Illustrative data. Two firms, A and B. Each sells 100 units a day at 10. AC = 6 for both.
Profit each: (10 − 6) × 100 = 400.
A cuts its price to 9. B keeps 10.
A sells 150: profit (9 − 6) × 150 = 450. B sells 60: profit 240.
B matches: both charge 9 and sell 110 each.
Profit each: (9 − 6) × 110 = 330. Both are worse off than at the start.
B might cut to 8, then A to 7: a price war. Prices fall towards cost; profit is squeezed.
Consumers gain in the short run. Weaker firms may leave, leaving fewer rivals in the long run.
Quick check
?Illustrative data. Two rival firms each sell 200 units a week at a price of 5, with an average cost of 3. One firm cuts its price to 4. The other matches at once, and each now sells 220 units. What is each firm's weekly profit after the price cut?
Mission 1
Stable prices, leaders and followers
Because a price cut is likely to be matched, prices in oligopoly are often stable ("sticky") for long periods (the kinked demand curve).
Price leadership: one firm, often the largest, changes its price and rivals follow.
Tacit agreement: firms keep prices in line with no formal deal and no contact.
Following a leader's price is hard to prove as collusion. An agreement to fix prices is a cartel and is illegal.
Say: "tacit collusion" for following without agreement — not: "a cartel", which needs an agreement.
Mission 1
Predatory pricing
Predatory pricing: setting price below cost to drive a rival out of the market, then raising price once it has gone.
A common test: is price below average variable cost (AVC)?
The predator makes losses now for market power later. It needs deep pockets and some way to stop rivals returning.
It is illegal as an abuse of a dominant position (UK Competition Act 1998; EU competition law).
Real case: in 2003 the European Commission fined Wanadoo, a French internet provider, €10.35 million for predatory pricing of broadband.
Hard part: telling predation apart from fierce, fair competition, which also lowers prices.
Mission 1
Limit pricing
Limit pricing: an established firm sets a price low enough to deter entry, at or just below a possible entrant's minimum average cost.
The established firm often has lower costs (economies of scale, experience). So at the limit price it still makes supernormal profit, just less than the short-run maximum.
Structural barriers come from the market itself: economies of scale, sunk costs, patents.
Behavioural barriers come from firms' strategy: limit pricing, predatory pricing, heavy advertising.
Say: "limit pricing keeps price above the firm's own average cost" — not: "selling below cost", which is predatory pricing.
Mission 1Graph lab
The price that keeps rivals out
Illustrative data. An established firm: AC = MC = 6. Market demand: P = 20 − 0.1Q. A rival with a minimum AC of 10 enters only if it expects the price to stay above 10.
Takeaway: the limit price is set by the rival's costs; at 10 the firm still earns 400, against 490 at 13.
Quick check
?Illustrative data. An established firm has an average cost of 20. Its profit-maximising price is 34. A possible entrant has a minimum average cost of 26 and will enter only if it expects the price to stay above 26. Which price is limit pricing?
Mission 1
Non-price competition
Step 1 of 2
Methods:
Product differentiation: design, quality, features, new models.
Branding and advertising.
Loyalty schemes: points, rewards, memberships.
Service: delivery, after-sales care, opening hours, location.
Packaging and research and development (R&D).
Aim 1: shift the firm's demand curve to the right (D1 → D2): more sold at every price.
Aim 2: make demand less price elastic: loyal customers stay even if price rises.
Say: "an increase in demand" (a shift) — not: "an extension of demand", which is a movement along the curve.
Mission 1
Why a few rivals prefer it
A price cut can be copied in hours. A new design, a strong brand or a loyal customer base takes rivals much longer to copy.
It avoids a price war that would hurt every firm.
Strong brands raise barriers to entry: a newcomer must spend heavily just to be noticed.
Costs:
Advertising raises costs, which may be passed on in higher prices.
Competitive advertising can cancel out: each firm spends more, market shares barely change.
Benefits: informative advertising helps buyers choose; competition on quality and R&D brings better products.
Quick check
?A firm in an oligopoly launches a successful advertising campaign for its product. What is the campaign trying to do to the demand curve for its product?
Mission 1
Competition over time: creative destruction
Short-run benefits of competition: lower prices, better service, less waste (X-inefficiency squeezed out).
Long-run benefits: innovation, new products, new firms, lower costs.
Creative destruction (Joseph Schumpeter, 1942): new products and methods destroy old ones, and the firms built on them.
Example: digital photography replaced film; Kodak, long dominant in film, filed for bankruptcy protection in 2012.
So even a dominant firm's power may be temporary if rivals can innovate.
Mission 1Evaluate
Is rivalry between a few big firms good for consumers?
It depends on whether low prices last: a price war helps buyers, unless it is predatory and prices rise later.
It depends on the type of non-price competition: better products and useful information, or advertising that only raises costs.
It depends on barriers to entry: limit pricing and heavy branding can keep new rivals out.
It depends on time: rivalry in R&D can bring large long-run gains.
Mission check
?Illustrative case: two coffee chains have most of the coffee shops in a city. Chain A is choosing between cutting all its prices by 10% and launching a loyalty app that gives a free drink after every ten bought. Which is the strongest reason the app may raise A's profit more than the price cut?
With a few rivals, a price cut is quickly matched; non-price competition is harder to copy.
Mission 2
Mission 2: If one company controls a whole market, why doesn't it just charge the highest price it can?
Make a guess: If one company controls a whole market, why doesn't it just charge the highest price it can?
Mission 2
A price maker
Pure monopoly: one firm supplies the whole market. No close substitutes. High barriers to entry.
Monopoly power: the power to set price above marginal cost. A firm with a large market share can have it without being the only seller.
The monopolist's demand curve is the market demand curve: it slopes down.
So it is a price maker: it chooses price, or output, but not both. Demand decides the other.
Demand = average revenue (AR): the price received per unit.
Mission 2
Where monopoly power comes from
Legal barriers: patents, licences, state franchises. A patent normally lasts up to 20 years.
Economies of scale: a large incumbent has lower average cost than any small entrant.
Control of a key resource or of the network buyers must use.
Sunk costs and brand loyalty: entry is costly and hard to recover.
Few close substitutes: the fewer the substitutes, the less price elastic the firm's demand.
More barriers and fewer substitutes mean more monopoly power, and power that lasts.
Mission 2
Why MR is below AR
Illustrative data. To sell one more unit, the firm must cut the price on every unit.
Quantity
Price (AR)
Total revenue
Marginal revenue
1
10
10
10
2
9
18
8
3
8
24
6
4
7
28
4
5
6
30
2
The 5th unit sells for 6, but the price cut on the first 4 units loses 4. MR = 6 − 4 = 2.
So MR < AR at every output after the first.
With a straight-line demand curve, MR is twice as steep as AR.
Say: "MR lies below AR for a monopolist" — not: "price equals marginal revenue".
Quick check
?Illustrative data. A monopolist can sell 4 units a day at a price of 20, or 5 units a day at a price of 18. What is the marginal revenue of the 5th unit?
Mission 2
Profit is greatest where MR = MC
Step 1 of 3
If MR > MC, one more unit adds more to revenue than to cost: raise output.
If MR < MC, the last unit adds more to cost than to revenue: cut output.
So profit is maximised at the output where MR = MC.
Price: go up from that output to the demand (AR) curve.
A monopolist always produces where demand is price elastic: MR is positive there.
Say: "read price off the AR curve at the MR = MC output" — not: "price is set where MR = MC".
Mission 2Graph lab
Choose the output
Illustrative data: AR = 50 − Q; MC = AC = 10.
Takeaway: profit peaks where MR = MC (Q = 20), not where revenue or price is highest.
Mission 2
Worked example: price, profit and lost surplus
Illustrative data. AR = 50 − Q, so MR = 50 − 2Q. MC = AC = 10.
A competitive industry with the same costs: P = MC = 10, Q = 40.
Deadweight loss (a later screen explains it) = ½ × (40 − 20) × (30 − 10) = 200.
Mission 2
Extra profit, normal profit or a loss
Profit per unit = AR − AC at the MR = MC output.
AR > AC: supernormal profit. AR = AC: normal profit. AR < AC: a loss.
Short run: a loss-making monopolist keeps producing if price covers AVC. Below AVC it shuts down.
Long run: barriers stop entry, so profit above normal can last. A firm that cannot cover AC in the long run leaves.
Say: "barriers to entry let supernormal profit persist in the long run" — not: "a monopoly always makes a profit".
Quick check
?Illustrative data. A monopolist maximises profit at an output of 300 units. At that output, AR = 12, ATC = 9 and MC = MR = 6. What is its profit?
Mission 2
Monopoly versus perfect competition
Step 1 of 3
Same costs, constant MC = AC. Compare the two outcomes.
Perfect competition: P = MC, output Qc, price Pc.
Monopoly: MR = MC, so output is lower (Qm < Qc) and price is higher (Pm > Pc).
Rectangle (Pm − Pc) × Qm: consumer surplus transferred to the monopolist.
Triangle from Qm to Qc, below D and above MC: units worth more than they cost, never made. This is the deadweight loss.
Monopoly is allocatively inefficient: P > MC.
Say: "the rectangle is a transfer; the triangle is the deadweight loss" — not: "the whole fall in consumer surplus is lost".
Quick check
?A monopoly is compared with a competitive industry with the same constant MC. Which area is the deadweight loss caused by the monopoly?
Area
Where it is
w
Triangle below D and above Pm, from 0 to Qm
x
Rectangle between Pm and Pc, from 0 to Qm
y
Triangle below D and above MC, from Qm to Qc
z
Rectangle below Pc and above 0, from 0 to Qm
Mission 2
Static and dynamic efficiency
Allocative: P > MC, so output is too low.
Productive: output is usually not at the lowest point of AC.
X-inefficiency: with no rivals, costs can drift above the lowest possible AC: slack management, waste.
Dynamic efficiency may go either way:
Supernormal profit can fund research and development, and a patent protects the reward.
But a firm safe behind barriers may feel little pressure to innovate.
Say: "X-inefficiency" for costs above the lowest possible AC — not: "productive inefficiency".
Mission 2
Economies of scale versus efficiency
Illustrative data. Same demand, AR = 50 − Q.
Many small firms with no economies of scale: MC = AC = 30. Price 30, output 20.
One large firm with economies of scale: MC = AC = 6.
MR = MC: Q = 22, P = 28.
The monopoly charges less and sells more, and still earns supernormal profit.
It is still allocatively inefficient: P (28) > MC (6).
Mission 2
Monopoly power as a market failure
Market failure: the market misallocates resources.
Monopoly power: price above MC, too little output, a deadweight loss.
A related market imperfection: factor immobility.
Workers and capital cannot easily move (occupational or geographical immobility).
So resources stay where they are less valued, and new firms find it harder to enter.
Market power and factor immobility are imperfections: they stop the market reaching the efficient outcome.
Mission 2Evaluate
Is monopoly always bad?
Consumers: higher prices and less choice; but possibly lower prices if economies of scale are large.
Workers and suppliers: one dominant buyer may hold down pay or input prices; or profits fund secure jobs.
Owners: supernormal profit. Government: more tax on profits.
It depends on economies of scale: big enough to outweigh the deadweight loss?
It depends on what profit is used for: research and new products, or higher payouts?
It depends on barriers: if entry is possible, the threat of rivals can hold prices down (see Mission 4).
It depends on regulation: price caps and competition law can limit abuse.
Mission check
?Illustrative case: a town's only ferry operator sets one fare for all passengers. At its current fare, its marginal revenue is 4 and its marginal cost is 7 per passenger. What should it do to raise its profit?
A monopolist weighs each extra sale: the best price is where MR = MC, not the highest price it could charge.
Mission 3
Mission 3: Why can two people sitting side by side on the same train have paid very different fares?
Make a guess: Why can two people sitting side by side on the same train have paid very different fares?
Mission 3
Same product, different prices
Price discrimination: charging different buyers different prices for the same good or service, for reasons not linked to cost.
Examples: peak and off-peak train fares; child and adult cinema tickets; student discounts.
Not price discrimination: a higher price because supplying costs more (e.g. delivery to a remote island).
Say: "price discrimination" only when cost is the same — not: for any price difference.
Mission 3
Three conditions
1. Market power: the firm must be a price maker. A price taker cannot set prices.
2. Separate groups with different price elasticities of demand, and a way to tell them apart (age, time, place, ID). The group with the more elastic demand gets the lower price.
3. No resale: buyers at the low price must not be able to sell on to those charged more.
If resale is easy, the low-price group buys for everyone (market seepage or arbitrage).
Quick check
?A firm with market power plans to charge students a lower price than other adults for an identical product. Its costs are the same for both groups. Which situation would stop this plan from raising its profit?
Mission 3
Three degrees
First degree (perfect): each buyer pays their own maximum willingness to pay.
Second degree: price depends on how much you buy: bulk discounts, lower price per unit after a set amount.
Third degree: different prices for different groups: age, time of day, location.
Real firms rarely know every buyer's maximum price. Personalised online pricing is an attempt to get closer.
Mission 3
Third degree: the diagram
Two markets, the same MC (constant).
In each market, the firm produces where MR = MC.
Price in each market is read off its own AR (demand) curve.
The less price elastic market pays the higher price.
The more elastic market pays less: a high price there would lose too many sales.
Say: "the higher price is charged in the market where demand is less price elastic" — not: "the richer group always pays more".
Mission 3
Worked example: business travellers and students
Illustrative data. MC = AC = 20.
Business travellers: AR = 120 − Q, so MR = 120 − 2Q.
MR = MC: Q = 50, P = 70.
Students: AR = 40 − 0.5Q, so MR = 40 − Q.
MR = MC: Q = 20, P = 30.
PED at those prices: business −1.4; students −3. Students pay less.
One price for all: the best single price is 70. Students (who pay at most 40) buy nothing.
Same two markets as the previous screen. Now the students' demand grows: at every price, students want to buy more.
Takeaway: each market has its own MR = MC price. The less elastic group pays more; when both groups have the same PED, they pay the same price.
Quick check
?Illustrative data. A firm sells in two separate markets with the same constant MC = 10. In market A, AR = 70 − 2Q, so MR = 70 − 4Q. In market B, AR = 30 − 0.5Q, so MR = 30 − Q. Which prices maximise its profit?
Mission 3
Perfect price discrimination
Step 1 of 2
Each unit sells at the buyer's maximum price, so the demand curve becomes the MR curve.
The firm produces where D = MC, the P = MC output: the same output as perfect competition.
All consumer surplus becomes producer surplus. Consumer surplus = 0.
No deadweight loss: allocatively efficient output.
Illustrative data (as): AR = 50 − Q, MC = 10.
Single price: Q = 20, profit 400, consumer surplus 200, deadweight loss 200.
Say: "efficient but not equitable" — not: "consumers gain because output rises".
Quick check
?A single-price monopolist becomes able to practise perfect (first-degree) price discrimination. Its costs do not change. Compared with before, which statement is correct?
Mission 3
Who gains and who loses?
Producers: more profit. It may fund investment, or keep a service running (e.g. a rail route).
Consumers in the high-price group: pay more; lose consumer surplus.
Consumers in the low-price group: may be served for the first time.
In an earlier screen, students were served only under price discrimination.
Total output: may rise. Then some deadweight loss is removed.
Real example: the 16–25 Railcard gives one third off most rail fares in Great Britain.
Mission 3Evaluate
Good or bad?
It depends on output: if total output rises, welfare can rise; if it does not, welfare usually falls.
It depends on who pays more: lower prices for students, children or pensioners can help equity; higher prices for those who must travel at peak times may not.
It depends on use of profit: research and investment, or higher payouts to owners?
It depends on costs of separating groups: checking ID, building booking systems.
It depends on fairness: buyers may see personalised prices as exploitation.
Mission check
?Illustrative case: a theme park charges local residents less than tourists for an identical day ticket. Its costs are the same for both groups. Which pair of conditions is needed for this to earn more profit than one price for all?
Different prices for the same thing need market power, groups with different elasticities, and no resale.
Mission 4
Mission 4: Can a market with only one firm still behave as if it were full of competitors?
Make a guess: Can a market with only one firm still behave as if it were full of competitors?
Mission 4
The threat of entry
A contestable market: one where new firms can enter and leave easily, so the threat of entry disciplines the firms already there.
What counts is how easy it is to get in and out, not how many firms there are now.
Perfectly contestable market:
free entry and free exit: no sunk costs
entrants can use the same technology and reach the same costs as incumbents
perfect information about prices and profits
In theory, even a market with one firm can be perfectly contestable.
William Baumol and colleagues set out the theory in 1982.
Mission 4
Sunk costs
Sunk cost: a cost that cannot be recovered when a firm leaves the market.
Examples: launch advertising, specialist research, a non-refundable licence, machinery with no other use.
Not sunk: a delivery van or an aircraft, which can be sold or leased to someone else.
Sunk costs are a barrier to exit, and so a barrier to entry: an entrant risks losing them if it has to leave.
Say: "a sunk cost cannot be recovered on exit" — not: "a sunk cost is any fixed cost". Rent on a short lease is fixed but can be ended.
Quick check
?A firm is thinking of starting a new bus service on a local route. Which of these costs is most likely to be a sunk cost?
Mission 4
Worked example: hit-and-run entry
Step 1 of 3
Illustrative data. One incumbent charges 15. Its AC = 10: supernormal profit of 5 a unit.
An entrant with the same AC of 10 undercuts at 14.
It sells 100 units before the incumbent can react.
Profit while there: (14 − 10) × 100 = 400.
The incumbent cuts its price. The entrant leaves. No sunk costs, so it loses nothing on exit.
This is hit-and-run competition: enter, take the profit, leave.
So the incumbent's best defence is to price at AC from the start: normal profit only.
Mission 4Graph lab
How high can the price go?
Illustrative data. Incumbent AC = MC = 10. Its profit-maximising price is 16. A hit-and-run entrant would sell 100 units before the incumbent reacts. It enters if its profit while there is greater than its sunk cost of entry.
Takeaway: the higher the sunk costs, the higher the price the incumbent can safely charge. The market is less contestable.
Quick check
?Illustrative data. An incumbent has an average cost of 8. A hit-and-run entrant with the same costs would sell 50 units before the incumbent could react, and would have sunk costs of 150. It enters only if its profit while there is greater than its sunk costs. What is the highest price the incumbent can charge without attracting entry?
Mission 4
Contestability and efficiency
In a perfectly contestable market, in the long run:
Normal profit only (P = AC). Any supernormal profit invites hit-and-run entry.
Productive efficiency: a firm that does not produce at the lowest possible cost is undercut.
X-inefficiency is squeezed out: slack is punished.
With two or more firms, P = MC: allocative efficiency.
A single firm with falling AC (a natural monopoly) prices at P = AC, not P = MC: P = MC would mean a loss.
So behaviour depends on how easy entry is, not just on how many firms there are now.
Economies of scale: an entrant starts small with higher AC.
Product differentiation and branding: loyal customers.
Intellectual property (patents, copyright) and R&D spending.
Legal barriers: licences, regulation.
Incumbents' strategy: limit pricing, predatory pricing (see Mission 1).
Barriers to exit: sunk costs written off, long contracts, redundancy payments.
Quick check
?A market is served by one firm whose average cost falls over the whole range of market demand. The market is perfectly contestable. In the long run, where will the firm set its price?
Mission 4
Real markets: how contestable?
Airline routes were the classic example: aircraft can move from route to route, so entry to one route looks cheap.
The EU opened its internal air market fully in 1997: any EU airline could fly any route inside the EU. Low-cost airlines entered many routes.
But later studies of US routes found fares were lower where more airlines actually flew. The threat of entry alone did not hold fares down fully.
Reasons: airport slots, branding, loyalty schemes and incumbents' fast price cuts.
Usefulness of the model:
It explains why some firms with large market shares still keep prices low.
It shows that market structure is not everything: conduct depends on entry conditions.
Few real markets are perfectly contestable.
Mission 4Evaluate
Does contestability protect consumers?
Advantages: lower prices, normal profit, productive efficiency, pressure to innovate, without the need for many firms.
Disadvantages: supernormal profit is low, so there may be less to spend on R&D; firms may focus on short-run survival.
It depends on the size of sunk costs: high sunk costs, little threat.
It depends on how fast incumbents react: a quick price cut makes hit-and-run unprofitable.
It depends on information: entrants must know profits are there.
It depends on policy: removing barriers (deregulation, opening markets) may do more than breaking up firms.
Mission check
?Illustrative case: one coach company runs the only service between two towns. It earns large supernormal profits. Which change is most likely to make it lower its fares, even though no rival has yet entered?
The threat of entry, not the number of firms, decides how far a lone firm can raise its price.
Mission 5
Mission 5: When you would gladly pay more than the price, where does that extra value go?
Make a guess: When you would gladly pay more than the price, where does that extra value go?
Mission 5
Consumer surplus
Step 1 of 3
Willingness to pay: the most a buyer would pay for a unit.
You would pay 15 for a concert ticket. It costs 10. You gain 5 that you never pay.
Consumer surplus = what buyers are willing to pay − what they actually pay.
The demand curve shows willingness to pay for each unit.
On a graph: the area below the demand curve and above the price, up to the quantity bought.
Mission 5
Producer surplus
Step 3 of 3
Each seller has a minimum price they would accept for a unit: its extra cost.
The supply curve shows that minimum price for each unit.
Producer surplus = price received − minimum price the seller would accept.
On a graph: the area above the supply curve and below the price, up to the quantity sold.
Say: "producer surplus" — not: "profit". It ignores fixed costs.
Quick check
?Illustrative data: four buyers would each pay at most 12, 10, 8 and 6 for one unit of a good. The market price is 8. What is the total consumer surplus in this market?
Mission 5
Worked example: measuring the areas
Illustrative data. Demand meets the price axis at 16. Supply meets it at 4.
Equilibrium: price 12, quantity 40 units a week.
Both areas are triangles: ½ × base × height.
Consumer surplus = ½ × 40 × (16 − 12) = 80.
Producer surplus = ½ × 40 × (12 − 4) = 160.
Total (community) surplus = 80 + 160 = 240.
Height is always measured from the price line.
Mission 5
Total surplus is largest at equilibrium
Step 1 of 2
Community surplus = consumer surplus + producer surplus.
Up to Qe, each unit is worth more to buyers than it costs to make: trading it adds surplus.
Beyond Qe, a unit costs more to make than buyers value it: trading it would reduce surplus.
So, with no market failure, a competitive market maximises total surplus at equilibrium.
This is allocative efficiency.
Lost total surplus from producing the wrong quantity is a deadweight loss.
Mission 5
Worked example: deadweight loss
Step 1 of 3
Same market (illustrative data). Output is held at 30, not 40.
At Q = 30, buyers value the 30th unit at 13 (demand); it costs 10 (supply).
The units from 30 to 40 are not traded. The lost triangle is the deadweight loss.
Deadweight loss = ½ × (40 − 30) × (13 − 10) = 15.
Total surplus falls from 240 to 225.
Quick check
?Illustrative data. On a diagram, demand meets the price axis at 60 and supply meets it at 15. The market clears at a price of 30 and a quantity of 150. What is total surplus at equilibrium?
Mission 5
When demand or supply shifts
Build the new equilibrium first, then redraw the areas.
Supply rises (costs fall): price falls, quantity rises.
Consumer surplus rises: existing buyers pay less, and new buyers join.
Producer surplus: the price is lower, but costs are lower and more units sell. With a parallel shift it rises too.
Demand rises: price and quantity rise.
Producer surplus rises: a higher price on more units.
Consumer surplus is measured under the new demand curve. With a parallel shift it rises too, even though price rose.
Demand or supply falls: the reverse.
Say: "an increase in supply" (a shift) — not: "an extension of supply" (a movement along the curve).
Mission 5Graph lab
Demand rises
Demand for the good rises (a parallel shift right). Supply does not change.
Takeaway: a parallel rise in demand raises both surpluses; the higher price is more than offset by more units and a higher demand curve.
Quick check
?A fall in costs shifts supply right. Price falls from P1 to P2 and quantity rises from Q1 to Q2. Which areas show the increase in consumer surplus?
Area
Where it is
a
Triangle below demand and above P1, from 0 to Q1
b
Rectangle between P1 and P2, from 0 to Q1
c
Triangle below demand, between P1 and P2, from Q1 to Q2
Mission 5
Monopoly: surplus moved and lost
Compare a competitive industry and a monopoly with the same costs (constant MC).
Competitive: output Qc where P = MC. Consumer surplus is the whole triangle above MC.
Monopoly: output Qm where MR = MC; price Pm read off AR = D.
Rectangle (Pm − MC) × Qm: consumer surplus transferred to the producer.
Triangle between Qm and Qc, below D and above MC: deadweight loss. No one gets it.
Say: "the rectangle is a transfer of surplus" — not: "the rectangle is a welfare loss".
Mission 5
Price discrimination and surplus
First-degree (perfect): each buyer pays their own willingness to pay.
All consumer surplus becomes producer surplus.
Output rises to Qc, where D = MC, so no deadweight loss: allocatively efficient output, but buyers gain nothing.
Third-degree: different prices to groups with different PED.
Higher price in the inelastic market: consumer surplus transferred to the producer.
Lower price in the elastic market: some buyers now buy who were priced out.
Welfare effect: depends on whether total output rises.
Mission 5Evaluate
Is the biggest total surplus always best?
It depends on third parties: the areas count only buyers and sellers. External costs and benefits are left out.
It depends on who gains: a gain of 1 to a rich person counts the same as 1 to a poor person. Equity is a separate question.
It depends on ability to pay: willingness to pay reflects income as well as need.
It depends on measurement: real demand and supply curves are estimated, not observed.
Mission check
?Illustrative case: a city caps the number of taxi licences. Fewer rides take place than at the free-market equilibrium, and fares rise. Compared with the free-market equilibrium, what happens to total surplus (consumer plus producer surplus)?
The extra value buyers keep is consumer surplus. Moving surplus from buyers to sellers is a transfer; trades that never happen are a deadweight loss.
Recap
The big ideas
Mission 1
Oligopolists are interdependent: a price cut is likely to be matched, so price wars squeeze everyone's profit.
Non-price competition (branding, quality, loyalty, service) aims to shift demand right and make it less price elastic.
Predatory pricing is below cost to remove a rival; limit pricing sets price just low enough to deter entry.
Mission 2
A monopolist faces the downward-sloping market demand, so MR < AR.
It produces where MR = MC and reads price off AR: higher price, lower output than perfect competition.
Result: a transfer of surplus to the firm and a deadweight (welfare) loss; possible X-inefficiency, but possible economies of scale and research.
Mission 3
Price discrimination: different prices for the same product, not explained by cost.
Conditions: market power; groups with different PED that can be told apart; no resale.
Third degree: MR = MC in each market; the less elastic market pays more.
Mission 4
A contestable market has low barriers to entry and exit; the threat of entry disciplines incumbents.
With no sunk costs, hit-and-run entry removes supernormal profit: price is pushed towards average cost.
Real markets are rarely perfectly contestable: sunk costs, branding and quick responses protect incumbents.