
    • The UK left the gold standard in 1931. Bank Rate was cut to 2% in 1932: "cheap money".
  • Keynes's General Theory (1936) argued that governments should raise spending in a slump.
  • Two readings, both still argued:
    • Keynesian: a collapse in spending that budget-balancing made worse.
    • Monetarist: a collapse in money that the central bank allowed.
Mission 5

The 1970s: when the old cure stopped working

  • After 1945, full employment was the top priority. Governments managed AD to keep unemployment low.
  • 1973–74: oil prices roughly quadrupled. A supply shock.
  • Result: stagflation. UK inflation (RPI) peaked at about 27% in 1975.
  • Raising AD to cut unemployment now pushed inflation even higher.
  • Direct controls on inflation were tried:
    • Incomes policies: legal or agreed limits on pay rises (UK, 1970s).
    • Price controls: the US froze wages and prices for 90 days in 1971.
  • Problems with direct controls:
    • They treat symptoms, not causes.
    • Shortages and black markets where prices are held below equilibrium.
    • Hard to enforce; pent-up pay and price rises when they end.
Mission 5

Monetarism and new priorities

  • Late 1970s: inflation became the top priority.
  • USA: from 1979, the Fed (chair Paul Volcker) cut money growth. The federal funds rate reached nearly 20% in 1980–81.
    • Inflation fell from 13.5% (1980) to 3.2% (1983).
    • The cost: a deep recession; unemployment hit 10.8% in 1982.
  • UK: from 1980, the government set targets for money supply growth (monetarism).
    • Inflation fell, but unemployment rose above 3 million in the 1980s.
    • Money targets proved hard to hit and were dropped.
  • 1992: the UK set an inflation target. 1997: the Bank of England was given control of interest rates.
  • Since 2008, financial stability has moved up the list.
Mission 5

2008: the response

  • The global financial crisis began in the banks: lending froze, AD collapsed.
  • UK:
    • Bank Rate cut from 5% (2008) to 0.5% (March 2009).
    • Quantitative easing: the Bank of England bought £200bn of assets, mainly government bonds, by early 2010.
    • VAT cut from 17.5% to 15% for 13 months.
    • Government stakes in failing banks (RBS, Lloyds).
  • USA:
    • Federal funds rate cut to 0–0.25% (December 2008); large-scale asset purchases (QE).
    • $700bn fund to rescue banks (TARP, 2008).
    • $787bn stimulus package (2009).
  • Lessons drawn from the 1930s: stop the money supply and banks collapsing; support AD.
Mission 5

After 2008: the austerity debate

  • From 2010, the UK and many other countries cut deficits: fiscal consolidation ("austerity").
  • Arguments for:
    • High debt can raise borrowing costs. In 2010, Greece's borrowing costs soared.
    • A credible plan may boost confidence and keep interest rates low.
    • Smaller deficits leave room to respond to the next shock.
  • Arguments against:
    • Cutting spending in a weak economy reduces AD and growth.
    • A study by IMF economists (2013) found the multiplier in the crisis was larger than forecasters assumed, so cuts hit output harder.
    • With interest rates near zero, monetary policy could not offset the cuts.
  • Your judgement depends on: the size of the multiplier, the level of debt, and market confidence.
Quick check
?In the USA from 1929 to 1933, the money supply fell by about a third as thousands of banks failed. Which response in 2008 most clearly reflects that lesson?
Mission 5

Problems and constraints for policymakers

  • Time lags: spotting a problem, acting and the effect can take 18 months or more.
  • Poor data and forecasts: GDP figures are revised; the size of the output gap is uncertain.
  • The zero lower bound: rates near 0% leave little room to cut.
  • High public debt limits fiscal room.
  • A global economy:
    • External shocks (energy prices, world recessions, pandemics) are outside any one government's control.
    • Capital flows and exchange rates can undo interest-rate changes.
    • Low-income countries face extra limits: poverty, weak tax bases, costly borrowing.
    • Competitiveness depends on supply-side factors that change slowly.
  • Expectations and politics: short-termism before elections; rising inflation expectations.
  • Result: government failure in macro policy is possible: a policy that arrives late or is the wrong size can destabilise the economy.
Mission 5Evaluate

Which policy works best?

  • Criteria for success: are the targets met (e.g. 2% inflation)? At what cost? How fast? With what side-effects? Who gains and who loses?
  • Relative effectiveness:
    • Monetary: quick to change, but weak near 0% rates and slow to work (about 18–24 months).
    • Fiscal: strong in a deep slump, but slow to agree and limited by debt.
    • Supply-side: lasting gains in capacity, but they take years.
  • It depends on:
    • The cause of the problem: demand shock or supply shock?
    • Spare capacity: a big gap favours stimulus; little spare capacity means inflation.
    • The state of public finances and how open the economy is.
Mission check

?Two economies both face rising unemployment. In Economy X, demand for its exports has collapsed and inflation is falling below target. In Economy Y, the price of imported food and fuel has doubled and inflation is rising above target. Which judgement is best?
Recap

The big ideas

Mission 1

  • Financial markets fail through asymmetric information, externalities (crashes hurt third parties), moral hazard, and speculation and bubbles.
  • Expectations, herding and animal spirits can shift demand for assets, so prices overshoot and then crash.
  • Failures in finance spread to the real economy through credit, debt, wealth and confidence.

Mission 2

  • At the zero lower bound, QE creates reserves to buy bonds: bond prices rise, yields fall, borrowing gets cheaper, AD shifts right.
  • Reversing QE (QT) contracts the money supply and pushes yields up.

Mission 3

  • Discretionary policy = a deliberate decision. Automatic stabilisers = tax and transfers that change with the cycle, with no decision.
  • In a recession, tax revenue falls and benefit spending rises: AD falls by less, the deficit rises.
  • Fiscal rules must leave room for stabilisers to work, or they can deepen a recession.

Mission 4

  • Government borrowing raises the demand for loanable funds and the real interest rate; private investment falls.
  • Crowding out is usually partial: higher rates also draw out extra saving.
  • Short run: interest-sensitive spending falls. Long run: slower capital accumulation and growth.
  • It is smaller in a deep recession, and public capital can crowd in private investment.

Mission 5

  • The policy mix combines fiscal, monetary and supply-side tools. When two policies push the same way, the AD change is certain and the interest-rate change is not, and the reverse.
  • Diagnose the shock first: demand shocks allow stimulus without conflict; supply shocks force a trade-off.
  • Priorities shifted: full employment after 1945, inflation from the late 1970s, financial stability after 2008. Each crisis was fought with lessons from the last.
🏆

Mini-lesson complete!

⭐⭐⭐

You've worked through Managing a global economy (part 2) for CCEA A-level Economics. 🎉

  1. Mission 1If people in finance are paid to judge risk, how can a whole market get it so badly wrong?
  2. Mission 2When interest rates can go no lower, how can a central bank still get people spending?
  3. Mission 3Why does a government's borrowing jump in a recession even when nobody votes for it?
  4. Mission 4When a government borrows more, can it leave firms with less to invest?
  5. Mission 5Why can the right cure for one slump be the wrong cure for the next?

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