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Cambridge International AS & A Level Economics (9708) · 7.6 Different market structures; 7.7 Growth and survival of firms; 7.8 Differing objectives and policies of firms (part 3 of 3)
Mini-Lesson

Different market structures; Growth and survival of firms; Differing objectives and policies of firms (part 3)

5 missions. Guess, learn, then check. Your place is saved.

  1. Mission 1How can two rival firms each make their best choice and still both end up worse off?
  2. Mission 2Why might a business choose to earn less profit than it could?
  3. Mission 3When the people who own a company are not the people who run it, whose goals win?
  4. Mission 4Why do some firms grow by buying up other firms, while most firms stay small?
  5. Mission 5Why can two people sitting side by side on the same train have paid very different fares?
Mission 1

Mission 1: How can two rival firms each make their best choice and still both end up worse off?

Make a guess: How can two rival firms each make their best choice and still both end up worse off?

Mission 1

A game between firms

  • Game theory studies decisions where your result depends on others' choices too.
  • Every game has:
    • players (here, two firms)
    • strategies (the choices open to each player, e.g. high price or low price)
    • payoffs (what each player gets, e.g. profit, for each pair of choices)
  • Oligopoly fits: firms are interdependent.
  • Say: "a strategy is a choice of action" — not: "a strategy is a payoff".
Mission 1

The payoff matrix

Cartel matrixFirm BB keeps toquotaB cheatsFirm AA keeps toquotaA cheats800, 800700, 875875, 700750, 750Nash equilibriumCells: (A's profit, B's profit)Illustrative data
  • Illustrative data: the cartel from an earlier lesson. Each firm either keeps to its quota (20 units) or cheats (25 units).
B keeps to quotaB cheats
A keeps to quota800, 800700, 875
A cheats875, 700750, 750
  • Each cell: (A's profit, B's profit). A chooses the row; B chooses the column.
  • Example: A keeps to quota, B cheats → A earns 700, B earns 875.
Mission 1

Dominant strategy

Cartel matrixFirm BB keeps toquotaB cheatsFirm AA keeps toquotaA cheats800, 800700, 875875, 700750, 750Nash equilibriumCells: (A's profit, B's profit)Illustrative data
  • A dominant strategy is best for a player whatever the other player does.
  • Method: fix the rival's choice, then compare your payoffs.
  • A's view:
    • If B keeps to quota: cheat 875 > keep 800.
    • If B cheats: cheat 750 > keep 700.
  • So cheating is A's dominant strategy. B's payoffs mirror A's, so B's dominant strategy is also to cheat.
  • Say: "dominant strategy: best whatever the rival does" — not: "the strategy with the biggest number in the matrix".
Quick check
?Illustrative data. Two firms, P and Q, each choose a high or a low price. Each cell shows (P's profit, Q's profit).
Q: high priceQ: low price
P: high price100, 9040, 110
P: low price120, 5060, 60

What is firm P's dominant strategy?

Mission 1

Nash equilibrium

Cartel matrixFirm BB keeps toquotaB cheatsFirm AA keeps toquotaA cheats800, 800700, 875875, 700750, 750Nash equilibriumCells: (A's profit, B's profit)Illustrative data
  • Nash equilibrium: an outcome where no player can do better by changing only its own strategy, given the other's choice.
  • Check each cell: would either player want to switch?
  • In the cartel game: (cheat, cheat) → (750, 750).
    • A switching to "keep" gets 700 < 750. B switching gets 700 < 750. No one gains: Nash equilibrium.
  • (keep, keep) → (800, 800) is not a Nash equilibrium: each firm could earn 875 by cheating.
  • When both players have a dominant strategy, the Nash equilibrium is where they both play it.
  • Say: "no player has an incentive to change strategy alone" — not: "both players get their best possible payoff".
Mission 1

The prisoner's dilemma

The prisoner's dilemmaFirm BB keeps toquotaB cheatsFirm AA keeps toquotaA cheats800, 800700, 875875, 700750, 750best togetherNash equilibriumarrow: each firm's incentive to cheatIllustrative data
  • The story: two suspects are questioned in separate rooms. Each can confess or stay silent.
  • Confessing is each one's dominant strategy. Both confess, yet both would get shorter sentences if both stayed silent.
  • A prisoner's dilemma: each player follows its own dominant strategy, and both end up worse off than if they had cooperated.
  • The cartel game is a prisoner's dilemma:
    • Nash equilibrium: (cheat, cheat): 750 each.
    • Cooperation: (keep, keep): 800 each.
  • Why cooperation fails: neither firm can trust the other, and a cartel agreement cannot be enforced in court.
Mission 1Graph lab

Can a penalty hold the cartel together?

Illustrative data as an earlier screen. The cartel agrees a penalty that any member caught cheating must pay. It is taken off the cheater's payoff.

Can a penalty hold the cartel together?Firm BFirm AKeepCheatKeep toquotaCheat800,800700,875875,700750,750
  • Takeaway: keeping to the quota is dominant only when cheating pays less whatever the rival does: here a penalty above 75.
Mission 1

Why the monopoly outcome is hard to reach

  • Illustrative data as (AR = 100 − Q, MC = AC = 20):
OutcomePriceTotal output
Monopoly (cartel keeps to quotas)6040
Both cheat (Nash equilibrium)5050
Perfect competition (P = MC)2080
  • Each firm's incentive to cheat pulls price below the monopoly price.
  • But price stays above, and output below, the perfectly competitive outcome.
  • Firms that meet again and again (a repeated game) may keep cooperating: cheating today could start a price war tomorrow.
Quick check
?Illustrative data as the earlier screens: AR = 100 − Q, MC = AC = 20; quota 20 each; "cheat" means producing 25. What is the market price at the Nash equilibrium of this game?
Mission 1Evaluate

How useful is game theory?

  • It shows why oligopolists are interdependent, and why cartels are unstable.
  • It depends on whether the game is one-off or repeated: repeated play makes cooperation easier (match what the rival did last time).
  • It depends on information: real firms rarely know their rivals' payoffs.
  • It depends on the number of firms: real markets often have more than two.
  • It depends on rationality: firms may value trust, reputation or market share, not just this period's profit.
  • Policy use: leniency rules turn a cartel into a prisoner's dilemma. The first member to confess is not fined (as with MAN in an earlier lesson).
Mission check

?Illustrative data. Two rival phone makers each choose whether to run a large advertising campaign. Each cell: (A's profit, B's profit).
B advertisesB does not
A advertises30, 3070, 10
A does not10, 7050, 50

Which statement is correct?

Mission 2

Mission 2: Why might a business choose to earn less profit than it could?

Make a guess: Why might a business choose to earn less profit than it could?

Mission 2

Why aim for maximum profit?

  • Economic theory usually assumes firms maximise profit: output where MC = MR.
  • Reasons a firm might:
  • Owners take the risk and want the reward (dividends, a higher share price).
  • Retained profit pays for investment and research.
  • Profit builds a cushion for bad years and makes lenders and investors keen.
  • High profit signals success and pays for growth.
Mission 2

Three targets on one diagram

Three targets on one diagramCosts and revenue01612109.2581214OutputAR = DMRMCACprofit max (MC = MR): P = 16, profit = 54revenue max (MR = 0): P = 12, TR = 144sales max (AR = AC): P = 10, TR = TC, normalprofitTotal revenue014414012881214OutputTRIllustrative data
  • Profit maximisation: MC = MR.
  • Sales revenue maximisation: MR = 0. The last unit adds nothing to TR, so TR is at its peak.
  • Sales (volume) maximisation: sell as many units as possible while still making normal profit: AR = AC.
  • Moving from profit max to revenue max to sales max: more output, a lower price, less profit.
  • Say: "revenue is maximised where MR = 0" — not: "where MC = MR".
Mission 2

Worked example: three outputs

Three targets on one diagramCosts and revenue01612109.2581214OutputAR = DMRMCACprofit max (MC = MR): P = 16, profit = 54revenue max (MR = 0): P = 12, TR = 144sales max (AR = AC): P = 10, TR = TC, normalprofitTotal revenue014414012881214OutputTRIllustrative data
  • Illustrative data. AR = 24 − Q, so MR = 24 − 2Q. TC = 42 + 0.5Q², so MC = Q.
  • Profit max: 24 − 2Q = Q → Q = 8, P = 16. TR = 128, TC = 74, profit = 54.
  • Revenue max: 24 − 2Q = 0 → Q = 12, P = 12. TR = 144 (the highest), profit = 30.
  • Sales max: AR = AC at Q = 14, P = 10. TR = TC = 140: normal profit only.
  • Each target gives up some profit for size.
Mission 2Graph lab

Change the target

Change the targetCosts and revenueOutput012142001020816AR = DMRMCACMC = MRMR = 0AR = AC
  • Takeaway: revenue peaks where MR = 0 and sales volume peaks where AR = AC; both mean more output, a lower price and less profit.
Quick check
Four outputs on a cost and revenue diagramCosts and revenue030405060OutputAR = DMRMCACMarked outputs, left to right: 30 (MC = MR), 40(AC lowest), 50 (MR = 0), 60 (AR = AC)Schematic: spacing not to scale. Illustrativedata.
?Illustrative data. On a firm's cost and revenue diagram: MC = MR at an output of 30; MR = 0 at an output of 50; AR = AC at an output of 60; AC is lowest at an output of 40. The managers' bonuses depend on the firm's sales revenue. Which output will they choose?
Mission 2

Growth, market share, survival

  • Growth: a bigger firm can gain economies of scale and market power, and spreads its risks. Managers often gain pay and status from size.
  • Market share: a larger share of sales can bring power over price and a strong brand. Firms may cut prices now to win it.
  • Survival: the first aim for many new firms and in recessions. Cover costs, keep cash flowing.
  • Many of these can serve long-run profit while lowering profit today.
Mission 2

Satisficing

  • Satisficing: aiming for a satisfactory level of profit, not the maximum. The term comes from the economist Herbert Simon.
  • Why firms satisfice:
  • Owners and managers are different people. Managers need only enough profit to keep shareholders content.
  • Firms have several stakeholders to keep happy at once.
  • Information is limited. Finding the exact MC = MR point is costly.
  • Satisficing is a minimum target, not a lack of effort. Profit below it brings pressure for change.
Mission 2

CSR and social objectives

  • Corporate social responsibility (CSR): a firm takes account of its impact on society and the environment, beyond what the law requires.
  • Examples: cutting emissions, fair supplier contracts, community projects, staff welfare.
  • Social enterprises and not-for-profit organisations put a social aim first.
  • Real case: in 2022 the founder of the outdoor clothing firm Patagonia transferred its ownership to a trust and a non-profit body. Profit not reinvested in the firm goes to fighting climate change.
  • For CSR: it can attract customers and staff, and protect the brand: long-run profit.
  • Against: Milton Friedman (1970) argued a firm's social responsibility is to increase its profits within the rules; owners, not managers, should choose how to spend on good causes.
Quick check
?A new food-delivery firm sets its prices below its costs to sign up as many customers as possible. It expects to make losses for several years. Which objective best explains this?
Mission 2Evaluate

Do firms really maximise profit?

It depends on …

  • Who controls the firm: an owner-manager may maximise profit; managers of a large company with many small shareholders have more room to pursue other goals.
  • Competition: in fiercely competitive markets, firms that do not aim at maximum profit may not survive.
  • Time horizon: growth, market share and CSR can be routes to long-run profit, so they may not be alternatives at all.
  • Information: firms rarely know MC and MR exactly; rules of thumb can approximate maximum profit.
  • Judge: profit maximisation is a useful assumption for predicting behaviour, but real firms often balance several objectives.
Mission check

?The managers of a large hotel chain aim each year for a level of profit that keeps its shareholders content. Once they reach it, they do not push for more. They avoid price rises and cost cuts that would upset staff and regular guests, even though these would raise profit. Which objective best describes their behaviour?
Mission 3

Mission 3: When the people who own a company are not the people who run it, whose goals win?

Make a guess: A large company is owned by thousands of shareholders but run by a team of hired managers. Whose goals usually win?

Mission 3

Owning versus controlling

Owning versus controllingOwners (shareholders)electBoard of directorsappointManagersrunthe firmdecisionsinformation(limited)Divorce of ownershipand control
  • In a small firm (a sole trader or a partnership) the owners usually run the business themselves.
  • A large public limited company (plc) may have thousands of shareholders. They own the company.
  • Shareholders elect a board of directors, who appoint managers to run the firm day to day. The managers control it.
  • This split is the divorce (separation) of ownership and control.
  • It lets a firm raise huge sums from many owners and hire expert managers.
  • But owners and managers may want different things.
  • Outside the UK, firms like this are usually called listed (publicly traded) companies or corporations.
  • Say: "a public limited company is privately owned by its shareholders" — not: "a plc is in the public sector".
Mission 3

The principal–agent problem

  • A principal hires an agent to act on the principal's behalf.
  • Here the shareholders are the principals; the managers are the agents.
  • The principal–agent problem: the agent may pursue their own goals rather than the principal's.
  • Two conditions make it a problem:
  • Different objectives: owners want profit (and a rising share price); managers may want pay, status, power or an easy life.
  • Asymmetric information: managers know far more about the business than scattered owners, so owners cannot easily check what managers do.
  • Other examples: voters (principals) and politicians (agents); a patient and a doctor; a homeowner and a builder.
Quick check
?Which situation is the clearest example of the principal–agent problem?
Mission 3

Lining up the incentives

Owners try to make the agents' goals match their own:

  • Performance-related pay: bonuses linked to profit or the share price.
  • Share options: managers gain if the share price rises, so they think like owners.
  • Monitoring: independent (non-executive) directors, audited accounts, published reports.
  • Shareholder votes: owners can vote down pay deals or remove directors.
  • Threat of takeover: if managers waste profit, the share price falls, a rival may buy the firm cheaply, and the managers lose their jobs.
  • Each fix has limits: targets can be gamed, and bonuses tied to this year's results can encourage short-termism.
Quick check
?To align managers with shareholders, a company pays its chief executive a large bonus if the share price is higher at the end of this year. Which unintended effect is most likely?
Mission 3Evaluate

How much does the divorce matter?

  • The principal–agent problem is a strong reason firms may not maximise profit. How serious it is depends on:
  • How spread out ownership is: a few large shareholders (e.g. pension funds) can monitor managers far better than thousands of small ones.
  • Information: better accounts, audits and independent directors shrink the information gap.
  • Competition: in a highly competitive market, a firm that wastes money makes losses and may not survive, which limits managers' freedom.
  • Pay design: rewards tied to long-run value align goals better than one-year targets, but no scheme is perfect.
  • Takeover threat: works only if shares are traded and rivals can buy them.
Mission check

?Lena founded a chain of gyms and still owns all of it. She has moved abroad and hired a chief executive on a salary plus a bonus based on the number of members. Lena checks the accounts twice a year. Which outcome is most likely?
Mission 4

Mission 4: Why do some firms grow by buying up other firms, while most firms stay small?

Make a guess: Most businesses never grow beyond a handful of people. What is the main reason?

Mission 4

Why grow?

  • Economies of scale: a bigger firm can cut its average cost (bulk buying, specialist machines, cheaper finance).
  • Market power: a larger market share gives more control over price and less threat from rivals.
  • Spreading risk: selling more products or in more countries means one bad market hurts less.
  • Survival: a large firm is harder to take over and better able to ride out a downturn.
  • Managers' goals: pay, status and power often rise with size (the principal–agent problem, Mission 3).
Mission 4

Two routes: organic or external

  • Organic (internal) growth: the firm expands by itself: new outlets, new products, more capacity, often paid for from retained profit.
  • Slower and lower risk; the firm keeps its culture and control.
  • External growth joins firms together:
  • Merger: two firms agree to combine into one.
  • Takeover (acquisition): one firm buys a controlling share of another, with or without its agreement.
  • Faster: it buys market share, brands and skills at once. But it is costly, risky, and the two cultures may clash.
  • Diversification: moving into new products or markets. It can be organic (launching a new range) or external (buying a firm in another industry).
Mission 4

Three directions of integration

Three directions of integrationRaw materials(steel)Manufacturing(car maker)Wholesale/distributionRetail(showrooms)anothercar makerHorizontalBackwardverticalForwardverticalHotelchainConglomerate
  • Think of a chain of production: raw materials → manufacturing → wholesale → retail.
  • Horizontal integration: firms at the same stage of the same industry join (two car makers).
  • Vertical integration: firms at different stages of the same chain join.
  • Backward: towards the supplier (a car maker buys a steel works).
  • Forward: towards the customer (a car maker buys a chain of car showrooms).
  • Conglomerate integration: firms in unrelated industries join (a car maker buys a hotel chain).
  • Say: "backward vertical integration" for buying a supplier — not: "forward", which means moving towards the final customer.
Quick check
?A coffee-shop chain buys a company that roasts coffee beans and already supplies the chain. What type of integration is this?
Mission 4

Motives for each type

TypeMain motivesMain risks
HorizontalEconomies of scale; bigger market share; removes a rivalCompetition authorities may block it; may raise prices for consumers
Vertical (backward)Secures supplies; controls quality and cost; captures the supplier's profit marginLocked into one supplier even if cheaper ones appear
Vertical (forward)Controls how the product reaches customers; captures the retailer's margin; may shut rivals out of outletsFirm may lack retail skills
ConglomerateSpreads risk across unrelated markets; uses spare cash or management skillFew economies of scale; managers may not understand the new industry
  • The motive should match the type: a firm worried about supplies looks backward; a firm worried about one market falling looks to conglomerate growth.
Mission 4

Real cases

  • Horizontal, blocked: in April 2019 the UK's competition authority (the CMA) blocked a merger of Sainsbury's and Asda, two of the country's largest supermarkets. It expected higher prices, less choice or lower quality for shoppers.
  • Vertical: in March 2018 Tesco, a supermarket chain, completed its takeover of Booker, a food wholesaler that supplies shops and restaurants.
  • Demerger (break-up): in July 2022 the drugs company GSK split off its consumer health products (toothpaste, painkillers) as a separate company, Haleon.
  • Horizontal, outside the UK: in March 2019 the US media group Disney completed its purchase of most of 21st Century Fox, a rival film and television producer.
  • The same patterns appear in every economy.
Mission 4Evaluate

Does growth pay?

  • Whether growth benefits a firm and its customers depends on:
  • Type: horizontal and vertical growth can give real cost savings; conglomerate growth gives few economies of scale.
  • Route: organic growth is slower but less risky; a takeover is fast but the buyer may overpay.
  • Culture and management: savings promised before a merger may be lost to clashing ways of working.
  • Size reached: past a point, diseconomies of scale outweigh economies.
  • Who you ask: shareholders may gain from market power while consumers pay higher prices; competition authorities weigh both.
  • So growth is not right for every firm. Most firms stay small: their market is small, finance for expansion is hard to get, or the owner prefers to keep control.
Mission check

?A chocolate maker's profits swing wildly because the price and supply of cocoa beans are unreliable. Its managers want growth that most directly reduces this problem. Which route fits best?
Mission 5

Mission 5: Why can two people sitting side by side on the same train have paid very different fares?

Make a guess: Why can two people sitting side by side on the same train have paid very different fares?

Mission 5

Same product, different prices

  • Price discrimination: charging different buyers different prices for the same good or service, for reasons not linked to cost.
  • Examples: peak and off-peak train fares; child and adult cinema tickets; student discounts.
  • Not price discrimination: a higher price because supplying costs more (e.g. delivery to a remote island).
  • Say: "price discrimination" only when cost is the same — not: for any price difference.
Mission 5

Three conditions

Three conditions for price discrimination1 Market powera price maker, not a price taker2 Groups with different elasticityLess elastichigher pricePED −1.4More elasticlower pricePED −33 No resalelow pricehigh priceIllustrative data.

1. Market power: the firm must be a price maker. A price taker cannot set prices.

2. Separate groups with different price elasticities of demand, and a way to tell them apart (age, time, place, ID). The group with the more elastic demand gets the lower price.

3. No resale: buyers at the low price must not be able to sell on to those charged more.

  • If resale is easy, the low-price group buys for everyone (market seepage or arbitrage).
Quick check
?A firm with market power plans to charge students a lower price than other adults for an identical product. Its costs are the same for both groups. Which situation would stop this plan from raising its profit?
Mission 5

Three degrees

Three degrees of price discriminationFirst degree: each buyer pays their ownmaximumPrice0QuantityDSecond degree: price per unit falls after a blockof unitsPrice per unit0Units boughtThird degree: different prices for differentgroupsAdultshigher priceStudentslower price
  • First degree (perfect): each buyer pays their own maximum willingness to pay.
  • Second degree: price depends on how much you buy: bulk discounts, lower price per unit after a set amount.
  • Third degree: different prices for different groups: age, time of day, location.
  • Real firms rarely know every buyer's maximum price. Personalised online pricing is an attempt to get closer.
Mission 5

Third degree: the diagram

Third-degree price discriminationMarket 1: less price elastic demandPrice0P1Q1QuantityAR1 = D1MR1MC = ACMarket 2: more price elastic demandPrice0P2Q2QuantityAR2 = D2MR2MC = AC
  • Two markets, the same MC (constant).
  • In each market, the firm produces where MR = MC.
  • Price in each market is read off its own AR (demand) curve.
  • The less price elastic market pays the higher price.
  • The more elastic market pays less: a high price there would lose too many sales.
  • Say: "the higher price is charged in the market where demand is less price elastic" — not: "the richer group always pays more".
Mission 5

Worked example: business travellers and students

Worked example: business travellers and studentsBusiness travellersAR = 120 − Q, MR = 120 − 2QPrice0702050QuantityARMRMC = ACStudentsAR = 40 − 0.5Q, MR = 40 − QPrice0302020QuantityARMRMC = ACIllustrative data. The two graphs use differentscales.
  • Illustrative data. MC = AC = 20.
  • Business travellers: AR = 120 − Q, so MR = 120 − 2Q.
    • MR = MC: Q = 50, P = 70.
  • Students: AR = 40 − 0.5Q, so MR = 40 − Q.
    • MR = MC: Q = 20, P = 30.
  • PED at those prices: business −1.4; students −3. Students pay less.
  • One price for all: the best single price is 70. Students (who pay at most 40) buy nothing.
    • Output 50; profit (70 − 20) × 50 = 2,500.
  • Price discrimination: output 70; profit 2,500 + (30 − 20) × 20 = 2,700.
Mission 5Graph lab

Who pays more?

Same two markets as the previous screen. Now the students' demand grows: at every price, students want to buy more.

Who pays more?StudentsPriceQuantity01002000801202030AR (students)MRMCBusiness travellersPriceQuantity01002000401205070AR (business)MRMC
  • Takeaway: each market has its own MR = MC price. The less elastic group pays more; when both groups have the same PED, they pay the same price.
Quick check
?Illustrative data. A firm sells in two separate markets with the same constant MC = 10. In market A, AR = 70 − 2Q, so MR = 70 − 4Q. In market B, AR = 30 − 0.5Q, so MR = 30 − Q. Which prices maximise its profit?
Mission 5

Perfect price discrimination

Perfect price discriminationPrice030102040QuantityP = MCAR = DAR = D = MRMCMRconsumer surplusprofitdeadweight lossproducer surplusSingle price: output 20, price 30.Each unit sells at its own price up to output 40.CS = 0, DWL = 0.
  • Each unit sells at the buyer's maximum price, so the demand curve becomes the MR curve.
  • The firm produces where D = MC, the P = MC output: the same output as perfect competition.
  • All consumer surplus becomes producer surplus. Consumer surplus = 0.
  • No deadweight loss: allocatively efficient output.
  • Illustrative data (as): AR = 50 − Q, MC = 10.
    • Single price: Q = 20, profit 400, consumer surplus 200, deadweight loss 200.
    • Perfect price discrimination: Q = 40, producer surplus 800, consumer surplus 0, deadweight loss 0.
  • Say: "efficient but not equitable" — not: "consumers gain because output rises".
Quick check
?A single-price monopolist becomes able to practise perfect (first-degree) price discrimination. Its costs do not change. Compared with before, which statement is correct?
Mission 5

Who gains and who loses?

  • Producers: more profit. It may fund investment, or keep a service running (e.g. a rail route).
  • Consumers in the high-price group: pay more; lose consumer surplus.
  • Consumers in the low-price group: may be served for the first time.
  • In an earlier screen, students were served only under price discrimination.
  • Total output: may rise. Then some deadweight loss is removed.
  • Real example: the 16–25 Railcard gives one third off most rail fares in Great Britain.
Mission 5Evaluate

Good or bad?

  • It depends on output: if total output rises, welfare can rise; if it does not, welfare usually falls.
  • It depends on who pays more: lower prices for students, children or pensioners can help equity; higher prices for those who must travel at peak times may not.
  • It depends on use of profit: research and investment, or higher payouts to owners?
  • It depends on costs of separating groups: checking ID, building booking systems.
  • It depends on fairness: buyers may see personalised prices as exploitation.
Mission check

?Illustrative case: a theme park charges local residents less than tourists for an identical day ticket. Its costs are the same for both groups. Which pair of conditions is needed for this to earn more profit than one price for all?
Recap

The big ideas

Mission 1

  • Payoff matrix: players, strategies, payoffs; each cell is (row player, column player).
  • Dominant strategy: best whatever the rival does. Nash equilibrium: no player gains by changing only its own strategy.
  • Prisoner's dilemma: each plays its dominant strategy, and both end up worse off than if they had cooperated. That is why cartels are unstable.

Mission 2

  • Theory assumes profit maximisation (MC = MR), but firms may aim for growth, market share, survival, satisfactory profit or social goals.
  • Revenue maximisation is at MR = 0 and sales maximisation at AR = AC: more output, a lower price, less profit.

Mission 3

  • When owners (principals) hire managers (agents), different goals plus asymmetric information let managers pursue their own aims.

Mission 4

  • Firms grow for economies of scale, market power, lower risk and survival; organically (by themselves) or externally (merger or takeover).
  • Horizontal joins the same stage, vertical joins different stages (backward to suppliers, forward to customers), conglomerate joins unrelated industries.
  • Most firms stay small because of small markets, limited finance or the owner's own goals.

Mission 5

  • Price discrimination: different prices for the same product, not explained by cost.
  • Conditions: market power; groups with different PED that can be told apart; no resale.
  • Third degree: MR = MC in each market; the less elastic market pays more.
🏆

Mini-lesson complete!

⭐⭐⭐

You've worked through Price system and the microeconomy (part 3) for Cambridge International AS & A Level Economics. 🎉

  1. Mission 1How can two rival firms each make their best choice and still both end up worse off?
  2. Mission 2Why might a business choose to earn less profit than it could?
  3. Mission 3When the people who own a company are not the people who run it, whose goals win?
  4. Mission 4Why do some firms grow by buying up other firms, while most firms stay small?
  5. Mission 5Why can two people sitting side by side on the same train have paid very different fares?

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