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AQA A-level Economics (7136) · 4.1.8 The market mechanism, market failure and government intervention in markets (part 2 of 3)
Mini-Lesson

The market mechanism, market failure and government intervention in markets (part 2)

5 missions. Guess, learn, then check. Your place is saved.

  1. Mission 1Should a government tax pollution, ban it, or let firms buy and sell the right to pollute?
  2. Mission 2Why can jobs sit empty in one place while people elsewhere cannot find work?
  3. Mission 3When should a government stop big firms from merging, fixing prices or growing too powerful?
  4. Mission 4Why might it make sense for only one company to lay the water pipes in a city?
  5. Mission 5Should a country's trains, water pipes and power lines be run by the state or by private companies?
Mission 1

Mission 1: Should a government tax pollution, ban it, or let firms buy and sell the right to pollute?

Make a guess: A factory's smoke harms people nearby. What should a government aim for?

Mission 1

The aim: make the polluter face the full cost

  • Governments intervene to correct market failure, and also to raise revenue, redistribute income and protect consumers.
  • A negative externality: the market produces Qm, more than the social optimum Q*.
  • The fix: make decision-makers face the external cost. This is internalising the externality.
  • The target is Q*, not zero. Some pollution is worth its cost.
  • Two families of tools:
    • market-based: taxes, subsidies, tradable permits, property rights. They change prices or incentives.
    • command and control: regulation, bans, limits. They set rules.
  • Others: information, government provision, agreements between countries.
Mission 1

A tax on each unit

Pigouvian taxCosts and benefits0P*PmP* − taxQ*QmQuantityMPB = MSB = DMPC = SMSCMPC + tax = MSCtaxwelfare loss (overproduction)tax revenue = tax × Q*
  • A Pigouvian tax: a tax per unit equal to the MEC at the social optimum.
  • Firms now pay MPC + tax. Supply shifts up, from MPC to MPC + tax.
  • If MEC is the same for every unit, MPC + tax = MSC.
  • Quantity falls from Qm to Q*. Price rises from Pm to P*.
  • Consumers and producers share the tax; the government gains tax revenue.
  • The welfare loss triangle disappears.
  • Say: "the tax internalises the external cost" — not: "the tax ends the pollution".
Mission 1

Worked example: setting the tax

  • Illustrative data: MPB = MSB = 100 − Q; MPC = 20 + Q; MEC = 20 per unit.
  • No tax: 100 − Q = 20 + Q, so Qm = 40, Pm = 60. Welfare loss = 100.
  • Tax = MEC = 20. New supply: 40 + Q.
  • 100 − Q = 40 + Q, so Q = 30 = Q*.
  • Buyers pay 70 (up 10). Firms keep 70 − 20 = 50 (down 10).
  • Here the burden splits 10: 10, because the curves have equal slopes.
  • Tax revenue = 20 × 30 = 600.
  • Welfare loss = 0: the market now reaches the social optimum.
Mission 1Graph lab

Set the tax

Illustrative data: MPB = MSB = 100 − Q; MPC = 20 + Q; MEC = 20, so MSC = 40 + Q.

Set the taxPrice, costs and benefitsQuantityQ*QmP*MPB = MSBMPCMSC
  • Takeaway: the tax must match the MEC. Too low leaves overproduction; too high causes underproduction.
Quick check
?Illustrative data: MPB = MSB = 120 − Q; MPC = 30 + Q. The MEC is 30 at every output. The government sets a per-unit tax equal to the MEC. How much tax revenue does it raise?
Mission 1

Carbon taxes

Carbon tax on a polluting industryCoal-fired electricityPrice of electricity0P2P1Q2Q1Quantity of electricityDS1S2 = S1 + carbon taxtaxLow-carbon supplierPrice of electricity0Quantity of electricityS (low-carbon)costs unchanged, so relatively cheaper than coal
  • A carbon tax: a tax per tonne of CO₂ emitted, charged on fuels by their carbon content.
  • On a polluting industry, e.g. coal-fired electricity: S1 → S2 (S + tax). Price rises, quantity falls.
  • Low-carbon producers become relatively cheaper. Firms and households switch.
  • Real world: British Columbia, Canada.
    • 2008: tax of C$10 per tonne CO₂e, with the revenue meant to be returned through other tax cuts.
    • 2024: C$80 per tonne.
    • A 2015 review of studies put emissions 5–15% lower than without the tax.
    • 1 April 2025: the tax on consumers was ended, as Canada dropped its national requirement for one.
  • Lesson: a carbon tax can cut emissions, but it lasts only while it keeps political support.
Mission 1

Subsidies for positive externalities

SubsidyCosts and benefits0QmQ*QuantityMPB = DMSBMPC = SMPC − subsidysubsidycost of subsidy = subsidy × Q*
  • Some goods give external benefits: MSB > MPB, so the market underproduces.
  • A subsidy per unit equal to the MEB at Q*: supply shifts down to MPC − subsidy.
  • Output rises to Q*; price to buyers falls.
  • Cost to the government = subsidy × Q*.
  • Examples: vaccinations, public transport fares, home insulation.
  • Subsidising a clean substitute (e.g. electric buses) also cuts demand for the polluting good.
Mission 1

Rules: regulation and legislation

Regulation(a) A limit on output at Q*Costs and benefits0limit = Q*QmQuantityMPB = MSB = DMPC = SMSC(b) A banCosts and benefits0QuantityMPB = MSB = DMPC = SMSCWhere is Q*?
  • Command and control: the law sets limits, enforced by inspection and fines.
    • emissions standards; limits on output or a cap at Q*
    • bans where the harm is severe: leaded petrol, CFCs
  • Real world: leaded petrol, still sold in 117 countries in 2002, was used for the last time in 2021 (UNEP).
  • Strengths: simple, certain, quick; best when the harm is dangerous at any level.
  • Limits: the same rule for every firm ignores their different costs of cutting; no reward for cutting more than the rule asks; inspection is costly.
Quick check
?A pesticide sold to farmers is found to poison rivers and wildlife even in very small amounts. What is the strongest economic case for banning it rather than taxing it?
Mission 1

Tradable permits

Permit marketPrice of a permit0P2P1Q2Q1Quantity of permits (tonnes)D for permitsS (cap)S1S2Illustrative onlytighter cap: supply shifts left, permit price rises
  • The government sets a cap: the total pollution allowed. It issues that many permits (1 permit = 1 tonne).
  • Permits are given out or auctioned. Firms may buy and sell them.
  • Firms that can cut cheaply cut more and sell spare permits. Firms that find cutting costly buy.
  • Illustrative data: firms A and B each emit 100 t. Cap = 150 permits, 75 each.
    • Cost of cutting 1 t: A 20, B 60.
    • No trade: each cuts 25 t. Cost = 25 × 20 + 25 × 60 = 2,000.
    • Trade at 40 a permit: A cuts 50 t (cost 1,000) and sells 25 permits to B (+1,000). B cuts nothing and pays 1,000.
    • Same total emissions (150 t). Total cost of cutting falls to 1,000.
  • The permit price rises as the cap tightens: a price on pollution, set by the market.
Mission 1

Real world: the EU Emissions Trading System

  • Started 2005: power stations and heavy industry in the EU.
  • The cap falls every year.
  • After the 2008 crisis, demand for permits fell. By 2013 there was a surplus of about 2 billion permits, and prices stayed low for years.
  • Fix: a Market Stability Reserve (from 2019) takes surplus permits off the market.
  • In February 2023 the price reached about €100 per tonne.
  • Lesson: permits fix the quantity; the price depends on how tight the cap is.
Quick check
?Illustrative data: firms X and Y each emit 60 t. Each is given 40 permits, so together they must cut 40 t. Cutting 1 t costs X 15 and Y 45. By how much does permit trading lower the total cost of cutting 40 t?
Mission 1

Property rights and bargaining

  • Externalities often arise because property rights are missing or unclear: no one owns the river or the air.
  • Assign the right, and the parties can bargain. This is the Coase idea.
  • Illustrative data: a factory gains 300 a year by dumping waste in a river. A fish farm downstream loses 500.
    • Fish farm owns the river: the factory would pay at most 300 to dump; the farm needs at least 500. No dumping.
    • Factory owns the river: the farm pays it between 300 and 500 to stop. No dumping.
  • Either way the efficient outcome is reached. The right decides who pays.
  • Limits: many victims (city air), high bargaining costs, harm hard to trace or measure.
Mission 1

Information, provision and agreements

EducationCosts and benefits0Q*QmQuantityMPB1MSBMSB = MPB2MPC = MSC = Seducationwelfare loss (overconsumption)
  • Information and education: campaigns, labels, warnings.
    • For a demerit good, people overvalue it. Education lowers MPB towards MSB.
  • Government provision: the state supplies a good with external benefits (vaccinations, public transport), to reach Q*.
Mission 1Evaluate

Which tool works best?

It depends on:

  • Measuring the externality. A tax needs the MEC; a cap needs the right total. Both are hard to value.
  • Elasticity of demand. If demand is price inelastic, a tax cuts output little but raises much revenue.
  • Enforcement and admin costs. Monitoring emissions, collecting taxes and policing bans all cost money.
  • Consequences for stakeholders. Carbon taxes take a bigger share of poorer households' income; returning the revenue can offset this. Firms may move production abroad.
  • Certainty. A permit cap fixes the quantity, not the price; a tax fixes the price, not the quantity.
Mission check

?Illustrative data: a city airport's night flights cause noise. Values per flight:
Flights per nightMPB = MSBMPCMEC
1080205
20703010
30604020
40505030
50406040

The government will charge a fixed tax per flight. Which tax brings the number of flights to the social optimum?

Mission 2

Mission 2: Why can jobs sit empty in one place while people elsewhere cannot find work?

Make a guess: Why can jobs sit empty in one place while people elsewhere cannot find work?

Mission 2

Two kinds of immobility

Two barriersOccupational immobilityqualificationskills and trainingGeographical immobilityno jobs herejobs herelow priceshigh prices
  • Labour mobility: how easily workers can move between jobs and places.
  • Occupational immobility: barriers to changing job or occupation.
    • lack of skills or qualifications for the new job
    • time and cost of training; licences (nursing, electricians)
    • age, confidence, discrimination
  • Geographical immobility: barriers to changing location.
    • big gaps in house prices and rents between regions
    • family ties, children's schooling
    • cost of moving; poor information about jobs elsewhere
  • Say: "immobility of labour causes structural unemployment" — not: "immobility is unemployment". Immobility is a cause; unemployment can be its effect.
Quick check
?A steelworker loses her job when the plant closes. There are vacancies for software testers in the same town, but she has none of the skills they ask for. Which barrier is she facing?
Mission 2

Why immobility is a market failure

  • Demand for labour keeps changing: some industries shrink, others grow.
  • Mobile workers move to the growing jobs, and wage differences signal where to go.
  • Immobile workers cannot respond to those signals.
  • Result: surpluses of labour in some markets, shortages in others, at the same time.
  • Labour is misallocated, so output is below what the economy could produce.
  • Factor immobility is a market imperfection: resources do not move to their most valued use.
Mission 2

Policies to improve mobility

  • Occupational mobility:
    • education, training and apprenticeships; retraining grants for adults
    • recognising qualifications from other regions and countries
    • better careers information
  • Geographical mobility:
    • more housing where the jobs are (planning reform, house building)
    • relocation grants; better transport links
    • online job information across regions
  • Move jobs to people: regional policy, e.g. grants or tax breaks for firms that invest in high-unemployment areas.
Mission 2

Migration and the labour market

Migration and the labour marketWage rate (W)0W1W2L1L2Quantity of labour (L)S1D1S2Supply shifts right: the wage falls
  • Immigration adds workers: the supply of labour shifts right (S1 → S2).
  • On its own: the wage falls and employment rises in that market.
  • But migrants also spend their wages. Labour is a derived demand, so the demand for labour shifts right too (D1 → D2).
  • Migrants may complement local workers (different skills), raising local workers' productivity, not competing with them.
  • They can fill skill shortages, e.g. in health and social care.
  • Most migrants are of working age, so they can add more in taxes than they use in services; the size of this effect depends on their jobs and pay.
  • Emigration has its own effects on the country people leave:
    • brain drain: it loses skilled workers it paid to train
    • but it gains money sent home by emigrants (remittances), and unemployment can fall
Mission 2Graph lab

Do new workers push wages down?

Illustrative data. One local labour market: wage 14 per hour, 100 thousand workers.

Do new workers push wages down?Wage per hourWorkers (thousands)0501502000102010014DS
  • Takeaway: if demand for labour rises as much as supply, the wage need not fall; who gains and who loses depends on the size of each shift.
Migration and the labour marketWage rate (W)0W1W1 = W3W2L1L2L3Quantity of labour (L)S1D1S2D2Supply shifts right: the wage fallsMigrants spend: demand shifts right too
Mission 2

Real world: what the evidence says

  • UK free movement for EU citizens ended on 31 December 2020. From 1 January 2021, a points-based immigration system applied to EU and non-EU workers alike.
  • A UK government advisory body (the Migration Advisory Committee, 2018) found migrants had "no or little impact" on the overall employment and unemployment of UK-born workers.
  • It added that effects may be more negative for lower-skilled and more positive for higher-skilled UK-born workers.
  • Geographical immobility: in England in 2023, a typical home cost 8.3 times the annual earnings of a full-time employee working in the same area. In 82% of London local authorities the ratio was above 12 (ONS).
  • So high-wage areas with high housing costs can find it hard to attract workers from cheaper regions.
Mission 2Evaluate

Will the policy work?

It depends on:

  • Substitutes or complements. Migrants with the same skills as local workers compete for jobs; those with different skills can raise local workers' pay.
  • Time. In the short run supply shifts first; over time demand rises as migrants spend and firms invest.
  • The cause of the problem. Retraining fixes occupational immobility but not a housing shortage; relocation grants fail if there are no affordable homes.
  • Government failure. Training schemes may teach skills employers do not want; policies are costly and take years.
Mission check

?A car factory closes. Hundreds of former car workers in the town are unemployed, while the town's hospital cannot fill vacancies for health care assistants. Which policy targets the main cause best?
Mission 3

Mission 3: When should a government stop big firms from merging, fixing prices or growing too powerful?

Make a guess: When should a government stop big firms from merging, fixing prices or growing too powerful?

Mission 3

Why have competition policy?

  • Market power can mean higher prices, lower output, less choice and a deadweight loss.
  • Firms with little competition may also let costs drift up (X-inefficiency) and innovate less.
  • Competition policy: laws and authorities that promote competition and stop firms abusing market power.
Mission 3

Three targets

Three targets1Anti-competitive agreementscartels, price fixing, sharing out markets2Abuse of a dominant positione.g. predatory pricing, refusing to supplyrivals3Mergersthat would substantially lessencompetition

1. Anti-competitive agreements (restrictive practices): cartels, price fixing, sharing out markets, bid rigging.

2. Abuse of a dominant position: e.g. predatory pricing (pricing below cost to drive out a rival), refusing to supply rivals, forcing buyers to take one product to get another.

3. Mergers that would substantially lessen competition.

  • Being large is not illegal. Abusing that position is.
  • The key question: would buyers face higher prices, lower quality or less choice?
  • A firm facing cheap imports or easy entry by rivals has little power to raise prices, even with a large share.
Mission 3

UK and EU rules

  • Competition and Markets Authority (CMA), since 2014: investigates cartels, abuse of dominance and mergers.
  • Competition Act 1998: bans anti-competitive agreements and abuse of a dominant position. Fines up to 10% of worldwide turnover.
  • Enterprise Act 2002: merger control; taking part in a cartel can be a criminal offence.
  • Leniency: the first cartel member to report can avoid a fine. This makes cartels unstable.
  • Regulators (e.g. Ofgem, Ofwat, Ofcom) also have competition powers in their industries.
  • Real case: in 2019 the CMA blocked the merger of Sainsbury's and Asda, two of the largest UK supermarket chains.
  • EU (awareness only): the European Commission enforces bans on cartels and abuse of dominance. In 2016 it fined truck makers €2.93 billion for a price-fixing cartel, and in 2017 Google €2.42 billion for abusing its dominance in online search.
  • Since the end of 2020 the Commission no longer rules on UK markets. The CMA does.
Quick check
?Which of these is most likely to break competition law?
Mission 3

Worked example: a merger

  • Illustrative data. Market shares (%): A 30, B 20, C 15, D 10, others 25 (each under 5).
  • Three-firm concentration ratio (CR3) before: 30 + 20 + 15 = 65%.
  • B and C propose to merge: share 35%.
  • CR3 after: 35 + 30 + 10 = 75%.
  • Merger types: horizontal (same stage, rivals: B + C), vertical (supplier and buyer), conglomerate (unrelated markets).
  • Horizontal mergers get the closest scrutiny: they remove a rival directly.
  • The authority can clear the merger, clear it with conditions (e.g. sell some stores), or block it.
  • Against the loss of a rival, it weighs any cost savings passed on to buyers.
Mission 3Graph lab

What does a cartel cost buyers?

Illustrative data. Market demand: P = 50 − Q. MC = AC = 10. A cartel acts like a monopoly: P = 30, Q = 20. Competition would give P = 10, Q = 40.

What does a cartel cost buyers?PriceQuantity0400102040502030CSDMC = AC
  • Takeaway: ending a cartel returns its profit to buyers and removes the deadweight loss.
Cartel vs competitionPrice0PcartelPcomp2040QuantityCSprofitDWLD = ARMC = ACconsumer surplus (CS) under the cartelcartel profit: (30 - 10) × 20deadweight loss (DWL)Illustrative data. Cartel: P = 30, Q = 20.Competition: P = 10, Q = 40.
Quick check
?Illustrative data. Market demand is P = 80 − 2Q and MC = AC = 20. A cartel sets Q = 15 and P = 50, earning a profit of 450. Under competition, P = 20 and Q = 30. If the cartel is broken up, by how much does consumer surplus rise?
Mission 3

Other tools to promote competition

  • Break up a monopoly into competing firms.
  • Price controls and regulation: price caps (RPI − X), quality targets.
  • Ban unfair trading practices: e.g. misleading pricing, forcing suppliers into unfair terms.
  • Deregulation: remove legal barriers to entry (see Mission 5).
  • Competitive tendering: firms bid for the right to supply a public service.
  • Privatisation: sell state-owned firms, often opening the market to rivals (see Mission 5).
  • Help for small businesses: grants, simpler rules, access to finance.
  • Make markets more contestable: lower barriers to entry so the threat of entry disciplines incumbents.
Mission 3

Impact on the economy

  • Prices: fall as cartels end and rivals enter.
  • Output and employment: output rises towards the competitive level. Jobs may rise across the market, though a merger blocked or a firm broken up can also cost jobs at the firm itself.
  • Profit: supernormal profit is squeezed.
  • Efficiency: allocative (P nearer MC), productive and X-efficiency improve. Dynamic efficiency may rise or fall.
  • Quality and choice: rivals compete to attract buyers.
  • Economic welfare: deadweight loss falls.
Mission 3Evaluate

How well does competition policy work?

  • It depends on information: proving a cartel, or telling predation from fierce competition, is hard and slow.
  • It depends on the size of the market: blocking a merger may stop a firm reaching the scale it needs to compete with global rivals.
  • It depends on dynamic efficiency: large firms' supernormal profit may fund R&D.
  • It depends on fines: too small to deter, or passed on to buyers?
  • It depends on the authority: regulatory capture (it comes to side with the firms it oversees) and the cost of investigations.
  • It depends on contestability: where entry is easy, the threat of entry may protect buyers without intervention.
Mission check

?Illustrative case: four firms supply cement in a country, with market shares of 35%, 25%, 20% and 20%. The two smallest firms propose to merge, saying it will cut their costs. Which finding gives the strongest economic case for the competition authority to allow the merger?
Mission 4

Mission 4: Why might it make sense for only one company to lay the water pipes in a city?

Make a guess: Why might it make sense for only one company to lay the water pipes in a city?

Mission 4

What makes a monopoly natural

Average cost keeps fallingPrice / cost0economies of scaleQuantityLRACDAverage cost falls across the whole market.
  • Some industries have huge fixed costs and low marginal costs: water pipes, rail track, power grids.
  • So average cost keeps falling as output rises, across the whole market.
  • Natural monopoly: one firm can supply the whole market at a lower average cost than two or more firms could.
  • A second network would duplicate the fixed cost: wasteful.
  • Say: "natural monopoly" for a cost reason — not: "a monopoly protected by law or a patent".
Mission 4

Worked example: one network or two?

  • Illustrative data. A town needs 300 connections. The network costs 1,200 (fixed). Each connection adds 2 (marginal cost).
  • One firm: AC = 1,200 ÷ 300 + 2 = 4 + 2 = 6.
  • Two firms, 150 connections each: AC = 1,200 ÷ 150 + 2 = 8 + 2 = 10.
  • Splitting the market raises average cost from 6 to 10.
  • Same marginal cost; the difference is the fixed cost spread over fewer users.
Quick check
?Illustrative data. A rail line has a fixed cost of 900 and a marginal cost of 3 per journey. The market is 150 journeys. If two firms each build their own line and each carries 75 journeys, what is each firm's average cost?
Mission 4

The natural monopoly diagram

The natural monopoly diagramPrice / cost0P1P2P3Q1Q2Q3QuantityP = ACP = MCAR = DMRLRACMCMR = MCloss at P = MCMC lies below AC while AC is falling.Three possible prices: MR = MC (unregulated), P= AC and P = MC.At P = MC, price is below AC: a loss.
  • AC (LRAC) falls across the whole demand curve. MC lies below AC.
  • Three possible prices:
    • Unregulated: MR = MC. High price, low output, profit above normal.
    • P = AC: normal profit. Output higher, price lower.
    • P = MC: the allocatively efficient output. But P < AC: a loss.
  • So a natural monopoly cannot be allocatively efficient and cover its costs without help.
  • Say: "MC is below AC whenever AC is falling" — not: "MC is above AC".
Mission 4

Worked example: three prices

Worked example: three pricesPrice / cost022104180300360QuantityAR = DMRACMCAC 14AC 9Illustrative data: AR = 40 − 0.1Q, MC = 4, AC =1,800/Q + 4.
  • Illustrative data. AR = 40 − 0.1Q. MC = 4. Fixed cost = 1,800.
  • Unregulated (MR = MC): 40 − 0.2Q = 4 → Q = 180, P = 22. AC = 1,800 ÷ 180 + 4 = 14.
    • Profit = (22 − 14) × 180 = 1,440.
  • P = AC: Q = 300, P = 10. AC = 1,800 ÷ 300 + 4 = 10. Normal profit.
  • P = MC: Q = 360, P = 4. AC = 1,800 ÷ 360 + 4 = 9.
    • Loss = (9 − 4) × 360 = 1,800: the whole fixed cost.
Mission 4Graph lab

Set the price cap

Same natural monopoly. A regulator sets a maximum price (price cap).

Set the price capPrice, costsQuantity18022AR = DMRMCAC
  • Takeaway: lowering the cap raises output; profit is normal at P = AC (10); below that the firm makes a loss.
Mission 4

Price caps: RPI − X

  • UK regulators of privatised utilities (e.g. Ofwat for water, Ofgem for energy) cap prices.
  • The classic formula, first used in 1984, is RPI − X: prices may rise each year by inflation (RPI) minus X%.
  • Worked example: RPI = 4%, X = 2. Maximum price rise = 4 − 2 = 2%. A price of 50 can rise to 51.
  • If the firm cuts costs by more than X, it keeps the extra profit: an incentive to be efficient.
  • Water added K for investment: RPI − X + K. Newer UK caps use other inflation measures (CPI or CPIH); the idea is the same.
Quick check
?Illustrative data. A regulated firm's price cap is RPI − X. RPI inflation is 3% and X is set at 5. What can the firm do to its price this year?
Mission 4

Other ways to regulate

  • Profit (rate-of-return) regulation: profit capped at a % of capital.
    • Risk: little reason to cut costs; firms may over-invest to raise the allowed profit.
  • Quality standards: a price cap can tempt a firm to cut quality. Regulators set standards (e.g. leaks, delays).
  • Performance targets: fines or rewards linked to service, e.g. punctuality or customer complaints.
  • Impact: lower prices and higher output, but possibly less profit for investment.
Mission 4

Who should own it?

  • Nationalisation (public ownership): the state owns the firm.
    • For: can price nearer MC; long-term investment; no supernormal profit to shareholders.
    • Against: weak profit incentive, so costs may drift up (X-inefficiency); political interference; funding competes with other public spending.
  • Privatisation: sale of state firms to private owners.
    • For: profit motive cuts costs; access to private capital.
    • Against: a private natural monopoly still needs regulation; profit may come before investment.
  • Example: water in England and Wales was privatised in 1989. Scottish Water is publicly owned.
  • Either way, each area is still served by a single network of water pipes.
  • The evidence on which model performs better is mixed; it depends on regulation and management.
Mission 4Evaluate

Does regulation work?

  • It depends on information: the firm knows its costs better than the regulator. X may be set too low or too high.
  • It depends on regulatory capture: a regulator may come to serve the industry it regulates.
  • It depends on quality: price caps can lead to cost cuts that harm service, unless standards are enforced.
  • It depends on investment: tight caps may squeeze money for new pipes, track and cables.
Mission check

?Illustrative case: a small town is served by one broadband network that costs a lot to build but very little to connect each extra home. A second firm plans to build its own full network and win half the town's homes. Assuming total demand does not change, what happens to the average cost of supplying a home?
Mission 5

Mission 5: Should a country's trains, water pipes and power lines be run by the state or by private companies?

Make a guess: Should a country's trains, water pipes and power lines be run by the state or by private companies?

Mission 5

Four tools, four meanings

  • Nationalisation: the state takes a firm or industry into public ownership.
  • Privatisation: transfer of a firm or activity from the public sector to the private sector.
  • Regulation: rules set by government or an appointed regulator, e.g. on prices, quality, safety or entry.
  • Deregulation: removing rules that restrict entry, prices or how firms operate.
  • Ownership (who owns it) and market structure (how many rivals) are separate questions.
  • Say: "privatisation changes the owner" — not: "privatisation creates competition".
Mission 5

Forms of privatisation

Ownership and control mapWho owns?publicsectorprivatesectorprivatisationnationalisationWho provides?state staffprivatecontractorcontractingoutstate still paysWho may enter?private rivallicence gatestatemonopolyderegulation / liberalisation
  • Sale of a state-owned firm: shares sold to the public or a buyer (denationalisation). E.g. British Telecom (1984).
  • Contracting out (competitive tendering): the state still pays for a service but invites private firms to bid to provide it, e.g. bin collection.
  • Liberalisation: opening a state monopoly to private rivals (a form of deregulation).
  • Public–private partnership (PPP): a private firm finances, builds and often runs a public project (e.g. a hospital); the state pays over many years.
  • Sale of state assets, e.g. land or council houses.
Mission 5

The case for privatisation

  • Profit motive: private owners gain from cutting costs, so less X-inefficiency (waste when a firm faces little pressure to keep costs down).
  • Shareholder pressure: a poorly run firm's share price falls, and it risks a takeover.
  • Competition, where the industry allows rivals: lower prices, more choice.
  • Access to private capital for investment, without adding to government borrowing.
  • One-off revenue for the government from the sale.
  • Less political interference in pricing and investment decisions.
  • Example: the UK sold telecoms (1984), gas (1986), water in England and Wales (1989), electricity (1990–91) and rail (1994–97).
Mission 5

The case against, and renationalisation

  • A natural monopoly (one network serves the whole market most cheaply, e.g. a power grid) sold whole stays a monopoly: a private monopoly still needs regulation.
  • Short-termism: dividends may come before long-term investment.
  • Social objectives may be dropped, e.g. loss-making rural routes.
  • Sale price: if shares are sold too cheaply, taxpayers lose; the one-off revenue replaces a flow of future profits.
  • Fragmentation: splitting a network among many firms can raise coordination costs.
  • Renationalisation arguments: run for the public interest, cheaper public borrowing, no dividends to pay out, one integrated network.
  • Example: Railtrack (privatised rail infrastructure) was replaced in 2002 by Network Rail, now a public body. A 2024 law lets passenger train services in Great Britain return to public ownership as contracts end.
Quick check
?A city council stops using its own staff to clean public parks. It invites private firms to bid, and pays the winning firm to do the work for five years. The parks stay free to use. Which policy is this?
Mission 5

Nationalisation: evaluate

  • For:
    • Can price nearer MC and serve social aims (e.g. universal service), not just profit.
    • Long-term investment in networks; account for externalities.
    • Rescue of a failing firm that the economy relies on, e.g. the bank Northern Rock (UK, 2008).
  • Against:
    • Weak profit incentive: X-inefficiency; losses may be covered by taxpayers (a "soft budget").
    • Political interference, e.g. prices held down before elections.
    • Investment competes with schools and hospitals for public money.
    • Cost of compensating the previous owners.
Mission 5

Deregulation, licences and prohibitions

Licence capFare (Price)0PeQeRides per day (Quantity)DS = MCFree market: D meets S = MC at Pe, Qe.
  • A licence limits who may operate (e.g. taxis, mobile spectrum). A prohibition bans an activity outright.
  • Deregulation removes barriers, so new firms can enter: supply rises, prices fall, choice widens.
  • Example: the US Airline Deregulation Act (1978) ended government control of fares and routes.
  • Example: UK local buses outside London were deregulated in 1986: any licensed operator could run a route.
  • Risks: firms "cherry-pick" profitable routes; safety and quality may suffer; financial deregulation can raise risk-taking.
  • Say: "deregulation lowers barriers to entry" — not: "deregulation means no rules at all".
Mission 5Graph lab

Lift the licence cap

Illustrative data. A city caps taxi licences, limiting rides to 5,000 a day. Fare: 20. Cost of the last ride (MC): 11.

Lift the licence capFare, costRides per day5,0002011DS = MClicence capgap 9
  • Takeaway: removing an entry limit shifts the market to where price = MC. The gap was a reward for holding a licence.
Licence capFare (Price)020PePe = 14115,000QeQe = 8,000Rides per day (Quantity)DS = MCLicence capcap removedlicence reward: the gap between fare andcostFree market: D meets S = MC at Pe, Qe.Entry allowed: rides rise and the fare falls to thecost of the last ride.
Mission 5

Worked example: competitive tendering

  • Illustrative data. A council's in-house refuse service costs 1.20 million a year.
  • Bids: Firm X 0.96 million; Firm Y 1.02 million.
  • Saving with X = 1.20 − 0.96 = 0.24 million. As a %: 0.24 ÷ 1.20 × 100 = 20%.
  • Saving with Y = 0.18 million = 15%.
  • But the cheapest bid is not always best value: check quality standards, penalties for missed collections, and staff terms.
  • Example: UK councils had to tender services such as refuse collection after the Local Government Act 1988.
  • PPP example: the UK's Private Finance Initiative (from 1992) built hospitals and schools. In 2018 the UK government stopped signing new PFI deals, after the National Audit Office questioned their value for money. Supporters point to projects delivered on time and risk passed to private firms.
Quick check
?Illustrative data. A hospital spends 2.50 million a year on its own cleaning staff. After tendering, it accepts a bid of 2.00 million a year. What is the percentage saving?
Mission 5

What regulators do

  • Where competition is weak, a regulator acts for consumers in its place.
  • Role: set price caps, quality and service standards; grant licences; give rivals fair access to networks; fine firms that break the rules.
  • UK examples: Ofwat (water), Ofgem (energy), Ofcom (communications), the Office of Rail and Road.
Mission 5

When regulators fail

  • Asymmetric information: the firm knows its costs better than the regulator. It may overstate costs to win a looser price cap.
  • Regulatory capture: a regulator comes to act in the interests of the firms it regulates, not consumers.
  • Why capture happens:
    • The regulator relies on the industry for information and expert staff.
    • A revolving door: staff move between regulator and industry.
    • A few firms gain a lot and lobby hard; millions of consumers each lose a little.
  • Example: after the 2010 Deepwater Horizon oil spill, the US Minerals Management Service, criticised as too close to the industry it oversaw, was broken up (2010–11).
  • Say: "regulatory capture" — not: "the regulator was bribed". Capture can happen without any law being broken.
Quick check
?Illustrative case: a country's rail regulator hires most of its senior staff from the train companies. Over ten years it approves every fare rise the companies ask for, using cost figures that only the companies collect. Which problem does this best show?
Mission 5Evaluate

Does it work?

  • It depends on competition: privatising a firm that faces rivals differs from selling a natural monopoly.
  • It depends on regulation: information, capture and the regulator's powers.
  • It depends on time: cost savings may come fast; under-investment may show only years later.
  • It depends on objectives: efficiency and low prices, or universal service and equity?
  • Evidence on ownership is mixed: many studies find that competition and regulation matter at least as much as who owns the firm.
Mission check

?Illustrative case: a government sells its state-owned national electricity grid as a single company. There is still only one grid, and the government sets up no regulator. What is the most likely result for the price of using the grid?
Recap

The big ideas

Mission 1

  • Correcting an externality means making decision-makers face the external cost or benefit, to reach Q*, not zero.
  • Taxes and subsidies change the price; regulation and bans set rules.
  • Permits cap the total and let trading find the cheapest cuts.
  • With clear property rights and low bargaining costs, the parties can bargain to the efficient outcome.

Mission 2

  • Occupational immobility (skills) and geographical immobility (place) leave surpluses and shortages side by side: a market failure and a cause of structural unemployment.
  • Immigration shifts labour supply right, and demand right as migrants spend: the wage effect depends on both shifts.

Mission 3

  • Competition policy targets anti-competitive agreements, abuse of dominance and mergers that would substantially lessen competition.
  • UK: the CMA enforces the Competition Act 1998 and the Enterprise Act 2002; fines up to 10% of worldwide turnover. The EU has parallel rules.

Mission 4

  • A natural monopoly has falling average cost across the whole market, so one firm supplies most cheaply.
  • Unregulated, it sets MR = MC; P = AC gives normal profit; P = MC is efficient but loss-making.
  • Regulators use price caps (RPI − X), profit limits, quality and performance targets; owners may be public or private.

Mission 5

  • Nationalisation, privatisation, regulation and deregulation answer two different questions: who owns the firm, and what rules it faces.
  • Privatisation and deregulation can cut costs and prices where rivals can enter; natural monopolies still need regulation.
  • Regulators face asymmetric information and the risk of regulatory capture.
🏆

Mini-lesson complete!

⭐⭐⭐

You've worked through Market failure and intervention (part 2) for AQA A-level Economics. 🎉

  1. Mission 1Should a government tax pollution, ban it, or let firms buy and sell the right to pollute?
  2. Mission 2Why can jobs sit empty in one place while people elsewhere cannot find work?
  3. Mission 3When should a government stop big firms from merging, fixing prices or growing too powerful?
  4. Mission 4Why might it make sense for only one company to lay the water pipes in a city?
  5. Mission 5Should a country's trains, water pipes and power lines be run by the state or by private companies?

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